People of the Philippines vs. Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes

The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration unless such corroboration is expressly required by law; and neither nocturnity nor cruelty may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance absent proof that nighttime was deliberately sought or that the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the victim's suffering beyond what the crime itself required.

Tomas Agner, the prosecution's principal witness, was originally included as an accused in the Information filed on February 18, 1977 before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, but was discharged upon motion of the trial fiscal so that he could testify for the State; Agner was the brother-in-law of Juan Galasi and co-owned with him a boat used in ferrying people across the river in Quirino, Isabela. The killing was prosecuted as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the Information alleging evident premeditation and treachery as qualifying circumstances, and the appeal required the Court to apply Article 14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances as well as Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on the discharge of an accused to become a state witness. The case also called for the application of Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code on the penalty imposable where no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attends the commission of the offense.

In the evening of April 27, 1976, three young men from Dolores, Quirino, Isabela — Florante Agtang, Apolonio Villanueva, and Oscar Viernes — went together to barangay Vintar in the same municipality to visit the women they were courting, Agtang to the house of Ester Galasi and Viernes to the house of Leticia Gambalan, with Villanueva accompanying Viernes and staying at Leticia's house after the two had conducted Agtang to Ester's. At about ten o'clock that night, Agtang dropped by Leticia's house, bade his companions go home, and the three set out together. Upon reaching the outskirts of Vintar, just after passing an Independent Church not far from Leticia's house, they heard a whistle and two men emerged from nowhere and warned them not to run away. The trio stopped and identified themselves; the two unidentified men approached and frisked them for hidden weapons, one pointing a long firearm at them. Villanueva and Viernes were found carrying knives while Agtang was divested of a homemade gun known as a paltik. Ordered to follow, they came upon a place near a cornfield where four more persons emerged, one of whom was identified as Tomas Agner. Villanueva fled after their captors threatened to use the knife taken from him to kill them; he was shot at but the shot missed. Infuriated by the escape, the captors beat Agtang and Viernes before they reached a river bank, ferried them across the river, and upon reaching the Magsaysay-Quirino boundary near the proposed railroad ordered the two to remove their clothes, with which they were tied. A certain Domingo then struck Agtang with the butt of a gun, felling him to the ground, and while Agtang lay fallen, Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes took turns stabbing him. The group left Agtang where he was slain; Viernes was released but forewarned not to reveal what had happened to anyone.

The following morning, despite the warning, Viernes reported the incident to the barangay captain of Dolores, who in turn reported it to the police authorities of Quirino, Isabela. Acting on the report, the police found the dead body at the place pointed to by Viernes, the body bearing multiple stab wounds. Brought to their house, the body was autopsied by Dr. Luis R. Tamayo, Municipal Health Officer of Roxas, Isabela, whose findings confirmed the presence of several stab wounds and attributed the cause of death to acute hemorrhage resulting from the injuries. Agtang sustained seven stab wounds on the left chest, right chest, epigastrium and abdomen, which injured the lungs, heart and stomach and produced massive hemorrhage; four puncture wounds on the right iliac region; and two other stab wounds on the right and left axilla which injured the lungs and also produced extensive hemorrhage — thirteen wounds in all, nine of them fatal.

