People of the Philippines vs. Bernardo Quidato, Jr.

The extrajudicial confessions of co-accused who are not presented on the witness stand are hearsay and inadmissible against the accused, and an uncounseled custodial confession is not cured by the belated arrival of counsel before its signing; a conviction resting on such confessions and on testimony barred by the marital disqualification rule cannot stand, suspicion however strong being insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Bernardo Quidato, Sr., a widower, lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Barangay Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao, and owned sixteen hectares of coconut land in the area. He was the father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and of Leo Quidato, and he employed Reynaldo and Eddie Malita as hired hands. The relationship of the victim to the accused placed the killing within the definition of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, while the money kept in the victim's house and the copra proceeds from the sale transacted shortly before the killing supplied the plan attributed to the accused.

Bernardo Quidato, Sr., a widower, lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Barangay Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao, where he owned sixteen hectares of coconut land. He was the father of accused-appellant Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and of Leo Quidato, and he employed Reynaldo and Eddie Malita as hired hands. On September 16, 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by accused-appellant and the two Malita brothers, went to Davao City to sell forty-one sacks of copra. After the sale, Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, and the two thereafter left; Bernardo and accused-appellant returned to Sitio Libod that same day.

According to Gina Quidato, on the evening of the following day, September 17, 1988, accused-appellant and the Malita brothers were drinking tuba at her house. She overheard the trio planning to go to her father-in-law's house to get money from him, but she had no idea what later transpired because she had fallen asleep before 10:00 p.m. Accused-appellant objected to her testimony on the ground that it was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Acknowledging the applicability of the rule, the trial judge allowed the testimony only against accused-appellant's co-accused, Reynaldo and Eddie.

The Malita brothers confessed to their participation in the crime, executing affidavits detailing how Bernardo was killed. Their version shows that Eddie had been living with accused-appellant for the past four years. At around 6:00 p.m. of September 17, 1988, accused-appellant asked Reynaldo to come to his house to discuss an important matter; upon Reynaldo's arrival, he saw that his brother Eddie was already there, and they started drinking beer. The Malita brothers alleged that at this juncture accused-appellant proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped, with Reynaldo bringing along a bolo. Upon reaching the house, accused-appellant knocked on the door and asked his father to let them in; when Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down, and Reynaldo hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Accused-appellant and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking for money but found none, so the three of them left. The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by accused-appellant's son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for breakfast. The cause of death, as stated in Bernardo's death certificate, was "hypovolemic shock secondary to fatal hacking wound on the posterior neck area."

On September 27, 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were promptly arrested by the police, and accused-appellant was likewise arrested. On September 29, 1988, the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they signified their intent to confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that the confession would be useless if given without counsel, Mara took down their testimony but refrained from requiring them to sign their affidavits; instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising them of their constitutional rights, and explained the contents of the affidavits to them in Visayan; the Malita brothers affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same, and only then did they affix their signatures.

In his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations of the Malita brothers. He claimed that the Malita brothers were not at his house on the evening of September 17, 1988, but that they passed by his house at around 10:00 p.m. and asked him to come with them to his father's house, threatening him with harm if he refused. Out of fear, he led the way to Bernardo's house and even knocked on the latter's door until Bernardo opened it. In the ensuing commotion he scampered away, but in his confusion reached his house only at around 11:00 p.m., although it was only about one hundred fifty meters away from Bernardo's house. He did not call for help. Eddie arrived a while later. Accused-appellant claimed not to have seen the actual killing, having run away earlier, but he admitted finding a bolo encrusted with blood at his house, which he turned over to his brother, who in turn surrendered it to the police. He did not feel uneasy having Eddie around even if he knew of the latter's participation in the crime.

After due trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the offense of parricide for the death of his father, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with all accessory penalties, ordering him to indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr. in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

• Right of Confrontation: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to the extrajudicial confessions of Reynaldo Malita (Exh. C) and Eddie Malita (Exh. D) in clear violation of his constitutional right to confront witnesses.
• Conspiracy: Accused-appellant maintained that the trial court erred in finding the existence of conspiracy in the case.
• Disregard of the Defense and Ill Motive: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in disregarding the defense he raised and in disregarding any ill motive of Reynaldo and Eddie Malita in killing the victim.

• Admissibility of the Sworn Statements: The Solicitor General advocated the admissibility of the sworn statements of the Malita brothers, citing Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against a co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

• Hearsay and Right of Confrontation: Whether the extrajudicial confessions of Reynaldo and Eddie Malita, who were never presented on the witness stand, are admissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
• Conspirator's Act or Declaration: Whether Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court permits the admission of the Malita brothers' affidavits as acts or declarations of a conspirator against accused-appellant.
• Right to Counsel in Custodial Investigation: Whether the affidavits, taken during custodial interrogation in the absence of counsel and signed only the following day in the presence of a CLAO lawyer, are admissible in evidence.
• Marital Disqualification: Whether the testimony of Gina Quidato, to which accused-appellant timely objected, may be used against him, directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the jointly tried murder case.
• Conspiracy: Whether the finding of conspiracy against accused-appellant may be sustained.
• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Whether the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Hearsay and Right of Confrontation: No. The affidavits of the Malita brothers, who never took the witness stand, are inadmissible hearsay, and the extrajudicial admissions of an accused are not admissible against a co-accused who was not given the opportunity to hear the declarant testify and to cross-examine him.
• Conspirator's Act or Declaration: No. Section 30, Rule 130 does not apply, the confessions having been made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the crime, and thus not during the conspiracy's existence.
• Right to Counsel in Custodial Investigation: No. An uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible, and the belated arrival of a CLAO lawyer the following day does not cure the defect.
• Marital Disqualification: No. The testimony of Gina Quidato must be disregarded as to accused-appellant, the disqualification being between husband and wife; it could be received only in the murder case against the Malita brothers and cannot be used against accused-appellant directly or indirectly.
• Conspiracy: No. With the affidavits and the wife's testimony excluded, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to accused-appellant, and the finding of conspiracy cannot be sustained.
• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: No. Suspicion, however strong, cannot sustain a conviction; the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to guilt, and it failed to do so.

