AI-generated

People of the Philippines vs. Cabale, et al.

The conviction of Benito Terante @ "Bodoy" for robbery with homicide and for robbery with less serious physical injuries was affirmed, with the civil indemnity for the heirs of Rufina Rosello increased from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00. Terante was one of four men who, on the evening of 7 June 1968, robbed and strangled to death the octogenarian storekeeper Rufina Rosello and robbed and mauled the motorcyclist Ricarido Fernando in Barrio Magaupas, Liloan, Southern Leyte. On appeal, he assailed his arraignment, which had been conducted only after the cases had been submitted for decision, and interposed alibi. The irregular arraignment was held non-prejudicial and fully cured because his counsel had entered trial without objection, cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, and adopted the prior proceedings after arraignment. The alibi failed for want of proof that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime, and it could not prevail over Fernando's positive identification.

Primary Holding

An arraignment conducted only after the prosecution has rested its case is a non-prejudicial irregularity that is deemed fully cured where defense counsel entered trial without objection, cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, and adopted the prior proceedings after arraignment; the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is not thereby violated. Alibi, to prosper, must be supported by proof not only that the accused was elsewhere when the crime was committed but also that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at that time, and it cannot prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution witness who had ample opportunity to observe the accused.

Background

Rufina Rosello was an octogenarian tending a small store in Barrio Magaupas, Liloan, Southern Leyte, and Ricarido Fernando was a motorcyclist who passed through the same barrio on the night of 7 June 1968. The prosecution arose from two robberies committed that evening, and the case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review because the trial court imposed the death penalty in the homicide case. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution, under which the death penalty is no longer imposable, altered the mode of review and the penalties at stake for the accused who remained in the case.

History

  1. Informations filed

    Two separate informations were filed before the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern Leyte: Criminal Case No. R-2894 for Robbery in Band with Less Serious Physical Injuries, for the crime committed against Ricarido Fernando, and Criminal Case No. R-2895 for Robbery in Band with Homicide, for the crime committed against Rufina Rosello.

  2. Joint trial and judgment of conviction

    After joint trial, the trial court, in a decision penned by Judge Getulio M. Francisco, found Demetrio Cabale, Florencio Daniel, and Benito Terante guilty in both cases; Bonifacio Cualteros was acquitted of both charges on reasonable doubt but was nevertheless ordered to indemnify the offended parties jointly with his co-accused.

  3. Automatic review

    Because the death penalty was imposed upon each of the accused Demetrio Cabale, Florencio Daniel, and Benito Terante in Criminal Case No. R-2895, the records of both cases were forwarded to the Supreme Court pursuant to law for review of the decision rendered therein.

  4. Finality as to Florencio Daniel

    Upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, under which the death penalty is no longer imposable, Daniel, when asked whether he wished to continue with the review of the decision as an ordinary appeal, informed the Court that he was no longer interested in pursuing an appeal and was willing to serve the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua; the judgment against him was accordingly considered final.

  5. Finality as to Demetrio Cabale

    The judgment against Demetrio Cabale likewise became final by reason of his escape from detention.

  6. Appeal of Benito Terante

    Terante manifested his desire to continue and pursue his appeal, and the Supreme Court resolved the same on the merits.

Facts

At about eight o'clock in the evening of 7 June 1968, Rufina Rosello, an octogenarian, was tending her small store in Barrio Magaupas, Liloan, Southern Leyte, when four men arrived — Demetrio Cabale, Florencio Daniel, Benito Terante @ "Bodoy", and Bonifacio Cualteros. Two of them, Daniel and Terante, entered the store while Cabale and Cualteros stayed outside and fired shots into the air, shouting: "Those persons who have no part get away. We are not afraid. We are the followers of Montemayor, and those who will get near will be killed."

Inside the store, Daniel and Terante demanded money from Rosello, but she refused to accede to their demand. They dragged the old woman outside the store and made her lie down on a bamboo bed. One of them then put his hands around her neck, strangling her, while the other held her upper legs and continued demanding money from her; Rosello told them that she had no money.

As this was going on, Ricarido Fernando arrived at the scene on a motorcycle. He was ordered to stop, but he did not, as he did not know the men stopping him, and his motorcycle was kicked so that he fell. A man whom he later identified as Cabale ordered him not to rise but to lie flat on the ground, and then began to search his pockets. When Fernando placed his hand over the back pocket of his pants, the man struck his hand with a gun and removed the money from the pocket amounting to P492.00. His wallet, containing his driver's license and the certificate of registration of his motorcycle, as well as some coins, were also taken from him. He was then repeatedly kicked and "rolled" over.

After strangling Rosello to death, Daniel and Terante went back to the store and, when they came out of it, were carrying the "alkansiya" of Rosello. They then joined their companions and tried to drive off with Fernando's motorcycle, but failed to start it. Cualteros thereupon ordered Fernando to start the motor, and after Fernando had started it, the four accused rode on the motorcycle and left the place. Fernando was taken to the White Cross Clinic at Malitbog, Southern Leyte, where his injuries on the head, left hand, right knee, and chest were treated; he was incapacitated from performing his regular work for a period of fifteen days. A post mortem examination conducted on Rosello's cadaver showed that she sustained injuries on her scalp, ear, cheek, and neck, and that the cause of death was "asphyxia by strangulation."

