People of the Philippines vs. Bayot

When homicide is committed on the occasion of a robbery, the offense is the complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death; band and dwelling in an uninhabited place are generic aggravating circumstances, not qualifying circumstances, and the place, time, and manner of commission affect only the penalty.

Emilio Luit and Beatriz Montoya lived as husband and wife in the sitio of Mulawin, barrio of Buenavista, municipality of General Trias, Province of Cavite. The case is governed by Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and punishes robbery with homicide, and by the last paragraph of Section 133 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, which governs the penalty when the death penalty is not unanimously imposed.

Emilio Luit and Beatriz Montoya lived as husband and wife in the sitio of Mulawin, barrio of Buenavista, municipality of General Trias, Province of Cavite. At midnight of May 10, 1935, five men went to their house and, after waking them, asked Beatriz Montoya to show them the house of one surnamed Bermudez. When Emilio Luit was asked to accompany them, he excused himself because he could not leave his wife alone. The men then asked for water, and Luit went down to comply. After drinking, they remained near the house and talked among themselves, some saying they should proceed eastward and others that they should rest because they were tired, having come from Indang. They again asked Luit to come down to answer another question, asking whether one Tano, whom they described as president of the Sakdal party, lived in his house, and implying that they were soldiers from Indang. When Luit answered that Tano neither lived nor went there, they asked for lodging. Although Luit had only one mat, he decided to welcome them; as he was about to open the door, one of the five men fired at him, causing a wound that pierced his body from the epigastric region to the opposite side.

After Luit had been wounded, three of the five men went up the house to demand money. They obtained nothing because Luit and Beatriz Montoya were penniless, but they carried away a lamp valued at P1.50, a pig under the stairs valued at P9, and a bolo whose value the prosecuting attorney could not determine. Luit was taken to the Philippine General Hospital in Manila, where he died two and a half hours later.

The day after the crime, Beatriz Montoya pointed to Delfin Bayot and Lazaro Dinglasan as two of the five men who had attacked them. A complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court of General Trias against them and Ponciano Amparo, John Doe, and Richard Doe. The lower court tried the case only against Delfin Bayot because Lazaro Dinglasan had not been arrested earlier, Ponciano Amparo had not been located, and the other two had not been identified. At trial, Beatriz Montoya testified that although she did not know the appellant by name at the time of the crime, she already knew him by face, having seen him pass several times by the place where she and the deceased lived, and that it was the appellant who fired the shot that wounded Emilio Luit and caused his death. The defense attempted to impeach her with statements allegedly made before the justice of the peace and before barrio lieutenant Rufino Buclatin at dawn and in the morning of May 11, 1935. The two officials testified that she had previously stated that her husband's aggressor was one Bayot, without mentioning his name, and that she could recognize the attackers if she saw them again.

At 6:00 a.m. on the day after the crime, Lieutenant Rueda of the Constabulary arrested the appellant after questioning Beatriz Montoya and obtaining the description of Emilio Luit's aggressor. The description was that the man was surnamed Bayot, son of Isidro, slightly pockmarked, and with a coca-cola haircut, and it tallied with the appellant. Lieutenant Rueda found Bayot on his land and brought him to the municipal building of General Trias, where Beatriz Montoya, seeing him in a line-up with several men, identified him as the aggressor. The deceased himself, before his death, stated that his aggressor was Bayot, son of Isidro, a habitue of cockpits, and approximately his age; the appellant was 22 and the deceased was 29. Beatriz Montoya also testified that she saw the appellant fire the shot, saw his hand when he went up the house immediately after firing, and heard him demand money when he was already inside. She could identify him because there was light and she already knew him by face several days before the incident.

The defense contended that the appellant could not have committed robbery because his father, with whom he lived, was well-to-do, owning 89 hectares of land, several draft and domestic animals, and a sugar mill. The defense also contended that the appellant was not the son of Isidoro Bayot but of Teodoro Bayot. The Supreme Court found these contentions weak: what belongs to the father does not belong to the son; "Teodoro" and "Isidro" are similar names; it did not appear that the deceased and Beatriz Montoya knew both men; and although an Isidoro Bayot, a cousin of the appellant, lived in Amadeo, it was not shown that he had a son. The Court found that the prosecution evidence—Beatriz Montoya, Lieutenant Rueda, and the deceased's statement before death—impeached the defense witnesses, Justice of the Peace Florentino Santos, Barrio Lieutenant Rufino Buclatin, and Municipal President Angel Genuino, and that Beatriz Montoya really recognized the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime.

