People of the Philippines vs. Crispulo de los Reyes, et al.

A discharge order under Rule 119 amounts to acquittal and bars future prosecution for the same offense unless the discharged accused fails or refuses to testify as committed; where he in fact testifies as a state witness, his reinclusion in the Information and subsequent conviction are illegal and void. The decision also affirms that irresistible force is not established where the accused had opportunities to escape or avoid participation, and that robbery with homicide absorbs physical injuries, regardless of their number or severity.

Kapi Baotao was a coconut plantation owner in Timbuligue, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur; among the accused, Perfecto Gulo was his nephew and Crispulo de los Reyes was the younger brother of Faustino de los Reyes. The case implicated the rule on discharge of an accused as a state witness under Rule 119, the youthful offender provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603, and the penalties for robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, with the 1987 Constitution having abolished the death penalty. The prosecution initially moved for the discharge of Cresencio Singue as a state witness, and the trial court granted the motion before later recalling it upon motion of his co-accused.

On 16 July 1969, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Faustino de los Reyes, Cresencio Singue, Crispulo de los Reyes, and Perfecto Gulo, armed with revolvers and a hunting knife, arrived at the house of Kapi Baotao in Timbuligue, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur. Six occupants were in the house: Kapi, his wife Sandiali, his daughter Rosa, his sons Tibulao and Sumpian, and his granddaughter. Crispulo and Perfecto positioned themselves behind the bushes, while Faustino and Cresencio walked toward the stairs. One of them shouted, “Nay, Nay.” Kapi, thinking it was a son-in-law shouting, told Tibulao to open the door.

As the door was opened, Faustino and Cresencio barged in. Cresencio immediately grabbed Tibulao and struck him on the head with a revolver, causing Tibulao to slump on the floor. Alarmed by the commotion, Sumpian rushed at Cresencio and tried to push him, but Sumpian was hacked instead. Kapi and Rosa tried to help, but Faustino shot Kapi several times and pistol-whipped Rosa in the mouth, rendering her unconscious. Sandiali grabbed her granddaughter and jumped through the window for safety. The wounded Sumpian managed to escape and sought cover downstairs, and Rosa, now conscious, followed suit. While hiding, Sumpian saw another person stationed below the window reaching for the loot being lowered from their house. Inside the house, Tibulao got hold of a bolo and hacked Cresencio; wounded, Cresencio scurried out of the house and ran away.

As the robbers fled, Sumpian entered the house and saw the prostrate figure of his father. He called for the other members of the household, and they discovered that P10,000.00 in paper bills kept by their father inside a suitcase was missing. The money, which the victim had saved from the harvest of his 24-hectare coconut plantation, was intended for the construction of a new house. That same night, the incident was reported to the authorities. In the early morning of 17 July 1969, a combined PC-police team went to the crime scene to investigate. They found the lifeless body of Kapi. While combing the area for evidence, some members of the team noticed a trail of blood leading to the fields and tracked it. There, they found Cresencio sitting in the bushes, wounded. During interrogation, he claimed that Faustino shot him four times after he blamed the latter for their misadventure. He then named his other companions, Faustino, Crispulo, and a third party who turned out to be Perfecto.

Thereafter, Crispulo was arrested in his house, where the police found one of the revolvers used in the crime as well as P40.15 in coins. In their sworn statements, Cresencio and Crispulo admitted being with the group that robbed and killed Kapi. Crispulo also implicated Perfecto as the fourth member. Upon his arrest, Perfecto gave a sworn statement corroborating the information given earlier by Cresencio and Crispulo.

