People of the Philippines vs. Charlie Almoguerra and Dante Aton

Circumstantial evidence satisfying the three requisites of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court — that there is more than one circumstance, that the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and that the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt — is sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, and conspiracy may be established by a chain of circumstances.

Florentino and Lily Julaton maintained a residence and store in Sitio Nabarira, Barangay Piña, San Jacinto, Masbate, where they kept a wooden chest containing cash. The offense charged — robbery with homicide — is defined and punished under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659, which prescribes the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.

Florentino and Lily Julaton lived with their three children — Gina, 14 years old; Lyn, 8 years old; and Rey, 7 years old — in Sitio Nabarira, Barangay Piña, San Jacinto, Masbate, where they kept a store and a wooden chest or "baul" containing P15,000.00 in cash and loose change. On May 9, 1994, the day of the barangay elections, the spouses went to the polling precinct at Barangay Piña to cast their votes. Before leaving, they instructed their three children to watch the store and prevent strangers from entering their house.

At around 9:30 o'clock that same morning, Jessie Genova, Jr. was gathering "malunggay" leaves at their farm, about thirty meters away from the Julaton house, when he heard appellant Dante Aton shouting and inviting him to smoke cigarettes. As he approached the house, he noticed that Aton was hiding his right hand behind the door while his left hand held a cigarette. Near the door lay the bodies of two dead children, Gina and Rey. When Aton uttered "ada na" (here he comes), appellant Charlie Almoguerra immediately went down the stairs holding assorted coins in his right hand and a bladed knife or "machete" in his left. Almoguerra then forced Jessie to accept the loose coins; frightened, Jessie received them, placed them inside his pocket, and ran away. As he fled, he heard the two shouting "kon mamarita ka, papatyon ka namon hasta an iyo familya" (if you tell somebody, we will kill you and your family). Upon reaching his house, he placed the coins inside a cabinet; after he and his father, Jessie Genova, Sr., accompanied the spouses Julaton in bringing the dead bodies to the Ticao District Hospital at San Jacinto, he gave the loose coins amounting to P30.75 to his father and told him about the incident. The next day, his father convinced him to report the matter to the police, and he executed a sworn statement.

Meanwhile, upon being informed of the incident by Sonny Amor, Florentino and Lily Julaton immediately returned home. Along the way, they saw appellant Almoguerra on the upper part of the hill near their house. Arriving there, they found all their children dead. They also found that their wooden chest had been forcibly opened and that their cash of P15,000.00 and some loose change were missing. SPO2 Noli "Socoy" Bartolay of the PNP of San Jacinto, Masbate conducted the investigation; he saw the dead bodies of Gina and Rey inside the kitchen, while that of Lyn was in the bedroom, and was informed by Lily Julaton that the wooden chest had been forcibly opened and the P15,000.00 kept therein was missing. Dr. Rosario Mores examined the victims' bodies and confirmed her three separate post-mortem reports, which recorded stab wounds on Gina (anterior neck), on Lyn (neck, abdomen, left hand, and right face), and on Rey (chest and neck). Dr. Mores declared that all the stab wounds "were probably inflicted or caused by a sharp pointed or edged instrument."

Lea Amor testified that when she visited her cousin, Efren Magdaraog, detained at the municipal building, she saw appellant Almoguerra, who was also detained. When she asked him why he killed the Julaton children, he answered that they refused to sell him cigarettes on credit. Appellant Aton, for his part, merely denied the charge. He testified that on that particular date he was in Barangay Piña to cast his vote in the barangay election but his name was not in the voters' list, so he decided to go to his brother's residence at Barangay Bagahanglad that same day. He also testified that he was investigated by the police and was forced to execute an affidavit on May 12, 1994 stating that he was with appellant Almoguerra and Efren Magdaraog when they committed the crime — an affidavit in which he narrated that Almoguerra and Magdaraog entered the Julaton house, that Magdaraog said "may cuarta pa dide" (there is money here), that Almoguerra stabbed the girl when she did not give him a cigarette, and that he ran away when Jessie Genova, Jr. arrived. He later retracted that affidavit on the ground that it was obtained involuntarily and that he was not assisted by his counsel, as a result of which Almoguerra and Magdaraog were released from detention. On May 20, 1994, with the assistance of his counsel, he executed another affidavit imputing the commission of the crime only to appellant Almoguerra, stating that he was with Almoguerra during the incident, that Almoguerra then intended to buy a cigarette, that he (Aton) prevented Almoguerra from stabbing the first victim, that Almoguerra also stabbed another girl, and that he ran away out of fear. He later attempted to retract this second affidavit as well, asserting that he was merely forced and tortured by SPO2 Bartolay to execute and sign it. On rebuttal, Dr. Jesus Camposano testified that Aton could not have been maltreated or tortured by the police and that, when physically examined, he was found to be mentally fit with no signs of apparent injuries on his body.

