People of the Philippines vs. Cirilo Magalona y Onoon

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction where the proved circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime. Where an unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim does not reduce the offense to reckless imprudence; the act is qualified by the felony it actually produced.

Cirilo Magalona y Onoon, also known as "William," was a farm worker at Sitio Ablang, Barangay Sta. Lucia Old, Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija, where the Arimbuyutan family — spouses Rosendo, Sr. and Rosario, and their children — likewise resided in a bamboo hut with a "talahib" roof. Before the grenade incident, Magalona had become a suspect in a rape case reported to the police on May 24, 1994, and had been placed in the custody of Barangay Captain Florentino Almeda of Sta. Lucia. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review because the trial court imposed the death penalty, a penalty authorized by Republic Act No. 7659.

Rosendo and Rosario Arimbuyutan, Sr. resided with their children — Rommel, Rosendo, Jr., Rosalie, Rosemarie, Regina, Ruby, Roldan, and Resty — in a hut at Sitio Ablang, Barangay Sta. Lucia Old, Zaragoza, Nueva Ecija. The hut's floor, including the flooring, was made of bamboo, its roof of "talahib," and its floor stood three feet above the ground. Cirilo Magalona, also known as "William," was a farm worker of one Corazon Ramos on a commission basis at Sitio Ablang and had been known in the area for about two years.

At around midnight of May 22, 1994, Avelina Mendoza, a 71-year-old housekeeper and neighbor of Magalona, was drinking coffee in her house at Sitio Ablang when Magalona knocked at her door and conversed with her. He told her that he was very angry at Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. and that he would return and kill him. On cross-examination, Mendoza stated that she had known Magalona for less than a year and had talked to him only once before the grenade explosion, and she admitted that Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. was her nephew.

At around 3:30 a.m. of May 25, 1994, while the Arimbuyutan spouses and their children were sleeping in their hut, an explosion occurred beneath the floor. The blast killed Resty Arimbuyutan and injured Rosario, Roldan, Rosemarie, and Rosalie Arimbuyutan. It also left a small crater on the ground and damaged the hut up to the roof. The victims were first brought to the medical center of the neighboring town of La Paz, Tarlac, and then to the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. On the way to the hospital, Resty died of hemorrhage secondary to "multiple blasting injury." Rosario sustained "blastin[g] injury multiple with perforation of the uterus," injuries from her waist to her knees, and underwent a surgical operation. Rosalyn sustained a fracture over the left kneecap. Rosemarie sustained a "blasting injury left gluteal area (left buttocks)" and was immediately given anti-tetanus medicine; Dr. Renato Ang testified that without prompt medical treatment, she could have died of complications. Roldan sustained "blasting injury multiple posterior chest left" and was given emergency "tube thoracostomy" to prevent his lungs from collapsing; Dr. Ang likewise testified that without medical treatment, the patient would have died. Rosario testified that the family spent P21,400 for hospitalization, medical expenses, and the funeral and burial expenses of Resty.

At around 8 a.m. of May 25, 1994, Police Officer Rodolfo Gutierrez of the Zaragoza PNP, together with two police officers and a photographer, investigated the incident. Gutierrez found a safety lever pin and some grenade shrapnels near the post of the Arimbuyutan hut, prepared an investigation report, and entered the incident in the police blotter. Based on the sworn statements of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., Bienvenido Sabater, and Adelina Mendoza, the suspect was Magalona. The police did not search for him because Barangay Captain Florentino Almeda brought him to the police station that morning; Almeda told Gutierrez that since Magalona had become a suspect in a rape case, he had been in Almeda's custody until he was surrendered to the police authorities.

