Primary Holding
A killing resulting from an intentional unlawful act cannot be classified as reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which applies only to acts that are lawful in themselves but performed without due care. When the act causing death is itself a criminal offense, the resulting crime is the felony defined by the Revised Penal Code, subject to the mitigating circumstances that may be present.
Background
The defendant Catalino Rabao and the deceased Salvacion Agawa were married before the justice of the peace of Naga on January 15, 1936, and had since been born to the marriage. The couple made their home in the house of Urbano Rellora, who lived maritally with the mother of the accused. The case arose from a domestic quarrel on the morning of December 15, 1937, in the municipality of Naga, Province of Camarines Sur, which resulted in the wife's death and the subsequent filing of a criminal information charging the defendant with parricide.
History
-
The acting provincial fiscal of Camarines Sur filed an information charging the defendant with parricide for killing his wife Salvacion Agawa on December 15, 1937, committed with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength.
-
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicted the appellant of parricide and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from eight years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs.
-
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that the lower court erred in declaring that he hit the deceased on the abdomen which caused her death, instead of finding him, at most, guilty of parricide through reckless imprudence.
Facts
Catalino Rabao and Salvacion Agawa were married on January 15, 1936, and thereafter made their home in the house of Urbano Rellora, who lived maritally with the mother of the accused. On the morning of December 15, 1937, the defendant, hardly awake after staying up late the previous night on account of the elections held in the municipality of Naga, noticed that his wife was preparing water with which to give the child a bath. He told his wife not to bathe the child because it had a cold, but the wife insisted, and a quarrel arose in the heat of which the accused punched his wife on the abdomen. She fell seated on a sack of rice nearby and immediately suffered an attack of which she died in spite of the aid rendered her by the accused himself and other persons who had arrived.
The following morning, Dr. Vicente Roxas performed an autopsy and found that the spleen of the deceased had been hypertrophied due to an acute and chronic malaria from which she had been suffering, and that death was caused by the hemorrhage of the spleen when it was ruptured as a consequence of an external blow on the abdomen which might have been that delivered by the accused. Urbano Rellora, the owner of the house where the defendant and the deceased lived, testified positively that he saw the accused punch his wife on the abdomen, as a result of which she fell seated on a sack of rice and that very moment she had an attack, became unconscious, and expired. The defendant himself, in his sworn declaration subscribed before the justice of the peace of Naga, voluntarily admitted having hit his wife on the abdomen with his fist when she said things that offended and made him nervous.
Another eye-witness, Raymundo Hilano, declared that he was passing in front of the defendant's house when he heard and saw him quarrelling with his wife and that the defendant was delivering blows on his wife. The Court found this testimony incredible, however, because Hilano claimed to have seen the aggression through a window that was three and a half meters high from the ground where he stood, making it clear that he could not have seen what was happening inside the house. The defense contended that the accused should, at most, be found guilty of parricide through reckless imprudence, but the Court rejected this theory.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Error in Finding of Fact: The defense alleged that the lower court erred in declaring that the accused hit the deceased on the abdomen, which caused her death, instead of finding him, at most, guilty of parricide through reckless imprudence.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Affirmation of Conviction: The Office of the Solicitor-General, representing the People of the Philippines, argued in support of the trial court's judgment convicting the appellant of parricide.
Issues
- Classification of the Offense: Whether the defendant's act of punching his wife on the abdomen, causing her death, constitutes parricide rather than parricide through reckless imprudence.
- Proper Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed by the lower court was in accordance with law, given the mitigating circumstances present and the absence of aggravating circumstances.
Ruling
-
Classification of the Offense: No. The defendant's act is not mere reckless imprudence. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that go to make up reckless imprudence must be lawful in themselves, and the attack consisting of the blow the defendant dealt his wife is not lawful, since it transgresses the Revised Penal Code itself, which expressly prohibits it under pain of punishment. The facts proven constitute the crime of parricide defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
-
Proper Penalty: The penalty imposed by the lower court was not in accordance with law. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of parricide is punished with reclusion perpetua to death. These penalties are indivisible, and Article 63, rule 3 provides that whenever there is present some mitigating circumstance with no aggravating one, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The penalty that should be imposed on the accused is that of reclusion perpetua.
Ruling Rationale
-
Classification of the Offense: The Court found that the lower court did not err in finding that the accused hit the deceased on the abdomen, which directly caused the rupture of her spleen, producing thereby an internal hemorrhage that caused her almost instant death. Urbano Rellora testified positively that he saw the accused punch his wife on the abdomen, and this testimony was corroborated by Dr. Roxas, who performed the autopsy and declared that death was caused by the hemorrhage produced by the rupture of the spleen, which rupture was caused by an external blow on the abdomen. The defendant himself voluntarily admitted having hit his wife on the abdomen with his fist. The Court rejected the defense's theory of reckless imprudence because under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts constituting reckless imprudence must be lawful in themselves; the attack consisting of the blow the defendant dealt his wife is certainly not lawful, since it transgresses the Revised Penal Code itself, which expressly prohibits it under pain of punishment.
-
Proper Penalty: The Court found that the following mitigating circumstances were present in favor of the defendant: lack of intention to commit so grave a crime (Article 13 [3], Revised Penal Code); having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation (Article 13 [6]); having surrendered himself to the authorities immediately after the commission of the crime (Article 13 [7]); with no aggravating circumstance. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of parricide is punished with reclusion perpetua to death. These penalties are indivisible, and the Revised Penal Code provides, in Article 63, rule 3, that whenever there is present some mitigating circumstance with no aggravating one, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court was convinced that the defendant did not really have the intention of committing so grave a crime as parricide, as the quarrel that led to the aggression had its origin from the natural and justifiable desire of the defendant, as a father, to prevent his child, which was then ill, from being given a bath. The Court invoked Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code and recommended to the President of the Philippines the commutation of the penalty imposed on the defendant.
Doctrines
-
Reckless Imprudence Distinguished from Intentional Felony — Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that constitute reckless imprudence must be lawful in themselves; when the act causing the injury or death is itself unlawful and prohibited by the penal code, the resulting crime is the felony defined by the code, not reckless imprudence. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the defendant's act of punching his wife was unlawful and therefore constituted parricide, not parricide through reckless imprudence.
-
Application of Penalty for Indivisible Penalties with Mitigating Circumstances — Under Article 63, rule 3 of the Revised Penal Code, whenever there is present some mitigating circumstance with no aggravating one, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this rule in imposing reclusion perpetua, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties prescribed for parricide under Article 246, given the presence of three mitigating circumstances and the absence of any aggravating circumstance.
Key Excerpts
-
"The defendant's act is not mere reckless imprudence, as the defense contends, since under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code the acts that go to make up reckless imprudence must be lawful in themselves, and the attack consisting in the blow the defendant dealt his wife is certainly not lawful, since it transgresses the Revised Penal Code itself, which expressly prohibits it under pain of punishment." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi distinguishing reckless imprudence from an intentional felony, establishing that an unlawful act cannot be classified as mere imprudence.
-
"Under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code the crime of parricide is punished with reclusion perpetua to death. These penalties are indivisible and the Revised Penal Code provides, in article 63, rule 3, that whenever there is present some mitigating circumstance with no aggravating one, the lesser penalty shall be applied." — This passage states the controlling rule for determining the proper penalty when mitigating circumstances are present and no aggravating circumstance exists.
-
"The quarrel that led to the aggression had its origin from the natural and justifiable desire of the defendant, as a father, to prevent his child, which was then ill, from being given a bath." — This passage explains the Court's basis for appreciating the mitigating circumstances in favor of the defendant, grounding the finding of lack of intention to commit so grave a crime.
Precedents Cited
N/A — The decision does not cite any prior case law.
Provisions
-
Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of parricide and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision in affirming the defendant's conviction for parricide.
-
Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines reckless imprudence and provides that the acts constituting it must be lawful in themselves. The Court applied this provision in rejecting the defense's theory that the killing constituted only reckless imprudence.
-
Article 63, rule 3, Revised Penal Code — Provides that whenever there is present some mitigating circumstance with no aggravating one, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this provision in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
-
Article 13 (3), (6), (7), Revised Penal Code — Lists the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a crime, passion or obfuscation, and voluntary surrender to the authorities. The Court appreciated these circumstances in favor of the defendant.
-
Article 5, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Authorizes the Court to recommend to the President the commutation of the penalty. The Court invoked this provision in recommending commutation of the penalty imposed.
-
Article 41, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the accessory penalties for the crime of parricide. The Court imposed these accessory penalties in its judgment.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concurred.
Notable Dissenting Opinions
N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the decision.