People of the Philippines vs. Cresencio Tabugoca

In incestuous rape of a minor daughter by her father, the father’s moral ascendancy and influence substitutes for force or intimidation; consummated rape requires only entry of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum, not full penetration or hymenal rupture; and where relationship is a qualifying circumstance under Republic Act No. 7659, it cannot simultaneously be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance. A complaint alleging frustrated rape also does not limit the trial court’s jurisdiction to convict for consummated rape where the information charges rape and jurisdiction is vested by law.

Cresencio Tabugoca was the father of complainants Jacqueline and Jinky Tabugoca, and after his wife died on August 28, 1991, he was their sole caretaker. Jacqueline was born on December 27, 1979, and Jinky on March 5, 1982. The second incident occurred after Republic Act No. 7659 took effect on December 31, 1993; that statute introduced qualified rape punishable by death where the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent.

Cresencio Tabugoca was the father of Jacqueline, Janet, Jinky, and Jewel. After his wife died on August 28, 1991, the sisters lived under his sole care in Barangay Roxas, Naguilian, Isabela. At around 10:00 in the evening of March 28, 1992, while Jacqueline and her sisters were sleeping, Tabugoca roused her and asked her to scratch his back. According to Jacqueline, Tabugoca then told her to stay, removed her shorts and underwear, made her lie down beside him, and inserted his penis into her vagina as she cried. He warned her not to tell anyone if she did not want to be harmed. Jacqueline, who was twelve years and three months old at the time, did not reveal the assault until she later learned of her sister’s experience.

In the early morning of December 9, 1994, Jinky was cleaning articles in their house when Tabugoca approached her, removed his clothes, ordered her to lie down, and removed her shorts and panty. He inserted his penis into her vagina; when Jinky cried and complained of pain, he said that pain was ordinary because it was her first coitus. He stopped after a while, lay down beside her, and told her they would continue the following day. At dawn on December 10, 1994, he attempted to molest her again, but Jinky resisted and he left her alone. Jinky was twelve years and nine months old.

Later on December 10, 1994, while Jacqueline and Jinky were watching television at their grandmother’s house, Jinky confided to their grandmother about the sexual abuse. Upon hearing this, Jacqueline disclosed her own experience from two years earlier. Their grandmother, Perlita Alejandro, brought them to the police and then to the Municipal Health Officer of Naguilian. On December 12, 1994, Dr. Maryann M. Fontanares examined both girls.

For Jacqueline, the medico-legal certificate recorded multiple healed lacerations or scars at the 3, 5, 6, and 9 o’clock positions of the hymen and an introitus that admitted two fingers with ease. Dr. Fontanares’ impression was that the findings suggested forcible abuse, with the first incident having occurred long before based on the healed hymenal scars. For Jinky, the vulva was edematous though the hymen was intact; the doctor’s impression was that full penetration had not been successful although attempts had been done, based on the swollen vulva. In court, Dr. Fontanares explained that Jacqueline’s lacerations resulted from sexual intercourse approximately on the date alleged, and that Jinky’s labia were swollen, tender, and reddish. After the examination, Jacqueline executed a criminal complaint for rape, while Jinky charged Tabugoca with frustrated rape.

At trial, Tabugoca claimed he was completely unaware of what happened on March 28, 1992 and December 9, 1994 because he was very drunk on those occasions; he said he learned of the accusations from the arresting policemen on December 10, 1994. Jacqueline testified on cross-examination that he smelled of liquor at the time, and Jinky testified that he was drunk on the night of December 9, 1994. Tabugoca said he had turned to drinking after his wife’s death and suggested that his daughters filed the complaints to retaliate for his castigating or whipping them when they committed mistakes. The trial court found beyond reasonable doubt that he had committed the crimes, relying on the categorical and untraversed testimonies of the daughters, the corroborating medical reports, and Dr. Fontanares’ testimony; it also found that the aggravating circumstances of relationship and intoxication, purposely sought to embolden him, had attended the commission.

• Intoxication and Insanity: Accused-appellant claimed he was completely unaware of the incidents because he was very drunk and later argued in his memorandum that intoxication-induced insanity exempted him from criminal liability.
• Amnesia: He maintained that he could not recall the events and learned of the charges only from the arresting policemen, contending that his failure to remember negated criminal responsibility.
• Jurisdiction: He argued that the complaint charging frustrated rape limited the trial court’s jurisdiction and precluded conviction for consummated rape.
• Lack of Penetration: He asserted that no rape was committed in Criminal Case No. 2387 because Jinky described only an attempt followed by desistance and because the medico-legal examination found no hymenal lacerations.
• Absence of Force or Intimidation: He contended that the prosecution failed to prove force or intimidation, and that Jinky’s absence of resistance rendered the intercourse voluntary or the product of a spirit of adventurousness.
• Delay and Motive: He argued that Jacqueline’s failure to immediately report the rape cast doubt on the accusation, and that the sisters filed charges out of sympathy, revenge, or because he whipped them for committing mistakes.

