People of the Philippines vs. Bienvenido de la Cruz y Mahusay

Treachery cannot qualify a killing as murder where the victim was forewarned of the impending attack and had the opportunity to escape, even if he later stumbled; and voluntary surrender is not mitigating where it was motivated by self-preservation rather than spontaneous and unconditional submission to authorities. The conviction was therefore for homicide only.

Bienvenido de la Cruz and Alfredo Timgas were brothers-in-law, Alfredo’s sister being married to Bienvenido. The killing occurred in Sitio Narolang, Barangay Laligan, Valencia, Bukidnon, and was prosecuted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which defines and penalizes murder.

On December 25, 1996, a cockfight was held in the afternoon in Sitio Narolang, Barangay Laligan, Valencia, Bukidnon. One of the gamecocks belonged to Alfredo Timgas, and its gaff was installed by his brother-in-law, Bienvenido de la Cruz. Unknown to Alfredo, Bienvenido placed his bet on the gamecock of his opponent. When Alfredo’s gamecock won, he was told to collect the bet from Bienvenido. Feeling betrayed, Alfredo confronted his double-dealing brother-in-law, and a fistfight ensued between them. The timely intervention of cooler heads pacified and prevented them from inflicting serious injuries on each other.

Alfredo later decided to play billiards near a basketball court. Bienvenido went home but returned shortly thereafter with a bolo and headed toward where Alfredo was. A friend warned Alfredo of danger when Bienvenido was only about ten meters away. Alfredo tried to run away but tripped on grass called mani-mani. Bienvenido caught up with him and stabbed him near the right armpit, penetrating his stomach. Bienvenido then fled, leaving his bolo impaled in the victim’s torso.

In his defense, Bienvenido claimed that he was requested by the victim’s brother, Agustin, to install the gaff on the gamecock. After Alfredo won the cockfight, he invited Bienvenido to a drink, but the latter refused. Alfredo got mad and started punching him, stopping only after Bienvenido fell to the ground. At that instance, a certain Oning Dagayday approached him and advised him to leave immediately as Alfredo’s brothers might get even with him. He noticed that Oning was holding a bloodied bolo and saw Alfredo grasping his blood-soaked armpit. He then hurried to the house of barangay councilor Ignacio de la Cruz, who accompanied him to the barangay captain to seek protection. From there, they proceeded to the police station to surrender.

At trial, Agustin Timgas, elder brother of the victim, testified to the stabbing and was corroborated by Ricky Aldion, who stated that he separated the initial scuffle, accompanied Alfredo to the billiards table, warned Alfredo when appellant returned with a bolo, and saw Alfredo run before being pursued and killed. The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and appellant’s disavowal feeble, and noted that Agustin’s relationship to the victim did not diminish his credibility. The victim’s mother, Caridad Timgas, testified that actual damages amounted to ₱18,000 for wake and funeral expenses, but no receipts were presented.

• Innocence and Surrender: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating his sincerity and good faith in surrendering to Kagawad Ignacio de la Cruz and the police authorities, which allegedly showed he was innocent of the crime charged.
• Voluntary Surrender as Mitigating: Appellant maintained that, assuming guilt, his unconditional surrender to the police authorities entitled him to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
• Treachery: Appellant contended that the trial court gravely erred in finding treachery because prosecution witnesses Agustin Timgas and Ricky Aldion testified that the victim was forewarned of the impending attack and had the chance to flee.
• Flight and Innocence: Appellant argued that the fact he did not escape clearly indicated his innocence, for had it been otherwise, he would not have been confident enough to surrender.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether appellant’s surrender to Kagawad Ignacio de la Cruz and the police authorities entitled him to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
• Treachery: Whether the killing of Alfredo Timgas was qualified by treachery.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation attended the killing.
• Criminal Liability and Penalty: Whether appellant is liable for murder or homicide and what penalty should be imposed.
• Damages: Whether the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages were proper.

• Voluntary Surrender: No. The surrender was not voluntary; it was motivated by self-preservation from feared retaliation, not spontaneous and unconditional submission to authorities.
• Treachery: No. The victim was forewarned and had the opportunity to escape; he stumbled. The killing is homicide only, not murder.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The crime was committed soon after the fistfight, with no sufficient lapse of time for appellant to reflect on the consequences of his act.
• Criminal Liability and Penalty: Homicide only. The penalty is indeterminate 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
• Damages: Actual damages were properly disregarded for lack of receipts; ₱50,000 civil indemnity and ₱50,000 moral damages were awarded.

• Voluntary Surrender: The requisites are: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity, the intent of the accused being to give himself up and submit unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the state the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Here, the alleged surrender to the barangay chairman was not voluntary; it was solely motivated by self-preservation from what he feared was imminent retaliation from the immediate relatives of Alfredo. It cannot be appreciated in his favor.
• Treachery: The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated because Alfredo was forewarned of the impending attack and could have in fact escaped had he not stumbled. Ricky Aldion testified that he warned Alfredo when appellant was about ten meters away, and Alfredo ran. Thus, appellant is liable only for homicide and not murder.
• Evident Premeditation: For this aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be shown: (a) the time when the appellant decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act showing that the appellant clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time that would allow the appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, the crime was committed soon after the fisticuff between appellant and Alfredo; the two appeared to be in good terms prior to the “double-cross” by the appellant. No appreciable time elapsed which afforded the appellant full opportunity to reflect and allow his conscience to overcome his deadly resolution.
• Criminal Liability and Penalty: Since treachery and evident premeditation were not proven, the conviction was modified to homicide only. The appellant was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with costs against appellant.
• Damages: The victim’s mother testified that actual damages incurred amounted to ₱18,000 for wake and funeral expenses. The trial court correctly disregarded the same in the absence of competent evidence such as receipts. The award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity was sustained since it can be awarded without need of evidence other than appellant’s responsibility for the death of the victim. Moral damages of ₱50,000 were also awarded on account of the grief and suffering of the victim’s heirs.

• Treachery as a qualifying circumstance — In this case, treachery cannot be appreciated where the victim was forewarned of the impending attack and had the opportunity to escape, even if he later stumbled. The killing was therefore homicide only, not murder.
• Voluntary surrender — The requisites are: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary. The essence is spontaneity, the intent of the accused being to give himself up and submit unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the state the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Applied here, the surrender to the barangay chairman was not voluntary because it was motivated by self-preservation from feared retaliation.
• Evident premeditation — The requisites are: (a) the time when the appellant decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act showing that the appellant clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time that would allow the appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Applied here, the crime was committed soon after the fistfight, with no appreciable time to reflect.
• Bare denial versus positive identification — A bare denial cannot prevail over positive identification and eyewitness account. Applied here, appellant’s denial failed against Agustin Timgas’s positive identification, corroborated by Ricky Aldion.
• Credibility of related witnesses — The fact that a witness is related to the victim does not diminish credibility absent improper motive. Applied here, Agustin Timgas’s relationship to the victim did not make his testimony less worthy of belief.
• Civil indemnity and moral damages — Civil indemnity of ₱50,000 may be awarded without need of evidence other than responsibility for death; moral damages of ₱50,000 may be awarded for grief and suffering of heirs. Actual damages require competent evidence such as receipts. Applied here, actual damages of ₱18,000 were disregarded; civil indemnity and moral damages were awarded.

• "Nevertheless, the appellant is liable only for homicide and not murder. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated against appellant because Alfredo was forewarned of the impending attack and he could have in fact escaped had he not stumbled." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for reducing the conviction from murder to homicide: treachery was negated by the victim’s forewarning and opportunity to escape.
• "The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity, the intent of the accused being to give himself up and submit unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the state the trouble of having to effect his arrest." — This passage defines the controlling doctrine on voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• "In the case at bar, the appellant’s alleged surrender to the barangay chairman was not voluntary. On the contrary, it was solely motivated by self-preservation from what he feared was an imminent retaliation from the immediate relatives of Alfredo. Consequently, the same cannot be appreciated in his favor." — This passage applies the voluntary-surrender doctrine to the facts and explains why the mitigating circumstance was rejected.
• "However, the award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity must be sustained since the same can be awarded without need of evidence other than appellant’s responsibility for the death of the victim." — This passage states the basis for sustaining civil indemnity despite the absence of documentary evidence.

• People vs. Legaspi, 331 SCRA 95, 113 [2000]; People vs. Estorco, 331 SCRA 38, 52-53 [2000]; People vs. Narvasa, 322 SCRA 675, 681 [2000] — Cited to support the rule that a bare denial cannot prevail over positive identification and eyewitness account.
• People vs. Casingal, 337 SCRA 100, 110 [2000]; People vs. Solis, 291 SCRA 529, 539 [1998] — Cited on the credibility of a witness related to the victim; relationship does not diminish credibility absent improper motive.
• People vs. Gaviola, 327 SCRA 580, 586 [2000] — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• Rene vs. Ignacio, 325 SCRA 375, 384 [2000] — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Salas, 327 SCRA 319, 332-333 [2000] — Cited for the essence of voluntary surrender as spontaneity and unconditional submission.
• People vs. Ortega, Jr., 276 SCRA 166, 189-190 [1997] — Cited in connection with the award of civil indemnity and the treatment of actual damages.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder; the information charged appellant under this provision. The Court held the killing was homicide only because the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not proven.
• Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code, as amended — Provides the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender; appellant invoked it, but the Court found the requisites not met because the surrender was not voluntary.

Vitug (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.