The prosecution's star witness was Tomas Agnir, or Agner, who upon motion of the fiscal was discharged from the Information by the trial court so that he could testify for the State. Agner, the brother-in-law of Juan Galasi and co-owner with him of a boat used in ferrying people across the river, testified that in the evening of April 27, 1976, Galasi, Romeo Reyes, Camilo Ferrer and a certain Domingo or Ding went to his house and asked him to take them across the river, warning him that should he refuse to obey they would kill him. Acceding, Agner went westward with them to the river and along the way they met Oscar Viernes, Florante Agtang and Apolonio Villanueva; Reyes, Domingo and Ferrer searched the three and took two knives each from Villanueva and Viernes and a paltik firearm from Agtang. Near the banana plants, as all of them resumed walking to the river, three other persons unknown to Agner joined them. Villanueva suddenly ran away and Domingo shot at but missed him, after which Domingo, Ferrer and Reyes tied Agtang and Viernes with what looked like a plastic rope. All of them went to the river where Agner ferried them across, then proceeded northward to the proposed railroad, where Agner was segregated at a distance of about four meters. From that distance Agner watched as Domingo struck Agtang's mouth with a gun butt, causing him to fall to the ground, while Ferrer and Reyes stabbed the victim several times as he lay helpless, all in the presence of Galasi. Domingo then ordered Viernes to go home, and the three unidentified persons told Agner to go home with instructions not to reveal what had happened on pain of death. According to Agner, Agtang was assaulted because Galasi, whose daughter was to be married to Agtang, did not want the marriage to take place as he preferred someone from Magsaysay to be his daughter's groom; Domingo was from Aggad, Magsaysay, Isabela. Villanueva, who was twenty-one years old at the time, corroborated Agner's story, testifying that he recognized Reyes and Ferrer as the two who first approached and whistled at their group, that he fled into a tobacco field where he hid the whole night, and that in the morning he went home, found Viernes, and learned that Agtang's dead body had been found on the other side of the Mallig River.

The defense interposed denial and alibi. Merlita Cajalne, Reyes' wife, testified that April 27, 1976 was their wedding anniversary, having been married on April 27, 1971; that after taking supper with their five children at six o'clock that night they went to bed; and that she woke at six o'clock the following morning to find her husband still asleep, adding that she was sure he did not leave home during the night because she got up six times to answer the call of nature. Reyes himself testified that he did not even go out of his home in Aga, Delfin Albano, Isabela on that day, much less that evening, and denied having been to Vintar; he claimed that Agner implicated him because he had not paid Agner for services rendered in planting and harvesting his palay. Ferrer, who used to farm the land of Antonio Gambalan in Aga, Magsaysay (now Delfin Albano), testified that he could not have gone to Vintar on April 27, 1976 because his sister Margarita was lying in state at their home, she having died at dusk of April 26, 1976 after failing to deliver the child she was carrying. His father Pedro Ferrer testified that he and his son Camilo had gone to bed at the same time in the evening of "a certain day in April, 1976" after serving coffee to visitors at the wake of his dead daughter, but on cross-examination declared that on that day they were celebrating the death anniversary of their grandmother. Ferrer's seventy-year-old mother, Quintina Francisco, could not remember the date of her daughter Margarita's death but insisted that on April 27, 1976 her son Camilo was in their house, although on cross-examination she declared that Margarita died in the early evening of April 27, 1976.

The trial court found that of the two qualifying circumstances alleged in the Information, only treachery was duly proven, evident premeditation having no factual basis, and that treachery was sufficiently established by the fact that Agtang was struck with the butt of a gun and stabbed repeatedly, sustaining thirteen wounds while he was tied and therefore in a defenseless position. It likewise found that the distance between the appellants' respective residences in Aga, Magsaysay (Delfin Albano), Isabela and Vintar, Quirino, Isabela was established by the defense only through the manifestation in court of their counsel, Atty. Melanie T. Singson, that there is no road connecting the two places, which she estimated to be seventy to eighty kilometers apart "in a straight line."

• Insufficiency of the Evidence: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in convicting them of the crime charged notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, contending that they should not have been convicted on the testimony of their former co-accused, which was not materially corroborated and therefore insufficient, coming as it did from someone who had his own interest to protect. They cited Barretto vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 176 (September 16, 1986), for the proposition that the testimony of a state witness which is not materially corroborated is not sufficient for conviction, and quoted the portion of Agner's testimony describing the participation of each perpetrator — that Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes stabbed Florante Agtang, that Domingo struck the victim's mouth with a firearm, and that Juan Galasi was with the group.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness Villanueva: Appellants asserted that although Apolonio Villanueva testified that he recognized the accused-appellants on the night of April 27, 1976, his testimony was ineffective and incredible because, when confronted with his sworn statement (Exhibit "C") taken by Cpl. Doroteo Villegas and subscribed before the Municipal Mayor of Quirino, he could hardly explain the inconsistency between his testimony and his sworn statement. In their brief they referred to Villanueva as a "state witness."

• Clarification of the Alleged Inconsistency: The Solicitor General countered that the alleged discrepancy between Villanueva's sworn statement and his testimony was clarified during his redirect examination, where he testified that he recognized the appellants as the ones who first whistled at his group but that he could not recognize the companions of Agner who emerged from the banana plantation.

• Sufficiency of the Discharged Co-Accused's Testimony: Whether the testimony of a former co-accused discharged as a state witness, allegedly uncorroborated and coming from one with an interest to protect, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness Villanueva: Whether the inconsistencies between Apolonio Villanueva's sworn statement and his testimony in court rendered his testimony ineffective and incredible.
• Nocturnity: Whether nighttime was properly appreciated as a separate aggravating circumstance.
• Cruelty: Whether cruelty was properly appreciated as a separate aggravating circumstance.
• Alibi and Conspiracy: Whether the defense of alibi was properly rejected and whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed in light of the proven conspiracy.

• Sufficiency of the Discharged Co-Accused's Testimony: No. The conviction stands; the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration unless such corroboration is expressly required by law, and Agner's testimony was in fact materially corroborated by the wounds sustained by Agtang as reflected in Dr. Tamayo's certification and testimony.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness Villanueva: No. Discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witness, since ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete, and the alleged discrepancy was clarified on redirect examination.
• Nocturnity: No. Nighttime must be deliberately sought in the perpetration of the crime, and the prosecution established no more than the simple fact that the crime was committed at night.
• Cruelty: No. Cruelty requires that the wrong done be deliberately augmented by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, and the prosecution failed to prove that the appellants inflicted the thirteen wounds in such a way as to make the victim agonize before any of the fatal blows.
• Alibi and Conspiracy: No, as to the defense of alibi. In view of the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, their alibi crumbled, and they had not strictly complied with the requirements of time and place. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, the killing having been qualified by treachery and attended by a duly proven conspiracy, with no aggravating or mitigating circumstance.

• Sufficiency of the Discharged Co-Accused's Testimony: Under Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a state witness is one of two or more persons jointly charged with the commission of a crime but who is discharged with his consent as such accused so that he may be a witness for the State, and he shall be discharged only after the court has required the prosecution to present evidence and his sworn statement at a hearing in support of the discharge and is satisfied that the requirements of Section 9 are present. Apolonio Villanueva was a prosecution witness but not a state witness, having never been an accused; it was Tomas Agner who was originally included as an accused in the Information but was discharged before the start of the hearing upon motion of the prosecution. While the procedure undertaken in discharging Agner may be questioned because the trial court ordered his discharge even before the prosecution had started presenting evidence, it is safe to assume that the court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, considered as basis for the discharge the sworn statement Agner executed before the police; moreover, the discharge was effected upon the motion of the trial fiscal who, being in possession of evidence ahead of the court and even the defense, was best qualified to determine who among the accused should be discharged to be a state witness. Any legal deficiency attending Agner's discharge from the Information may not affect the admissibility and credibility of his testimony in the absence of proof to the contrary. The trial court, upon which is vested the task of assigning probative value to the testimony of a witness, affixed the stamp of credibility upon Agner's testimony while treating it with extreme caution, and in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case, the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Although Villanueva failed to witness the actual assault upon Agtang because he fled before it transpired, Agner's sole testimony on that fact stands unaffected, since the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration unless such corroboration is expressly required by law; truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. Agner's testimony was in fact materially corroborated by the wounds sustained by Agtang as reflected in the certification executed by Dr. Tamayo who autopsied the corpse, as well as by Dr. Tamayo's testimony. The defense's attempt to taint Agner's testimony by imputing to him a motive — Reyes' failure to pay Agner for manual work performed in Reyes' farm — was found altogether too insignificant to impel any person to implicate an accused in so grave a crime as murder, and Ferrer himself admitted that while Agner was an acquaintance, their relationship did not extend beyond that, clearly implying that Agner had no reason to testify against the appellants other than to tell the truth.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness Villanueva: The Court has time and again held that discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses, since ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As a general rule, an inconsistency between two statements of a witness should be determined, not by resort to individual words or phrases, but by the whole impression or effect of what has been said or done. While Villanueva admitted in his sworn statement that he did not recognize "not even one" of the companions of Agner, on the witness stand he claimed that he did recognize the appellants although he did not know their names; the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that the alleged discrepancy was clarified during the redirect examination of Villanueva when he testified that he recognized the appellants as the ones who first whistled at his group but that he could not recognize the companions of Agner who emerged from the banana plantation.
• Nocturnity: The trial court improperly considered nocturnity as a separate aggravating circumstance. While it correctly stated that nighttime must be deliberately sought in the perpetration of the crime, a close examination of the records shows no factual support that the appellants indeed deliberately considered the cover of darkness as an indispensable factor in assaulting Agtang; the prosecution established no more than the simple fact that the crime was committed at night.
• Cruelty: Neither may cruelty be appreciated against the appellants. This aggravating circumstance is present when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, and the test in appreciating cruelty is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. In People vs. Dayug and Bannaisan, the Court said that there is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act which he intends to commit, and that the mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration. Thus, where the victim suffered twenty-one wounds or injuries, eight of which were fatal, the Court did not appreciate cruelty in the absence of positive proof that the wounds were inflicted while the victim was still alive to prolong unnecessarily his physical suffering; and in another case, where the victim sustained thirteen wounds, only one of which was mortal, the Court similarly did not take cruelty into account as there was no showing that the appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased the suffering of the deceased. In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellants inflicted the thirteen wounds upon the victim in such a way that he was made to agonize before they rendered any of the blows which snuffed out his life; by Agner's account, the appellants and Domingo dealt the victim successive blows so that he must have died instantaneously, considering that nine of his wounds were fatal. As a matter of fact, the trial court appreciated cruelty only because it considered the number of wounds on the victim to be "not necessary to consummate the crime of murder."
• Alibi and Conspiracy: In view of the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, their alibi crumbled; besides, they had not strictly complied with the requirements of time and place in said defense, it having been necessary to establish that they were somewhere else when the crime happened and that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the crucial time. Worth noting was the fact that the distance between the appellants' respective residences in Aga, Magsaysay (Delfin Albano), Isabela and Vintar, Quirino, Isabela was established by the defense only through the manifestation in court of their counsel that there is no road connecting the two places, which she estimated to be seventy to eighty kilometers apart "in a straight line." The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of Agtang and that the appellants shall be held responsible for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, there being treachery because Agtang was tied and therefore in a helpless condition before he was killed. The penalty for the crime of murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty is the medium period of said penalty, or reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The appellants must all bear this penalty in view of the duly proven conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime, their cooperative acts toward the common criminal objective of taking the life of Agtang proving that they were parties to a conspiracy.

• State witness distinguished from an ordinary prosecution witness — Under Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a state witness is one of two or more persons jointly charged with the commission of a crime but who is discharged with his consent as such accused so that he may be a witness for the State. Discharge requires that (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. A witness who was never charged as an accused is not a state witness. In this case, Villanueva, though described by the appellants as a state witness, was merely a prosecution witness; it was Agner who was the state witness.
• Effect of a defective discharge of a state witness — Any legal deficiency attending the discharge of an accused from the Information does not affect the admissibility and credibility of his testimony in the absence of proof to the contrary. The Court applied this notwithstanding that the trial court had ordered Agner's discharge even before the prosecution had started presenting evidence, presuming that the court exercised sound discretion and that the fiscal, being in possession of the evidence ahead of the court and the defense, was best qualified to determine who should be discharged.
• Single-witness rule — The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration unless such corroboration is expressly required by law; truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. Applied to Agner, whose testimony on the actual stabbing stood unaffected by Villanueva's flight and was in fact materially corroborated by the autopsy findings.
• Discrepancies between affidavits and testimony — Discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witness, since ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete; an inconsistency between two statements of a witness should be determined not by resort to individual words or phrases but by the whole impression or effect of what has been said or done. Applied to Villanueva, whose alleged inconsistency was clarified on redirect examination.
• Credibility findings of the trial court — Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case.
• Nocturnity — Nighttime is an aggravating circumstance only when it is deliberately sought or taken advantage of in the perpetration of the crime; the prosecution must show that the accused deliberately considered the cover of darkness as an indispensable factor, and proof that the crime was committed at night is not enough. Applied to strike down the trial court's appreciation of nocturnity.
• Cruelty — Present when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission. The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse; there is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain. The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds to cause death, with no appreciable time intervening between one wound and another to show a desire to prolong the victim's suffering, is insufficient. Applied to strike down the trial court's appreciation of cruelty despite the thirteen wounds, nine of them fatal.
• Alibi — Alibi is unavailing in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime; the defense must establish that the accused was somewhere else when the crime happened and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the crucial time. Applied to reject the appellants' defense, the distance between their residences and the crime scene having been established only through counsel's manifestation in court.
• Treachery — The killing was qualified by treachery because Agtang was tied and therefore in a helpless condition before he was killed, the victim having been rendered defenseless and given no chance to defend himself.
• Conspiracy — Cooperative acts toward a common criminal objective establish conspiracy; the appellants' cooperative acts toward the common criminal objective of taking Agtang's life proved that they were parties to a conspiracy, rendering each of them liable for the penalty.
• Penalty for murder absent modifying circumstances — Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death for murder; absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, Article 64(1) of the same Code requires the imposition of the medium period of said penalty, which is reclusion perpetua.

• "Under Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a state witness is one of two or more persons jointly charged with the commission of a crime but who is discharged with his consent as such accused so that he may be a witness for the State. He shall only be discharged after the court has required the prosecution to present evidence and his sworn statement at a hearing in support of the discharge and the court is satisfied that the requirements of Section 9 are present." — This passage supplies the canonical definition distinguishing a state witness from an ordinary prosecution witness, the very differentiation the Court set out to make at the outset of the decision and the basis for holding that Villanueva was not a state witness.
• "The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration unless such corroboration is expressly required by law. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies." — This states the ratio decidendi on the principal assignment of error, disposing of the appellants' contention that Agner's uncorroborated testimony could not sustain conviction.
• "There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act which he intends to commit. The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration." — Quoted from People vs. Dayug and Bannaisan, this is the Court's canonical formulation of the cruelty test, applied here to strike down the trial court's appreciation of cruelty despite the thirteen stab wounds.
• "While it correctly stated that nighttime must be deliberately sought in the perpetration of the crime, a close examination of the records shows no factual support that the appellants indeed deliberately considered the cover of darkness as an indispensable factor in assaulting Agtang. The prosecution established no more than the simple fact that the crime was committed at night." — This passage articulates the deliberate-seeking requirement for nocturnity and explains why the trial court's appreciation of that aggravating circumstance was improper.

• Barretto vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 176 (September 16, 1986) — Cited by the appellants for the proposition that the testimony of a state witness which is not materially corroborated is not sufficient for conviction; the Court did not apply it in their favor, upholding the conviction on the credible and materially corroborated testimony of Agner.
• People vs. Dayug and Bannaisan, 49 Phil. 423, 427 (1926) — Controlling precedent on cruelty as an aggravating circumstance; the Court quoted its formulation that cruelty requires the culprit to enjoy and delight in making the victim suffer slowly and gradually, and that successive wounds without appreciable time intervening to prolong suffering do not suffice.
• People vs. Pacris, 194 SCRA 654, 663 (March 5, 1991) — Followed; cruelty was not appreciated where the victim suffered twenty-one wounds, eight of which were fatal, absent positive proof that the wounds were inflicted while the victim was still alive to prolong his suffering.
• People vs. Jumauan, 98 Phil. 1, 4 (1955) — Followed; cruelty was not taken into account where the victim sustained thirteen wounds, only one of which was mortal, there being no showing that the appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased the suffering of the deceased.
• People vs. Ocimar, 212 SCRA 646, 655 (August 17, 1992) — Cited for the rule that the discharge of a state witness is properly effected upon motion of the fiscal, and that any legal deficiency in the discharge does not affect the admissibility and credibility of the witness's testimony.
• People vs. Armada, Jr., G.R. No. 100592, August 26, 1993, 225 SCRA 644 — Cited for the trial court's sound discretion in discharging an accused to become a state witness.
• People vs. Pacapac, G.R. No. 90623 (September 7, 1995) — Cited for the rule that the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of overlooked or misapplied facts of weight and substance.
• People vs. Torres, 232 SCRA 32 (April 28, 1994); People vs. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166 (January 10, 1994); People vs. Manalo, 229 SCRA 479 (January 24, 1994) — Cited together for the single-witness rule: a single positive and credible witness suffices absent corroboration expressly required by law, and truth is established by the quality rather than the quantity of testimonies.
• People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 (June 8, 1994); People vs. Quiming, 222 SCRA 371 (May 21, 1993) — Cited for the rule that discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witness, ex-parte affidavits being generally incomplete.
• People vs. Gabas, 233 SCRA 77 (June 13, 1994) — Cited for the rule that an inconsistency between two statements of a witness is determined not by individual words or phrases but by the whole impression or effect of what has been said or done.
• People vs. Pija, 245 SCRA 80 (June 16, 1995); People vs. Amania, G.R. No. 108598, September 21, 1995 — Cited for the rejection of alibi in the face of positive identification and for the requirement that alibi strictly comply with the elements of time and place, including physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene.
• People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 (March 23, 1995) — Cited in support of the holding that treachery qualified the killing because the victim was tied and therefore in a helpless condition before he was killed.
• People vs. Lacao, 60 SCRA 89, 97 (September 30, 1974) — Cited for the test in appreciating cruelty: whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.
• People vs. Mallari, 241 SCRA 113 (February 6, 1995) — Cited in support of the finding of conspiracy based on the appellants' cooperative acts toward the common criminal objective of taking the victim's life.
• People vs. Cutura, L-12702, 4 SCRA 663 — Quoted in the trial court's assessment for the rule that where the testimony of one of the accused is credible and corroborated by other witnesses, it cannot be totally discarded by the mere fact that said accused was discharged to be utilized as a government witness.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder, for which the prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The Court held that the killing of Agtang was murder, qualified by treachery, and that the appellants were criminally responsible thereunder.
• Article 14(21), Revised Penal Code — Provides that the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission. Cited as the statutory basis for cruelty, which the Court held was not established because the prosecution failed to show that the appellants deliberately and sadistically prolonged the victim's suffering.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of the penalty when neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attend the commission of the crime, requiring the medium period. Applied to fix the penalty at reclusion perpetua, the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248, after nocturnity and cruelty were discarded.
• Section 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Governs the discharge of an accused to become a state witness, requiring that (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. Cited in distinguishing a state witness from an ordinary prosecution witness and in holding that any deficiency in Agner's discharge did not affect the admissibility and credibility of his testimony.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.