Bienvenido Sabater, a 40-year-old farmer residing at Sitio Ablang whose hut stood about five to six meters from and fronting that of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., testified that at around 3:30 a.m. of May 25, 1994, he was inside his hut sitting on a bamboo bed, pacifying his six-month-old child and drinking coffee while his wife boiled water. His door and window had no shutters and were open. While taking coffee, he saw a person named William pass by in front of his hut and the hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., and then hide behind the acacia tree in front of his hut, which was between the two huts. He then saw an explosion under the floor of the Arimbuyutan hut and saw William running toward the direction of the "flood control." Upon hearing the explosion, Sabater took his child and lay face down on the floor in front of the open door for four to five seconds; facing the open door, he saw William run away, and when he noticed that William was alone, he stood up. He heard the Arimbuyutan family crying. Sabater testified that he recognized William because the latter frequently went to Sitio Ablang, that the moon was bright at 3:30 a.m., and that a lighted kerosene lamp hanging by the post illuminated William, who was hiding behind the acacia tree near his hut. In court, he pointed to the person he called "William," who identified himself as Cirilo Magalona. Sabater admitted, however, that he did not actually see who threw the grenade under the Arimbuyutan hut.

On December 2, 1996, Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. executed an Affidavit of Desistance, which the trial court disregarded since the prosecution had already rested its case and it was the defense's turn to present evidence. In the hearing scheduled on July 18, 1997, Magalona did not appear. The Provincial Warden explained that, pursuant to a COMELEC Resolution, the Provincial Jail had been under PNP control since April 23, 1995, and that policemen assigned to the jail had ordered Magalona to guard a co-detainee confined in a hospital who died on July 8, 1997; after the detainee's death, Magalona did not return to the Provincial Jail. By Order dated February 16, 1998, the trial court deemed Magalona to have waived his right to present evidence, and the case was submitted for decision. On May 21, 1999, the Provincial Warden informed the trial court that Magalona had been arrested and was detained at the Provincial Jail.

The trial court held that the testimony of Avelina Mendoza showed that Magalona had a motive to harm Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.; that the testimony of Bienvenido Sabater established that Magalona was responsible for the explosion; and that Magalona's escape from prison was persuasive evidence of his guilt. It found that the death of Resty and the injuries sustained by Rosario, Rosemarie, Rosalyn, and Roldan were caused by the explosion, qualifying the killing to murder.

• Credibility of Avelina Mendoza: Appellant argued that the trial court should not have given probative value to Mendoza's testimony on motive because she and appellant were not long-time acquaintances, having talked to each other only once, and because the alleged revelation of an intent to kill Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. to a stranger during a midnight visit was contrary to ordinary human experience; he further noted that Mendoza was the aunt of complainant Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.
• Insufficiency of Sabater's Testimony: Appellant argued that prosecution witness Bienvenido Sabater admitted that he did not actually see who threw the hand grenade under the Arimbuyutan hut, and that Sabater established only that he saw appellant hiding behind an acacia tree and then running away from the place of the explosion, which was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; appellant prayed for acquittal.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Avelina Mendoza and Bienvenido Sabater.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence adduced was sufficient to establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Nature of the Offense: Whether the killing of Resty Arimbuyutan and the injuries sustained by the other victims constituted the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
• Penalty: Whether the death penalty was correctly imposed upon appellant.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility is accorded great weight on appeal, absent any showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied a fact or circumstance of weight and substance; Mendoza's relationship to the complainant did not impair her credibility.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. Direct evidence is not indispensable; the combination of proven circumstances formed an unbroken chain pointing to appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
• Nature of the Offense: Yes. The single act of detonating a hand grenade produced the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder and double attempted murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of explosion having been alleged and proved.
• Penalty: Yes. Under Article 48, the penalty for the most serious crime — murder, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death — must be imposed in its maximum period, which is death.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Appellant cannot consider Avelina Mendoza a stranger, since she testified that she knew him as her neighbor. Being neighbors, it was not contrary to human experience for appellant to have visited Mendoza at midnight of May 22, 1994, and it was incumbent upon appellant to disprove the visit; having failed to do so, Mendoza's positive testimony prevailed. Although Mendoza was the aunt of complainant Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., such relationship does not, by itself, impair her credibility; on the contrary, her relationship to the complainant would deter her from implicating innocent persons, as her natural interest would be to secure the conviction of the real culprit. Mendoza's testimony established appellant's motive to kill Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., as she recounted that appellant told her he was very angry at "Sendo" and would return and kill him. As for Bienvenido Sabater, no evidence showed that he was impelled by improper motive in testifying against appellant; hence, his testimony deserved full faith and credence. It is well settled that the positive testimony of a credible witness is sufficient to support a judgment of conviction, because truth is established by the quality, not the quantity, of the evidence. It is likewise a well-entrenched rule that an appellate court generally will not overturn the trial court's findings on credibility, since the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue, having observed the deportment of witnesses during trial; such findings will not be disturbed unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. A review of the records disclosed no reason to disturb the trial court's findings.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The trial court convicted appellant on circumstantial evidence, and direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not indispensable for conviction when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish guilt. A judgment of conviction may be rendered when the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator. Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Although Sabater did not see appellant holding or throwing a hand grenade, the following chain of events pointed to appellant as the perpetrator: first, on May 22, 1994, appellant told Avelina Mendoza that he was very angry at Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. and would return and kill him; second, on May 25, 1994, at about 3:30 a.m., Sabater saw appellant pass by his hut and the hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.; third, Sabater saw appellant acting suspiciously as he went back and forth between the two huts, which fronted each other; fourth, Sabater saw appellant hiding behind the acacia tree in front of his hut; fifth, Sabater thereafter saw an explosion under the Arimbuyutan hut and saw appellant fleeing from the place of the incident toward the direction of the "flood control" at the river; and sixth, appellant was the only person seen near the Arimbuyutan hut before and after the explosion. Sabater recognized appellant because he frequently visited the place and had known him for about two years since he began farming at Sitio Ablang; the moon shone brightly at the time, and the light from the kerosene lamp near Sabater's open door illuminated appellant, who was hiding behind the acacia tree about five to six meters away. Appellant's culpability was strengthened by his flight from the site of the explosion; the Court has ruled that flight of an accused from the scene of the crime removes any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt. Had appellant been innocent, he would not have fled but would have gone to the Arimbuyutan hut after the explosion and rendered assistance to the victims. Moreover, Mendoza's testimony established that appellant had a motive to harm Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., a key element in the web of circumstantial evidence. Separately, appellant's flight after the death of the co-detainee he was guarding at the hospital signified a strong sense of guilt and an awareness that he had no tenable defense.