At trial, Crispulo and Perfecto testified that Faustino was the mastermind of the robbery and that he threatened to kill them if they refused to join him in the perpetration of the crime. The trial court found incredible their effort to exculpate themselves. Accused-appellants, including Cresencio, differed in their testimonies as to who followed whom during the trek toward the house of their intended victim; each claimed that Faustino was directly behind him to support the claim of force and intimidation. The trial court found these allegations contrary to common sense and not in accord with human behavior and the natural course of things. Perfecto was a nephew of the victim Kapi Baotao, while Crispulo was a younger brother of Faustino. Before and during the robbery, Crispulo and Perfecto had opportunities to escape or avoid involvement; they did not. Perfecto helped in carting away the stolen goods lowered from the house, while Crispulo took hold of part of the loot before finally going home. Crispulo also failed to alert the combined PC-police team that Faustino had just left his house when the arresting team arrived, enabling Faustino to elude capture. Perfecto never left the scene of the crime during the robbery; he admitted having received the goods from one of his companions upstairs, helped carry the wounded Cresencio to safer grounds, and brought some of the spoils to the house of Crispulo where they were later found by the police. Perfecto was 19 years old when the crime was committed and 26 years old when convicted; Crispulo reached first year high school, while Perfecto finished sixth grade.

• Irresistible Force: Accused-appellants Crispulo de los Reyes and Perfecto Gulo contended that the trial court erred in disregarding their defense that accused Faustino de los Reyes forced and intimidated them into joining him in the commission of the crime.
• Minority/Youthful Offender: Perfecto Gulo argued that under Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, he was still a youthful offender when the crime was committed, being then only 19 years old, so that the implementation of his sentence should have been suspended.
• Non-Christian Status: Accused-appellants argued that the mitigating circumstance of being non-Christians should be appreciated in their favor.
• Refusal to Join Conspiracy: Crispulo de los Reyes contended that he refused to join the conspiracy, although the only evidence he adduced to support this were his own self-serving statements.
• Double Jeopardy for Cresencio: Counsel for accused-appellants, who had previously moved for the reinclusion of accused Cresencio Singue in the Information, invoked double jeopardy in Cresencio’s behalf.

• Irresistible Force Not Established: The Solicitor General argued that it was highly improbable, if not ridiculous, for Faustino de los Reyes to have been able to force and intimidate Perfecto Gulo and Crispulo de los Reyes into joining him to commit the crime charged, because Faustino was alone against three, including Cresencio Singue, and could not rely on their loyalty and cooperation.
• Relationship with Victim and Accused: The Solicitor General pointed out that Perfecto Gulo was a nephew of the victim Kapi Baotao, and unless he was a party to the plan to rob, Faustino would not have informed him about it, much less forced him to join the group; Crispulo, in turn, was a younger brother of Faustino.
• Discharge of Cresencio: The prosecution advanced as reasons for the discharge of Cresencio Singue that it did not have direct evidence with which to convict all the accused, that there was an absolute necessity for his testimony which could be corroborated in its material points, and that he did not appear to be the most guilty.

• Irresistible Force: Whether accused-appellants Crispulo de los Reyes and Perfecto Gulo are exempt from criminal liability on the ground of irresistible force or uncontrollable fear exerted by Faustino de los Reyes.
• Conspiracy and Participation: Whether conspiracy and the accused-appellants’ participation in robbery with homicide were established despite their claims of involuntary participation, least guilt, and abandonment.
• Minority/Youthful Offender: Whether Perfecto Gulo’s minority at the time of the crime entitles him to suspension of sentence under Presidential Decree No. 603 or to minority as a mitigating circumstance.
• Non-Christian Status: Whether being non-Christians is a mitigating circumstance in favor of Crispulo de los Reyes and Perfecto Gulo.
• Dwelling, Penalty, and Civil Indemnity: Whether dwelling should be taken into account in imposing the proper penalty, and whether the penalty and civil indemnity imposed were correct.
• Discharge of State Witness/Double Jeopardy: Whether the reinclusion of Cresencio Singue after his discharge as a state witness and after he testified violated his right against double jeopardy and was valid.
• Designation of Offense: Whether the offense should be denominated robbery with homicide and physical injuries or simply robbery with homicide.
• Counsel de oficio Negligence: Whether the gross negligence of Cresencio’s counsel de oficio warranted the Court’s review of his case and disciplinary action.

• Irresistible Force: No. The claim of irresistible force failed because accused-appellants had opportunities to escape or avoid participation and did not take them, and the alleged compulsion did not reduce them to mere instruments acting without will and against their will.
• Conspiracy and Participation: Yes. Conspiracy and active participation were established; once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all, and abandonment must be by an overt act before the felony materializes.
• Minority/Youthful Offender: No. Perfecto was 19 at the commission of the crime but 26 at conviction; under Presidential Decree No. 603, suspension of sentence requires a youthful offender at both the time of the crime and the time of trial, and minority as a mitigating circumstance requires the offender to be under 18 at the time of the crime.
• Non-Christian Status: No. The appreciation of non-Christian status as a mitigating circumstance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and cannot reduce the accused’s awareness of the gravity of robbery and killing.
• Dwelling, Penalty, and Civil Indemnity: Dwelling should have been taken into account in imposing the proper penalty, but the death penalty having been abolished by the 1987 Constitution, the penalty remained reclusion perpetua; the civil indemnity was increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
• Discharge of State Witness/Double Jeopardy: Yes. The discharge order amounted to acquittal and barred future prosecution unless the discharged accused failed or refused to testify; because Cresencio actually testified as a state witness, his reinclusion was illegal and the subsequent conviction void.
• Designation of Offense: No. The offense should be denominated plainly as robbery with homicide; physical injuries are absorbed and merged in robbery with homicide.
• Counsel de oficio Negligence: Yes. The gross negligence of Cresencio’s counsel de oficio warranted including Cresencio in the resolution of the appeal and imposing disciplinary sanction on counsel.

• Irresistible Force: To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will; the compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal combat or for escape. Accused-appellants failed to convince the Court that they were left no choice but to follow Faustino’s order. Before and during the robbery, they did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to escape or avoid involvement. They did not attempt to escape while walking toward the scene of the crime, despite the footpath being surrounded by tall grasses. As Faustino and Cresencio entered the house, Crispulo and Perfecto stayed behind and could have simply run away but did not. Perfecto helped in carting away the stolen goods lowered from the house, while Crispulo took hold of part of the loot before going home. Their failure to deter the commission of the crime, or to report it at least, militated against their pretensions. Their testimonies on who followed whom were diametrically opposed and contrary to common sense and human behavior, as it would have been physically impossible for Faustino to commit the robbery and at the same time ensure that the others performed their specific assignments. The Solicitor General’s observation that Faustino was alone against three and could not rely on their loyalty further weakened the defense.

• Conspiracy and Participation: Once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each becomes secondary. To extricate himself from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony. While Crispulo may have been the least guilty among the malefactors, his failure to alert the combined PC-police team that Faustino had just left his house enabled Faustino to elude capture. When the conspiracy was first broached to Crispulo, he himself admitted in his sworn statement that it was he who suggested that Perfecto be included in the group. His only evidence that he refused to join the conspiracy were his own self-serving statements. Assuming arguendo that Crispulo was the least guilty, it was of no consequence because conspiracy had already materialized; his abandonment came too late. With respect to Perfecto, he never left the scene of the crime during the robbery; he admitted having received the goods from one of his companions upstairs, helped carry the wounded Cresencio to safer grounds, and brought some of the spoils to the house of Crispulo where they were later found by the police. He was therefore an active and willing participant.

