People of the Philippines vs. Bayani De Leon, et al.

A claim of self-defense fails where the victim merely pulls “something” from his jacket at a distance and does not aim or use it, because there is no unlawful aggression. The trial court’s refusal to convict for robbery with homicide because robbery was not proven operates as an acquittal of the robbery component, and the appellate court may not thereafter convict the accused of separate robbery without violating double jeopardy.

The accused-appellants Bayani, Antonio, Danilo, and Yoyong, all surnamed De Leon, are siblings. Emilio A. Prasmo was the victim; his wife Erlinda A. Prasmo and daughter Gina Prasmo testified for the prosecution, while the defense presented Carmelita de Leon, the accused-appellants’ sister, and the accused themselves. The charge was filed under the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes Robbery with Homicide, Murder, and Robbery, and the 1987 Constitution supplies the guarantee against double jeopardy.

On March 2, 2002, an Information was filed in Quezon City charging Bayani, Antonio, Danilo, and Yoyong De Leon with Robbery with Homicide. The Information alleged that the four, conspiring and mutually helping one another, armed with a sumpak, samurai, lead pipe, and .38 caliber revolver, robbed Emilio A. Prasmo of ₱7,000 while he was walking along A. Bonifacio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, and, on the occasion of the robbery, shot and hacked him with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and treachery, causing his death. At arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty except Antonio, prompting the RTC to order a reverse trial as to him.

At trial, Erlinda A. Prasmo, Emilio’s wife, testified that on March 2, 2002, while she and Emilio were walking along Sta. Lucia Street, Novaliches, on their way to RP Market, the accused-appellants, who are siblings, blocked their way. Danilo, armed with a sumpak, suddenly hit Emilio with a bakal; Antonio, armed with a samurai, hacked Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a lead pipe at the right back portion of his legs and the middle back portion of his torso; Danilo then took Emilio’s ₱7,000 and aimed the sumpak at the lower portion of Emilio’s chest and fired, causing Emilio to slump to the ground; and Yoyong hit Emilio with a lead pipe at the back of the neck and the middle portion of his back. As the attack proceeded, Erlinda shouted for help, but nobody dared to help because Bayani, armed with a gun, shouted “walang lalapit.” The accused-appellants immediately left, and Emilio was brought to FEU Fairview Hospital, where he died. Gina Prasmo, Emilio’s daughter, testified that she was at home when she was informed of the incident, went to the hospital, and learned that her father was already dead. Dr. Editha Martinez’s testimony was dispensed with because she did not perform the autopsy, but she identified the Medico-Legal Report, Autopsy Report, and sketches of Emilio’s injuries.

The defense presented Carmelita de Leon, sister of the accused-appellants. She testified that on the evening of March 1, 2002, Danilo and Antonio arrived at her house with bleeding heads and told her that Emilio and his son Edgardo Prasmo had attacked and mauled them. They reported the incident to barangay tanod Julio Batingaw, who told them to return in the afternoon for a meeting with Emilio and Edgardo; when they returned, Emilio and Edgardo did not appear. That evening, at around 7 o’clock, fifteen men carrying firearms, including Jerry and Edgar, sons of Emilio, stormed her house looking for the accused-appellants and threatened to kill her if she did not disclose their whereabouts. The defense offered medical certificates for the injuries sustained by Antonio and Danilo dated March 1, 2002 and a barangay blotter entry dated March 2, 2002 about their mauling.

The accused-appellants gave their own accounts. Yoyong testified that he was at the house of his brother-in-law Willie Bandong in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, to discuss the schedule of the pabasa, and stayed there between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening. Danilo testified that he was with his mother in Pugad Lawin, Quezon City, to accompany her in her work as a manghihilot, and that they left Pugad Lawin between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening and went home. Bayani, a police civilian agent, testified that on the night of the crime he was at Police Station No. 5 in Fairview, Quezon City, talking to a police officer. Antonio testified that on the morning of March 2, 2002, he went to the barangay hall with his mother Carmelita and Danilo to file a complaint against Emilio and Edgardo due to the previous evening’s mauling; they were told to return in the afternoon for a meeting, but Emilio and Edgardo did not appear. On the way home, Antonio met Emilio, Erlinda, and Gina walking along A. Bonifacio Street. According to Antonio, Emilio, upon seeing him, immediately opened his jacket and tried to pull “something” out; Antonio instantly tried to grab that “something” from Emilio, and while they grappled for possession of it, it fired. Bernaly Aguilar, who was on her way to the market in Sta. Lucia, witnessed a fight involving Antonio and another man grappling over a bakal; after she walked a few meters away, she heard a shot.

The RTC found Erlinda’s narration of the incident clear and convincing. While her testimony had some inconsistencies, the RTC considered them collateral and minor and not destructive of her probative value. It found the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery, with abuse of strength absorbed by treachery, and found that robbery was not duly established. The Court of Appeals likewise found Erlinda’s recollection direct, positive, and convincing, unshaken by tedious cross-examination. It found that the accused-appellants’ only intent was to kill Emilio, as shown by the means used and the debilitating, fatal, and multiple wounds inflicted, and that Danilo’s taking of the ₱7,000 was on the spur of the moment or a mere afterthought.

