People of the Philippines vs. Bocar

A criminal case dismissed by the trial court after an unsworn summary investigation, without the prosecution having been given any opportunity to present its evidence, is void for lack of jurisdiction; such a void dismissal does not terminate the first jeopardy and therefore cannot bar the remand of the case for trial on the merits.

The criminal charge arose from a dispute over six pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs taken from a compound at the pier, with the complainant Juan B. Bañez, Jr. and the accused each asserting ownership of the same logs, so that the controversy was in substance a question of ownership. The Office of the City Fiscal of Manila conducted the preliminary investigation that preceded the filing of the information for theft.

On March 28, 1967, the Assistant Fiscal for Manila filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila an information charging Cesar S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio with theft. The information alleged that on or about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, the three accused, conspiring and confederating with three others whose true names, identities and whereabouts were still unknown, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away six pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs valued at P7,104.62 belonging to Juan B. Bañez, Jr., to his damage and prejudice in the same amount. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 85798.

On May 3, 1967, the three accused were arraigned and each pleaded "not guilty." Neither the propriety nor the validity of the information and of the arraignment was contested, and the issues having been joined, the case stood ready for trial on the merits.

Proceedings were had on July 7, 1967, when the respondent Judge conducted what he styled a "summary investigation," directing questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. The transcript of that proceeding shows that the parties were not placed under oath before they answered the respondent Judge's queries, and that no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case. The prosecution was never given a chance to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court. At the end of the investigation, the respondent Judge issued the order under review, dismissing the case on the opinion that it was "more civil than criminal," that the issue was who owned the logs, and that during the summary investigation the accused had acknowledged taking the logs from the compound at the pier in good faith, without any intention to steal them from anybody. The order likewise cancelled the bond filed by the accused and imposed no costs.

On July 12, 1967, the City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the July 7, 1967 order. On July 18, 1967, the private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration, and on August 8, 1967, the City Fiscal's Office joined them in that motion. On August 9, 1967, the respondent Court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration, a copy of which was received by the City Fiscal's Office on August 11, 1967. The People thereafter commenced the present special civil action seeking the annulment of the July 7, 1967 order.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack of Jurisdiction: Whether respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated July 7, 1967 dismissing Criminal Case No. 85798.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the void dismissal order may serve as a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy barring the remand of the criminal case for trial on the merits.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack of Jurisdiction: Yes. The dismissal was issued after an unsworn summary investigation in which no evidence in law had been entered into the records and the prosecution was never allowed to offer its evidence, rendering the order arbitrary, whimsical and capricious and thus an abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
• Double Jeopardy: No. The dismissal being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, it did not validly terminate the first jeopardy, and the remand of the case merely continues that jeopardy without exposing the accused to a second one.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack of Jurisdiction: The Office of the City Fiscal of Manila had conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaint of Juan B. Bañez, Jr., and on the strength of that investigation filed the information for theft against the three accused, who were thereafter arraigned and pleaded not guilty; neither the information nor the arraignment was contested, and the case was ready for trial on the merits. The subsequent proceedings, however, were marred with irregularities. The transcript of the July 7, 1967 proceedings showed that the parties were not placed under oath before answering the queries of the respondent Judge, so that no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case, and that the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court. The issuance of the dismissal order was therefore arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is violated, as held in Uy vs. Genato, Serino vs. Zosa, People vs. Gomez and People vs. Balisacan. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction, and the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will, as held in Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction, per Aducayen vs. Flores and Shell Co. vs. Enage, and may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head." Accordingly, the respondent Judge's dismissal order was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Double Jeopardy: Because the dismissal order was null and void for lack of jurisdiction, it could not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy, as held in Serino vs. Zosa. The constitutional guarantee that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" under Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution is clarified by Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, substantially reproduced as Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which bars a second prosecution only where the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance, and after he had pleaded to the charge. Three requisites must concur to raise the defense: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused, per People vs. Ylagan. The lower court was not a competent court, having been ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. As quoted from People vs. Gomez, a dismissal that is purely capricious amounts to grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction; such a dismissal, made sua sponte for no proper reason at all, is void for being issued without authority, and being void it cannot terminate the proceedings, so that the same jeopardy that attached continues and the defense of double jeopardy is without merit. A purely capricious dismissal likewise deprives the State of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict and denies the prosecution its day in court; being a dismissal without due process, it is null and void and will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy.

• Due process of the prosecution in criminal cases — The prosecution, no less than the accused, is entitled to due process; where it is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is violated. The Court applied the doctrine to a trial court's dismissal of an information after an unsworn "summary investigation" in which no evidence in law had been entered into the records and the prosecution was never permitted to introduce and offer its evidence formally under the Rules of Court.
• Grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction — A dismissal issued arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously, without authority and for no proper reason, amounts to grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Because the respondent Judge acted without authority in dismissing the case, the order was void and could not terminate the proceedings.
• Violation of constitutional rights ousts courts of jurisdiction — Where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction; the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue, and a judgment rendered in disregard of due process is void for lack of jurisdiction and may be treated as a "lawless thing."
• Requisites of double jeopardy — Three requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan). Here, the lower court was not a competent court because it had been ousted of jurisdiction, so the first jeopardy was never validly terminated.
• Void dismissal does not terminate jeopardy — A dismissal that is void for lack of due process cannot terminate the criminal proceedings; the same jeopardy that attached continues, and a remand for further hearing or trial merely continues the first jeopardy without exposing the accused to a second one.

• "Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before respondent Court. respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit." — This passage states the core ratio for the jurisdictional holding: the absence of sworn testimony and of any evidence of record rendered the dismissal an arbitrary act rather than a judicial adjudication.
• "The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction." — This is the doctrinal bridge by which the denial of the prosecution's due process was converted into a jurisdictional defect, the foundation of the entire ruling.
• "Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused." — This is the canonical enumeration of the requisites for the attachment of legal jeopardy, derived from People vs. Ylagan and frequently cited in subsequent double jeopardy jurisprudence.
• "In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy." — This passage supplies the resolution of the double jeopardy question and explains why the remand ordered in the dispositive portion is constitutionally permissible.

• People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 — The controlling precedent for the requisites of attachment of legal jeopardy, cited for the proposition that jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, upon a valid plea, and upon dismissal or termination without the express consent of the accused.
• People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 (May 29, 1967) — Quoted at length; holds that a purely capricious dismissal amounts to grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, is void for being issued without authority, and cannot terminate the proceedings, so that the same jeopardy continues and double jeopardy does not lie.
• People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119 (Aug. 31, 1966) — Cited for the rule that a purely capricious dismissal deprives the State of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict, denies the prosecution its day in court, and is null and void as a dismissal without due process, hence not a proper basis for double jeopardy.
• Serino vs. Zosa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 (Aug. 31, 1971) — Cited for the violation of the prosecution's right to due process and, specifically, for the proposition that a dismissal order void for lack of jurisdiction does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
• Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 (May 29, 1974) — Cited among the authorities holding that the deprivation of the prosecution's fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case violates its right to due process.
• Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 (Jan. 30, 1971) — Cited for the rule that the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
• Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, 51 SCRA 78 (May 25, 1973) — Cited for the rule that where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction, and for the characterization of such a judgment as a "lawless thing."
• Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 (Feb. 27, 1973) — Cited together with Aducayen vs. Flores for the proposition that a decision rendered in disregard of due process is void for lack of jurisdiction.

• Section 22, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — Provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The Court identified this as the constitutional guarantee invoked, but held it inapplicable because the first jeopardy had never been validly terminated by the void dismissal.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court (substantially reproduced as Section 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective January 1, 1985) — Bars a second prosecution for the offense charged, or any attempt or frustration thereof, or any offense necessarily included therein, where the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after he had pleaded to the charge. The provision was applied to show that the dismissal, having been issued by a court ousted of jurisdiction, did not satisfy its terms and therefore did not bar the remand.

Aquino (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Abad Santos, J., is on leave.