• Minority/Youthful Offender: To benefit from Presidential Decree No. 603, the accused must be a youthful offender not only at the time of commission of the crime but also at the time of trial. Perfecto was already 26 years old when he was convicted. Under the Code, where an accused is no longer a youthful offender at the time of sentencing, he cannot anymore avail of the benefit of suspension of his sentence. Neither can his minority at the time of commission of the crime be appreciated as a mitigating factor. The original version of Article 189 of Presidential Decree No. 603, which was the law then applicable when the accused were sentenced by the trial court, provides that a youthful offender is one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the provisions of that chapter. Article 189 of Presidential Decree No. 603 modifies Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code on suspension of sentence, not paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the same Code, which treats of minority as a mitigating circumstance. Paragraph 2 of Article 13 states that the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years; in the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 80. Thus, for minority to be considered a mitigating circumstance, the offender must be under eighteen years of age at the time the crime was committed. Perfecto was already nineteen years old when he committed the crime, so he did not qualify as a minor. Presidential Decree No. 1179 later amended Presidential Decree No. 603 by reverting the maximum age of a youthful offender from twenty-one years to eighteen years.

• Non-Christian Status: The fact that Crispulo and Perfecto are non-Christians cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in their favor. The appreciation of this circumstance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court considering all facets of the case that would best serve the interest of justice. Both appellants admitted having received formal education: Crispulo reached first year high school, while Perfecto finished sixth grade. Even if their education be ignored, such attenuating circumstance is nonetheless unavailing. In People vs. Salip Manla, the Court held that the fact that defendants belong to cultural minorities cannot conceivably reduce, from the subjective point of view, the defendants’ awareness of the gravity of their offense, for robbery and killing are by their very nature just as wrong to the ignorant as they are to the enlightened.

• Dwelling, Penalty, and Civil Indemnity: With regard to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, this should have been taken into account in the imposition of the proper penalty because robbery with homicide can be committed without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the home. Under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, when homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The Court stated that the proper penalty then was death and not reclusion perpetua as incorrectly imposed by the trial court. However, with the abolition of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution, the appellants should be sentenced just the same to reclusion perpetua. With respect to civil indemnity, conformably with recent jurisprudence, the amount of P12,000.00 should be increased to P50,000.00.

• Discharge of State Witness/Double Jeopardy: Under Section 10 of Rule 119, the only instance where the trial court may validly recall its order discharging an accused to become a state witness is when he subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused. Once his discharge from the Information is effected, the legal consequence of acquittal follows and persists unless the accused so discharged fails or refuses to testify pursuant to his commitment. The fact that not all the requisites for his discharge are present is not a ground to recall the discharge order. Unless and until it is shown that the discharged accused failed or refused to testify against his co-defendants, subsequent proof showing that any or all of the conditions listed in Section 9 of Rule 119 were not fulfilled would not wipe away the resulting acquittal. Besides, Cresencio did not appear to be the most guilty but Faustino, who remains at large. The records showed that Cresencio was not notified of the hearing on 27 February 1973 when he was supposed to testify, as his name was not even among those listed in the subpoena. Despite his reinclusion in the Information and the denial of his motion to quash, Cresencio proceeded to testify, not in his own behalf but as a state witness against his co-accused, with the tacit conformity of the prosecution and the express approval of the court. The express approval by the court of the presentation of Cresencio as a state witness amounted to the nullification of its recall order and the consequent reinstatement of the order for his discharge. The discharge order amounted to his acquittal and effectively barred future prosecution for the same offense. His reinclusion in the Information was illegal, improper, infirm, and his subsequent conviction was rendered sans authority, without jurisdiction. All proceedings against him thereafter were a complete nullity.

• Designation of Offense: While the Court sustained the conviction of Crispulo de los Reyes and Perfecto Gulo, it excepted to the designation of the offense charged. Instead of convicting the accused for “robbery with homicide and physical injuries,” “physical injuries” should be deleted, so that the offense should be denominated plainly “robbery with homicide,” regardless of the number of persons killed, maimed, or injured. The term homicide found in paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood in its generic sense; it includes murder and physical injuries, whether serious or slight, committed during the robbery, which crimes are merged in robbery with homicide.

• Counsel de oficio Negligence: The gross negligence of Cresencio’s counsel de oficio in the performance of his professional duties resulted in his client languishing in jail for the past seventeen years without regard for his constitutional right to due process, constraining the Court to include Cresencio in the resolution of the present appeal. Atty. Emiliano R. Deleverio, by his lackadaisical attitude, indifference, abandonment, and neglect in espousing Cresencio’s defense, violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon 18, which mandates every lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence, as well as Canon 19, which demands that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. By failing to file a notice of appeal in his client’s behalf despite being aware that the question on double jeopardy was a genuine constitutional issue that could have set his client free and averted his unwarranted incarceration for seventeen years, Atty. Deleverio should be severely censured.

• Irresistible Force / Uncontrollable Fear — To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal combat or for escape. The Court applied this doctrine against the accused-appellants because they had opportunities to escape or avoid participation and did not take them, and because their testimonies on how Faustino allegedly coerced them were contradictory and contrary to human behavior.

• Conspiracy; Act of One Is Act of All — Once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each becomes secondary. To extricate himself from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony. The Court applied this doctrine to Crispulo, whose abandonment came too late because the conspiracy had already materialized, and to Perfecto, who actively participated by receiving and carrying away the stolen goods.

• Discharge of Accused as State Witness Amounts to Acquittal — Under Section 10 of Rule 119, the only instance where the trial court may validly recall its order discharging an accused to become a state witness is when he subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused. Once the discharge from the Information is effected, the legal consequence of acquittal follows and persists unless the accused so discharged fails or refuses to testify pursuant to his commitment. The fact that not all the requisites for discharge are present is not a ground to recall the discharge order. The Court applied this doctrine to Cresencio Singue, who actually testified as a state witness; his reinclusion was illegal and his conviction void.

• Youthful Offender Under Presidential Decree No. 603 — To benefit from Presidential Decree No. 603, the accused must be a youthful offender not only at the time of commission of the crime but also at the time of trial. The original Article 189 of Presidential Decree No. 603 defines a youthful offender as one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and it modifies Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code on suspension of sentence, not paragraph 2 of Article 13 on minority as a mitigating circumstance. For minority to be mitigating, the offender must be under eighteen years of age at the time of the crime. The Court applied this doctrine against Perfecto Gulo, who was 19 at the time of the crime and 26 at conviction.

• Non-Christian Status as Mitigating Circumstance — The appreciation of non-Christian status as a mitigating circumstance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court considering all facets of the case that would best serve the interest of justice. It cannot reduce the accused’s awareness of the gravity of the offense, for robbery and killing are by their very nature just as wrong to the ignorant as they are to the enlightened. The Court applied this doctrine against Crispulo and Perfecto, especially since both had received formal education.

• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance in Robbery with Homicide — Robbery with homicide can be committed without necessarily transgressing the sanctity of the home, so dwelling should be taken into account in imposing the proper penalty. The Court noted that the trial court should have considered dwelling, although the death penalty having been abolished, the penalty remained reclusion perpetua.

• Robbery with Homicide Absorbs Physical Injuries — The term homicide in paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood in its generic sense; it includes murder and physical injuries, whether serious or slight, committed during the robbery, which crimes are merged in robbery with homicide. The offense should be denominated plainly as robbery with homicide, regardless of the number of persons killed, maimed, or injured. The Court applied this doctrine to modify the designation of the offense.

• Counsel de oficio Competence and Diligence — Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence, while Canon 19 demands that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. The Court applied this doctrine in severely censuring Atty. Emiliano R. Deleverio for failing to file a notice of appeal despite a genuine constitutional issue that could have set his client free.

• "To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will." — This passage states the controlling requisites for the exempting circumstance of irresistible force, which the Court applied to reject the defense of Crispulo and Perfecto.
• "Once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary." — This passage articulates the conspiracy doctrine applied to hold both accused-appellants liable despite Crispulo’s claim of being the least guilty and Perfecto’s claim of involuntary participation.
• "Under Sec. 10 of Rule 119, the only instance where the trial court may validly recall its order discharging an accused to become a state witness is when he subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused." — This passage defines the narrow ground for recalling a discharge order and is central to the Court’s ruling that Cresencio’s reinclusion was illegal.
• "The term homicide found in par. 1, Art. 294, of the Revised Penal Code should be understood in its generic sense; it includes murder and physical injuries, whether serious or slight, committed during the robbery, which crimes are merged in robbery with homicide." — This passage states the rule that physical injuries are absorbed in robbery with homicide, supporting the modification of the offense designation.