• Credibility of Erlinda Prasmo: Accused-appellants argued that the Court of Appeals erred in giving full credence to Erlinda’s inconsistent testimony. They pointed to the inconsistency between her Sinumpaang Salaysay, where she identified Antonio as the one who fired the sumpak at Emilio’s lower chest and took money, and her direct examination, where she testified that Danilo shot Emilio with a sumpak and took his wallet. They further argued that Erlinda could not have mistaken Danilo for Antonio because she knew both men, who lived six houses away from the Prasmos, and Antonio had a distinctive cleft palate or was “ngongo.”
• Self-Defense: Antonio maintained that he acted in self-defense. He claimed that Emilio opened his jacket and tried to pull “something” out, that Antonio tried to grab it, and that while they grappled for possession, the sumpak fired. He argued that his testimony established all the essential requisites of self-defense.
• Denial and Alibi: Bayani, Danilo, and Yoyong interposed denial and alibi. Yoyong claimed he was at Willie Bandong’s house in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; Danilo claimed he was with his mother in Pugad Lawin, Quezon City; and Bayani claimed he was at Police Station No. 5 in Fairview, Quezon City. They argued that the Court of Appeals disregarded these defenses.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving full credence to the allegedly inconsistent testimony of Erlinda Prasmo.
• Self-Defense: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the self-defense interposed by Antonio De Leon.
• Denial and Alibi: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the denial and alibi interposed by Bayani, Danilo, and Yoyong De Leon.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in convicting Danilo De Leon of separate Robbery after the RTC had convicted him only of Murder because robbery was not proven, thereby violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: No. Inconsistencies between an affiant’s sworn statement and in-court testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness; they may even erase suspicion of rehearsal or fabrication, and in-court testimony commands greater weight.
• Self-Defense: No. Antonio admitted authorship by pleading self-defense, but the defense failed to prove unlawful aggression and the other requisites; Emilio’s act of pulling “something” from his jacket did not constitute unlawful aggression, and the nature, location, and number of wounds disproved self-defense.
• Denial and Alibi: No. The conviction for Murder was affirmed as to all accused-appellants; no reversible error was found in the lower courts’ rejection of the denial and alibi.
• Double Jeopardy: Yes. The Court of Appeals violated Danilo’s right against double jeopardy by convicting him of separate Robbery after the RTC’s judgment, which convicted only of Murder because robbery was not proven, amounted to an acquittal of the robbery charge; a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: The Court applied the rule that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally incomplete and inaccurate and, by nature, inferior to testimony given in court. When there is an inconsistency between an affidavit and in-court testimony, the testimony commands greater weight. Discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness; they may erase suspicion that the witness was rehearsed or that the testimony was fabricated. The Court of Appeals correctly found that, despite minor inconsistencies, Erlinda’s narration revealed each and every detail of the incident and gave no impression of fabrication. Her recollection was direct, positive, and convincing, and remained unshaken by cross-examination.
• Self-Defense: Because Antonio pleaded self-defense, he admitted authorship of the crime, and the burden shifted to him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The defense failed to discharge this burden. Unlawful aggression requires an assault, attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner that places the defendant’s life in actual peril; mere threatening or intimidating attitude is insufficient, and there must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. Emilio’s act of pulling “something” out from his jacket while three to four meters away from Antonio did not amount to unlawful aggression. Even if Antonio’s account were truthful, there was no showing that Emilio aimed or pointed the sumpak at him or attempted to shoot him; the threat was more imagined than real. The act of pulling “something” out cannot constitute unlawful aggression, and there was no sufficient provocation, or provocation at all, in that act. The Medico-Legal Report No. M-685-02 dated March 12, 2002 showed that Emilio sustained numerous wounds, including a fatal gunshot wound in the chest, which belied the claim that Antonio was alone and acted in self-defense. The nature and location of the wounds are important indicators that disprove self-defense, and the means used, as shown by the nature, location, and number of wounds, were more than sufficient to repel or prevent any alleged attack. The wounds revealed a deliberate onslaught and homicidal aggression, not self-defense.
• Denial and Alibi: The Court affirmed the lower courts’ factual findings and conviction. The denial and alibi of Bayani, Danilo, and Yoyong were among the defenses rejected below, and the Court found no reversible error in that rejection; the affirmance of the Murder conviction left those defenses uncredited.
• Double Jeopardy: Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Double jeopardy attaches when the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All elements were present as to Danilo. A valid Information for robbery with homicide was filed in a court of competent jurisdiction; the accused pleaded not guilty; and the RTC acquitted Danilo of the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence when it convicted him only of Murder because robbery was not proven. The RTC Decision finding the accused guilty of Murder and not Robbery with Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone. Because the first jeopardy had already attached, the Court of Appeals was precluded from ruling on Danilo’s innocence or guilt of robbery. The acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient evidence was immediately final and could not be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable; the Court cannot review a verdict of acquittal even on an appeal based on alleged misappreciation of evidence, because the constitutional proscription affords the acquitted defendant final repose and safeguards against government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in convicting Danilo of the separate crime of Robbery.

