People of the Philippines vs. Carlo Lagrana y Mañibo

Voluntary surrender, to be mitigating, must be spontaneous and must show the accused’s intent to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of searching for and capturing him; a mere report to the police while asserting self-defense is not voluntary surrender. The conviction for Murder attended by treachery was affirmed, with the civil indemnity modified to P20,000.00.

According to the prosecution, at around 8:00 P.M. on 3 December 1981, Benito Adarlo was seated along the road near the store of Eladio de Villa in Dao, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, with Frangeline Salazar, who was holding one of Adarlo’s right arm under the armpit. Carlo Lagrana, Salazar’s uncle, arrived, focused a lighted flashlight on Adarlo’s face, and forthwith struck Adarlo on the head with a piece of wood (“kakawati”) about one meter in length. Adarlo fell face downward and lost consciousness; he never regained consciousness and died in the provincial hospital on 6 December 1981. The autopsy disclosed the cause of death as “shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage secondary to skull fracture secondary to head trauma.”

Adarlo’s brother, Nestor Adarlo, was nearby and ran to his brother’s succor, but Lagrana challenged him. Nestor ignored the challenge and carried his brother to their house, which was not too distant from the scene. Another eyewitness, Pio Sigalat, was on his way to Eladio de Villa’s store and was behind Lagrana at a distance of about five meters; Sigalat saw Lagrana carrying a flashlight and a piece of wood and ultimately hitting Adarlo on the head.

The following morning, 4 December 1981, Lagrana and Salazar were summoned by the police for investigation but were initially released. They were subsequently both charged with Murder.

Lagrana invoked self-defense, claiming that Adarlo, who was then drunk, chased him with a knife, and that he hit Adarlo with a piece of “kakawati” when Adarlo thrust the knife at him. Salazar claimed that he and Adarlo drank liquor before the incident and that, because Adarlo was challenging him, he left Adarlo behind because he was afraid. He recounted that the following morning, when his mother informed him that policemen were looking for him, he and Lagrana went to the police station to report, but they were both sent home.

The trial court gave no credence to either defense. It found that although both accused reported to the police the day after the commission of the crime, it was not for the purpose of submitting themselves unconditionally: Lagrana claimed self-defense when interrogated, Salazar gave no statement, and they did not go to surrender but merely to report the incident, never evincing any desire to own responsibility for the killing.

• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant Lagrana argued that the trial court erred in brushing aside the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Penalty: Appellant Lagrana argued that the penalties imposed upon him were over and above those he deserved.
• Scope of Appeal: Appellant Lagrana did not question his conviction or the characterization of the crime, confining his appeal to the lone assignment of error on voluntary surrender and penalty.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the trial court erred in brushing aside the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Penalty: Whether the penalties imposed upon accused-appellant were over and above those he deserved.

• Voluntary Surrender: No. Voluntary surrender was not established; a surrender must be spontaneous and show unconditional submission, either by acknowledging guilt or by intending to save the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture. Lagrana reported to the police but claimed self-defense.
• Penalty: No. The penalties imposed were affirmed; guilt for Murder with treachery was proven beyond reasonable doubt, and no mitigating circumstance attended. The only modification was the civil indemnity, increased to P20,000.00.

• Voluntary Surrender: The requisites for voluntary surrender are that it be spontaneous and that it show the accused’s intent to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. The trial court found that although Lagrana and Salazar reported to the police the day after the killing, they did not do so to submit unconditionally. Lagrana claimed self-defense when interrogated, while Salazar gave no statement. They did not go to the police to surrender but merely to report the incident, and they never evinced any desire to own responsibility for the killing. People vs. Regales was cited in support. Thus, voluntary surrender was not a mitigating circumstance.
• Penalty: Lagrana’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt through two credible prosecution eyewitnesses who identified him as the main culprit. His uncorroborated plea of self-defense failed to overcome the clear and direct testimony of these witnesses. The crime was Murder attended by treachery, considering the method by which Lagrana attacked the victim without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim might have made. No mitigating circumstance attended the killing. The trial court’s penalty was therefore affirmed, and the Supreme Court modified only the civil indemnity, ordering Lagrana to indemnify the heirs of Benito Adarlo in the amount of P20,000.00 with costs.

• Voluntary Surrender — A surrender, to be voluntary and mitigating, must be spontaneous and must show the accused’s intent to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case, Lagrana and Salazar reported to the police the day after the killing, but Lagrana claimed self-defense when interrogated and Salazar gave no statement; they did not go to surrender but merely to report, and never evinced a desire to own responsibility for the killing. The circumstance was therefore not credited.
• Treachery — Murder is qualified by treachery when the attack is made without risk to the accused arising from any defense the victim might have made. Treachery attended the killing because Lagrana focused a flashlight on the victim’s face and struck him on the head with a piece of wood while the victim was seated and held by Salazar, rendering the victim unconscious and never to regain consciousness.
• Self-Defense — An uncorroborated plea of self-defense fails to overcome the clear and direct testimony of credible prosecution eyewitnesses. Lagrana claimed that the victim, then drunk, chased him with a knife and thrust it at him, but the trial court gave no credence to this defense, and his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• "A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either (1) because he acknowledges his guilt, or (2) because lie wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture." — This passage states the requisites for voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, the central rule on which Lagrana’s appeal failed.
• "Accused did not go to the police authorities to surrender but merely to report the incident. Indeed, they never evinced any desire to own the responsibility for the killing of the deceased (People vs. Regales, 6 SCRA 830)." — This finding, quoted from the trial court and adopted by the Supreme Court, explains why the report to the police did not amount to voluntary surrender.
• "The crime is Murder, attended by treachery, considering the method by which LAGRANA attacked the Victim without risk to himself arising from any defense which the Victim might have made." — This passage affirms the characterization of the killing as Murder with treachery, supporting the penalty imposed.
• "WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that LAGRANA shall indemnify the heirs of the decease, Benito Adario, in the amount of P20,000.00 with costs." — This is the dispositive portion, showing that the conviction and penalty were affirmed and only the civil indemnity was modified.

• People vs. Regales, 6 SCRA 830 — Cited in the trial court’s discussion, quoted in the decision, for the rule that an accused who reports to the police but does not submit unconditionally and does not own responsibility for the killing has not voluntarily surrendered. The Supreme Court relied on this to reject Lagrana’s sole assignment of error.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes Murder; the trial court convicted Lagrana as principal under this article in relation to Article 46, and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
• Article 46, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for principals in the commission of a felony; cited by the trial court in imposing the penalty on Lagrana as principal.
• Article 52, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for accomplices; cited by the trial court in imposing the indeterminate penalty on Salazar as accomplice.
• Article 110, Revised Penal Code — Governs the civil liability of principals and accomplices; cited by the trial court in allocating the indemnity between Lagrana and Salazar.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6127 — Governs credit for preventive imprisonment; the trial court ordered that the accused be credited with the full term of preventive imprisonment if they had any, subject to disciplinary rules, otherwise four-fifths.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — The trial court held it inapplicable to Lagrana because of the penalty imposable on him, but applicable to Salazar. The Supreme Court did not discuss it on appeal.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, and Gancayco, JJ., concurred.