• Sufficiency of Penetration: Whether rape in Criminal Case No. 2387 was consummated despite Jinky’s characterization of an attempt and the absence of hymenal lacerations.
• Force and Intimidation: Whether the prosecution proved the element of force or intimidation despite the absence of resistance by Jinky.
• Insanity and Intoxication: Whether intoxication or alleged insanity and amnesia exempted accused-appellant from criminal liability or mitigated the penalty.
• Jurisdiction: Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to convict for consummated rape where the complaint charged frustrated rape.
• Credibility and Delay: Whether Jacqueline’s delay in reporting and the alleged revenge motive undermined her credibility.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the aggravating circumstances of relationship and intoxication were correctly appreciated and whether the trial court’s penalty and civil liability awards were proper.

• Sufficiency of Penetration: Yes. Full penetration or hymenal rupture was not required; proof of entry of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum sufficed, and Jinky’s testimony and swollen labia established that entry.
• Force and Intimidation: No. In incestuous rape, actual force or intimidation need not be shown; the father’s moral ascendancy and influence over the daughter substitutes for violence or intimidation.
• Insanity and Intoxication: No. Sanity is presumed, accused-appellant failed to prove complete deprivation of intelligence, amnesia was not a defense, and intoxication did not mitigate.
• Jurisdiction: No. The complaint starts the prosecution, but jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the complaint; the trial court could try the offense charged in the information.
• Credibility and Delay: No. Delay in reporting a rape committed by a father against his daughter was justified by threats, and the alleged motives were implausible and did not destroy the victims’ credibility.
• Penalty and Damages: Yes in part. Relationship could not aggravate the qualified rape because it was an element of the offense; intoxication could aggravate, but the indivisible penalties were unaffected. Moral and exemplary damages were modified and increased.

• Sufficiency of Penetration: Conviction for rape does not require full penetration or rupture of the hymen. The decision reiterated that proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum suffices. Jinky’s declaration that her father inserted his penis into her vagina and the medical finding of swelling in her labia were telltale signs of entry into the vaginal lips. Her lay characterization of the crime as attempted rape was a conclusion of law addressed to the courts and did not negate consummation.

• Force and Intimidation: In incestuous rape, the father’s moral ascendancy and influence over the daughter substitutes for violence or intimidation. Under People vs. Matrimonio, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code recognizes two forms of intimidation: threats and overpowering moral influence. As the victims’ father, accused-appellant exercised that moral ascendancy over both daughters, which was sufficient to force them to submit. Jinky’s absence of resistance was understandable given her age, previous beatings, and her father’s strong moral and physical control; it did not establish consent. The decision found it incredible that a daughter would voluntarily submit to her own father, a sexual act between father and daughter being extremely revolting.

• Insanity and Intoxication: The law presumes every person sane, and an accused who pleads insanity bears the burden of proving it. Exempting insanity requires complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Accused-appellant presented no expert witness, psychiatric evaluation report, or psychological evidence. Amnesia in itself is not a defense unless competent proof shows that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his action and that it was wrong; failure to remember is not proof of mental condition at the time of the crime. His intoxication claim also failed to satisfy the elements for mitigation, and the decision instead found intoxication aggravating based on his habitual drinking.

• Jurisdiction: The filing of a complaint by the offended party in rape cases is jurisdictional only in the sense that it starts the prosecutorial proceeding; it is not the complaint that confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. Jurisdiction is vested by law, specifically by the Judiciary Law and the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the regional trial court. Since the offense charged in the information was rape properly within the trial court’s jurisdiction, that court could hear and try the offense. People vs. Bangalao, et al. was followed: a change in the allegations as to the manner of committing the crime should not divest the court of jurisdiction already acquired.

• Credibility and Delay: Delay in reporting a rape committed by a father against his daughter due to threats is justified. Incestuous rape magnifies the terror because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection, and his constant presence numbs the victim into silence. The alleged motives of sympathy, revenge, or disciplinary beatings were grossly implausible; no decent young Filipina would publicly admit ravishment and bring shame upon her family unless the accusation were true. Testimony of young victims, especially against a close relative, is entitled to greater weight.

• Penalty and Damages: Under Republic Act No. 7659, when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, relationship is a qualifying circumstance and cannot also be used as a generic aggravating circumstance. Intoxication, however, was aggravating because of accused-appellant’s habitual drinking. Because reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties, ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances did not affect the sentences. For civil liability, Jacqueline was entitled to moral and exemplary damages for wounded feelings and social humiliation and because an aggravating circumstance existed. Jinky was entitled to compensatory damages and exemplary damages, but not moral damages because no sufficient evidence supporting them was introduced.