• Inconsistencies between ex parte affidavits and in-court testimony — Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally incomplete and inaccurate and are inferior to testimony given in court. When an affidavit and in-court testimony conflict, the testimony commands greater weight; discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness and may even erase suspicion of rehearsal or fabrication. The Court applied this to uphold Erlinda Prasmo’s credibility despite inconsistencies between her Sinumpaang Salaysay and her direct examination.
• Self-defense; reverse trial and burden of proof — When an accused pleads self-defense, the accused admits authorship of the crime and the burden shifts to the accused to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court applied this to Antonio De Leon and found the defense failed.
• Unlawful aggression — Unlawful aggression refers to an assault, attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner that places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not suffice; there must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. The Court held that Emilio’s act of pulling “something” from his jacket while three to four meters away, without aiming or using it, did not constitute unlawful aggression.
• Nature, location, and number of wounds as indicators — The nature and location of wounds are important indicators that disprove a plea of self-defense. The Court relied on the Medico-Legal Report showing multiple injuries, including a fatal gunshot wound, to conclude that the assault was a deliberate onslaught and homicidal aggression rather than self-defense, and that intent to kill was established.
• Double jeopardy — Under Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. Double jeopardy attaches when the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable and cannot be reviewed even for alleged misappreciation of evidence. The Court applied this to bar Danilo De Leon’s separate Robbery conviction after the RTC’s judgment acquitted him of robbery by convicting only of Murder for insufficiency of evidence.

• "Inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in her sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness; it is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause. In fact, contrary to the defense’s claim, discrepancies erase suspicion that the witness was rehearsed or that the testimony was fabricated." — This passage states the rule on affidavit-versus-court testimony and explains why Erlinda Prasmo’s credibility was upheld despite inconsistencies.
• "Unlawful aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not suffice. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon." — This passage defines unlawful aggression, the first requisite of self-defense, and supports the rejection of Antonio De Leon’s claim.
• "Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent." — This passage states the elements of double jeopardy applied to bar Danilo De Leon’s separate Robbery conviction.
• "A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. In fact, the Court cannot, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of acquittal of the trial court due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes." — This passage explains why the Court of Appeals could not reverse the RTC’s acquittal on the robbery charge.

• People vs. Dagami, 394 Phil. 482, 488-489 (2000) — Cited for the rule that ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete and inaccurate, inferior to in-court testimony, and that inconsistencies between them do not discredit the witness; the Court relied on it to uphold Erlinda Prasmo’s credibility.
• People vs. Placer, G.R. No. 181753, 9 October 2013, 707 SCRA 199, 207 — Cited for the elements of self-defense that the accused must prove: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation.
• People vs. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 167-168 — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression as an imminent and immediate assault or threat placing life in actual peril, requiring actual physical force or use of a weapon.
• People vs. Bayocot, 256 Phil. 27, 34-35 (1989) — Cited to support the conclusion that the victim’s act of pulling “something” out cannot constitute unlawful aggression.
• People vs. Anies, 203 Phil. 332, 351 (1982) — Also cited for the rule that pulling “something” out is not unlawful aggression.
• People vs. Cañete, 350 Phil. 933, 943-944 (1998) — Cited for the principle that the nature and location of wounds are important indicators that disprove self-defense.
• People vs. Lanuza, G.R. No. 188562, 24 August 2011, 656 SCRA 293, 300-301 — Cited for the conclusion that the nature and number of wounds established intent to kill and showed homicidal aggression rather than self-defense.
• People vs. Nimo, G.R. No. 92533, 5 October 1993, 227 SCRA 69 — Cited by the RTC for the rule that robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself to sustain robbery with homicide; the RTC relied on it in convicting the accused of Murder only, which the Supreme Court later treated as an acquittal of robbery for double jeopardy purposes.
• Bangayan, Jr. vs. Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777 and G.R. No. 172792, 19 October 2011, 659 SCRA 590, 600 — Cited for the elements of double jeopardy and the rule that an acquittal cannot be reviewed even on alleged misappreciation of evidence.
• People vs. CA, G.R. No. 198589, 25 July 2012, 677 SCRA 575, 579 — Cited for the rule that an acquittal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is immediately final and cannot be appealed.
• People vs. Terrado, 580 Phil. 79, 87 (2008) — Cited for the purpose of the double jeopardy guarantee: to afford the acquitted defendant final repose and safeguard against government oppression through abuse of criminal processes.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — Defines and penalizes Murder. The RTC convicted all accused of Murder under this article, and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Article 293 and Article 294(5), Revised Penal Code — Define Robbery and the penalty for robbery under paragraph 5. The Court of Appeals used these provisions to convict Danilo De Leon of separate Robbery, but the Supreme Court held that conviction could not stand because it violated double jeopardy.
• Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Court applied this guarantee to bar Danilo De Leon’s separate Robbery conviction after the RTC’s judgment acquitted him of robbery by convicting only of Murder for insufficiency of evidence.

• Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, Chief Justice, Chairperson
• Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
• Lucas P. Bersamin
• Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe