People of the Philippines vs. Carlos Villamor

A conviction for rape may rest solely on the credible testimony of the victim, and an information that fails to allege the victim's age is merely defective, not void, where the omitted fact is established by evidence admitted without objection and the imposable penalty is unaffected; the failure to move to quash a duplicitous information before entering a plea waives the defect and authorizes conviction for as many offenses as are charged and proved.

Carlos Villamor is the uncle of the complainant Efegin Villamor, her father being his brother, and the complainant lived with him under the same roof in Barangay Marintoc, Mobo, Masbate. The alleged offenses spanned September 1989 to October 1993, a period straddling the effectivity on December 31, 1993 of Republic Act No. 7659, the Death Penalty Law, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code to make the death penalty mandatory where the rape victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. That statutory backdrop controls both the penalty imposable and the treatment of the information's omission of the complainant's age.

Efegin Villamor, thirteen years old at the time of her testimony, was the niece of Carlos Villamor, her father being the accused's brother. She lived with the accused under the same roof in Barangay Marintoc, Mobo, Masbate, and was dependent on him for shelter and sustenance.

According to the prosecution, sometime in September 1989, while she was sleeping in the bedroom of the house, she was awakened by movements inside the room and was surprised to see before her the accused, her own uncle, holding a bolo. He immediately removed her underwear; when she resisted his advances, he punched and strangled her until she lost consciousness. Upon regaining consciousness soon after, she saw the accused still on top of her in the process of consummating his bestial desire. After satisfying his lust, he threatened her not to report the incident to anyone.

The abuse continued for four more years, until October 30, 1993, when the accused again sexually assaulted her. No longer able to bear such depredations, sometime in November 1993 she related her experience to a certain Donna Thelma Bongais, who reported the matter to Nilda Medina of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in Masbate; the DSWD in turn took custody of the complainant. Dra. Florenda D. Almero, provincial health officer of Masbate, examined her and issued a report entitled "Physical and Medical Examination" showing, among external findings, developed breasts and sparsely grown pubic hair, and, among internal findings, a curdled-milk-like discharge inside the vaginal canal, old-healed hymenal lacerations corresponding to the 2, 6, and 9 o'clock positions, an orifice admitting three fingers of the examiner's hand with slight resistance, and a smear for human spermatozoa with a positive pregnancy test. The complainant also revealed that she had been abused at least ten times from September 1989 to October 1993; as a result she became pregnant and gave birth on July 2, 1994.

The accused, for his part, claimed that the charge against him was a fabrication by the complainant due to her hostility against him and upon the inducement of Donna Thelma Bongais. He testified that the complainant, at an early age, was already involved with his son Danilo, as evidenced by two letters he discovered in his son's wallet; that upon learning of the relationship he confronted the complainant and manifested his objections; and that on two occasions he allegedly caught the complainant and his son having carnal knowledge. These incidents, according to the accused, aroused the complainant's anger and precipitated her charges of rape against him. His testimony was corroborated by his wife, Romana, who narrated that she knew of the relationship between Danilo and the complainant. To establish the basis for Bongais' inducement, the accused further testified that he had quarreled with the former's brother over a misunderstanding concerning an ice box.

