People of the Philippines vs. Cecilia Que Yabut et al.

Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is a transitory or continuing offense, and the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any one of its essential ingredients took place. The delivery of the check to the payee is the final act essential to the consummation of the obligation, and the place of delivery fixes the venue where the element of deceit transpired.

The private respondents, Cecilia Que Yabut and Geminiano Yabut, Jr., were officers of the Yabut Transit Line, a business concern. They were separately charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, for issuing checks drawn against banks in Caloocan City in payment for tires and gas supplies purchased from Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station, owned and operated by Alicia P. Andan. The complainant maintained her business and residence in Malolos, Bulacan. The cases presented novel questions concerning the rule on venue or jurisdiction in estafa cases involving postdated or insufficient-fund checks, and whether the new law on checks punishes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

Cecilia Que Yabut, as treasurer of the Yabut Transit Line, was charged in criminal case 1404 before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan with estafa by means of false pretenses. The information alleged that during the period from February 22 to February 26, 1975, in the Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, she prepared, issued, and made out Check Nos. CB-19035 B, CB-190396, and CB-190397, dated February 22, February 24, and February 26, 1975, in the total sum of P6,568.94, drawn against the Merchants Banking Corporation in Caloocan City, payable to Freeway Tires Supply, owned and operated by Alicia P. Andan. The checks were issued in payment for articles and merchandise delivered to and received by the accused, who well knew that at the time there were no or insufficient funds in the bank. Upon presentation, the checks were dishonored, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to deposit the necessary funds, to the damage and prejudice of Alicia P. Andan.

Geminiano Yabut, Jr., husband of Cecilia Que Yabut, was separately charged in criminal case 1405-M before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, presided over by Judge Edgardo L. Paras, with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that during the period from February 23 to April 9, 1975, in the Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, he, as president of the Yabut Transit Line, by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation and Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company, located in Caloocan City, prepared, issued, and made out fourteen checks in the total sum of P37,206.00, payable to Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station, owned and operated by Alicia P. Andan, in payment for articles and merchandise delivered to and received by the accused. The checks were dishonored upon presentation, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to deposit the necessary funds.

Instead of entering a plea, Cecilia Que Yabut filed a motion to quash on September 1, 1975, contending that the acts charged do not constitute the offense because there was no allegation that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the merchandise, and that the venue was improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued and delivered to, and received by, the complainant in Caloocan City, where she holds office. Geminiano Yabut, Jr. similarly moved to quash on the grounds that the facts recited do not constitute an offense because the checks were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation, and that the venue was improperly laid. The People opposed the motions, maintaining that Republic Act No. 4885, amending Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, penalizes the postdating or issuance of checks in payment of pre-existing obligations, and that the Malolos court could exercise jurisdiction since the last ingredient of the offense, damage, transpired in Bulacan, the residence of the complainant.

Judge Jesus de Vega quashed the information against Cecilia Que Yabut on November 10, 1975, ruling that the proper venue was Caloocan City and not Bulacan, without resolving whether estafa lies for postdating or issuing a check in payment of a pre-existing obligation. Judge Paras quashed the information against Geminiano Yabut, Jr. on October 13, 1975, ruling that all the elements of the crime — issuance of the rubber check, attempted encashment, and refusal to honor — took place within the territorial jurisdiction of Caloocan City. The People's motions for reconsideration were denied, and the People filed the two petitions for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

• Venue and Jurisdiction: The People maintained that the Malolos court could exercise jurisdiction over the case, since the last ingredient of the offense, damage, transpired in Bulacan, the residence of the complainant, after the dishonor of the checks for lack of funds.
• Pre-existing Obligation: The People argued that Republic Act No. 4885, amending Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, penalizes the postdating or issuance of checks in payment of pre-existing obligations.
• Nature of the Obligation: The prosecution represented to the trial courts in its Opposition to the Motions to Quash: "We will prove by our evidence that said checks are not in payment of a pre-existing obligation."

• Facts Do Not Constitute an Offense: Cecilia Que Yabut contended that the acts charged do not constitute the offense because there is no allegation that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the merchandise, the crime of estafa not being indictable when checks are postdated or issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
• Improper Venue: The respondents argued that the venue was improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued and delivered to, and received by, the complainant in Caloocan City, where respondent Que Yabut holds office.
• Pre-existing Obligation: Geminiano Yabut, Jr. moved to quash on the ground that the facts recited do not constitute an offense because the checks were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

• Venue and Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of First Instance of Bulacan properly acquired jurisdiction over the estafa cases, or whether venue should have been laid in Caloocan City where the checks were written, signed, or dated.
• Sufficiency of the Informations: Whether the facts charged in the informations constitute estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885.
• Pre-existing Obligation: Whether the postdating or issuance of a worthless check in payment of a pre-existing obligation constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Venue and Jurisdiction: Yes. Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or continuing offense, and the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place, pursuant to Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.
• Sufficiency of the Informations: Yes. The facts alleged in the informations, if hypothetically admitted, substantially meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law, and the averments sufficiently inform the respondents of the nature and cause of the accusations against them.
• Pre-existing Obligation: Deferred. Due to the absence of concrete evidence on the specific nature of the obligation assumed or supposedly discharged by the issuance of the bad checks, resolution of this controversial issue on the basis of the averments in the criminal informations alone is not yet ripe.

• Venue and Jurisdiction: The Court reasoned that estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or continuing offense, whose basic elements of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In such event, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. The theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or province, the court of that municipality or province has the sole jurisdiction to try the case. In the present cases, deceit took place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage occurred in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks. Jurisdiction could, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered. The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed; what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative; until delivery, the contract is revocable. The issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto. The element of deceit through the issuance and delivery of the worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Bulacan, conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case.

• Delivery to a Messenger: The Court rejected the argument that Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from the respondents in Caloocan City constituted delivery to the complainant at that place. Yambao did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as payee or indorsee, and there appeared to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in her sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal that Yambao was but her "messenger" or "part-time employee." There was no special fiduciary relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential; the principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so to act. It must exist as a fact; the law makes no presumption thereof, and the person alleging it has the burden of proof to show not only the fact of its existence but also its nature and extent. This is more imperative when it is considered that the transaction dealt with involves checks, which are not legal tender, and the creditor may validly refuse the same as payment of obligation.

• Place of Business of the Offended Party: The Court further noted that the place of business of the offended party, the Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station, is at Malolos, Bulacan, from where the tire and gas purchases were made by the two private respondents. As a consequence, payment thereof should be considered effected at Malolos, Bulacan. Under Article 1251 of the Civil Code, if the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing, the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the obligation was constituted. The receipt by the two private respondents at Caloocan City of the tires and gas supplies from Malolos, Bulacan, signifies but the consummation of the contract between the parties; it was the result of an obligation previously contracted at Malolos, Bulacan. The averments in the informations do not indicate that the complainant is an ambulant peddler of tires and gas, but maintains a fixed and determinate place of business at Malolos, Bulacan. Obligations, therefore, contracted as regards her business must presumptively be at her place of business.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: The Court held that in considering a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. The facts alleged in the criminal charge should be taken as they are. An analysis of the two informations involved in the present case convinced the Court that the facts charged therein substantially constitute the integral elements of the offense as defined in the law, and the averments sufficiently inform the two private respondents of the nature and cause of the accusations against them, thereby defeating any constitutional objection of lack of notice.

• Pre-existing Obligation: The Court deferred resolution of whether the postdating or issuing of a worthless check in payment of a pre-existing obligation constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, due to the absence of concrete evidence on the specific nature of the obligation assumed or supposedly discharged by the issuance of the bad checks. The parties were at divergence on the character of the obligation for which the private respondents issued the checks intended as payment thereof. The deferment of the resolution became more imperative when it is considered that the question raised is one of first impression and of consequential far-ranging effects on transactions in checks.

• Transitory or Continuing Offense — An offense is transitory or continuing when its essential elements may independently arise in separate places, and the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. The Court applied this doctrine to estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, holding that deceit and damage may arise in different places, and jurisdiction may be entertained by either court where an essential ingredient took place.

• Venue in Criminal Actions — Under Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. The Court applied this rule to hold that the Malolos court properly acquired jurisdiction because the element of deceit through the issuance and delivery of the worthless checks took place in Malolos, Bulacan.

• Delivery as the Final Act of Consummation — The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation; an undelivered bill or note is inoperative, and until delivery, the contract is revocable. The Court applied this principle to determine that the place of delivery of the checks, not the place where they were written, signed, or dated, fixes the venue of the offense.

• Contract of Agency Not Presumed — For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential; the principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so to act. It must exist as a fact, and the law makes no presumption thereof; the person alleging it has the burden of proof to show not only the fact of its existence but also its nature and extent. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the claim that a mere messenger or part-time employee who received the checks was an agent of the complainant for purposes of fixing venue.

• Motion to Quash Based on Facts Not Constituting an Offense — In considering a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. The facts alleged in the criminal charge should be taken as they are. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the informations substantially alleged the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.

• "Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the event of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed." — This passage articulates the core doctrine of the case, establishing that estafa by bad check is a transitory offense and that jurisdiction may be entertained by any court where an essential ingredient took place.

• "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is revocable." — This passage defines the controlling principle for determining the place of commission of the offense, emphasizing that delivery, not the place of writing or signing, fixes the venue.

• "In considering a motion to quash based on the ground '(t)hat the facts charged do not constitute an offense,' the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. The facts alleged in the criminal charge should be taken as they are." — This passage states the standard for resolving motions to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, which the Court applied to uphold the sufficiency of the informations.

• Tuzon vs. Cruz, L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 238-39 — Cited as authority for the proposition that estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a transitory or continuing offense, and that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed.
• US vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 390 (1912) — Cited for the proposition that the basic elements of estafa are deceit and damage.
• People vs. Yumang, L-19569, May 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 299 — Cited in support of the rule on venue for transitory offenses, that the action may be instituted where any essential ingredient of the offense took place.
• People vs. Segovia, 103 Phil. 1162, unrep. (1958) — Cited for the standard in resolving motions to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
• People vs. Supnad, 117 Phil. 617 (1963) — Cited for the proposition that the facts alleged in the criminal charge should be taken as they are in resolving a motion to quash.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code — The provision defining the crime of estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The Court applied this provision to determine the elements of the offense and the sufficiency of the informations.
• Republic Act No. 4885 — The amendatory law on checks that penalizes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of pre-existing obligations. The Court noted the parties' divergence on whether this law covers checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, and deferred resolution of the question.
• Section 14(a), Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court — The rule providing that in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. The Court applied this rule to uphold the Malolos court's jurisdiction.
• Section 2(a), Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court — The rule on motions to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The Court applied this rule in determining the sufficiency of the informations.
• Section 190, Negotiable Instruments Law — The provision defining a holder as the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. The Court applied this provision to determine that Modesto Yambao, as a mere messenger, did not take delivery of the checks as holder.
• Article 1249, Civil Code of the Philippines — The provision stating that checks are not legal tender and the creditor may validly refuse the same as payment of obligation. The Court cited this provision in support of its reasoning on the delivery of checks.
• Article 1251, Civil Code of the Philippines — The provision stating that if the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing, the payment shall be made wherever the thing might be at the moment the obligation was constituted. The Court applied this provision to determine that payment should be considered effected at Malolos, Bulacan, the place of business of the offended party.
• Article 1475, Civil Code of the Philippines — The provision establishing that a contract of sale is consensual in nature. The Court cited this provision in support of its reasoning that the receipt of tires and gas supplies at Caloocan City was the result of an obligation previously contracted at Malolos, Bulacan.

• Justice Makasiar
• Justice Antonio
• Justice Muñoz Palma (concurred in the results)

• Justice Teehankee (concurring) — Justice Teehankee concurred on the ground that the informations expressly allege that the crimes of estafa were committed in the Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan. He reasoned that respondents' motions to quash on the ground of improper venue must yield to the express allegations of the informations, bearing in mind that what determines jurisdiction are the allegations in the information and that venue is sufficiently conferred wherein any one of the essential ingredients of the offense charged took place. He further noted that a quashal motion raising the question of lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged raises a simple question of law and imports on the part of the accused-movant a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. He observed that the informations actually charge that estafa was committed in two aspects: by obtaining the goods by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds for the checks issued in payment of the goods, and by issuing checks without sufficient funds, under Article 315, paragraphs 2(a) and (d) of the Revised Penal Code. He agreed that the question of whether Republic Act No. 4885 now includes the act of issuing a bad check in payment of a pre-existing obligation in the crime of estafa was properly ruled as premature, and cannot be resolved until the facts, such as whether the checks were issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, shall have been duly established at the trial.