People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Wilfred N. Chiok

An accused who, without justifiable cause, fails to appear at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction loses the remedies available against that judgment, and the trial court is mandated to order his arrest; a preliminary injunction enjoining such arrest is improper, the accused having by his flight demonstrated that he is a fugitive from justice.

Rufina Chua met Wilfred N. Chiok in 1989, when he represented himself to her as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock market and persuaded her to invest her money in stocks and to designate him as her stockbroker. For several years thereafter Chiok acted as her stockbroker, and the profits she realized from their transactions led her to trust him with the handling of her stock investments. The dispute that followed arose from that brokerage arrangement and from the entrustment of funds made in reliance on Chiok's representation that he was a licensed stockbroker, a representation later shown to be false.

Sometime in 1989, Rufina Chua met Wilfred N. Chiok, who represented himself to her as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock market. He encouraged her to invest her money in stocks and asked her to designate him as her stockbroker, and on his prodding she agreed. For several years Chiok acted as Rufina's stockbroker, and she made a profit out of their transactions, which prompted her to trust him in handling her stock investments.

In 1995, Chiok encouraged Rufina to purchase shares in bulk on the representation that this would increase her earnings. Accordingly, in June 1995, she entrusted to him the amount of ₱9,563,900.00 for the purpose of buying shares of stocks in bulk. She deposited ₱7,100,000.00 in Chiok's account, and with respect to the remaining ₱2,463,900.00, she personally gave it to him. Chiok thereupon told her to wait for one week. A week elapsed, but she did not hear from him; upon her inquiry, he advised her to wait for another week, but still there was no news from him. When she was finally able to contact him, he admitted that he had spent the money. He issued two checks as payment, but when she deposited them in the drawee bank, they were dishonored for insufficient funds.

In a letter dated October 25, 1995, Rufina demanded payment from Chiok, but the demand remained unheeded. Upon inquiry, Rufina came to know that Chiok was not a licensed stockbroker but only a telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc. She immediately caused the filing of an information for estafa against him with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 109927.

During arraignment, Chiok, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty and posted bail. Trial ensued. Chiok denied the charge against him. He testified that he was not an employee of Bernard Securities, Inc.; that he buys and sells U.S. dollars and that Rufina used to buy dollars from him; that what actually existed between them was an unregistered partnership; and that he received the amount of ₱9,563,900.00 as her investment in their partnership.

After the presentation of the parties' evidence, the trial court set the promulgation of judgment for January 26, 1999, but Chiok and his counsel failed to appear on that date, and the promulgation was re-set to February 1, 1999. On February 1, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Chiok of estafa and sentencing him to suffer twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. During the promulgation of the judgment, Chiok and his counsel failed to appear despite notice. Consequently, the prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail on the ground that there was an indication that Chiok might flee or commit another crime. On May 28, 1999, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order granting the motion, cancelling Chiok's bail and giving him five (5) days from receipt within which to surrender before the court, otherwise his arrest would be ordered. Because he did not surrender despite the lapse of the given period, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest on June 25, 1999, which was returned unserved because he could not be found at his given address. The Court of Appeals thereafter issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the Omnibus Order, and, in its Resolution of September 20, 1999, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Chiok's arrest on the grounds that he should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal since the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense, and that the probability of his flight during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The People of the Philippines, as petitioner, contended that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent Chiok.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Respondent Chiok maintained that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution of September 20, 1999.

• Cancellation of Bail and Arrest Pending Appeal: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it rendered its assailed Resolution of September 20, 1999 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent.