In resolving the case, the trial court accorded full faith and credence to the complainant's testimony regarding how she was sexually molested by the accused, finding it clear, straightforward, and convincing, and dismissed the claim that the charge was merely a fabrication by both the complainant and Bongais. It accordingly convicted the accused of ten counts of rape, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of ten reclusion perpetua, ordered him to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P500,000.00, and to support the offspring.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Appellant raised the sole issue that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten counts of rape.
• Delay in Reporting: Appellant harped on the fact that it took the complainant more than five years to report the crime.
• Failure to Recall Specific Dates: Appellant stressed the failure of the complainant to remember the specific dates of the ten other defilements.
• Fabrication and Hostility: Appellant claimed that the charge against him was a fabrication by the complainant due to her hostility against him and upon the inducement of Donna Thelma Bongais, the inducement being traced to his quarrel with the latter's brother over a misunderstanding concerning an ice box.
• The Danilo Theory: Appellant asserted that it was Danilo, his son, who had intercourse with the complainant, and that the complainant's relationship with Danilo had been the subject of his objections and of two occasions on which he allegedly caught them having carnal knowledge.
• Lapse of Memory: Appellant contended that the complainant's inability to remember the exact month and date of her brother's death cast serious doubt on the veracity and reliability of her testimony, especially regarding important matters.
• Duplicitous Information: Appellant questioned the propriety of being charged with ten counts of rape under one information.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten counts of rape.
• Defective Information — Age of the Complainant: Whether the failure of the information to state the age of the complainant rendered the conviction for statutory rape invalid.
• Right to be Informed of the Charge: Whether the omission of the complainant's age from the information violated the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
• Duplicitous Information: Whether the accused may be convicted of ten counts of rape charged in a single information.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and the awards of civil indemnity and damages were proper.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: No. The conviction stands; the complainant's testimony, found clear, straightforward, and convincing, established the ten counts, and the defense of denial cannot prevail over her positive identification of the accused.
• Defective Information — Age of the Complainant: No. The omission did not invalidate the conviction because the imposable penalty was the same under paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 335 for offenses committed before Republic Act No. 7659, and the defect was cured by the complainant's unobjected testimony that she was nine years old at the time of the first assault.
• Right to be Informed of the Charge: No violation. The accused could not invoke surprise, the order of the investigating judge having stated the complainant's age, and he was in any event aware that his victim was a young girl, his niece, living under his roof.
• Duplicitous Information: No. The defect was waived by the failure to move to quash before entering a plea, and the Court could convict him of as many offenses as were charged and proved.
• Penalty and Damages: Correct as to the penalty. Reclusion perpetua for each count was proper because Republic Act No. 7659's mandatory death penalty did not apply to offenses committed before its effectivity; the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 per count was affirmed, and moral damages of P100,000.00 were additionally awarded.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: The Court applied the settled principles that an accusation for rape can be made facilely, that it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused to disprove, and that the prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Corollarily, when the victim says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof; the evidence must not only proceed from a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as common experience and observation can approve as probable under the circumstances. The trial court found the complainant's testimony clear, straightforward, and convincing. The delay of more than five years in reporting was readily explained: from the first to the last offense in October 1993, the victim was a minor living in the house of the accused and dependent on him for shelter and sustenance, and he threatened her with death, so that a young girl was easily intimidated and would rather keep quiet than risk physical harm and humiliation. The accused, her uncle, was at least forty years old when the first assault was committed and exercised moral ascendancy, not to mention physical superiority, over a nine-year-old ingenue. Her failure to remember the specific dates of the ten defilements was immaterial, since the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. The claim of fabrication was rejected: it was highly inconceivable that the complainant would accuse the accused of rape merely because he castigated her over her love life, no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless it were true, and it stretched the imagination to assert that Bongais urged the complainant to concoct the charge on the flimsy ground of a misunderstanding between her brother and the accused over a trifle dispute involving an ice bucket. The theory that Danilo was the culprit was likewise rejected, the complainant having vehemently denied it and having testified on direct and cross-examination in a straightforward, clear, and convincing manner; besides, it was unbelievable that the complainant and Danilo would have had a sexual relationship considering that both were less than fourteen years old when the alleged liaison started in 1992, and the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserves full credence. Her inability to remember the exact date of her brother's death was too inconsequential to merit discourse, her brother having died when she was only nine years old. Finally, the accused could offer only a mere denial, without even explaining or elucidating relevant factors; denial as a defense is inherently weak and viewed with disfavor due to the facility with which it can be concocted, and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness. After going over the complainant's testimony in its entirety, the Court was convinced of the accused's culpability for the other nine counts of rape.

