People of the Philippines vs. Christopher Caña Leonor

A conviction for robbery with homicide requires that the robbery itself be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime; the victim's admissible dying declaration may establish both the robbery and the homicide committed on the occasion thereof. Where no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attends robbery with homicide, the lower of the two indivisible penalties—reclusion perpetua—must be imposed.

On May 15, 1995, at around 11:30 a.m., at the Hermanos Building on General Santos Avenue, Bicutan Extension, Parañaque, Christopher Caña Leonor stabbed dentist Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, and the wound ultimately caused her death. Christopher admitted the stabbing. The prosecution and the defense differed on the circumstances surrounding the incident.

According to the prosecution, Dr. Tarlengco was at her third-floor dental clinic when a man later identified as Christopher entered and asked about the cost of tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her fee, Christopher said he would return and left in a hurry. Minutes later, he came back, and Dr. Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. While she was preparing her dental instruments, Christopher barged in and demanded money. She told him her money was on the table. He then stabbed her, grabbed her watch, and ran away. Dr. Tarlengco struggled out of the clinic and shouted for help. Security guard Reynaldo Baquilod heard her shout, "Tulungan ninyo ako, sinaksak ako ng taong iyon," and saw that she was referring to a man running out of the building from upstairs. Baquilod chased Christopher to Daang Hari Street, where he was joined by traffic policeman Luis Galeno, who had been alerted by people running after a person with a bloodied shirt. When they caught up with Christopher, Baquilod grabbed his hand and took from him a Titus wristwatch and P900 cash. When queried, Christopher answered, "Sir, hindi ko naman gusto po ito. Ginawa ko lang ito dahil kailangan ng pamilya ko." He was brought to the Parañaque Police Block Station. PO3 Mateo Interia, instructed to investigate, proceeded to Dr. Tarlengco's clinic, where a bloodied balisong was seen at the ground floor of the Hermanos Building. Baquilod turned over the watch and money to Interia. Dr. Tarlengco was brought to the South Super Highway Medical Center, where she underwent an emergency operation for a stab wound on her chest. After the operation, her father, Fernando Tarlengco, was allowed to talk to her inside the operating room. Although she was gasping for breath, she narrated that a man pretended to be a patient, asked how much it would cost to pull a tooth, left in a hurry after she quoted her price, returned, and was told to wait while she prepared the instruments; that he then barged in, demanded money, and after she told him it was on the table, stabbed her and grabbed her watch and ran away. She also said she felt she could no longer endure the pain. She later died. Dr. Ronaldo Baluyot, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the post-mortem examination, testified that the stab wound on the chest could have been caused by a single-bladed fan knife. Geraldine Tarlengco testified that on the morning of May 15, 1995, she saw Dr. Tarlengco strap on a Titus watch and place in her wallet one P500 bill and four P100 bills. Dr. John Enrique Franco testified that Dr. Tarlengco told him at the hospital that a man posing as a patient held her up and stabbed her. Joseph B. Sumalbar, Dr. Tarlengco's fiancé, testified that he confronted Christopher at the police station, and Christopher said, "hindi ko po naman gusto, Kailangan ko lamang ang pera," and "Mahuhuli na po ako kaya ginawa ko iyon?" SPO3 Mateo Interia testified that he took the statement of Dr. Tarlengco's father and executed a referral to the Provincial Prosecutor for Christopher's inquest; he reported that Christopher was being held for robbery with homicide but forgot to state the stolen property, and after Mr. Tarlengco reminded him, he intercalated a reference to P900 and a Titus wristwatch. Fernando Tarlengco also described the family's expenses: P8,718 for hospital expenses; about P2,500 to P3,500 charged by Funeraria Malaya; P22,500 for the casket; P8,250 paid to Manila Memorial, Inc.; P5,000 for masses; and about P10,000 for food served at the wake.