• Cancellation of Bail and Arrest Pending Appeal: Yes. The trial court correctly cancelled Chiok's bail because of his failure to appear during the promulgation of judgment despite notice, a violation of the condition of his bail that he must appear before the proper court whenever so required by that court or the Rules; having jumped bail, his arrest as ordered by the trial court is proper under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

• Cancellation of Bail and Arrest Pending Appeal: The trial court correctly cancelled respondent's bail because of his failure to appear during the promulgation of judgment despite notice. He violated the condition of his bail that he must appear before the proper court whenever so required by that court or the Rules; simply stated, he jumped bail, and as such his arrest, as ordered by the trial court, is proper. This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in the rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest, subject only to the accused's right, within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, to surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of those remedies, stating the reasons for his absence and proving that it was for a justifiable cause. The last paragraph of Section 6 authorizes the promulgation of judgment in absentia in view of respondent's failure to appear despite notice. The rule authorizing promulgation in absentia is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. Here, respondent tried in vain to subvert the judicial process by not appearing during the promulgation of judgment; thus, he lost his remedies against the judgment. In fact, he cannot challenge successfully the cancellation of his bail by the trial court. The Court of Appeals certainly erred in enjoining the arrest of respondent. Its declaration that respondent might flee or commit another crime is conjectural and utterly lacks merit, because respondent already demonstrated that he is a fugitive from justice.

• Promulgation of judgment in absentia and the loss of remedies — Under the last paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, judgment may be promulgated in absentia where the accused fails to appear despite notice. The rule is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. Where the judgment is one of conviction and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, he loses the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment, and the court shall order his arrest; within fifteen (15) days from promulgation, however, he may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of those remedies, stating the reasons for his absence, and if he proves justifiable cause he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. In this case, Chiok failed to appear at the promulgation despite notice and did not surrender within the period given, so he lost his remedies against the judgment and could not successfully challenge the cancellation of his bail.
• Cancellation of bail for violation of its conditions — Bail is conditioned on the accused's appearance before the proper court whenever so required by that court or the Rules. Failure to appear at the promulgation of judgment despite notice constitutes a violation of that condition — in the Court's words, the accused "jumped bail" — and justifies the cancellation of bail and the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The trial court's cancellation of Chiok's bail and its order for his arrest were therefore upheld.
• Fugitive from justice; conjectural flight — The appellate court's premise that the probability of the accused's flight during the pendency of his appeal was merely conjectural was rejected. Because Chiok had already failed to appear at promulgation despite notice and had not surrendered within the period given, he had demonstrated that he was a fugitive from justice; the risk of flight was not speculative, and the injunction against his arrest was consequently improper.

• "If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest." — This is the operative portion of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure as quoted by the Court; it supplies the mandatory rule that defeated the appellate court's injunction against Chiok's arrest.
• "It bears stressing that the rule authorizing promulgation in absentia is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment." — This passage states the rationale behind the in absentia rule and is the Court's answer to the argument that the accused's provisional liberty should be preserved pending appeal.
• "The Court of Appeals certainly erred in enjoining the arrest of respondent. Its declaration that respondent might flee or commit another crime is conjectural utterly lacks merit. Respondent already demonstrated that he is a fugitive from justice." — This is the ratio decidendi on the propriety of the injunctive relief; it rejects the appellate court's factual premise that the risk of flight was speculative.

• Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139599, February 23, 2000, 326 SCRA 362 — Cited by the Court in support of the proposition that the arrest of the accused, as ordered by the trial court after the cancellation of his bail, is proper.
• Florendo vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 325 (1994) — Cited, through Agpalo's Handbook on Criminal Procedure, in connection with the rule authorizing promulgation of judgment in absentia.
• People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998) — Likewise cited, through Agpalo's Handbook on Criminal Procedure, in connection with the rule authorizing promulgation of judgment in absentia.

• Section 6, Rule 120, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs the promulgation of judgment. It requires that notice be given to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, and provides that if the judgment is for conviction and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest, subject to his right to surrender and move for leave to avail of those remedies within fifteen (15) days from promulgation upon proof of justifiable cause. The provision supplied the mandatory basis for cancelling Chiok's bail and ordering his arrest, and for reversing the injunction.
• Section 2(b), Rule 114, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Cited by the Court as the source of the condition of bail that the accused must appear before the proper court whenever so required by that court or the Rules. Chiok's failure to appear at the promulgation of judgment despite notice violated this condition.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended — The procedural vehicle by which the People of the Philippines elevated the Court of Appeals' Resolution of September 20, 1999 to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Puno (Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concurred in the decision.