People of the Philippines vs. Cecilio Binondo

When an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, the burden lies on the accused to prove the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence; absent unlawful aggression, the plea must fail, and the killing is murder when attended by treachery or by cruelty that outrages the victim's corpse.

Cecilio Binondo was charged with murder for the killing of Pat. Domiciano Dinopol. The prosecution proceeded under the Revised Penal Code, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.

Cecilio Binondo was charged with murder for the killing of Pat. Domiciano Dinopol. At about 10:00 or 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23, 1986, prosecution witnesses Maximo Dinopol and his wife Pablita, neighbors of Cecilio, saw Cecilio with seven other persons carrying a naked body of a dead person into his yard. They alleged having heard Cecilio tell his companions that they should have nothing to worry about because he would take sole responsibility for the death of the victim. On that same evening, Cecilio brought the head of the decapitated victim to the police station at the municipal building. Pat. Esmeraldo dela Peña received it at the station although his tour of duty would yet start at 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. He asked preliminary questions; when the Station Commander arrived, the latter took over the investigation. After a brief interview, the Station Commander sent Pat. Franklin Aniñon and CHDF Boy Padilla to retrieve the body from Cecilio's house, and ordered Rosendo and Valentina, companions of Cecilio, to bring the air rifle (escopita) and bolo used by Cecilio to the Municipal building.

Dr. Ferraren, Municipal Health Officer of Ginatilan, Cebu, conducted the autopsy and issued a Medical Certificate. The certificate stated that at about 1:45 o'clock p.m. of February 24, 1986, a human head, severed from its body, identified by Pfc. Rotillo Siñeres of the Simboan Police Force as that of Pat. Domiciano Dinopol of the same force, was examined at the Municipal building, Simboan, Cebu, with findings of eyes half closed; an incised wound about 4 inches long on the lower jaw with underlying bone cracked; and lacerated wounds about 1/2 inch on the left and right parietal areas. On the same day, at about 2:20 in the afternoon, a beheaded human body was examined at the residence of the parents of Pat. Domiciano Dinopol in Samboan, with significant findings of multiple incised wounds on the thorax, at the level of the Xphoid, left lateral side, left deltoid, supraeliac area, and abdomen, with some intestines exposed and some portions severed.

Cecilio declared that he killed Pat. Domiciano Dinopol in self-defense. According to him, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of February 23, 1986, he, his wife Valentina Binondo, his son Rosendo, and Brgy. Councilman Severino Dinopol went to the house of the spouses Bilanghilot to drink tuba. They left at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening. When they were near the Barangay Health Center of Basak, the victim, carrying a gun with the left hand and a bolo in his right hand, suddenly emerged from under the mango tree and approached him in an angry mood, brandishing his bolo as if charging him, and said: "Why are you looking for me? What is your purpose?" Valentina interceded and tried to pacify Domiciano. To avoid trouble, Cecilio walked away and proceeded home with Rosendo; Severino went home ahead of Valentina.

About five minutes after Cecilio and Rosendo arrived at their house, Valentina came gasping for breath and told Cecilio to close all windows and doors because Domiciano was following her and had said he would kill Cecilio and Rosendo. Cecilio secured the front door, shut off all the lights, and got his air gun and bolo to defend himself and his companions. He asked Rosendo to go upstairs to take care of his wife and children on the second storey. Domiciano arrived and tried to force open the main door but failed. He asked Cecilio to come out, shouting: "Cilio, come out I will break your head." Domiciano went towards the kitchen door, and Cecilio awaited the attack. Domiciano forced open the kitchen door. When he was about to enter with his head protruding inside the kitchen, Cecilio aimed his rifle at Domiciano's head. From a distance of about one and one half (1-1/2) feet, he fired. Domiciano was still holding his firearm and his bolo. After the single shot from the air gun, Domiciano turned his head towards Cecilio and aimed his gun at him. Before Domiciano could fire, Cecilio attacked him with his bolo to make him loosen his hold on his weapons, followed by five or six more strokes on the neck and body to be sure Domiciano would drop his weapons. Domiciano dropped his weapons and fell to the floor. Except on the skin of the nape, the head was almost severed from the body. Knowing that Domiciano had an amulet which could revive him if his body were doused with water, Cecilio decided to cut off his head completely. Immediately thereafter, he carried the victim's body to the municipal building and surrendered to the police authorities.

The trial court refused to give credit to his plea of self-defense and convicted him of murder on the basis of his admission of killing Domiciano. It did not credit his story that the deceased went to his house purposely to kill him, and found no unlawful aggression or unjust provocation on the part of the victim. The medico-legal certificate attested to severe wounds located on vital parts of the body, and the accused suffered no physical harm or injury.

• Self-Defense: Accused-appellant Cecilio Binondo argued that the trial court erred in disregarding his plea of self-defense and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. He maintained that he killed Domiciano Dinopol in self-defense after the victim threatened him, proceeded to his house, forced open the kitchen door, and was about to attack him.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances in his favor. The decision later identifies voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance he claimed.

• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court erred in disregarding the accused-appellant's plea of self-defense and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether any attending circumstance qualified the killing to murder.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused-appellant.

• Self-Defense: No. The plea of self-defense was rejected; the accused admitted the killing but failed to prove the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, particularly unlawful aggression.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Yes. The killing was murder, qualified by treachery and by cruelty/outraging the corpse under the Revised Penal Code.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Yes, in part. The trial court erred in not appreciating voluntary surrender, but it was offset by treachery as an aggravating circumstance; incomplete self-defense could not be claimed absent unlawful aggression.

• Self-Defense: When the accused admits killing but invokes self-defense, the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing evidence lies with the accused. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Self-defense is essentially a question of fact, and the trial court, having seen and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their testimonies absent a showing that it overlooked facts and circumstances of weight and substance. The accused failed to prove unlawful aggression. Even assuming his story were true, the oral threat made by Domiciano to kill him, unaccompanied by any other unequivocal act clearly showing intent to carry out the threat, did not constitute unlawful aggression; mere shouting of threats and poundings on the door of the accused's house were not unlawful aggression. Because the accused extinguished all sources of light inside the house, there could not have been any immediate and imminent attack from the victim, who could not locate him physically. The physical evidence also negated self-defense: the accused suffered no harm or injury; the number and nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim proved that the attack came from the accused; the victim had no chance to defend himself even if armed; the wounds were severe and located on vital parts; and the accused continued inflicting injuries after the victim fell helpless. The means employed became unreasonable and unnecessary when, after the aggression ceased and the victim no longer posed any threat, the accused continued inflicting injuries. The decapitation was not justified by the claim that the victim possessed an amulet, because a dead man could not have posed further resistance or attack.
• Qualifying Circumstances: The crime committed was murder. Treachery was established from the testimony of the accused himself. According to him, his wife arrived ahead of the victim and he was apprised that the victim was on his way to their house and was threatening to kill him and his son. He had enough time to prepare himself, his weapons, and his surroundings in a way that he would have the advantage of position and could deliver the first blow without risk to himself from his unwary victim. He accomplished this by putting off all the lights inside the house and by positioning himself near the kitchen door where he could not be seen at once. The accused employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the offense which tended directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. These facts constituted treachery, which raised the crime to murder. Furthermore, when the killing was done with cruelty, by deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, it was likewise qualified to murder. No greater outrage, insult, or abuse can a person commit upon a corpse than to sever the head therefrom; the head represents the dignity of the person, and any violence directed towards it cannot be interpreted in any other manner than an outrage to his corpse.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The trial court erred in not appreciating voluntary surrender in favor of the accused. This may be offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused could not claim incomplete self-defense because there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. However, the killing was accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of outraging the corpse of the victim, thus constituting the crime into murder. Treachery may be considered as a mere aggravating circumstance which may be set off by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Self-defense; burden of proof — When the accused admits having killed the victim but invokes self-defense, the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing evidence lies with the accused. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. In this case, Binondo admitted the killing but failed to discharge that burden.
• Unlawful aggression — Unlawful aggression is an essential element of self-defense. An oral threat to kill, unaccompanied by any other unequivocal act clearly showing intent to carry out the threat, does not constitute unlawful aggression. Mere shouting of threats and poundings on the door of the accused's house do not constitute unlawful aggression. The Court found no unlawful aggression, especially because the accused had extinguished all lights and the victim could not locate him.
• Reasonable necessity of the means employed — The means employed in repelling an attack must be reasonably necessary. The defense fails where the accused continues inflicting injuries after the aggression has ceased and the victim is helpless. The Court found the means unreasonable because the accused inflicted numerous severe wounds on vital parts and decapitated the victim after he had dropped his weapons and fallen.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when the accused employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the offense which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The Court found treachery from the accused's own testimony: he had time to prepare, put off the lights, and position himself near the kitchen door where he could not be seen at once, enabling him to deliver the first blow without risk.
• Cruelty/outraging the corpse — A killing is qualified to murder when done with cruelty, by deliberately or inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or by outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. No greater outrage, insult, or abuse can be committed upon a corpse than to sever the head therefrom; the head represents the dignity of the person. The Court held that decapitation outraged the victim's corpse.
• Voluntary surrender — Voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance. The trial court erred in not appreciating it in favor of the accused. It may be offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. In this case, the killing remained murder because of the qualifying circumstance of outraging the corpse.
• Incomplete self-defense — Incomplete self-defense cannot be claimed where there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The Court held that the accused could not claim it because unlawful aggression was absent.

• "Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that when the accused admits having killed the victim, but invokes self-defense, the burden of proving the elements of that defense by clear and convincing evidence lies with the accused." — This states the controlling rule on the burden of proof in self-defense cases and explains why Binondo's admission of the killing did not relieve him of proving his defense.
• "Even assuming that his story were true, the oral threat made by Domiciano to kill him unaccompanied by any other unequivocal act clearly showing his intent to carry out his threat does not constitute unlawful aggression." — This defines the threshold for unlawful aggression and is central to the rejection of the self-defense plea.
• "The accused-appellant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the offense which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. These facts established by evidence on record clearly constitute treachery, which raised the crime to murder." — This is the Court's canonical application of treachery to the accused's preparation and positioning before the killing.
• "No greater outrage, insult or abuse can a person commit upon a corpse than to server the head therefrom. The head represents the dignity of the person and any violence directed towards it cannot be interpreted in any other manner than an outrage to his corpse." — This articulates the Court's basis for treating the decapitation as cruelty/outraging the corpse, a circumstance that qualified the killing to murder.

• People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 (1946); People vs. Libed, 14 SCRA 410 (1965); People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 (1972); People vs. Kindo, 95 SCRA 553 (1980); People vs. Bacoyot, 174 SCRA 285 (1989); People vs. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 (1991) — Cited in the decision's footnote to the doctrine that when the accused admits killing but invokes self-defense, the burden of proving the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence lies with the accused.
• People vs. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 (1991) — Cited again in relation to the rule that self-defense is essentially a question of fact and that the trial court, having seen and heard the witnesses, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies.
• People vs. Masangkay, 157 SCRA 320 (1988) — Cited for the rule that mere shouting of threats and poundings on the door of the accused's house do not constitute unlawful aggression.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 248, paragraph 6 — Cited for cruelty/outraging the corpse as a qualifying circumstance for murder. The Court applied it because the accused severed the victim's head from the corpse.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 14 — Cited for treachery as an aggravating circumstance. The Court considered treachery as an aggravating circumstance that may be offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 14, paragraph 16 — Cited in the footnote to the cruelty/outraging-corpse discussion as an additional reference.

Chief Justice Narvasa; Justices Feliciano, Regalado, and Nocon concurred.