• Demurrer to the Complaint: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in overruling his demurrer because the information allegedly charged two separate crimes—robbery in an inhabited house, and robbery in band and in an uninhabited place—without alleging the qualifying circumstances for those offenses.
• Credibility of Beatriz Montoya: Petitioner maintained that the lower court erred in giving credit and weight to Beatriz Montoya's testimony, which he claimed was improbable and contradictory.
• Defense Witnesses: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in disregarding the testimony of the witnesses for the defense.
• Guilt and Aggravating Circumstances: Petitioner contended that the lower court erred in finding him guilty of frustrated robbery with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, band, and dwelling.
• Financial Condition and Identity: Petitioner argued that he could not have committed robbery because his father was well-to-do, owning 89 hectares of land, draft and domestic animals, and a sugar mill; and that he was not the son of Isidoro Bayot but of Teodoro Bayot, so the identification referring to Isidoro's son did not point to him.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The Solicitor-General, for the appellee, argued that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, and craft should be taken into consideration without any mitigating circumstance to offset them.

• Sufficiency of the Information and Demurrer: Whether the lower court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the information charged separate robberies rather than the complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Credibility and Identification: Whether Beatriz Montoya's testimony identifying Delfin Bayot as the assailant was credible and sufficient despite alleged prior inconsistent statements and claimed improbability.
• Defense Evidence: Whether the lower court erred in disregarding the testimony of the defense witnesses.
• Nature of the Crime and Penalty: Whether Delfin Bayot was guilty of frustrated robbery with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, band, and dwelling, or of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, and whether the aggravating circumstances and absence of mitigating circumstances warranted the maximum penalty.

• Sufficiency of the Information and Demurrer: No. The information sufficiently charged the complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1); band and dwelling in an uninhabited place are generic aggravating circumstances, not qualifying circumstances.
• Credibility and Identification: Yes. Beatriz Montoya's identification was credible and sufficient; her alleged prior statements did not overcome her positive identification, which was corroborated by the description and the deceased's ante-mortem statement.
• Defense Evidence: No. The defense witnesses' testimony was properly rejected; the prosecution evidence, including Lieutenant Rueda's testimony and the deceased's statement, impeached it.
• Nature of the Crime and Penalty: The conviction for frustrated robbery was reversed; appellant was found guilty of robbery with homicide. Nighttime, dwelling, and craft were considered as aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance to offset them. The penalty was reclusion perpetua because no unanimity existed for the death penalty.

• Sufficiency of the Information and Demurrer: The information charged the complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstances of band and dwelling in an uninhabited place. A qualifying or inherent aggravating circumstance gives the crime its proper name and exclusive penalty, while a generic aggravating circumstance merely increases the penalty without exceeding the statutory limit. Band and dwelling in an uninhabited place are not qualifying or inherent in robbery with homicide; they are generic. The place of commission of robbery under Article 294 is not essential to the imposition of the prescribed penalties. When homicide is committed on the occasion of robbery, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, and the circumstances of place, time, and manner of commission only determine whether reclusion perpetua or death should be imposed. The demurrer was therefore properly overruled.
• Credibility and Identification: Beatriz Montoya testified that she already knew the appellant by face before the incident, saw him fire the shot that wounded Emilio Luit, saw his hand when he went up the house after firing, and heard him demand money inside the house. The defense sought to impeach her with statements allegedly made before the justice of the peace and barrio lieutenant Rufino Buclatin on May 11, 1935, to the effect that she could not identify the attackers. The record showed, however, that at 6:00 a.m. on the day after the crime, Lieutenant Rueda questioned her, obtained the description of the aggressor as surnamed Bayot, son of Isidro, slightly pockmarked, and with a coca-cola haircut, arrested the appellant, and brought him to the municipal building, where she identified him in a line-up. The deceased himself, before his death, stated that his aggressor was Bayot, son of Isidro, a habitue of cockpits, and approximately his age; the appellant was 22 and the deceased 29. There was light, and Beatriz Montoya had known the appellant by face for several days. The prosecution witnesses had no motive to distort the truth. The identification was therefore credible.
• Defense Evidence: The defense witnesses—Justice of the Peace Florentino Santos, Barrio Lieutenant Rufino Buclatin, and Municipal President Angel Genuino—testified that Beatriz Montoya had previously stated she could not identify the attackers. Their testimony was impeached by Lieutenant Rueda's account that Beatriz Montoya gave him the description of the appellant immediately after she had spoken to the municipal president, and by her positive identification of the appellant. The defense's contention that the appellant could not have committed robbery because his father was well-to-do did not prove innocence, since what belongs to the father does not belong to the son. The contention that the appellant was Teodoro Bayot's son rather than Isidoro Bayot's son was weak: the names are similar, it was not shown that the deceased and Beatriz Montoya knew both men, and although an Isidoro Bayot lived in Amadeo, it was not shown that he had a son. The defense evidence was properly disregarded.
• Nature of the Crime and Penalty: The facts established the complex crime of robbery with homicide, not frustrated robbery. Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code punishes robbery with homicide by reclusion perpetua to death when homicide is committed on the occasion of a robbery. The aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, and craft were to be considered without any mitigating circumstance to offset them. The maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua to death could not be imposed because there was no unanimity among the members of the Court, one member being of the opinion that the appellant should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction sufficient to offset all the aggravating circumstances. Pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 133 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua. The appellant was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Emilio Luit in the sum of P1,000, plus P10.50 for the lamp and pig robbed, and to pay the costs.