Initial investigations revealed that one of the robbers was Florencio Daniel, who used to be a "cargador" of the Palancas. When questioned, Daniel admitted that he had participated in the commission of the robberies and pointed to Demetrio Cabale, Bonifacio Cualteros, and Benito Terante as his companions in committing the same. Terante was subsequently arrested by a policeman and PC soldiers in connection with the robberies committed at Magaupas, and the four accused were charged in the two informations that gave rise to these cases.

Terante denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged and interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he was in the copra drier located at Barrio Suba, Sogod, Southern Leyte from seven o'clock in the evening of 7 June 1968, standing watch over piles of coconuts to be made into copra together with one Cresencio Dugos, until 10 June 1968, when a policeman and PC soldiers came and arrested him. He likewise claimed that there was an irregularity in his arraignment, which was done after the cases had been submitted for decision, so that he was not afforded the chance to prepare properly for his defense, and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Vicente Mangaring, Rosita Makiling, and Ricarido Fernando were not credible in view of the inconsistencies and improbabilities in such testimonies. The trial court found the offenses established against Terante and his co-accused Cabale and Daniel, acquitted Cualteros on reasonable doubt, and appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance in fixing the penalty in Criminal Case No. R-2894.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Alibi: Respondent-appellant Terante denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged and maintained that he was in the copra drier at Barrio Suba, Sogod, Southern Leyte from seven o'clock in the evening of 7 June 1968, standing watch over piles of coconuts to be made into copra together with one Cresencio Dugos, until 10 June 1968, when a policeman and PC soldiers arrested him in connection with the robberies committed at Magaupas.
  • Irregular Arraignment: He claimed that there was an irregularity in his arraignment since it was done after the cases had been submitted for decision, so that he was not afforded the chance to prepare properly for his defense.
  • Incredibility of Prosecution Witnesses: He argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Vicente Mangaring, Rosita Makiling, and Ricarido Fernando are not credible in view of the inconsistencies and improbabilities in such testimonies.
  • Improper Appreciation of Nighttime: He contended that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in fixing the penalty imposed upon him in Criminal Case No. R-2894, there being no proof that he and his co-accused had purposely sought the cover of darkness in committing the crime.

Issues

  • Arraignment After Submission for Decision: Whether the arraignment of the appellant, conducted after the cases had already been submitted for decision, violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
  • Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi was established by sufficient proof as would entitle the appellant to acquittal.
  • Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses rendered those testimonies unworthy of credence and the evidence insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Aggravating Circumstance of Nighttime: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating nighttime as an aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. R-2894.

Ruling

  • Arraignment After Submission for Decision: No. The irregularity was non-prejudicial and had been fully cured, the defense having entered trial without objection, cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, and adopted the prior proceedings after arraignment; no violation of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation resulted.
  • Alibi: No. Alibi requires proof not only that the accused was elsewhere when the crime was committed but also that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at that time; Terante proved neither, and his alibi could not prevail over Fernando's positive identification.
  • Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities referred to insignificant details that had been fully explained, and the findings of fact of the trial court, which turned on the credibility of witnesses, were left undisturbed.
  • Aggravating Circumstance of Nighttime: Yes, the contention is correct — nighttime was not shown to have been purposely sought; but the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. R-2894 remains correct because abuse of superior strength attended the crime, with no mitigating circumstance to offset it.

Ruling Rationale

  • Arraignment After Submission for Decision: While the arraignment of the appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. The Court relied on People vs. Atienza, where a similar issue was raised and the Court held that the procedure of arraigning the accused after the prosecution had rested its case did not prejudice the appellant's rights: his counsel entered into trial without any objection on the ground that his client had not yet been arraigned, cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution, and, when the fiscal offered to reproduce all his evidence by presenting his witnesses again, agreed or did not object to having the same evidence for the government declared by the court as reproduced, so that the error or defect had been substantially or fully cured. In the instant cases, counsel for the appellant likewise entered into trial without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned and had the full opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution; when the cases were being retried after the appellant had been arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint manifestation with the prosecution adopting all proceedings had previous to the arraignment. There was, therefore, no violation of the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
  • Alibi: Settled is the rule that for alibi to prosper as a defense, the accused must prove, not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Terante failed to prove his alibi that he was at the copra drier at Barrio Suba, Sogod, Southern Leyte when the robberies were committed. He claimed to be with one Cresencio Dugos at the time, but he did not present Dugos to corroborate his claim. He likewise failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be at Barrio Magaupas, Liloan, Southern Leyte at the time the robberies were being committed; since he stated that he went to Barrio Suba at about seven o'clock in the evening and the robberies were committed at about eight o'clock in the evening of 7 June 1968, there was a time difference of only an hour, so that it was not improbable for him to be at the scene of the crimes at the time they were being committed. Moreover, the alibi could not prevail over the testimony of Ricarido Fernando, who positively identified the appellant as one of the four persons who perpetrated the robberies on the night of 7 June 1968. The moon was shining brightly and Fernando had ample time and opportunity to observe the robbers at close range, so that he could not have been mistaken in identifying them; he may not have known their names when the crimes were committed, but he saw their faces and identified them in court. Fernando had no ill motive to testify falsely against the appellant, so that his testimony is entitled to full weight and credence.
  • Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, pointed out by the appellant, refer to insignificant details which cannot destroy the credibility of said witnesses; besides, they have been fully explained. The issue involves the credibility of witnesses, and the Court found no reason to set aside the findings of fact of the trial court.
  • Aggravating Circumstance of Nighttime: The Court agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime in fixing the penalty imposed upon him in Criminal Case No. R-2894, for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries, there being no proof that the appellant and his co-accused had purposely sought the cover of darkness in committing the crime. The penalty imposed was nevertheless still correct since there was abuse of superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset it.

Doctrines

  • Non-prejudicial irregularity in arraignment; curative effect of counsel's participation — An arraignment held only after the prosecution has rested its case is an irregularity that does not invalidate the proceedings where it is non-prejudicial and has been substantially or fully cured. The defect is cured where defense counsel entered into trial without objecting that the accused had not yet been arraigned, had full opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, and, upon retrial after arraignment, filed a joint manifestation with the prosecution adopting all proceedings had prior to the arraignment. No violation of the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation results.
  • Requisites of alibi — For alibi to prosper as a defense, the accused must prove, not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Both elements must concur; failure to prove the physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene, as where the distance between the claimed location and the crime scene could be traversed within the one-hour interval between the accused's departure and the commission of the offense, defeats the defense. Corroboration by the person the accused claims to have been with is likewise essential, and the non-presentation of that witness weakens the alibi.
  • Alibi vis-à-vis positive identification — Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by a prosecution witness who had ample time and opportunity to observe the malefactors at close range, particularly where the scene was well lighted by a brightly shining moon and the witness harbored no ill motive to testify falsely. The witness's initial ignorance of the accused's names does not diminish the weight of his in-court identification, since he saw their faces at the time of the crime.
  • Abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance — Although nighttime was improperly appreciated for want of proof that the accused purposely sought the cover of darkness, the penalty remains correct where abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime and no mitigating circumstance was present to offset it. The aggravating circumstance need not be the one erroneously relied upon by the trial court, so long as another aggravating circumstance is established and unoffset.
  • Findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court — Alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that refer to insignificant details, and which have been fully explained, cannot destroy the witnesses' credibility. Where the issue turns on the credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded respect and will not be set aside absent any reason to do so.
  • Civil indemnity for death — The indemnity for the death of the victim is fixed at P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence, superseding the lower amount of P12,000.00 awarded by the trial court.

Key Excerpts

  • "Settled is the rule that for alibi to prosper as a defense, the accused must prove, not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed." — The canonical formulation of the two-pronged requisites of alibi, which the Court applied to reject Terante's defense because he failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the crime scene.
  • "We hold that this error or irregularity has not prejudiced the right or interests of the appellant, and considering that appellant's counsel had full opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses who took the witness stand for the government and that furthermore he agreed to the reproduction, of the evidence from the prosecution, the error or defect had been substantially or fully cured." — Quoted by the Court from People vs. Atienza and made the basis for holding that the arraignment conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision was non-prejudicial; it states the ratio decidendi on the procedural issue.
  • "Besides, the alibi of the appellant cannot prevail over the testimony of Ricarido Fernando who positively identified the appellant as one of the four (4) persons who perpetrated the robberies on the night of 7 June 1968." — States the settled hierarchy between the defense of alibi and a positive identification made by a witness who had ample opportunity to observe the malefactors.
  • "While we agree with this contention of the appellant, the penalty imposed is still correct since there was abuse of superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset it." — Illustrates that an erroneously appreciated aggravating circumstance does not invalidate the penalty where another aggravating circumstance is established and remains unoffset by any mitigating circumstance.

Precedents Cited

  • People vs. Atienza, G.R. No. L-3001, June 17, 1950, 86 Phil. 576, 579-580 — The sole case cited by name in the decision. Quoted at length and followed as controlling authority for the rule that arraignment conducted after the prosecution had rested its case is a non-prejudicial error where defense counsel entered trial without objection, cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, and agreed to the reproduction of the prosecution's evidence, so that the error or defect was substantially or fully cured.

Provisions

  • 1987 Constitution — Abolition of the death penalty — The decision notes that upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, under which the death penalty is no longer imposable, the accused Florencio Daniel, when asked whether he would like to continue with the review of the decision as an ordinary appeal, informed the Court that he was no longer interested in pursuing an appeal and was willing to serve the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua. This constitutional change governed the mode of review of the death penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. R-2895 and the penalty exposure of the accused.
  • Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation — The decision held that there was no violation of the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, notwithstanding that his arraignment was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, because the irregularity was non-prejudicial and had been fully cured by his counsel's participation in the trial and adoption of the prior proceedings.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concurred with the ponencia of Justice Padilla.