• Nature of the Offense: Even if appellant, in detonating a hand grenade under the Arimbuyutan hut, intended to kill Rosendo, Sr., but instead killed his son Resty and seriously injured other family members, appellant is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence; where malice or intention to cause injury exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it has produced. The trial court correctly held that the death of Resty and the injuries sustained by Rosario, Rosemarie, Rosalyn, and Roldan were caused by an explosion, qualifying the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court, however, incorrectly stated that the killing was also attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery; absent any particulars on the manner in which the aggression was commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder, as treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. Nevertheless, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of explosion, which was alleged in the Information, was sufficient to qualify the killing to murder. As to the injuries, those of Rosario and Rosemarie appeared fatal based on their medical certificates and the fact that Rosario underwent an operation, but the prosecutor failed to ask Dr. Arnold Castro, who attended to them, whether their injuries would have caused death without prompt medical treatment; with respect to Roldan and Rosalyn, Dr. Renato Ang testified that their wounds would have caused death without his prompt medical treatment. Considering that the offenses were caused by a single act of detonating a hand grenade, the trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code; to be precise, appellant committed the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder and double attempted murder.

• Penalty: Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Applying the provision, the penalty for the most serious crime (murder), which is reclusion perpetua to death, should be imposed in the maximum period. The trial court therefore correctly imposed the death penalty. Three Justices of the Court maintained their position that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submitted to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

• Circumstantial Evidence — Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable for conviction when circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishes guilt. Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this test to the six circumstances proved — the prior threat, appellant's presence near the hut, his suspicious back-and-forth movements, his concealment behind the acacia tree, his flight after the explosion, and his being the only person seen near the hut before and after the blast — and held that they formed an unbroken chain pointing to appellant as the perpetrator.

• Flight as Evidence of Guilt — Flight of an accused from the scene of the crime removes any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt. The Court relied on appellant's flight from the site of the explosion, reasoning that an innocent person would have gone to the victim's hut and rendered assistance rather than flee. It likewise treated appellant's escape from custody after the death of the co-detainee he was guarding as signifying a strong sense of guilt and an awareness that he had no tenable defense.

