People of the Philippines vs. Bonifacio Lopez y Marcella

Treachery qualifies a killing to murder where the attack is sudden and unexpected, depriving the victim of any opportunity to defend herself or retaliate, and the method of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted; in a complex crime, the penalty for the more serious offense is imposed in its maximum period, and where that penalty is indivisible, the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances is inconsequential.

Accused-appellant Bonifacio Lopez y Marcella @ Opring was the brother of Librada Ramirez and thus the uncle of the victim, Gerarda "Gina" Abdullah, who was nine months pregnant at the time of the killing. The case was prosecuted under Republic Act No. 7659, which reimposed the death penalty and amended Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code to punish murder with reclusion perpetua to death. The decision was rendered per curiam, and four Justices reiterated their adherence to the separate opinions in People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, even as they abided by the majority ruling.

Accused-appellant Bonifacio Lopez y Marcella @ Opring was the brother of Librada Ramirez and the uncle of the victim, Gerarda "Gina" Abdullah, who was nine months pregnant on July 19, 1998. At around 2:30 o'clock that afternoon, Librada heard a commotion inside their house in Dagupan City and rushed home, where she saw accused-appellant attacking John Frank with a knife, blood already oozing from the latter's neck. Librada approached accused-appellant to calm him down, but he sneered, poked his knife at her, grabbed her by the hair, and pulled and pushed her violently from side to side while John Frank wrestled with him for possession of the knife. When Librada finally freed herself, John Frank told her to escape and seek help, and she ran to the house of their policeman neighbor about ten to fifteen meters away.

With the help of a neighbor, John Frank pulled accused-appellant outside the house and locked him out by closing the front and back doors. Not long after, John Frank saw accused-appellant jump over the fence and barge into the bathroom where Gina was taking a bath. Standing on top of the sink and peeping through the bathroom window, John Frank saw accused-appellant violently stabbing Gina, who fell on her back to the ground. Gina managed to get up and tore down a GI sheet forming part of the bathroom enclosure to force her way out.

When Librada returned, she saw Gina running out of the bathroom. Accused-appellant, who was about to leave, spotted Gina being lifted into a parked jeep, rushed toward her, dragged her out of the vehicle, kicked her, and mercilessly stabbed her again before fleeing. Gina was brought to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, where she expired. Esteven Basi, a passerby, witnessed accused-appellant kicking and stabbing a pregnant woman whom he later learned to be Gina. Dr. Benjamin Bautista, Rural Health Physician of Dagupan City, conducted an autopsy on Gina's cadaver and documented multiple stab wounds to the left and right sides of her body, penetrating and perforating the lungs, liver, small intestine, and pregnant uterus, with massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a prolapsed umbilical cord.

Accused-appellant testified in his own defense and presented his daughter, Josephine Lopez Almonte, to corroborate his story. According to him, his daughter Marilyn went missing on May 25, 1998, and four days later he saw Gina, Librada, and Librada's other daughters Vicky and Emily quarrelling with his wife, during which he heard Gina say that his daughter was a flirt. On June 3, 1998, Marilyn returned home looking pale and suffering from dizziness, and on one occasion fell down the stairs. Suspicious, accused-appellant inspected her belongings and found a letter Marilyn had prepared for one Jeffrey stating that he had had her baby aborted. When confronted, Marilyn allegedly confessed that it was Librada who had maneuvered the abortion. On July 19, 1998, accused-appellant recounted that after having lunch with his children and some friends, he went to Librada's house to ask her about the abortion. Librada answered by calling him a devil, and upon hearing the altercation, John Frank took a knife from the kitchen and stabbed him in the abdomen. Gina then covered his face with a towel while Librada held his left hand, and he and John Frank fought for possession of the knife. Feeling dizzy from his abdominal wound, he was unaware whether anyone was injured in the scuffle. After getting out of the house, he tried to report the incident to a retired captain named Rosendo Maramba but could not locate him; when the police arrived, he gave himself up and surrendered. He presented no medical certificate to prove the stabbing and no witness other than his daughter Josephine, whose testimony substantially repeated his account.