• Defective Information — Age of the Complainant: The information filed against the accused failed to state the age of the complainant, even though he was convicted of statutory rape. This defect notwithstanding, the trial court did not err in convicting him. First, the crime having occurred prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, whether the offense was committed under paragraph 1 (using force or intimidation) or paragraph 3 (statutory rape) of Article 335, the imposable penalty would still be the same — reclusion perpetua. Second, the information was not void; it was merely defective. The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised. Here, the complainant testified that at the time the first sexual abuse occurred she was only nine years old, a fact to which the defense did not object.

• Right to be Informed of the Charge: The failure to state the complainant's age in the information cannot be considered a violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charge against him. It would be illogical not to assume that when the accused ravished the complainant, he was aware that his victim was a mere slip of a girl, unsophisticated and defenseless; moreover, aside from being his niece, the complainant lived with him under the same roof. Furthermore, even if the information did not allege that the complainant was nine years old, there was substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him when the order issued by the investigating judge, a copy of which was attached to the record of the preliminary investigation, clearly stated that the complainant was nine years old. Consequently, the defense could not invoke the element of surprise so as to deprive it of the opportunity to suitably prepare for the accused's defense.

• Duplicitous Information: Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information must charge only one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. However, under Sections 1 and 3(e) of Rule 117, the accused, before entering his plea, should have moved to quash the complaint for being duplicitous; otherwise, he is deemed to have waived the defect. Hence, the Court could convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them.

• Penalty and Damages: Under Republic Act No. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the relationship of uncle and niece in rape makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. However, since the offenses were committed prior to the effectivity of that law, the original penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty, should be imposed; thus the trial court correctly sentenced the accused to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. Since there was a total of ten separate counts of rape, the trial court imposed P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each, or a total of P500,000.00, evidently in line with prevailing jurisprudence existing at the time it rendered judgment; accordingly, the civil indemnity to be awarded should be P50,000.00 for each count, or a total of P500,000.00. In addition to the civil indemnity, in crimes of rape moral damages may now be awarded to the victim without the need for proving the same in the pleadings, since the anguish and pain the victim had to endure are so evident that it would be expecting too much for her to recite in detail her traumatic experience simply to obtain pecuniary restitution. A rape victim is a victim many times over, physically, socially, psychologically, and emotionally scarred in a way that may last a lifetime; rape stigmatizes the victim worse than the perpetrators, as our culture puts a premium on purity and virginity as virtues.

• Credibility of the Rape Victim's Testimony — When the victim says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed; if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. The Court applied this rule to sustain the conviction, the trial court having found the complainant's testimony clear, straightforward, and convincing.
• Evidence Must Be Credible in Itself — For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court used this standard in evaluating the complainant's account.
• Prosecution Evidence Must Stand on Its Own Merits — The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The Court reiterated this principle as a governing doctrine in rape cases.
• Delay in Reporting Rape by a Minor — It is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her life. The Court held that the complainant's five-year delay was explained by her minority, her dependence on the accused for shelter and sustenance, and his threats of death, reinforced by his moral ascendancy and physical superiority as her uncle.
• Date of Commission Is Not an Essential Element of Rape — Victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of times, and manner they were violated, and the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. The complainant's failure to recall specific dates of the ten defilements was therefore immaterial.
• Denial as a Defense — Denial, as a defense, is inherently weak and is viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which it can be concocted, and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness. The accused's bare denial, unaccompanied by any explanation of relevant factors, was rejected.
• Defective Information Cured by Evidence — The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised. The omission of the complainant's age was cured by her testimony, admitted without objection, that she was nine years old at the time of the first abuse.
• Waiver of the Defect of Duplicity — Under Sections 1 and 3(e) of Rule 117, the accused must move to quash an information that charges more than one offense before entering his plea; otherwise, he is deemed to have waived the defect. The waiver authorized the Court to convict him of as many offenses as were charged and proved and to impose the penalty for each and every one of them.
• Substantial Compliance with the Right to Be Informed — The failure to allege the victim's age in the information is not a violation of the accused's right to be informed of the nature of the charge where the order of the investigating judge, attached to the record of the preliminary investigation, stated the complainant's age, so that the defense could not invoke surprise.
• Prospective Application of Republic Act No. 7659 — The death penalty made mandatory by Republic Act No. 7659 for rape committed by a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree cannot be imposed for offenses committed prior to its effectivity; the original penalty of reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty, applies.
• Moral Damages in Rape Without Proof — In crimes of rape, moral damages may be awarded to the victim without the need for proving the same in the pleadings, the anguish and pain being so evident that requiring detailed recitation to obtain pecuniary restitution would be expecting too much.