Appellant Charlie Almoguerra, together with his mother Josefina and his sister Rodelyn, offered a different account. On May 9, 1994, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Josefina Almoguerra left their house at Bagabansalan, Bartolabac, San Jacinto and went to the polling precinct at Barangay Piña to cast her vote; at that time, her husband Bienvenido and her children Charlie, Jerry, Darwin, and Rodelyn were still asleep. After casting her vote at about 10:00 o'clock that same morning, she heard that Florentino Julaton's children had been killed; she proceeded to their residence, stayed there until 11:00 o'clock noon, and saw the dead bodies. After informing her family and children about the incident, her husband and their son Charlie went to the Julaton's house, where they stayed for only thirty minutes because the latter had a fever caused by a boil at his left armpit. On May 12, 1994, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Charlie was investigated by the police, and on July 4, 1994 he was arrested and detained. He admitted that while he was in detention at the Matiporon provincial jail, he escaped with a certain Donggoy and thereafter committed another crime of robbery in Aroroy, Masbate.

An Information dated June 29, 1994 charged both appellants with robbery with homicide. The trial court found the defenses of denial and alibi to be the weakest of all defenses, observing that Barangay Bagahanglad, where Aton claimed to be, and Sitio Bagabansalan, Barangay Bartolabac, where Almoguerra claimed to be, are neighboring barangays of Barangay Piña reachable in a matter of minutes, and that Aton himself claimed to be in Barangay Piña on the morning of May 9, 1994 while Almoguerra's mother was also there to cast her vote. It held that the circumstances borne out by the records indubitably pointed to the accused as the culprits and that the killing was aggravated by treachery and dwelling.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant Almoguerra assigned as error the trial court's act of giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which he claimed were replete with improbabilities, and its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Insufficiency of the Evidence: Both appellants contended that the trial court erred in finding them guilty of robbery with homicide, stressing that the May 11, 1994 affidavit of prosecution witness Jessie Genova, Jr. did not mention the name of appellant Almoguerra as one of the assailants.
• Involuntariness of Aton's Affidavit: Appellant Aton argued that his May 20, 1994 affidavit stating that he was with Almoguerra when the latter committed the crime was obtained through force and maltreatment, and that he could not be held liable for robbery with homicide because he neither took the money nor killed the victims, having in fact prevented Almoguerra from killing the first victim.
• Civil Liability: Both appellants assigned as error the order directing them to pay the heirs of the three children P50,000.00 each, or a total of P150,000.00, and to return the P15,000.00 taken from the spouses Florentino and Lily Julaton.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between the appellants in the commission of the crime was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Defenses of Denial and Alibi: Whether the appellants' defenses of denial and alibi should be credited.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling attended the commission of the crime.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of death was properly imposed upon the appellants.
• Civil Liability: Whether the trial court erred in ordering the appellants to pay the heirs of the three children P50,000.00 each and to return the P15,000.00 taken from the spouses Julaton.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: No. The three requisites of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court were satisfied, and the combination of circumstances produced conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established through a chain of circumstances showing that the appellants acted with a single criminal design before, during, and after the killing.
• Defenses of Denial and Alibi: No. Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses, and the appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. Treachery and dwelling were alleged in the Information and proved by strong and convincing evidence.
• Penalty: Yes. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death; the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling warranted the supreme penalty of death.
• Civil Liability: Partly no. The award of civil indemnity and restitution was correct, but the award was modified to include P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Direct evidence is not the only matrix from which a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt; the rules on evidence and case law sustain conviction through circumstantial evidence. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that (1) there be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances be such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court adopted the thirteen circumstances relied upon by the trial court: that the appellants knew May 9, 1994 was a barangay election day and that most registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, including the spouses Julaton, would go to the polling precincts; that only the Julaton children were left to watch the house and store; that Jessie Genova, Jr. saw appellant Aton at the Julaton's house and heard him loudly invite the witness to smoke; that the witness saw Aton hiding his right arm behind the door while holding a cigarette in his left hand, and saw the bodies of two dead children; that after Aton uttered "ada na," Almoguerra descended the stairs holding a machete and loose coins; that Almoguerra forced the witness to accept the coins before the latter fled; that the witness heard both appellants threaten to kill him and his family if he reported the matter; that police investigation established the bodies were found in the kitchen and bedroom and that P15,000.00 was missing from the forcibly opened wooden chest; that physical examination showed the stab wounds were caused by a sharp pointed or edged instrument; that Aton's two affidavits placed him with Almoguerra at the Julaton store and admitted the stabbing; that Aton's May 12, 1994 affidavit revealed the intent to rob, with Magdaraog declaring "may cuarta pa dide"; that Dr. Camposano found Aton physically and mentally fit with no apparent injuries, so his affidavits deserved credence; and that Almoguerra escaped from the provincial jail and committed another robbery. Viewed in their entirety, these circumstances were as convincing as direct evidence and negated the appellants' innocence. The elements of robbery with homicide — (a) the taking of personal property by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide, used in its generic sense, is committed — were all proved.

• Conspiracy: Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. The series of events showed that the appellants were of one mind, not only in taking the money of the spouses Julaton, but also in the manner they committed the crime; their concerted actions were indications of a criminal conspiracy. Appellant Aton placed himself squarely at the crime scene when the killing occurred on the occasion of the robbery, admitting not once but twice in his own affidavits that he was with appellant Almoguerra before, during, and after the commission of the crime, and confirming the veracity of his statements on the witness stand. His contention that he intervened when Almoguerra attacked the first victim and thereafter ran away out of fear did not deserve credence; had this been so, he would not have left only after he saw prosecution witness Jessie Genova, Jr. On the whole, his conduct affirmed that he consciously concurred with Almoguerra in committing the crime.

• Defenses of Denial and Alibi: For the defense of alibi to stand, it must be shown not only that the appellants were somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Considering the distance between the scene of the crime and the places where both appellants claimed to be, it was physically possible for them to have been at the crime scene at the time of its commission. Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses; since the appellants failed to substantiate their alibi with the testimony of a credible witness, it was reduced to self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law. Appellant Almoguerra's defense was further weakened by his escape from the provincial jail; flight per se cannot prove guilt, but considered in the light of other circumstances, it may be deemed a strong indication of guilt.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling were alleged in the Information and proved by the prosecution through strong and convincing evidence. Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery, and the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of attack was not shown. Since the victims of the robbery with homicide were young children aged 7, 8, and 14, the killing was aggravated by treachery. Dwelling was likewise present, the appellants' deliberate intrusion into the privacy of the Julaton domicile showing perversity; dwelling is considered aggravating in robbery with homicide because this kind of robbery cannot be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the house.

• Penalty: Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659, the prescribed penalty for robbery with homicide is composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling attended the commission of the crime, the supreme penalty of death was imposed upon the appellants.

• Civil Liability: The trial court correctly awarded P150,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victims' heirs; when death occurs as a result of a crime, each appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. Lily Julaton's claim that P25,000.00 was spent for funeral expenses was unsubstantiated; to be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. While the prosecution failed to present any receipt, the Court was aware that such expenses were indeed incurred, and temperate damages may be recovered in lieu of actual damages when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty; following People vs. Abrazaldo, temperate damages were computed at P25,000.00. Moral damages of P50,000.00 were awarded, moral damages not being intended to enrich the victims' heirs but to allow them to obtain means for diversion that could serve to alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings, Lily Julaton having equivocally described how she and her husband suffered untold wounded feelings for the loss of their children. Exemplary damages of P25,000.00 were awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, which provides that in criminal offenses exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling being present. The order for the return of the P15,000.00 taken from the spouses Julaton was proper, the restitution of the thing itself being authorized under Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Circumstantial Evidence — Three Requisites — Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Direct evidence is not the only matrix from which a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. The Court applied the test to thirteen enumerated circumstances and held that, viewed in their entirety, they were as convincing as direct evidence and negated the appellants' innocence.

• Conspiracy Proved by Chain of Circumstances — Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances, since direct proof of a criminal agreement is rare. The Court found that the series of events showed the appellants were of one mind in taking the money and in the manner of committing the crime, their concerted actions being indications of a criminal conspiracy. Aton's admission in two affidavits that he was with Almoguerra before, during, and after the crime, confirmed on the witness stand, established his conscious concurrence.

• Alibi — Requisites and Evidentiary Weight — For alibi to prosper, it must be shown not only that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses; absent such corroboration, it is reduced to self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law. The proximity of the barangays where the appellants claimed to be — reachable from the scene in a matter of minutes — defeated the defense.

• Flight as Indication of Guilt — Flight per se cannot prove guilt, but considered in the light of other circumstances, it may be deemed a strong indication of guilt. Almoguerra's escape from the provincial jail, coupled with his commission of another robbery in Aroroy, Masbate, weakened his defense and, taken with the other circumstances, indicated guilt.

• Treachery in the Killing of Minor Children — Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. The killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of attack was not shown. The victims being aged 7, 8, and 14, the killing was aggravated by treachery.

• Dwelling in Robbery with Homicide — Dwelling is considered aggravating in robbery with homicide because this kind of robbery cannot be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the house. The appellants' deliberate intrusion into the privacy of the Julaton domicile showed perversity and warranted the imposition of the supreme penalty.

• Temperate Damages in Lieu of Actual Damages — Temperate damages may be recovered in lieu of actual damages when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. Because no receipt substantiated the claim for funeral expenses, temperate damages of P25,000.00 were awarded.

• Moral Damages — Moral damages are not intended to enrich the victims' heirs; rather, they are awarded to allow them to obtain means for diversion that could serve to alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings. P50,000.00 was awarded to the victims' heirs.

• Exemplary Damages Under Article 2230 — In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling justified an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

• Restitution Under Article 105 — The restitution of the thing itself is proper under Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code, warranting the order for the appellants to return the P15,000.00 cash stolen from the spouses Julaton.

• "Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt." — This states the threshold proposition that opens the Court's evidentiary analysis and anchors the entire conviction on circumstantial evidence; it is the canonical formulation of the rule that circumstantial evidence may suffice for conviction.
• "The proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances." — This articulates the evidentiary standard by which the Court found the appellants to have acted with a single criminal design, and is the formulation commonly cited in subsequent cases involving conspiracy proved circumstantially.
• "Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses." — This states the ratio for rejecting the appellants' defense, explaining why their uncorroborated claims of being elsewhere could not overcome the prosecution's evidence.
• "Temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty." — This defines the doctrinal basis for the award of P25,000.00 in temperate damages after the claim for funeral expenses was left unsubstantiated by receipts.

• People vs. Edralin Taboga, G.R. Nos. 144086-87, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 500 — Cited as authority for the proposition that the rules on evidence and case law sustain conviction through circumstantial evidence; the Court relied on it to justify drawing conclusions of guilt from circumstantial proof.
• People vs. Napalit, G.R. Nos. 142919 and 143876, February 4, 2003 — Cited for the enumeration of the elements of robbery with homicide: (a) taking of personal property by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide is committed.
• People vs. Visaya, G.R. No. 136967, February 26, 2001, 352 SCRA 713 — Cited for the rule that proof of conspiracy is most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances; the Court applied it to find a criminal conspiracy from the appellants' concerted actions.
• People vs. Avendaño, G.R. No. 137407, January 28, 2003 — Cited for the requisites of alibi — that the accused must show he was elsewhere and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene — and for the rule that alibi is inherently weak and unreliable unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses.
• People vs. Solamillo, G.R. No. 126131, June 17, 2003 — Cited for the requirement that actual damages be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable, and for the rule that flight, considered with other circumstances, may be a strong indication of guilt.
• People vs. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003 — Cited for the holding that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery; relied upon to appreciate treachery in the killing of the minor victims.
• People vs. Feliciano, 256 SCRA 706 (1996) — Cited for the rule that dwelling is considered aggravating in robbery with homicide because this kind of robbery cannot be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the house.
• People vs. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003 — Cited as the basis for computing temperate damages at P25,000.00 in lieu of unproved actual damages.
• People vs. Echagaray — Referenced in the closing portion of the decision as the source of the separate opinions maintaining that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional; three members of the Court adhered to those separate opinions but submitted to the majority ruling that the law is constitutional.

• Article 293, Revised Penal Code — Defines robbery as the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything. The Court used this definition as the first component of the special complex crime charged.
• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659 — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide is committed. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction and in imposing the supreme penalty of death given the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court — Sets out the three requisites of circumstantial evidence: more than one circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found all three requisites satisfied.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The presence of dwelling justified the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
• Article 105, Revised Penal Code — Governs restitution, providing for the restitution of the thing itself. The Court relied on it to affirm the order for the appellants to return the P15,000.00 taken from the spouses Julaton.
• Article 83, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 — Governs the exercise of the pardoning power in death penalty cases. The Court directed that the records be forwarded to the Office of the President upon finality of the Decision for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. The decision also records that three members of the Court, while maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echagaray that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submitted to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.