Giving full faith and credence to the eyewitness accounts of Librada, John Frank, and Esteven Basi, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of murder with abortion and imposed the penalty of death. The trial court rejected accused-appellant's version, finding the prosecution's eyewitness accounts credible and the defense's claim of accidental stabbing incredible.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in the application of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically the rule governing the imposition of an indivisible penalty.
• Imposition of the Death Penalty: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death.
• Absence of a Qualifying Circumstance: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder since the case was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Vindication of a Grave Offense: Accused-appellant pleaded for consideration of the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense allegedly committed by the victim against his daughter.
• Credibility of Esteven Basi: Accused-appellant asserted that Esteven Basi's testimony is unreliable since he did not execute any statement in connection with the investigation and merely presented himself later to Librada so he could testify in the trial.

• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing of Gerarda "Gina" Abdullah so as to qualify the crime to murder.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Vindication of a Grave Offense: Whether the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense may be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant.
• Credibility of Witness: Whether the testimony of Esteven Basi is credible despite his failure to execute a statement during the investigation.
• Application of Article 63, Revised Penal Code: Whether the trial court correctly applied Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the death penalty for the complex crime of murder with abortion.
• Damages: Whether the award of actual and compensatory damages is proper.

• Treachery: Yes. Treachery is present when the employment of means of execution gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and the method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted; the essence is a swift and unexpected attack on a victim without the slightest provocation.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Vindication of a Grave Offense: No. The mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated where almost two months lapsed between the alleged insult and the killing, giving the accused sufficient time to recover his serenity, and where the provocation was not proportionate to the act committed.
• Credibility of Witness: Yes. The initial reluctance of a witness to volunteer information about a criminal case and his unwillingness to be involved in the investigation due to fear of reprisal are insufficient factors to affect credibility, the natural reluctance of a witness being a matter of judicial notice.
• Application of Article 63, Revised Penal Code: Yes. In a complex crime, the penalty for the more or the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period; as between murder and unintentional abortion, murder is the more serious crime, and death being the maximum and an indivisible penalty, mitigating or aggravating circumstances are inconsequential.
• Damages: No. The award of P25,000 as actual and compensatory damages must be deleted for lack of documentary evidence, although the civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 are sustained.

• Treachery: Treachery is considered present when there is the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and the method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on a victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Here, Gina was taking a bath when accused-appellant suddenly forced himself into the flimsy structure serving as a bathroom and, without warning, repeatedly stabbed her. As she fell to the ground, he continued his attack; even as she forced herself out of the bathroom, he ruthlessly assaulted her from behind. When the wounded Gina had freed herself and was being lifted into the jeep to be brought to the hospital, accused-appellant caught up with her, dragged her out, kicked her while helpless on the ground, and without pity stabbed the already beaten-up nine-month pregnant woman. An attack upon an unconscious victim who could not have put up any defense whatsoever is treacherous; Gina, almost dead on the ground and given her physical condition, was totally unprepared and had no weapon to resist the attack. The stabbing was thus treacherous, and the trial court correctly concluded that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The defense's version — that Librada held accused-appellant's hand while he wrestled with John Frank for the knife, and that Gina assisted by covering his face with a towel and in the process must have been accidentally stabbed several times causing her and her baby's death — is incredible and unbelievable, being a claim not borne out by the testimonial evidence of Dr. Bautista and his autopsy report. For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The gruesome wounds sustained by the victim belie the exculpatory pretension of accused-appellant and confirm the prosecution's theory that he purposely and vigorously attacked Gina in order to kill her.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Vindication of a Grave Offense: The record furnishes no basis to justify the appreciation of this mitigating circumstance. Accused-appellant claims that his daughter Marilyn went missing on May 25, 1998, and that four days thereafter he saw Gina and her companions quarrelling with his wife and heard Gina say that his daughter was a flirt. Even if true, the stabbing incident took place on July 19, 1998, or almost two months thereafter, and the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be considered in his favor because he had sufficient time to recover his serenity. The supposed vindication did not immediately or proximately follow the alleged insulting and provocative remarks. Aside from the requirement that the provocation should immediately precede the commission of the offense, it should also be proportionate to the damage caused by the act and adequate to stir one to its commission. The remark attributed to Gina that accused-appellant's daughter is a flirt does not warrant and justify his act of slaying the victim. Indeed, accused-appellant does not accuse Gina of committing the alleged abortion; he imputes it to Gina's mother Librada. Further, accused-appellant even had knowledge that the victim was pregnant, as shown by his own testimony, yet such tender physical condition did not deter him from taking his vengeful act, snuffing out the lives of both Gina and the baby inside her womb.

• Credibility of Witness: The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigation due to fear of reprisal are common and have been judicially declared insufficient factors to affect credibility. The natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case and to provide information to the authorities is a matter of judicial notice. Thus, hesitation of a witness to relate the felony he witnessed and to identify the author thereof is not a ground to discard his testimony. A frank and consistent manner of testifying bears the mark of a credible witness. Esteven was a mere passerby, and there is nothing to indicate that he was actuated by improper motives to testify against accused-appellant; where there is no evidence that the witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated. Esteven's testimony must therefore be given full weight.

• Application of Article 63, Revised Penal Code: Accused-appellant was charged with the complex crime of murder with abortion, not with two independent charges of murder and unintentional abortion. In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law. The stabbing and killing of the victim, which likewise caused the death of the fetus, arose from the single criminal intent of killing the victim, as shown by accused-appellant's pursuit of the victim after she was able to escape. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, punishes murder with reclusion perpetua to death when committed with attendant circumstances including treachery. In a complex crime, the penalty for the more or the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. As between murder and unintentional abortion, murder is the more serious crime, and the penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua to death. Death, being the maximum or the greater penalty, must then be imposed, and since this is an indivisible penalty, the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances is inconsequential.

• Damages: Modification of the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim is in order. Because no documentary evidence was presented as proof, the amount of P25,000 as actual and compensatory damages should be deleted. The civil indemnity of P50,000 is affirmed, and the heirs of the victim are entitled to moral damages of P50,000 for their mental anguish and pains suffered based on testimonial evidence during the trial.

• Treachery — Treachery is present when the employment of means of execution gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and the method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Its essence is a swift and unexpected attack on a victim without the slightest provocation on his part. The Court applied the doctrine to qualify the killing to murder, finding that the victim was stabbed without warning while bathing, attacked from behind as she fled, and stabbed again while helpless on the ground, and that an attack upon an unconscious victim who could not have put up any defense whatsoever is treacherous.

• Complex Crime — In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the stabbing and killing of the victim, which likewise caused the death of the fetus, arose from the single criminal intent of killing the victim, as shown by the accused's pursuit of the victim after she escaped, and that the accused was properly charged with the single complex crime of murder with abortion rather than two independent charges.

• Penalty in Complex Crimes — In a complex crime, the penalty for the more or the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. As between murder and unintentional abortion, murder is the more serious crime, and its penalty under Article 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death. Death, being the maximum or the greater penalty, must be imposed; and because it is an indivisible penalty, the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances is inconsequential.

• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense — For the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense to be appreciated, the vindication must immediately or proximately follow the alleged insulting or provocative remarks, and the provocation must be proportionate to the damage caused by the act and adequate to stir one to its commission. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the mitigating circumstance, finding that almost two months had lapsed between the alleged insult and the killing, giving the accused sufficient time to recover his serenity, and that the remark that his daughter was a flirt did not warrant or justify the slaying.

• Credibility of a Reluctant Witness — The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigation due to fear of reprisal are common and have been judicially declared insufficient factors to affect credibility; the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case and to provide information to the authorities is a matter of judicial notice. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the credibility of Esteven Basi, a passerby who did not execute a statement during the investigation, noting that a frank and consistent manner of testifying bears the mark of a credible witness and that absent evidence of improper motive, the presumption is that a prosecution witness was not actuated by improper motive.

• Credibility of Evidence — For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the defense's version, finding the claim of accidental stabbing incredible and belied by the gruesome wounds sustained by the victim.

• "Treachery is considered present when there is the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and the method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted." — This passage states the canonical formulation of treachery, the qualifying circumstance that elevated the killing to murder in this case.

• "In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law." — This passage articulates the nature of a complex crime, which the Court used to explain why the accused was charged with a single offense of murder with abortion rather than two independent charges.

• "In a complex crime, the penalty for the more or the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." — This passage states the controlling rule on the penalty for complex crimes, which the Court applied in holding that death, the maximum penalty for murder, had to be imposed notwithstanding the presence of mitigating circumstances.

• "The natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case and to provide information to the authorities is a matter of judicial notice." — This passage defines the Court's treatment of reluctant witnesses and supplied the basis for upholding the credibility of Esteven Basi despite his failure to execute a statement during the investigation.

• People vs. Bernas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94372, July 5, 1999 — Cited for the definition of treachery: the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of the method of execution.
• People vs. Lagarteja, G.R. No. 127095, June 22, 1998 — Cited for the essence of treachery as a swift and unexpected attack on a victim without the slightest provocation on his part.
• People vs. Flores, 252 SCRA 31 (1996) — Cited for the rule that an attack upon an unconscious victim who could not have put up any defense whatsoever is treacherous.
• People vs. Santos, 255 SCRA 309 (1996) — Cited for the rule that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be considered where the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity.
• People vs. Luayon, 260 SCRA 739 (1996) — Cited for the requisites of the mitigating circumstance: the provocation should immediately precede the commission of the offense and should be proportionate to the damage caused and adequate to stir one to its commission.
• People vs. Lising, 285 SCRA 595 (1998); People vs. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210 (1998); People vs. Israel, 231 SCRA 155 (1994) — Cited for the rule that the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigation due to fear of reprisal are insufficient to affect credibility.
• People vs. Villanueva, 284 SCRA 501 (1998); People vs. Cario, 288 SCRA 404 (1998) — Cited for the rule that the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case and to provide information to the authorities is a matter of judicial notice.
• People vs. Medina, 292 SCRA 436 (1998) — Cited for the rule that a frank and consistent manner of testifying bears the mark of a credible witness.
• People vs. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352 (1998) — Cited for the presumption that a prosecution witness was not actuated by improper motive absent evidence to the contrary.
• People vs. Alacar, 211 SCRA 580 (1992) — Cited for the rule that in a complex crime, the stabbing and killing of the victim which caused the death of the fetus arose from a single criminal intent.
• People vs. Hilario, 284 SCRA 344 (1998) — Cited for the rule that testimony not borne out by the testimonial evidence of the autopsy physician and his autopsy report cannot be given weight.
• People vs. Niño, 290 SCRA 155 (1998) — Cited for the rule that testimony conforming to the quotidian knowledge, observation, and experience of man is often deemed reliable.
• Cosep vs. People, 290 SCRA 378 (1998) — Cited for the rule that evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself.
• People vs. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682 (1997) — Cited in the note that four Justices maintained their adherence to the separate opinions therein that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty.
• People vs. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349 (1998) — Cited as the basis for the award of moral damages grounded on testimonial evidence during the trial.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Punishes murder with reclusion perpetua to death when committed with attendant circumstances including treachery. The Court applied this provision in holding that the killing was qualified to murder by treachery and that the prescribed penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
• Article 256, Revised Penal Code — Defines unintentional abortion. The Information charged the accused with murder complexed with abortion under Article 248 in relation to Article 256.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the rules for the application of indivisible penalties. The Court applied the rule that in a complex crime, the penalty for the more or the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period, and that where the penalty is indivisible, mitigating or aggravating circumstances are inconsequential.
• Section 25, Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83, Revised Penal Code — Requires that, upon finality of the decision, the records of the case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. The Court ordered compliance with this provision.

Davide, C.J. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, JJ., concurred. Mendoza, J., was on leave. Four Justices maintained their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray (267 SCRA 682 [1997]) that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, but nonetheless abided by the ruling of the majority and assented that the death penalty should be imposed.