• "when the victim says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the crediting rule for a rape victim's testimony, and it supplied the decisive basis for affirming the conviction on the complainant's lone testimony.
• "the general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been raised." — This states the ratio for rejecting the accused's challenge to the information's omission of the complainant's age, the omission having been cured by her unobjected testimony that she was nine years old at the time of the first assault.
• "it is not uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her life." — This passage disposes of the accused's principal argument on appeal, holding that the complainant's five-year delay in reporting was explained by her minority, her dependence on the accused, and his threats.
• "denial, as a defense, is inherently weak and is viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which it can be concocted." — This articulates the standard treatment of denial as a defense and explains why the accused's bare denial could not overcome the complainant's positive identification of him.

• People vs. Rosare, 264 SCRA 398 (1996) — Cited in support of the rule that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect is cured by evidence introduced during trial without objection.
• People vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1 (1993) — Cited, together with Sections 1 and 3(e) of Rule 117, for the rule that the defect of duplicity is waived if not raised by a motion to quash before the plea.
• People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696 (1996) — Cited, along with several companion cases, for the doctrine that a young girl of tender age is easily intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her life.
• People vs. Zaballero, 274 SCRA 627 (1997) — Cited for the rule that victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of times, and manner they were violated.
• People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1997) — Cited for the rule that the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.
• People vs. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998 — Cited for the rule that in crimes of rape, moral damages may be awarded to the victim without the need for proving the same in the pleadings.
• People vs. Danao, 253 SCRA 146 (1996) — Cited for the rule that denial, as a defense, is inherently weak and is viewed with disfavor by the courts.
• People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274 (1996) and People vs. Panilio, 255 SCRA 503 (1996) — Cited for the rule that denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness.
• People vs. Galimba, 253 SCRA 722 (1996) — Cited for the rule that the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserves full credence.
• People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687 (1995) — Cited for the requirement that evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from a credible witness but must be credible in itself.
• People vs. Ibay, 233 SCRA 15 (1994) — Cited for the observation that rape stigmatizes the victim worse than the perpetrators, as our culture puts a premium on purity and virginity as virtues.

• Article 335, paragraphs 1 and 3, Revised Penal Code — Defines rape committed by using force or intimidation and rape committed against a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, as well as statutory rape; the Court held that for offenses committed before Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty under either paragraph is the same, reclusion perpetua, so the information's failure to allege the complainant's age did not affect the penalty.
• Republic Act No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) — Took effect on December 31, 1993 and amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code to make the death penalty mandatory where the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; because the offenses were committed prior to its effectivity, the original penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed instead.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Cited in relation to the imposition of reclusion perpetua as a single indivisible penalty for each count of rape.
• Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires that an information charge only one offense, except in cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; the Court acknowledged the rule but held the defect waived.
• Sections 1 and 3(e), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Govern the motion to quash, including the ground of duplicity; the accused's failure to move to quash before entering his plea was deemed a waiver of the defect.
• Section 3, Rule 120, Rules of Court — Cited for the authority of the Court to convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and to impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them.
• Constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the charge — The Court held that the omission of the complainant's age from the information did not violate this right, there having been substantial compliance through the investigating judge's order stating that the complainant was nine years old, and the accused being in any event aware of his victim's youth.

Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.