• Complex Crime of Robbery with Homicide — Under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, when homicide is committed on the occasion of a robbery, the offense is the complex crime of robbery with homicide, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The place, time, and manner of commission do not change the nature of the crime but only determine whether reclusion perpetua or death should be imposed.
• Qualifying or Inherent Aggravating Circumstances Distinguished from Generic Aggravating Circumstances — A qualifying or inherent aggravating circumstance gives the crime its proper and exclusive name and places the author in a situation deserving no other penalty than that especially prescribed for the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance increases the penalty but does not exceed the statutory limit. In robbery with homicide, band and dwelling in an uninhabited place are generic, not qualifying or inherent.
• Credibility of Positive Identification — A witness's positive identification of an accused, based on prior familiarity and observation at the time of the crime, may prevail over alleged prior inconsistent statements and defense testimony where corroborated by other evidence, such as the accused's arrest based on a matching description and the victim's ante-mortem statement.
• Financial Condition and Motive as Defense — The wealth or financial condition of an accused's parent does not establish the accused's innocence, because what belongs to the parent does not belong to the child. Lack of motive does not necessarily negate guilt.
• Penalty When Death Penalty Lacks Unanimity — Where the law prescribes reclusion perpetua to death and the Court is not unanimous in imposing the death penalty, the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 133 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3.

• "If homicide is committed on the occasion of a robbery, the penalty which should unavoidably be imposed upon the accused is reclusion perpetua to death, and no other." — This states the majority's ratio on the penalty for the complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• "In crimes of robbery, a qualifying or inherent aggravating circumstance should not be mistaken for a merely generic aggravating circumstance." — This introduces the Court's distinction between aggravating circumstances that change the nature of the crime and those that merely increase the penalty.
• "The effect of a generic aggravating circumstance not offset by any mitigating circumstance, is to increase the penalty which should be imposed upon the accused, but without exceeding the limit prescribed by law; while that of a qualifying or inherent aggravating circumstance is not only to give the crime committed its proper and exclusive name but also to place the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that especially prescribed for said crime." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the distinction between generic and qualifying or inherent aggravating circumstances.
• "It is far better to acquit a man of such a serious crime upon the ground that the evidence is not sufficient to prove his guilt, even though he may be guilty, than to send to the penetentiary during his life-time a man who may be innocent" — This passage appears in Justice Laurel's dissenting opinion, citing People vs. Asians, and expresses the dissent's standard for resolving insufficient identification evidence.

• People vs. Asians, 53 Phil. 59, 71 — Cited in the dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel for the principle that it is better to acquit a person of a serious crime when the evidence is insufficient to prove guilt, even if he may be guilty, than to send a possibly innocent person to the penitentiary for life.

• Article 294, subsection 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes the complex crime of robbery with homicide. The Court applied it to hold that when homicide is committed on the occasion of a robbery, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, and the place, time, and manner of commission only determine which of the two penalties should be imposed.
• Last paragraph of Section 133, Administrative Code, as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3 — The Court invoked this provision as the basis for imposing reclusion perpetua after finding that the penalty should be the maximum period of reclusion perpetua to death but that there was no unanimity among the members of the Court for the death penalty.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Imperial, JJ., concurred.

• Justice Laurel — Dissented on the ground that Delfin Bayot was not satisfactorily identified as the person who shot and killed Emilio Luit or participated in the robbery. The crime occurred at midnight in a remote barrio; the shot was fired from outside where it was dark; Beatriz Montoya was inside a lighted house and put out the light immediately after hearing the detonation; five robbers were outside. Her affidavit, Exhibit 1, did not mention the appellant as the shooter or intimidator. The deceased's dying declaration, Exhibit C, referred only to one Bayot, an old acquaintance, a name shared by many in the locality; the appellant's father was Teodoro Bayot, not Isidoro, and an Isidoro Bayot in the same barrio was a relative. The deceased described the assailant as a gallerista, white, stout, of regular height, and about his age, details that did not tally with the appellant; the appellant was not a gallerista. Municipal President Angel Genuino testified that Beatriz Montoya said she could not identify the person who shot Emilio. Justice of the Peace Florentino Santos ordered the dismissal of the case against the appellant on June 11, 1935. The appellant came from a well-to-do family, had no past criminal record, and was living happily with his wife; it was unlikely he walked five hours in the dark to rob poor persons for a lamp, a small pig, and a bolo. The dissent cited People vs. Asians in support of acquittal where evidence is insufficient.