• Moral Ascendancy Doctrine in Incestuous Rape — In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the father’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy flows from parental authority, which the Constitution and laws recognize, and from the child’s duty to obey and respect parents. The Court applied this doctrine to both daughters because accused-appellant was their father and exercised moral influence over them.

• Sufficiency of Penetration Rule — Full penetration of the female genital organ is not required to sustain a rape conviction. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen. The presence of an intact hymen therefore does not negate rape. Applied here, Jinky’s testimony of insertion and the swelling of her labia proved consummated rape.

• Jurisdiction in Rape Cases — When the filing of a complaint by the offended party in rape cases is described as jurisdictional, it means only that the complaint starts the prosecutory proceeding; jurisdiction over the offense is vested by law. The information governs the offense tried, and a complaint alleging a lesser or different offense does not restrict the court’s lawful jurisdiction.

• Insanity and Amnesia as Defenses — Every person is presumed sane, and insanity exempts only where there is complete deprivation of intelligence or lack of the least discernment. Amnesia by itself is not a defense to a criminal charge unless competent proof shows the accused did not know the nature and quality of the act and that it was wrong. Mere failure to remember does not prove mental condition at the time of the crime.

• Delay in Reporting Incestuous Rape — Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim. A rape victim’s actions are often overwhelmed by fear rather than reason, and incestuous rape magnifies that terror because the perpetrator is normally expected to give protection. The Court applied this to Jacqueline’s silence following her father’s threat.

• Aggravating Versus Qualifying Circumstances — A circumstance used as an element of a qualified offense cannot also be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Thus, relationship, when it qualifies rape under Republic Act No. 7659 because the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, cannot separately aggravate. Intoxication may aggravate if habitual. Nonetheless, indivisible penalties such as reclusion perpetua and death are imposed regardless of ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• "In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation." — This passage from People vs. Matrimonio states the controlling rationale that dispensed with proof of actual force or intimidation as to both victims because accused-appellant was their father.

• "It is axiomatic in criminal law that in order to sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration of the female genital organ is not required. It is enough that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ." — This defines the penetration requirement applied to Jinky’s case, where the hymen was intact but the labia were swollen.

• "Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim. A rape victim’s actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason." — Quoted from People vs. Melivo, this passage supported the rejection of the challenge to Jacqueline’s credibility based on her delayed disclosure.

• "When it is said that the filing of the complaint by the offended party in cases of rape is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding, but it is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case." — This defines the limited role of the complaint and defeated the claim that a complaint charging only frustrated rape barred conviction for consummated rape.

• People vs. Matrimonio, G.R. Nos. 82223-24, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 613 — Followed; supplied the doctrine that a father’s moral ascendancy substitutes for violence or intimidation and that delay in reporting due to threats is justified.
• People vs. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 694 — Followed; held that absence of violence or resistance is insignificant in incestuous rape because the father’s overpowering moral influence takes the place of force.
• People vs. Melivo, G.R. No. 113029, February 8, 1996, 253 SCRA 347 — Followed; explained that delay in reporting rape incidents due to threats cannot be taken against the victim and that incestuous rape magnifies the victim’s terror.
• People vs. Bangalao, et al., 94 Phil. 354 (1954) — Followed; held that a change in allegations as to the manner of committing rape should not divest the court of jurisdiction already acquired.
• People vs. Navarrete, G.R. No. L-43833, November 28, 1980, 101 SCRA 394 — Followed; held that the degree of force or intimidation need not be the same when the offender is the victim’s father because of strong moral and physical control.
• People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555 — Cited for the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993.
• People vs. Catanyag, G.R. No. 103974, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 293 — Cited for the presumption of sanity and the accused’s burden to prove insanity.
• People vs. Pastores, et al., G.R. No. L-29800, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 498 — Cited for the principle that hymenal rupture or laceration is not indispensable to a rape conviction.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) — Defined rape and recognized two forms of intimidation: threats and overpowering moral influence. Applied to treat the father’s moral ascendancy as sufficient intimidation and to punish qualified rape with death.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Effective December 31, 1993; introduced qualified rape when the victim is under eighteen and the offender is a parent, punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death. Applied to Criminal Case No. 2387.
• Article 62(5), Revised Penal Code — Provided that a circumstance inherent in the offense cannot be considered aggravating; thus, relationship, already qualifying, could not separately aggravate.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provided that indivisible penalties such as reclusion perpetua and death are applied regardless of ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
• Section 20, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Governed the jurisdiction of the regional trial court and supported its authority to try the rape offense charged in the information.
• Article 83, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25, Republic Act No. 7659 — Required forwarding the records to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power upon finality of the death sentence.
• Articles 2217, 2230, and 2234, Civil Code — Governed the award of moral and exemplary damages. Applied to grant additional moral damages to Jacqueline and exemplary damages to both victims.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concurred. The text notes that two Members of the Court voted to impose reclusion perpetua in the capital case, but does not identify them.