• People vs. Loreno, G.R. No. 54414, July 9, 1984; 130 SCRA 311 — Cited in support of the rule that a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will.
• People vs. Degoma, G.R. Nos. 89404-05, 22 May 1992 — Cited for the rule that once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation becomes secondary.
• People vs. Punzalan, G.R. No. 78853, 8 November 1991; 203 SCRA 364 — Cited for the rule that to extricate himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony.
• Villanueva vs. Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, No. L-45798, 15 December 1982, 119 SCRA 288; People vs. Casiguran, No. L-45387, 7 November 1979, 94 SCRA 244 — Cited for the rule that to benefit from Presidential Decree No. 603, the accused must be a youthful offender not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time of trial.
• People vs. Salip Manla, No. L-21688, 28 November 1969; 30 SCRA 389, 397 — Cited for the rule that membership in cultural minorities cannot reduce the accused’s awareness of the gravity of robbery and killing, which are wrong to the ignorant and the enlightened alike.
• People vs. Gapasin, G.R. No. 52017, 27 October 1986, 145 SCRA 178; People vs. Mercado, No. L-39511, 28 April 1980, 97 SCRA 232 — Cited for the rule that dwelling should be taken into account in imposing the proper penalty in robbery with homicide because the crime can be committed without transgressing the sanctity of the home.
• Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs. Pedro Son, G.R. No. 80286, 27 May 1992 — Cited for the rule that unless and until it is shown that the discharged accused failed or refused to testify against his co-defendants, subsequent proof that the conditions for discharge were not fulfilled will not wipe away the resulting acquittal.
• People vs. Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, 30 January 1992; People vs. Ga, No. L-49831, 27 June 1990, 186 SCRA 790 — Cited for the rule that the term homicide in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is generic and includes murder and physical injuries, which are merged in robbery with homicide.

• Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision in reviewing the penalty and in holding that the term homicide includes murder and physical injuries, which are merged in robbery with homicide.
• Article 80, Revised Penal Code — Governs suspension of sentence for youthful offenders. The Court explained that Article 189 of Presidential Decree No. 603 modifies Article 80, not Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
• Article 13, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Treats minority as a mitigating circumstance and requires that the offender be under eighteen years of age at the time of the crime. The Court applied this provision to hold that Perfecto Gulo, who was nineteen at the time of the crime, did not qualify for the mitigating circumstance of minority.
• Section 9, Rule 119 — Lists the requisites for the discharge of an accused to become a state witness. The Court noted that the fact that not all the requisites for discharge are present is not a ground to recall the discharge order once discharge has been effected.
• Section 10, Rule 119 — Provides that the trial court may validly recall its order discharging an accused to become a state witness only when the accused subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused. The Court applied this provision in nullifying Cresencio’s reinclusion and reinstating his discharge.
• Article 189, Presidential Decree No. 603 (original version) — Defines a youthful offender as one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and states that the provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the provisions of that chapter. The Court applied this provision in rejecting Perfecto’s claim to suspension of sentence.
• Presidential Decree No. 1179 — Amended Presidential Decree No. 603 by reverting the maximum age of a youthful offender from twenty-one years to eighteen years. The Court cited this amendment in discussing the age requirement for youthful offender status.
• 1987 Constitution — The Court applied the abolition of the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution in holding that, although the proper penalty for the offense was death, the appellants should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
• Canon 18 and Canon 19, Code of Professional Responsibility — Canon 18 mandates every lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence, while Canon 19 demands that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. The Court applied these provisions in severely censuring Atty. Emiliano R. Deleverio for his negligence.

Cruz, Padilla, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ.