People of the Philippines vs. Berroya, et al.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction only when all the circumstances are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Mere presence at a conspiracy discussion, even approval of it without active participation, is not enough for conviction; conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence, and the same degree of proof required to establish the crime is necessary to support a finding of conspiracy.

The case involves the kidnapping of Chou Cheung Yih, a Taiwanese national, in Multinational Village, Parañaque, Metro Manila. The accused-appellants were charged under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code for kidnapping for ransom, the crime having been committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act 7659. The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, as no prosecution witness saw the actual abduction, and the victim himself failed to identify any of the accused.

Chou Cheung Yih, a Taiwanese national, was abducted by four men in Multinational Village, Parañaque, Metro Manila on May 11, 1993. His abductors seized his cellular phone and other personal effects. The following day, his father, Chou Cheng Fu, in Taipei City, was contacted by the kidnappers who demanded a ransom of US$5 Million, eventually agreed upon at P10 Million. On May 17, 1993, Chou Cheng Fu remitted the money through a jewelry store in Taiwan to the Fu Wa San Company, a Hongkong firm, and Chou Cheung Yih was released that same afternoon. When presented on the witness stand, the victim failed to identify any of the accused.

Chief Inspector Wilfredo Reyes testified that on April 21, 1993, an informer, Michael Evasco, approached him and informed him of Francisco "Kit" Mateo's invitation to join a kidnap for ransom operation. Reyes was designated to go undercover to infiltrate Mateo's group. On April 30, 1993, Reyes was introduced to Kit Mateo, who told him they were all "bata ni Berro saka ni Barako," referring to accused-appellant Berroya and General Alqueza. On May 7, 1993, a meeting was held at Mateo's office where assignments were given: Evasco was to lead the actual abduction, with SPO4 Vienes heading one of two back-up teams. During this meeting, Mateo spoke on the telephone with someone and afterwards gave a thumbs up sign saying "Okey na pare, at ito pala ay may clearance na kay Barako." On May 10, 1993, Reyes met accused-appellant Berroya, who told him "Willy, pagbutihin n'yo lang, ito naman ay alam ni Barako."

Lenny Pagtakhan, a "comadre" of Kit Mateo, testified that she was present at the May 7, 1993 meeting and overheard a telephone conversation between Mateo and Berroya, where Mateo said "Sir, I have already given instructions to the group" and Berroya told him to call the next day or meet on Monday. She also testified that at the May 10, 1993 meeting, Berroya took over presiding and said "O sige kailangan malinis ang pagkuha ng tao," although on cross-examination she changed her testimony, saying the statement was actually made by Kit Mateo. She further testified that a week or two later, she was with Mateo and Vienes when they distributed ransom money, giving several bundles to Berroya.

The prosecution also presented telephone records showing that on May 11, 1993, a call was made from the victim's cellular phone to Mateo's Le France office; on May 14, 1993, another call was made from the same cellular phone to a telephone registered under the name of Samuel Abellera, a neighbor of Berroya; and on the same day, a Hongkong telephone registered under Lee Kim Jok called the direct line to the Office of the Chief of Special Operations Group, which Berroya headed. The Hongkong telephone was traced to an apartment registered in the name of Lee Kim Jok and Emil Ong alias "William Teng" or "Reynaldo Manio." On May 14, 1993, Mateo and William Teng went to Hongkong, and on May 17, 1993, William Teng collected the ransom money in Hongkong, evidenced by a check stub in the name of Reynaldo Manio amounting to HK$2,962,963.00.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Accused-appellants argued that the lower court erred in accepting the version of prosecution witnesses Lenny Pagtakhan and Chief Inspector Wilfredo Reyes, despite the clear showing that these witnesses were not possessed of the required credibility and trustworthiness to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
• Conspiracy: Accused-appellants argued that the lower court erred in holding that there was conspiracy between accused-appellants.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Accused-appellants argued that the lower court erred in convicting them despite the absence of sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt of their guilt.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Solicitor General believed that in the instant case the prosecution had failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of appellant Berroya, conceding that the theory of the prosecution against appellant Berroya had "too many loose ends" that it dismally failed to tie up to the satisfaction of the constitutional requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence linking the accused-appellants to the kidnapping was sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between accused-appellants was established by positive and conclusive evidence.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: No, as to Berroya and Vienes; Yes, as to Mateo. The circumstantial evidence against Berroya and Vienes was ambiguous, inconclusive, and failed to meet the test of moral certainty, while the evidence against Mateo constituted an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion of his guilt.
• Conspiracy: No, as to Berroya and Vienes; Yes, as to Mateo. Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence, and mere presence at meetings or ambiguous telephone calls are insufficient to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The Court applied the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (i) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (ii) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (iii) the combination of all the circumstances must be such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient, all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The Court found that the prosecution failed to meet this standard as to Berroya and Vienes.

• Conspiracy: The Court held that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence, and cannot be based on mere conjectures. The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is necessary to support a finding of conspiracy. Mere presence at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without any active participation, is not enough for purposes of conviction. An assumed intimacy has no legal bearing inasmuch as conspiracy transcends companionship. To hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.

• Evidence Against Berroya: The Court found that a substantial part of C/Insp. Reyes' testimony was inadmissible hearsay, as Reyes never learned the identity of the intended victim and was only told the details of the kidnapping by Evasco on May 20, 1993. Kit Mateo's statements about Berroya being part of the group were inadmissible against Berroya under the res inter alios acta rule. The telephone conversation on May 7, 1993 was ambiguous, with no proof of the exact conversation. Berroya's alleged statement to Reyes was equivocal. Reyes' testimony was riddled with inconsistencies, including his failure to submit any report and the unsigned receipt for the P50,000.00. Pagtakhan's testimony was also inconclusive, as she changed her testimony on cross-examination regarding who made the statement "O sige kailangan malinis ang pagkuha ng tao." The telephone records only identified the numbers, not the actual callers or receivers, nor the matters discussed. The Court concluded that the prosecution's theory against Berroya had "too many loose ends" that failed to satisfy the constitutional requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• Evidence Against Vienes: The evidence against Vienes only established his presence at the May 7 and May 10, 1993 meetings and his presence at the Le France office on May 11, 1993. No witness saw him participate in the actual kidnapping, and the victim failed to identify him. The trial court convicted him largely due to his alleged conspiracy with Mateo, based on his close friendship and presence at the meetings. The Court held that assuming Vienes was a participant in the planning, in the absence of eyewitnesses to the actual abduction, there was a paucity of evidence as to whether he carried out his part of the plan. His presence at the meetings was insufficient to convict him. Without proof that he personally took part in the execution of the kidnapping, there was at most a conspiracy, and conspiracy alone without execution of its purpose is not a crime punishable by law except in special cases.

• Evidence Against Mateo: The Court found that the facts on record regarding Mateo constituted an unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that he was guilty of kidnapping. The following circumstances were considered: (a) it was proved that there was a plot to kidnap a Taiwanese national, formulated on May 7 and May 10, 1993, and Mateo was present and presided over the meetings; (b) William Teng was present at these meetings; (c) in the afternoon of the abduction, the victim's cellular phone was used to call Mateo's Le France office; (d) during ransom negotiations, there was an exchange of phone calls between Mateo's telephone and William Teng's place in Hongkong; (e) William Teng called the victim's father seven times, and Mateo presented no evidence to rebut or explain the reason for such calls; (f) on May 14, 1993, Mateo went to Hongkong with William Teng, allegedly to buy spare parts for a Volkswagen, but presented no proof of such purchase; and (g) William Teng personally collected the ransom money in Hongkong on May 17, 1993. The Court held that these circumstances collectively and ineluctably constituted an unbroken chain leading to a single conclusion—that there was a consummated conspiracy between Mateo and Teng to kidnap Chou Cheung Yih for ransom.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt — The constitutional presumption of innocence requires the State to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, which means moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. It does not require absolute certainty, but evidence showing a mere possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction. The Court applied this doctrine in acquitting Berroya and Vienes, finding that the prosecution failed to even approximate the required quantum of proof.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence — For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, the following requisites must concur: (i) there must be more than one circumstance to convict; (ii) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and (iii) the combination of all the circumstances must be such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. All the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence and cannot be based on mere conjectures. The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is necessary to support a finding of conspiracy. Mere presence at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without any active participation, is not enough for purposes of conviction. To hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.

• Res Inter Alios Acta — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. The Court applied this rule to exclude Kit Mateo's statements about Berroya being part of the group, as these were inadmissible against Berroya.

• Hearsay Evidence — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception. The Court applied this rule to exclude C/Insp. Reyes' testimony regarding details of the kidnapping told to him by Evasco, as Reyes never participated in the actual kidnapping.

• "For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt." — This passage states the controlling test for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, which the Court applied to acquit Berroya and Vienes.

• "Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be established as a fact. The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is necessary to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself." — This passage defines the standard of proof required to establish conspiracy, which the Court applied in finding the evidence insufficient against Berroya and Vienes.

• "The mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction." — This passage establishes the principle that presence at conspiracy discussions alone is insufficient for conviction, which was the basis for acquitting Vienes.

• "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." — This passage articulates the lodestar of the accusatorial system of criminal justice, requiring acquittal when evidence admits of an explanation consistent with innocence.

• People vs. Gapasan, 243 SCRA 53 [1995] — Cited for the definition of proof beyond reasonable doubt as moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
• People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37 [1995], citing People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 517 — Cited for the principle that circumstantial evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
• Pareño vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 242 (1996), citing Macadangdang vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 308 (1989) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence, with the same degree of proof required to establish the crime.
• People vs. Paguntalan, 242 SCRA 753 (1995) — Cited for the principle that an assumed intimacy has no legal bearing inasmuch as conspiracy transcends companionship.
• People vs. Tami, 244 SCRA 1 (1995) — Cited for the rule that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.
• People vs. Cortez, 57 SCRA 508 (1974) — Cited for the principle that mere presence at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without active participation, is not enough for conviction.
• People vs. Somooc, 244 SCRA 731 (1995) — Cited for the rule that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, as the corroborative evidence or the lack thereof and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case may require.
• People vs. Cunanan, 19 SCRA 769 (1967) — Cited for the Spanish maxim "Mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se castigue uno inocente" (It is better that ten presumed guilty persons remain unpunished than that one innocent person be punished).

• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The Court applied this provision in requiring the State to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
• Article 267, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of kidnapping, under which the accused-appellants were charged and convicted. The crime was committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act 7659, so the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.
• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Referenced for the principle that conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law except in special cases.
• Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which the Court applied to exclude hearsay testimony.
• Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another (res inter alios acta), which the Court applied to exclude Mateo's statements against Berroya.

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concurred. Panganiban, J., concurred in the result.