• Hearsay and Right of Confrontation: In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie Malita, yet the two brothers were not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present them gives these affidavits the character of hearsay, and it is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter has not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him. The affidavits therefore cannot supply the proof of accused-appellant's participation in the killing.

• Conspirator's Act or Declaration: The Solicitor General invoked Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which allows the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence to be given in evidence against a co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The inapplicability of the provision is clearly apparent: the confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the crime, so it cannot be said that the execution of the affidavits consisted of acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence. No independent evidence of the conspiracy having been offered, the affidavits could not be admitted under this exception.

• Right to Counsel in Custodial Investigation: Even assuming the affidavits were voluntarily given, the manner by which they were obtained by the police renders them inadmissible. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day. Under People vs. Compil, the belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day, even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect, for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from the confessants; People vs. De Jesus likewise holds that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution.

• Marital Disqualification: The testimony of Gina Quidato must also be disregarded, accused-appellant having timely objected thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellant's case. That testimony cannot, however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule, for what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

• Conspiracy: Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's testimony as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to accused-appellant. The finding of conspiracy, which drew its support from that excluded evidence, has no competent basis in the record and cannot be sustained.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Accused-appellant's defense, to put it mildly, is dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his father's house on the strength of the latter's verbal threats, his incredulous escape from the clutches of the two, his inexplicable failure to return home immediately, his failure to seek assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with him immediately after the incident, and the nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita brothers as the culprits all suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet suspicion, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused. This the prosecution failed to demonstrate.

• Hearsay Rule and the Right of Confrontation — Affidavits are inadmissible hearsay unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm their averments and submit to cross-examination. Corollarily, the voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter has not been given an opportunity to hear the declarant testify and cross-examine him. In this case, the Malita brothers never testified, so their affidavits detailing accused-appellant's supposed participation were excluded and could not support the conviction.

• Conspirator's Act or Declaration under Section 30, Rule 130 — The exception requires that (a) the conspiracy be shown by evidence other than the act or declaration itself, and (b) the act or declaration relate to the conspiracy and be made during its existence. The Court held the provision inapplicable because the confessions were executed after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the crime, and thus were not acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence.

• Right to Counsel in Custodial Investigation — An uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. The belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day, even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect, since the investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements; admissions obtained during custodial interrogation without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel, remain flawed under the Constitution.

• Marital Disqualification Rule — During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. The disqualification operates only between the spouses, so the wife may testify in a case involving other parties or accused; but her testimony in the jointly tried case against the other accused cannot be used against her husband directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of those proceedings, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt and the Insufficiency of Suspicion — Suspicion, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment. The prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused. Because the remaining evidence against accused-appellant was incompetent, his admittedly dubious defense did not relieve the prosecution of its burden, and acquittal followed.

• "It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay." — This states the ratio for excluding the Malita brothers' affidavits, the principal evidence on which the conviction rested, and is the canonical formulation of the hearsay objection to untested affidavits.
• "The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him." — This defines the co-accused limitation on extrajudicial admissions and supplies the constitutional dimension of the right of confrontation in this case.
• "The confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's existence." — This is the Court's ground for rejecting the Solicitor General's reliance on Section 30, Rule 130, fixing the temporal requisite of the conspirator's-declaration exception.
• "The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence." — This is the controlling statement on custodial confessions, applied to invalidate affidavits taken without counsel even though signed before a CLAO lawyer the following day.
• "Yet, suspicion, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused." — This articulates the standard that ultimately compelled acquittal notwithstanding the Court's characterization of the defense as dubious.

• People vs. Manhuyod, G.R. No. 124676, May 20, 1998 — Cited as authority for the rule that affidavits whose affiants do not take the witness stand must be excluded from the judicial proceeding as inadmissible hearsay.
• People vs. Surigawan, 228 SCRA 458 (1993); People vs. Ferry, 66 Phil. 310 (1938); People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718 (1926) — Cited for the rule that the voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused who was not given the opportunity to hear the declarant testify and cross-examine him.
• People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1995) — Cited as controlling on the point that the belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day, even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect, because the investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements.
• People vs. De Jesus, 213 SCRA 345 (1992) — Cited for the rule that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution.
• People vs. Cabintoy, 247 SCRA 442 (1995) — Cited, together with Article III, Sections 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, for the inadmissibility of an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel.
• Duran vs. CA, 71 SCRA 68 (1976) — Cited for the axiom that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense but must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes parricide, the offense charged in the information and the offense for which accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court as a co-principal.
• Section 22, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that during their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. Accused-appellant timely invoked this provision against the testimony of his wife, Gina Quidato, and the Court held that her testimony, though receivable in the jointly tried murder case against the Malita brothers, could not be used against him directly or indirectly.
• Section 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against a co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Invoked by the Solicitor General to justify admission of the Malita affidavits, the provision was held inapplicable because the confessions were made after the conspiracy had ended and after the crime had been consummated.
• Article III, Sections 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution — Guarantee the rights of persons under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel and the requirement of a valid waiver in writing and in the presence of counsel. These provisions formed the basis for excluding the Malita brothers' affidavits, which were taken without counsel and signed only the following day before a CLAO lawyer.

Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur. Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.