• Mistake in the Identity of the Intended Victim — Where an unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence; where malice or intention to cause injury exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it has actually produced. The Court held that even if appellant intended to kill Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., he was liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act, including the death of Resty and the injuries to the other family members.

• Treachery Must Be Proved — Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. Absent any particulars on the manner in which the aggression was commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder. The Court accordingly rejected the trial court's finding of treachery but sustained the murder qualification on the separate ground of explosion.

• Complex Crimes Under Article 48 — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The Court applied this rule to the single act of detonating a hand grenade, which produced murder, double frustrated murder, and double attempted murder, and affirmed the death penalty as the maximum period of the most serious crime.

• Credibility of Witnesses on Appeal — An appellate court generally will not overturn the trial court's findings on witness credibility, since the trial judge is in a better position to assess credibility, having observed the deportment of witnesses during trial. Such findings will not be disturbed unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. The Court also held that a witness's relationship to the victim does not, by itself, impair credibility; if anything, it would deter the witness from implicating innocent persons.

• Temperate Damages in Lieu of Actual Damages — Actual damages cannot be awarded based merely on a list of expenses presented by the prosecution; the claim must be adequately supported by receipts. Where it is shown that the family of the deceased suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount cannot be proved with certainty, temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered in lieu of actual damages.

• "Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently establish his guilt." — This passage states the threshold rule on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence and frames the Court's rejection of appellant's argument that Sabater's failure to see the actual throwing of the grenade mandated acquittal.

• "There can be a judgment of conviction when the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain of events that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime." — This is the canonical formulation of the unbroken-chain test applied by the Court in assessing the six circumstantial facts, and it is the passage most frequently invoked in subsequent jurisprudence on circumstantial evidence.

• "Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence." — This passage articulates the rule on mistake in the identity of the intended victim (aberratio ictus), explaining why appellant remained liable for the death of Resty and the injuries to the other family members despite his alleged intent to kill only Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr.

• "Treachery cannot be presumed, but must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself." — This passage states the evidentiary standard for appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance and supports the Court's deletion of treachery from the trial court's findings while sustaining the murder qualification on the ground of explosion.

• People vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 133737, January 13, 2003 — Cited as authority for the rule that direct evidence is not indispensable and that circumstantial evidence may suffice for conviction; also cited for the rule on the finality of the trial court's credibility findings.
• People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307, 317 (1950) — Cited as authority for the rule that where an unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered reckless imprudence, and that the act is qualified by the felony it produces.
• People vs. Flores, 328 SCRA 461, 470 (2000) — Cited for the doctrine that flight of an accused from the scene of the crime removes any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt, and for the principle that motive is a key element in the web of circumstantial evidence.
• People vs. Santiago, G.R. No. 133445, February 27, 2003 — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself.
• People vs. Rafael, G.R. Nos. 146235-36, May 29, 2002 — Cited for the rule that actual damages cannot be awarded based merely on a list of expenses; the claim must be supported by receipts.
• People vs. Caloza, Jr., G.R. No. 138404, January 28, 2003 — Cited for the rule that temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot be proved with certainty.
• People vs. Loreto, G.R. No. 137411-13, February 28, 2003 — Cited for the rule that moral damages are awarded without need of proof other than the death of the victim.
• People vs. Ansowas, G.R. No. 140647, December 18, 2002 — Cited for the rule that a witness's relationship to the complainant does not, by itself, impair the witness's credibility.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death when committed with any of the attendant circumstances, including "by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin." The Court held that the explosion, alleged in the Information and proved at trial, qualified the killing of Resty Arimbuyutan to murder; treachery was rejected for lack of proof of the manner in which the aggression commenced.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The Court applied this provision to the single act of detonating a hand grenade, which produced murder, double frustrated murder, and double attempted murder, and affirmed the death penalty as the maximum period of the most serious crime.

• Rule 133, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this three-part test to the six circumstances proved against appellant.

• Article 2224, Civil Code — Provides that temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The Court awarded P15,000 in temperate damages in lieu of the deleted actual damages of P21,400.

• Section 25, Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83, Revised Penal Code — The Court directed that, upon finality of the Decision, the records be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power, in accordance with this provision.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., were on official leave.