People of the Philippines vs. Carlito Martos

A conviction for the illegal sale of marijuana cannot stand where the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt both the fact of the sale and the identity of the corpus delicti, and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded the accused.

Carlito Martos, a jeepney conductor, stood charged under Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 — which defines and penalizes the sale, giving away and delivery of prohibited drugs, marijuana included. Enforcement of that statute in the case was undertaken by the First Narcotics Regional Unit based in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, whose agents mounted the operation that gave rise to the charge.

Acting on the tip of a confidential informer or asset, a team from the First Narcotics Regional Unit based in Urdaneta, Pangasinan — composed of Sgts. Rogelio Raguine, Peregrino Benito and Ramon Padilla — proceeded to Barangay Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 1, 1989, in pursuit of a certain "Lito" who was reported to be engaged in selling marijuana to students and adults alike.

According to the prosecution, "Lito," whose full name is Carlito Martos, was washing his feet at the water pump near his house when Sgt. Raguine and the confidential informer approached him. Raguine, acting as poseur-buyer, was introduced by the informer to "Lito"; he then inquired whether "Lito" had "stuff" for sale and, upon eliciting an affirmative answer, ordered P50.00 worth of stuff. Lito went inside his house and returned after a while to where Raguine and the informer were waiting, handing over the stuff contained in a small plastic bag; Raguine in turn gave Martos a P50.00 bill whose serial number he had earlier recorded in a log book. Convinced that the content of the plastic bag was marijuana, Raguine immediately signalled Sgts. Benito and Padilla, who were then positioned in separate places some ten meters away from the water pump, to close in and effect the arrest. After identifying themselves as NARCOM agents, Benito and Padilla seized Martos, but the latter wrenched himself free from his captors and escaped. The three agents pursued him, and when Martos heard a shot he stopped running, raised his hands and surrendered; it turned out that the shot had been fired from the gun of Sgt. Padilla and had accidentally hit the confidential informer on the left arm. Martos was thereupon brought to the NARCOM office in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and the stuff, marked as Exhibit "D," was turned over to the PC/INP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for analysis. Lauena Layador, Assistant Chief of the Chemistry Branch of the PC/INP Crime Laboratory Service, conducted a microscopic, chemical and chromatographic examination to determine whether the specimen submitted was marijuana; her report, Exhibit "C," confirmed that the stuff was marijuana.

Martos, a jeepney conductor, testified for the defense that in the afternoon of February 1, 1989, between 4:00 and 5:00 o'clock, while he was washing his feet at a pump well some three meters away from his house, he heard a person shout, "dadiay ni, dadiay ni, paltogan yon." He then saw three men coming down from the dike, two of whom drew their guns. Frightened, he tried to run away, but when he heard a shot he stopped and raised his hands. When the three men overtook him, one of them handcuffed him while the other two started hitting him with the butts of their guns, boxing and kicking him. As a tricycle was being called, one of the men took "a plastic bag with leaves inside" from his pocket and placed it in his hands; Carlito refused to hold it and instead dropped the thing. His testimony was corroborated by two other defense witnesses. At the NARCOM station in Urdaneta, the agents tried to force him to sign a document, but he refused; the agents even called a CLAO lawyer who likewise insisted that he sign the documents since "there is nothing wrong" about it. He claimed that he was also forced to sign his name on a cellophane and cajoled to settle the case for P25,000.00. He was then jailed and released only at 1:00 o'clock the following day.

The Information dated March 20, 1989 charged that on or about February 1, 1989, in Barangay Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan, the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away and deliver fifty (50) grams of dried marijuana leaves worth P50.00 to MSgt. Rogelio Raguine, an incognito NARCOM agent, a prohibited drug and without any authority of law. On appeal, Martos argued that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of which he was convicted, and the Solicitor General joined him in that plea for acquittal, both alleging that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were highly improbable, self-contradictory and contradictory and outlining several inconsistencies therein.

The trial court's treatment of the record supplied the decisive factual backdrop for the appeal. The P50.00 bill supposedly offered to the accused to purchase the marijuana was never formally offered in evidence although it had been marked as a prosecution exhibit during the testimony of Sgt. Raguine, yet the trial court referred to it as Exhibit "C" in one part of its decision and as Exhibit "D" in another, and even relied on it to support its finding that the evidence consummated the transaction. The decision further stated that the confidential informer was wounded on the right arm, when the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses consistently stated that the informer was hit on the left arm.

• Insufficiency of the Evidence: The appellant argued that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling marijuana for which he was convicted.
• Improbable, Self-Contradictory and Contradictory Testimonies: The appellant and the Solicitor General alleged that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were highly improbable, self-contradictory and contradictory, and outlined several inconsistencies in those testimonies.
• Identity of the Corpus Delicti: The Solicitor General observed that no evidence was presented to prove that the marijuana marked as Exhibits "D" to "D-4" in court was the same marijuana allegedly sold by the accused-appellant to the buy-bust team, noting that the endorsement letter was first sent to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet without the alleged marijuana stuff.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of selling marijuana.
• Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, allegedly highly improbable, self-contradictory and contradictory, are sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Identity of the Corpus Delicti: Whether the marijuana marked as Exhibits "D" to "D-4" in court is the same marijuana allegedly sold by the accused-appellant to the buy-bust team.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: No. The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, its evidence being so slender and shaky, and taken in its entirety utterly insufficient to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses: No. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of the poseur-buyer, were replete with inconsistencies and evasions on material points, rendering them unworthy of credit and incapable of supporting a conviction.
• Identity of the Corpus Delicti: No. No evidence established that the marijuana marked in court as Exhibits "D" to "D-4" was the same substance allegedly sold, the endorsement letter having been transmitted to Camp Dangwa without the stuff.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: In prosecuting a case for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person charged at a particular time, date and place committed any of the unlawful acts penalized therein. The Court found itself unconvinced that the prosecution's evidence could stand ground sufficient to convict the appellant. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty could not even be invoked in the prosecution's favor, because it cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded an accused person. The Court applied the settled rule that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The accused is not even called upon to offer evidence on his behalf; his freedom is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction is in existence. The Solicitor General's own Manifestation, quoted in the decision, described the prosecution's evidence as unconvincing, slender and shaky, not presented with the care and thoroughness which the gravity of the offense demanded, and utterly insufficient to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses: The Court set aside the general rule that the findings of fact of trial courts deserve great weight and respect, because the case fell within the recognized exceptions: when the conclusion is a finding based entirely on speculations; when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; where there is grave abuse of discretion; when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. The case called for a careful scrutiny of the records due to irreconcilable differences in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which weakened the case for the People, and the trial judge was admonished for a poor analysis and synthesis of the facts. On the P50.00 bill, Sgt. Raguine testified on direct examination that he gave the bill to the accused before giving the signal to his companions, but on cross-examination he did not reiterate this and instead insisted that upon ascertaining that the stuff was marijuana he immediately gave the pre-arranged signal; no corroboration on the handling of the bill was made by Sgts. Benito and Padilla, who were likewise present. Raguine testified that he recorded the serial number of the bill in their logbook before the buy-bust operation, but he was unable to produce the logbook, allegedly because it could no longer be found in their office. He also testified that the P50.00 bill was surrendered by the accused at their headquarters, yet in a later testimony gave another version, saying the bill was recovered from the appellant's right front pocket right after his arrest at the vicinity of his house. Although Raguine was supposed to be the star witness of the prosecution, having acted as poseur-buyer, he displayed a poor recall of the incidents relative to the arrest of the accused-appellant within a short span of time — more or less six months from the supposed commission of the crime to the time he testified — and hedged, hesitated and involved himself in apparent inconsistencies, as shown by his inability to say whether the accused was washing his face and hands at the artesian well, his inability to recall the dialect used by the confidential informer in talking to the accused, and his admission that he could no longer remember the container of the marijuana and was not sure of it. The trial court compounded these defects by referring to the P50.00 bill as Exhibit "C" in one part of its decision and as Exhibit "D" in another and relying on it to support its finding that the evidence consummated the transaction, and by stating that the confidential informer was wounded on the right arm when all the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses consistently stated that the informer was hit on the left arm. The Court invoked Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and is expected to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, to be studious and cautious in making decisions, and to exhibit industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him.

• Identity of the Corpus Delicti: The Solicitor General observed that there was no evidence presented to prove that the marijuana marked as Exhibits "D" to "D-4" in court was the same marijuana allegedly sold by the accused-appellant to the buy-bust team. This observation was substantiated by the fact that the endorsement letter was first sent to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet without the alleged marijuana stuff. Luena Layador, the chemist who conducted the examination of the specimen, testified that she had to go personally to Camp Dangwa to get the specimen, together with other specimens; that she could identify the said specimen only through the names written on the plastic bag; and that she did not know the persons whose names appeared on the said plastic bag. During her testimony the names of the members of the unit appearing on the plastic bag were read as Sgt. Padilla and M/Sgt. Raguine, and the prosecution sought to mark the names of Sgt. Padilla, Sgt. Benito and Sgt. Raguine as Exhibits "D-2," "D-3" and "D-4." At the formal offer of evidence, Exhibit "D" was offered and admitted as the subject marijuana leaves, Exhibit "D-1" as Chemistry Report No. 132-89, and Exhibits "D-2," "D-3" and "D-4" as the names of the persons appearing in the plastic bag, who were asserted to be the same persons who apprehended the accused during the incident. Despite the vehement objections of counsel for the defense, the court admitted all the exhibits for the purpose for which they were offered. The Court held that this state of the record left the identity of the prohibited drug unestablished to the degree of moral certainty required for conviction.

• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duty — The presumption that public officers regularly perform their official duties cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded an accused person. In this case, the Court refused to invoke the presumption in favor of the arresting NARCOM agents, holding that it could not supply the want of proof of the sale and of the identity of the corpus delicti.

• Moral Certainty and the Equipoise Rule — Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The Court applied this rule to reverse the conviction, the prosecution's evidence having left the fact of the sale and the identity of the drug open to an explanation consistent with innocence.

• Quantum of Proof in Dangerous Drugs Prosecutions — In prosecuting a case for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person charged, at a particular time, date and place, committed any of the unlawful acts penalized therein. The Court found the prosecution's evidence slender, shaky and utterly insufficient to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

• Exceptions to the Respect Accorded Trial Court Factual Findings — Although the findings of fact of trial courts deserve great weight and respect because of the privilege of examining the demeanor of witnesses, the rule admits of exceptions:

  • (1) when the conclusion is a finding based entirely on speculations;
  • (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
  • (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
  • (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and
  • (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee. The Court found the case to fall within these exceptions, the trial judge having misapprehended the facts and rendered a poor analysis and synthesis of the record.

• Identity of the Corpus Delicti in Dangerous Drugs Cases — The prosecution must prove that the prohibited drug examined and marked in court is the very substance allegedly sold or delivered by the accused. The Court found this requirement unmet where the endorsement letter was sent to Camp Dangwa without the alleged marijuana stuff, the chemist had to retrieve the specimen personally, and she could identify it only through names on the plastic bag written by persons she did not know.

• Duty of Judges Under the Code of Judicial Conduct — Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence, is expected to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and should be studious and cautious in making decisions, exhibiting industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed upon him. The Court admonished the trial judge for a decision that mislabeled exhibits and misstated a fact established by all the witnesses.

• Freedom as Forfeitable Only Upon Proof of Guilt — The accused is not even called upon to offer evidence on his behalf; his freedom is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction is in existence. The Court relied on this principle in acquitting the appellant notwithstanding his defense of denial and frame-up.

• "We cannot even presume that official duty was regularly performed by the arresting officers, for it cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded an accused person." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the evidentiary weight of the presumption of regularity in buy-bust operations, holding that it cannot substitute for the proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
• "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the moral certainty requirement and the equipoise rule as applied to the prosecution's circumstantial and testimonial evidence.
• "The accused is not even called upon to offer evidence on his behalf. His freedom is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence." — This passage fixes the burden of proof in criminal cases and explains why the appellant's defense of denial and frame-up did not need to be credited in order to secure an acquittal.
• "The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, such as (1) when the conclusion is a finding based entirely on speculations; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee." — This passage enumerates the recognized exceptions to the respect ordinarily accorded the factual findings of trial courts, and supplied the framework for the Court's review of the trial judge's flawed findings.

• People vs. Zapanta y Centeno, G.R. No. 90853, 195 SCRA 200 (1991) — Cited, together with People vs. Kalubiran, in support of the Court's observation that notwithstanding its commendation of law enforcement officers engaged in the dangerous task of apprehending drug traffickers, it cannot disregard the many reports of false arrest of innocent persons for extortion and blackmail.
• People vs. Kalubiran, G.R. No. 84079, 196 SCRA 644 (1991) — Cited with People vs. Zapanta y Centeno for the same proposition concerning reports of false arrests of innocent persons for extortion and blackmail.
• People vs. Canada, L-63728, 144 SCRA 121 (1986) — Cited, together with People vs. Taruc, as authority for the exceptions to the rule that the findings of fact of trial courts deserve great weight and respect.
• People vs. Taruc, L-74655, 157 SCRA 178 (1988) — Cited for the exceptions to the respect accorded trial court factual findings and, in the discussion of the quantum of proof, for the moral certainty rule.
• People vs. Rojo, G.R. No. 82737, 175 SCRA 119 (1989) — Cited for the requirement that in prosecuting a case for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the prosecution must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person charged, at a particular time, date and place, committed any of the unlawful acts penalized.
• People vs. Parayno, 24 SCRA 3 — Cited with People vs. Palana for the rule that evidence capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence, does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.
• People vs. Palana, 47 Phil. 48 — Cited with People vs. Parayno for the same moral certainty rule.
• People vs. Malilay, 63 SCRA 420 — Cited for the proposition that the accused is not even called upon to offer evidence on his behalf, his freedom being forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction exists.

• Article II, Section 4, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) — Defines and penalizes the sale, giving away and delivery of prohibited drugs, including marijuana. The accused was charged and convicted under this provision, but the conviction was reversed because the prosecution failed to establish the offense and the identity of the corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt.
• Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct — Provides that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The Court invoked this provision in admonishing the trial judge for a poor analysis and synthesis of the facts, including the mislabeling of exhibits and the misstatement of the location of the confidential informer's gunshot wound.
• Constitutional Presumption of Innocence — The decision invoked the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded an accused person in holding that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail over it.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ.