People of the Philippines vs. Bonifacio Abadies

Treachery qualifies a killing to Murder where the victim, at the time of the attack, was not in a position to defend himself and the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed; evident premeditation, by contrast, is appreciated only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of the time the accused determined to commit the crime, an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to that determination, and a sufficient lapse of time between the decision and its execution to allow reflection — mere threats unsupported by evidence of a fixed criminal resolve being insufficient. Absent any aggravating circumstance, the penalty for Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties, pursuant to Article 63(2).

Cecilio Roldan was the nephew of accused-appellant Bonifacio Abadies, described in the record as a known neighborhood "toughie." The two were related by blood and lived near each other in Barangay Cadaohan, Ormoc City, where Cecilio's brother, Jose Manuel Roldan, resided next door. A few weeks before the incident, in December 1995, Cecilio had been unable to give Abadies the additional amount of P10,000.00 for the lease of a rice land owned by a certain Langkoy Fran, a circumstance the prosecution presented as the source of the accused's grudge against the victim. The killing occurred during the Christmas Eve celebration of the Roldan family.

On December 24, 1995, Cecilio Roldan, his wife Cynthia, their twelve-year-old son Ronald, and their neighbor Salve Aligway were celebrating Christmas Eve at the balcony of the Roldan house in Barangay Cadaohan, Ormoc City. At 2:00 a.m. of Christmas Day, Cynthia saw appellant Bonifacio Abadies, her husband's uncle, approach Cecilio from behind and, without warning, shoot him with a short firearm about eight inches in length. Cecilio was hit on the upper back and slumped to the floor, while Salve Aligway rushed to his side. Because the balcony was lighted, Cynthia saw appellant running toward the back of their house.

Jose Manuel Roldan, Cecilio's brother who lived next door, heard the gunshot, immediately went out of his house, and saw appellant, his uncle, carrying a firearm and hurriedly entering his own house about ten meters away. Jose Manuel rushed to his brother's house fearing that he had been hurt. He recalled that on the morning of the previous day, appellant had threatened to kill Cecilio because of a recent misunderstanding between them. Cecilio was brought to the Ormoc District Hospital, where he eventually died.

According to the victim's widow, appellant harbored a grudge against her husband because the latter had been unable to give him the additional amount of P10,000.00 for the lease of a rice land owned by a certain Langkoy Fran in December 1995, a few weeks before the shooting. Dr. Jesus Castro, who conducted the post-mortem examination, found that Cecilio sustained a fatal gunshot wound at the back which hit the heart, and that the distance of the gun from the victim was more than one foot, judging from the absence of gunpowder on the body. His post-mortem report indicated "Cause of Death: CP arrest, 2º Massive and Profuse bleeding 2º to gunshot wound."

Appellant admitted having shot Cecilio but claimed the shooting was accidental because the gun went off while the two were grappling for its possession. He alleged that at around 11:00 p.m. of Christmas Eve, 1995, Cecilio invited him and his two sons to celebrate Christmas at his home; they arrived and sat at the terrace, where they drank tuba and ate chicken with him. At about past midnight, Cecilio went to his bedroom and, when he returned, was carrying a gun. Eleodoro, appellant's son, shouted, "Watch out Pa, you might be shot!" Upon hearing the warning, appellant got up and grabbed Cecilio's hand; while the two grappled for possession of the firearm, they both fell down with Cecilio on top of him. Appellant tried to twist Cecilio's arm toward his back when the gun suddenly went off. Immediately after the explosion, appellant and his two sons fled, leaving the victim alone; there were no other people present when the incident happened. At 7:00 a.m. the next morning, appellant was arrested.

Faced with these conflicting versions, the trial court found the prosecution witnesses more worthy of credence, their testimonies being spontaneous, positive, and forthright and not destroyed or rebutted throughout the trial. The trial court further found that the killing was attended by treachery and by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the latter anchored on the unrebutted testimony of Jose Manuel Roldan regarding appellant's threat to kill the victim.

• Evident Premeditation Not Proved: Accused-appellant maintained that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum penalty of death despite the fact that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• Treachery: Whether the killing of Cecilio Roldan was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, thereby qualifying the killing to Murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was proved beyond reasonable doubt so as to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of death was correctly imposed on accused-appellant.

• Treachery: Yes. Treachery attended the killing because the two conditions therefor were present: the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack, and the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed.
• Evident Premeditation: No. None of the requisites of evident premeditation can be inferred from the facts, the records not showing the time when accused-appellant resolved to commit the crime and the threat to kill being unsupported by evidence of acts manifesting a clung-to determination.
• Penalty: No. With no aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the proper imposable penalty for Murder is reclusion perpetua, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, pursuant to Article 63(2).

• Treachery: Murder is the unlawful killing of any person when qualified by any of the circumstances listed under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and treachery or alevosia, having been aptly alleged in the Information, is one such qualifying circumstance. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The two conditions for treachery are present: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Here, Cecilio Roldan was in the comforts of his home, eating, drinking, and thoroughly engrossed in the gaiety of the yuletide season while engaged in light banter with his wife and a neighbor, when he was suddenly and without warning shot from behind by accused-appellant, his uncle. As in People vs. Herrera, accused-appellant suddenly positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him, and, without any warning, promptly delivered the fatal shot. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life and of the danger that lurked behind him; there was no way he could have defended himself, taken flight, or avoided the assault. The attendance of treachery thus qualified the killing to Murder. The Court likewise found no reason to reverse the trial court's ruling on the nature of the crime, the prosecution witnesses having been found more worthy of credence, their testimonies spontaneous, positive, and forthright, and not destroyed or rebutted throughout the trial.

• Evident Premeditation: Like treachery, the elements of evident premeditation must be established with equal certainty as the criminal act itself in order for it to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. The following must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. It must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning; there must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim. Criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing a determination to commit the crime; the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation." In this case, none of the requisites can be inferred from the facts. The records do not show the time when accused-appellant resolved to commit the crime, and the date and, if possible, the time when the malefactor determined to commit the crime is essential because the lapse of time for purposes of the third requisite is computed from such date and time. The second requisite is likewise wanting: the fact that accused-appellant made threats to kill the victim does not necessarily prove evident premeditation without a showing that he performed acts manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination. Such threats, unsupported by evidence which would disclose his true criminal state of mind, will only be construed as casual remarks naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation; an expression of hatred does not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime. Indeed, Jose Manuel Roldan, upon whose testimony the finding of evident premeditation was anchored, himself admitted that he did not think accused-appellant would pursue his plan to kill Cecilio, declaring on re-cross examination, "Nobody thought that he would carry out his plan." Without such evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, would not be enough to sustain a finding of this aggravating circumstance. The evidence therefore falls short of proving evident premeditation.

• Penalty: There being no aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the proper imposable penalty for the killing of Cecilio Roldan is reclusion perpetua. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for Murder is reclusion perpetua to death, and the lesser of these two indivisible penalties shall be imposed pursuant to Article 63(2) of the said Code. Following prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Cecilio Roldan is proper without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. Moral damages, pegged at P50,000.00 by controlling case law, was also correctly awarded by the trial court, taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victim's family brought about by his death. The award of P25,000.00 as actual expenses incurred by the widow of Cecilio Roldan, which was duly proved, is likewise affirmed.

• Treachery (Alevosia) as a Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. Its essence is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. The Court applied the doctrine to hold that the killing was qualified to Murder, the victim having been shot from behind while unsuspecting and engaged in the gaiety of the Christmas Eve celebration, with no opportunity to defend himself, take flight, or avoid the assault.
• Evident Premeditation — Requisites and Proof — Evident premeditation, like treachery, must be established with equal certainty as the criminal act itself in order to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. The following must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Its essence is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. It must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning; there must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim. The Court applied the doctrine to reject the trial court's finding, the records not showing the time of the resolve to kill and the threats made by the accused being unsupported by evidence of acts manifesting a clung-to determination.
• Threats as Insufficient Proof of Evident Premeditation — The fact that the accused made threats to kill the victim does not necessarily prove evident premeditation without a showing that he performed acts manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination. Threats unsupported by evidence which would disclose the true criminal state of mind will only be construed as casual remarks naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation; an expression of hatred does not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime.
• Penalty for Murder and the Rule on Indivisible Penalties — Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for Murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Where no aggravating circumstance attends the commission of the crime, the lesser of these two indivisible penalties shall be imposed pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court applied this rule to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
• Civil Indemnity for Death, Moral Damages, and Actual Damages — Following prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim is proper without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. Moral damages, pegged at P50,000.00 by controlling case law, may be awarded taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victim's family brought about by his death. Actual expenses duly proved are likewise recoverable.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — This passage states the statutory definition of treachery relied upon by the Court in holding that the killing was qualified to Murder, and it supplies the canonical formulation of alevosia under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code.
• "The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part." — This passage compresses the ratio for the finding of alevosia, explaining why the shooting of an unsuspecting victim from behind, while he was at leisure in his own home, satisfied the qualifying circumstance.
• "Like treachery, the elements of evident premeditation must be established with equal certainty as the criminal act itself, in order for it to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance." — This passage states the evidentiary standard governing evident premeditation and is the pivot of the Court's reversal of the trial court's finding on that circumstance.
• "The fact that accused-appellant made threats to kill the victim does not necessarily prove evident premeditation without a showing that accused-appellant performed acts manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination." — This passage explains why the threat recounted by Jose Manuel Roldan could not sustain the aggravating circumstance, characterizing such threats as casual remarks emanating from rancor rather than a settled criminal resolution.

• People vs. Herrera, G.R. Nos. 140557-58, December 5, 2001 — Cited as the recent case whose factual pattern the Court found analogous, where the accused suddenly positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him, and without any warning delivered the fatal shot; relied upon to support the finding of treachery.
• People vs. Galam, 325 SCRA 489 [2000] — Cited in support of the two conditions required for treachery, namely, that the victim was not in a position to defend himself and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed.
• People vs. Romeo Garcia, G.R. No. 129216, April 20, 2001 — Cited for the principle that the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part.
• People vs. Moyong, 344 SCRA 730 [2000]; People vs. Mendoza, 332 SCRA 485 [2000]; People vs. Reyes, 287 SCRA 229 [1998] — Cited collectively for the rule that the elements of evident premeditation must be established with equal certainty as the criminal act itself before it may be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
• People vs. Calago, G.R. No. 141122, April 22, 2002; People vs. Galvez, G.R. No. 136790, March 26, 2001; People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 138046, December 8, 2000 — Cited collectively for the three requisites of evident premeditation: the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and a sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow reflection.
• People vs. Uganap, et al., G.R. No. 130605, June 19, 2001 — Cited for the rule that the essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
• People vs. Mariano, 347 SCRA 109, 125 [2000] — Cited for the requirement that evident premeditation be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning, and for the rule that mere presumptions and inferences, however logical and probable, cannot sustain a finding of the circumstance.
• People vs. Gadin, Jr., 331 SCRA 345, 354 [2000] — Cited for the requirement of direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim.
• People vs. Umayam, G.R. No. 134572, April 18, 2002 — Cited for the rule that criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing a determination to commit the crime, and that the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but "evident premeditation."
• Rabor vs. People, 338 SCRA 381, 389 [2000] — Cited for the rule that the date and, if possible, the time when the malefactor determined to commit the crime is essential because the lapse of time for purposes of the third requisite is computed from such date and time.
• People vs. Dimailig, 332 SCRA 340, 352 [2000] — Cited for the rule that an expression of hatred does not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime.
• People vs. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 131477, April 20, 2001; People vs. Mindanao y Gumabao, 335 SCRA 200 [2000]; People vs. Quijon, 325 SCRA 453 [2000] — Cited collectively as prevailing jurisprudence supporting the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim without need of proof other than the fact of death.
• People vs. Pardua, et al., G.R. No. 110813, June 28, 2001; People vs. Ereneo, 326 SCRA 157 [2000] — Cited collectively as controlling case law pegging moral damages at P50,000.00.
• People vs. Alba, et al., G.R. Nos. 130627 & 139477-78, May 31, 2001; People vs. Langit, 337 SCRA 323 [2000] — Cited collectively in support of the award of actual damages for expenses duly proved by the victim's widow.
• People vs. Mahinay, 304 SCRA 767 [1999] — Cited together with People vs. Mariano for the rule that mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient to sustain a finding of evident premeditation.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes Murder as the unlawful killing of any person when qualified by any of the circumstances listed therein, and fixes the penalty at reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied it to hold that the killing of Cecilio Roldan, being attended by treachery, constituted Murder, and to determine the range of the imposable penalty.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery or alevosia as an aggravating circumstance, present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The Court applied this definition, together with its two conditions, to qualify the killing to Murder.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. The Court applied this provision to impose reclusion perpetua instead of death after finding no aggravating circumstance present.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., was on leave.