Christopher, for his part, testified that on May 15, 1995, at about 6:00 a.m., he left Calauag, Quezon, and boarded a bus bound for Manila with P800 and a fan knife in his pocket. He was to fetch his family for the town fiesta on May 25, 1995. His head and two molar teeth were aching. He alighted at Alabang and took a bus bound for Bicutan Extension. Upon reaching Bicutan Extension, he looked for a dentist to have his aching teeth pulled and found Dr. Tarlengco's dental clinic at the third floor of a building on General Santos Avenue. He asked how much an extraction cost and was told P150 per tooth. He negotiated for P100 per tooth, but Dr. Tarlengco rejected the offer. He then proceeded to look for another dentist, but before he could leave, Dr. Tarlengco stopped him and agreed to charge P100 per extraction. He was made to sit on the dental chair as she prepared the instruments. Just as she was about to inject anesthesia, she remarked that she changed her mind and would charge P150 per tooth. Christopher pushed away her hand, which angered her. She castigated and cursed him for asking for an extraction without being able to pay. As he was making his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco cursed and pushed him, at which moment he blacked out. He then sensed that the dentist was in pain and saw blood spurting. He realized that he had stabbed her. In shock, he stepped back, lost his grip on his fan knife, and ran out of the clinic and out of the building. When he looked back, he saw Dr. Tarlengco shouting for help, and a security guard with a shotgun aimed at him chased him. He ran to where there were many people. Police Officer Galeno grabbed him by the hand and asked what happened; he replied, "Sir, nakadisgrasya ako." Galeno warded off the pursuing security guard and brought Christopher to the police station. Four policemen, including PO3 Interia, took turns mauling and kicking him, and one policeman took money from his wallet; his clothes were also confiscated. During the investigation, Christopher admitted stabbing Dr. Tarlengco but denied taking P900 and a Titus wristwatch from her. He was surprised when he was later informed that he would be charged with robbery with homicide, not homicide only. Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, Christopher's uncle, testified that at about noon of May 15, 1995, he received a telephone call from Christopher saying that he had stabbed someone; when asked why, Christopher answered, "Aburido ako Kuya Ding, aburido ako." Renato Leonor, Christopher's father, testified that he went to see his son at his detention cell but could hardly recognize him because he was bloodied, and he remembered that Christopher had complained of toothache before leaving for Manila. Dr. Alfredo Besa, a dentist, examined Christopher three hours before taking the stand and determined that two of Christopher's teeth were due for extraction and, at their condition, were probably aching as early as a year before. He claimed that people complaining of toothache are usually irritable, but admitted that none of his patients complaining of toothache had ever killed a person or brought a fan knife to his clinic, and he had never heard of any patient with a toothache who killed a dentist. The trial court found the testimonies of police officer Galeno and guard Baquilod more credible and convicted Christopher of robbery with homicide.

• Robbery Not Established: Christopher argued that he should be convicted only of homicide, not robbery with homicide, because the robbery was not proved; he claimed the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions and were therefore concoctions and manufactured evidence, pointing out that Baquilod failed to mention in his sworn statement, given immediately after the incident, that he retrieved a Titus wristwatch and P900 from Christopher.
• Inadmissible Admissions: Christopher contended that the testimonies of Baquilod, Galeno, Interia, Sumalbar, and Yu Guray that he admitted to them on separate occasions his commission of the offense charged were inadmissible because the admission was not in writing, was not made with the assistance of counsel, and was not preceded by a warning as to the consequences of the admission; in any event, their testimonies were hearsay evidence.
• Bias: Christopher stressed the possible bias of Yu Guray considering that she caused the filing against him of the information for robbery with homicide.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Christopher urged the Court to appreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender, and voluntary confession.

• Robbery Established: The Solicitor General asserted that the robbery was duly and satisfactorily established by the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco to her father, corroborated by the testimonies of Baquilod and Galeno.
• Failure to Exclaim Robbery: The Solicitor General argued that Dr. Tarlengco's failure to exclaim that she was robbed when she shouted for help from her clinic's balcony was of no moment, since she later told Dr. Franco and her father of the complete events that transpired.
• Affidavit Omissions: The Solicitor General maintained that Galeno's failure to mention in his sworn statement that money and a wristwatch were retrieved from Christopher did not negate his claim to that effect, because he later stated that fact in his testimony; testimonies in open court are superior to affidavits taken ex parte.
• Intercalation: The Solicitor General contended that Interia's insertion of the stolen items in the police referral did not diminish the truth of the allegation of robbery, since the intercalation was intended to make the referral accurate.
• Credibility: The Solicitor General argued that the core issues involved the credibility of witnesses, and that the trial court's judgment on credibility should not be interfered with unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence that have been overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result of the case.

• Robbery with Homicide: Whether the accused should be convicted of homicide only rather than robbery with homicide.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were so inconsistent and contradictory as to render the conviction erroneous.
• Dying Declaration: Whether Dr. Tarlengco's dying declaration was admissible and sufficient to establish the robbery and the homicide.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender, and voluntary confession should be appreciated in favor of the accused.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the death penalty and the awards of moral damages and attorney's fees were proper.

• Robbery with Homicide: Yes. The conviction for robbery with homicide was affirmed; the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other essential element, and the killing occurred by reason or on the occasion thereof.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's credibility findings were upheld; the alleged inconsistencies did not warrant reversal.
• Dying Declaration: Yes. The dying declaration complied with the requisites and established both the robbery and the homicide.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. None of the claimed mitigating circumstances was appreciated.
• Penalty and Damages: Modified. The penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua, and moral damages and attorney's fees were reduced to P50,000 and P25,000, respectively.

• Robbery with Homicide: The accused admitted stabbing Dr. Tarlengco, shifting to him the burden to prove a justifying or exempting circumstance; he failed. The remaining factual issue was whether the killing was by reason or on the occasion of robbery. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires the robbery itself to be proved as conclusively as any other essential element. Robbery is the taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of a person or by using force upon things. Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph Sumalbar identified the items recovered from Christopher as belonging to the victim. His possession of the stolen watch and money, corroborated by Galeno and Baquilod, gave rise to the presumption that he was the taker and doer of the whole act. The intercalation in Interia's referral was explained as an honest mistake. The dying declaration established violence and intimidation in the taking and that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery. Thus, robbery with homicide was established.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The trial court found the testimonies of Galeno and Baquilod more credible. The Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial court's credibility findings unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence that were overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. No such overlooked facts were shown. The alleged inconsistencies—Baquilod's omission in his sworn statement and Galeno's failure to mention the stolen items—did not negate their open-court testimonies, which are superior to ex parte affidavits.

• Dying Declaration: The father's testimony on the victim's declaration was admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule. The requisites are: (1) the declaration must refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant's death; (2) it must be made under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) it must be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of improper influence; (4) it must be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify. Dr. Tarlengco's declaration complied: she talked about the incident leading to her condition; it was a first-hand account; it was made in a criminal case where her death was part of the subject of inquiry; and she was convinced she was about to die, saying she felt she could no longer endure, and was cold, gasping, and complaining of pain. She narrated that a man pretending to be a patient demanded money, she surrendered it, he stabbed her and took her watch. The declaration established robbery and homicide on the occasion thereof.

• Mitigating Circumstances: Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases where the accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs. Sufficient provocation must be proportionate to the gravity of the retaliatory act; a push and bad words do not justify retaliation with a knife. Passion and obfuscation require loss of self-control, not consciousness; Christopher claimed he blacked out, and the events did not naturally tend to produce powerful excitement. Voluntary surrender was not present because he fled to where many people were, presumably to confuse his pursuer, and was grabbed by Galeno. Voluntary confession requires a plea of guilty made spontaneously and unconditionally in open court before the presentation of prosecution evidence; Christopher made no such plea.

• Penalty and Damages: Robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 294(1). There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the lower of the two indivisible penalties—reclusion perpetua—must be imposed under Art. 63(2), without benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The awards of P2 million moral damages and attorney's fees were excessive; they were reduced to P50,000 and P25,000, respectively. The other awards—P50,000 death indemnity and P44,318 actual damages—were retained.

• Robbery with homicide — A conviction for robbery with homicide requires that the robbery itself be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. Robbery is the taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things. The homicide must be perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. In this case, the taking of the victim's watch and P900 through violence and intimidation, followed by her stabbing, established the complex crime.

• Dying declaration — A dying declaration is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule when it complies with five requisites: (1) it refers to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant's death; (2) it is made under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) it is made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of improper influence; (4) it is offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify. The Court found Dr. Tarlengco's declaration to her father satisfied all requisites and established both the robbery and the homicide.

• Presumption from possession of stolen property — A person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is presumed to be the taker and the doer of the whole act. The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner was deprived of her possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case the presumption becomes one of robbery. The Court applied this presumption to Christopher's possession of the victim's watch and money.

• Mitigating circumstances in homicide — Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate where the accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs. Sufficient provocation must be proportionate to the gravity of the retaliatory act. Passion and obfuscation require a clear showing of causes naturally tending to produce powerful excitement depriving the accused of reason and self-control; a momentary blackout is not loss of self-control. Voluntary surrender requires surrender to a person in authority or other person; fleeing to a crowd and being caught does not qualify. Voluntary confession requires a spontaneous and unconditional plea of guilty in open court before the prosecution presents evidence. None applied.

• Trial court's credibility findings — The Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial court's judgment on the credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence that have been overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. The trial judge is in a better position to decide credibility because he heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The Court found no overlooked facts and upheld the trial court's assessment.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply where the penalty imposed is an indivisible penalty such as reclusion perpetua or death. Because the penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death and no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the crime, the lower indivisible penalty was imposed without benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• "One could be convicted of robbery with homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime." — This states the ratio decidendi on the quantum of proof for the robbery component of the complex crime.
• "To be admissible, a dying declaration must (1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarant's death; (2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of improper influence; (4) be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify." — This is the canonical formulation of the requisites for admitting a dying declaration.
• "The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner of the articles was deprived of her possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case, the presumption becomes one of robbery." — This defines the presumption that connected Christopher's possession of the stolen watch and money to the robbery.
• "There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance against or in favor of CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law." — This explains the reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• People vs. Conde, 252 SCRA 681, 688 [1996] — Cited for the rule that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial court's credibility findings unless there are overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and influence that would affect the result.
• People vs. Barlis, 231 SCRA 426, 442 [1994] — Cited for the definition of robbery as the taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things.
• People vs. Dayrit, 108 Phil. 100 [1960] — Cited for the rule that lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases where the accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs.
• People vs. Isleta, 264 SCRA 374, 390 [1996] and People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472, 485 [1997] — Cited in connection with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the imposition of the lower indivisible penalty.

• Revised Penal Code, Art. 294(1) — Defines robbery with homicide and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court used it to determine the penalty after affirming the conviction.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 63(2) — Provides that when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed. The Court applied it to reduce the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 13(7) — The mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession is limited to a plea of guilty made spontaneously and unconditionally in open court before the presentation of prosecution evidence. Christopher made no such plea.
• Revised Penal Code, Arts. 11 and 12 — Justifying and exempting circumstances. Because Christopher admitted stabbing the victim, the burden shifted to him to prove any such circumstance; he failed.
• Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(j) — Establishes the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. The Court used it to support the finding that Christopher took the victim's watch and money.
• Rules of Court, Rule 130, Secs. 36 and 37 — Section 36 limits a witness to facts derived from his own perception; Section 37 recognizes the dying declaration as an exception. The Court admitted Fernando Tarlengco's testimony on the victim's declaration under this exception.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law, Sec. 2 — The Court held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law was not applicable, so the penalty was imposed without its benefit.

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.