People of the Philippines vs. Banaban

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of an agreement; it may be inferred from the acts of the accused done in pursuance of an apparent criminal or unlawful purpose common between them. The Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant as co-principal in the murder, finding that the unity of purpose and community of design among the accused were clearly inferred from their collective acts of lying in wait, successively shooting the victim, and fleeing together.

The spouses Herminio and Marina Balderas were tenants of Juanita Barrido in her riceland in Piliwan, Ajuy, Iloilo, occupying her house under tenancy. Jesus Barrido, Juanita's younger brother, had on several instances tried to persuade the spouses to vacate the property, and by force or intimidation succeeded in driving them from the house, though they continued to occupy the land. Benhur Banaban, also a tenant of Juanita, lost his female carabao and suspected Herminio of stealing it, a matter that was brought before the Barrio Captain and the Mayor of Ajuy.

The spouses Herminio and Marina Balderas were tenants of Juanita Barrido in her riceland in Piliwan, Ajuy, Iloilo, occupying her house under tenancy. In 1971, Juanita and her husband went to Ajuy and, finding the portion of her land occupied by the spouses neglected, offered them P800.00 to vacate. Herminio refused unless paid P3,000.00 or the matter was settled in the Court of Agrarian Relations. Jesus Barrido, Juanita's younger brother, tried on several instances to persuade the spouses to vacate, and by force or intimidation succeeded in driving them from the house, though they continued to occupy the land.

Benhur Banaban, also a tenant of Juanita, lost his female carabao and, with his son Danilo, suspected Herminio of stealing it. When confronted, Herminio told them they could get the carabao if they paid him P50.00. The matter was brought to the Barrio Captain and then to the Mayor of Ajuy, where Herminio admitted asking for P50.00 but claimed he did so in jest while drunk. On January 25, 1972, the carabao was found dead, tied to a tree in the mountain of Pedaga, Ajuy. The following morning, the Barrio Captain, Benhur, and Danilo reported the finding to Mayor Jose Rojas Jr., who sent Pat. Ben Sason to summon Herminio. Herminio promised before the mayor to pay Benhur P400.00 for the carabao on February 1, 1972. Herminio tried to borrow the amount from Jesus Barrido, who refused, and he did not pay as promised.

The mayor then sent his policemen, accompanied by Jesus Barrido, to call for Herminio, whom they found drinking beer in a store in Punta Equi, Culasi, with T/Sgt. Nicolas Belicano of the Constabulary. Herminio refused to go with them, telling the sergeant that if he went with Jesus Barrido and his companions, he would be killed. T/Sgt. Belicano asked for a warrant of arrest, and when they had none, told them not to arrest Herminio without authority. That night, Herminio slept in the sergeant's house.

At about 8:45 in the evening of February 8, 1972, while Herminio was walking along the road with his child on his right shoulder, followed by his wife Marina, he was ambushed, shot, and wounded by Jesus Barrido, Benhur Banaban, Danilo Banaban, Jimmy Monaga, and two other unidentified men, near the bodega of Mr. Blancaflor in Piliwan. He was brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital, where Dr. Salvador Aguirre operated on him for gunshot wounds, including an 8.5 cm x 9.5 cm wound at the left lumbar region with pellets entering the abdominal cavity, passing through loops of small and large intestines, and severing the greater curvature of the stomach. On February 13, 1972, at 11:15 p.m., Herminio died in the hospital, survived by his wife and four minor children: Enrique, age 9; Erlando, age 8; Wilfredo, age 5; and Herminio Jr., age 2.

The defense of appellant Benhur Banaban was alibi, anchored on the testimony of his son Danilo Banaban, who claimed that he alone shot Herminio and that the accused had nothing to do with the death. The trial court rejected Danilo's testimony, finding no competent evidence of his alleged surrender to the police or detention in the municipal jail, and noting that the police investigation had not identified the shooter. The Solicitor General pointed out that Danilo, the eldest of ten children living with his parents, may have been prevailed upon by his mother to take full responsibility to clear his father.

• Declaration Against Interest: The appellant assailed the trial court for not giving weight to the testimony of Danilo Banaban, arguing that his written admission was a declaration against interest within Section 32, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court and, hence, more reliable and trustworthy.
• Lack of Conspiracy: The appellant contended that the trial court erred in convicting him as co-principal despite the absence of evidence of conspiracy.
• Weakness of Prosecution Evidence: The appellant claimed that he and his co-accused were convicted not on the strength of the prosecution evidence but on the weakness of their defense, pointing out contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
• Alibi: The appellant maintained that he was in Sitio Dulang, Barrio Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, about 4 kilometers from the scene of the crime, watching the palay of Isaac Cacho, and learned of the victim's death only the following morning when his wife told him their son Danilo had killed a person.

• Credibility of Danilo Banaban: The Solicitor General argued that Danilo Banaban's assumption of penal responsibility was an afterthought, noting that as the eldest of ten children living with his parents, it would not be strange that his mother prevailed upon him to take full responsibility for the crime, and that in clearing his father, Danilo had to include the other accused because they were indicted as co-conspirators.
• Positive Identification: The prosecution maintained that the appellant and his co-accused were positively identified as the assailants, with no convincing proof that the prosecution witnesses had a reason to testify falsely.

• Declaration Against Interest: Whether the trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to the testimony of Danilo Banaban, whose written admission was allegedly a declaration against interest under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
• Conspiracy: Whether the appellant was properly convicted as co-principal in the commission of the offense despite the alleged absence of evidence of conspiracy.
• Basis of Conviction: Whether the appellant was convicted on the weakness of his defense rather than the strength of the prosecution evidence.
• Alibi: Whether the appellant's defense of alibi should be sustained.

• Declaration Against Interest: No. The trial court properly rejected Danilo Banaban's testimony, as Section 32, Rule 130 requires that the declarant be deceased, outside the Philippines, or unable to testify; Danilo was available and actually testified in court.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established, as the unity of purpose and community of design among the appellant and his co-accused were clearly inferred from their acts proven by evidence, even without direct proof of an agreement.
• Basis of Conviction: No. The appellant and his co-accused were positively identified as the assailants, and the appellant had a motive to kill the deceased, who had taken his carabao for ransom and failed to pay its value.
• Alibi: No. The appellant was positively identified as one of the perpetrators, and there was no convincing proof that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.

• Declaration Against Interest: The Court held that Section 32, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court finds no application because the rule requires that the declaration be made by a person who is deceased, outside the Philippines, or unable to testify. In this case, Danilo Banaban was available as a witness and was, in fact, presented in court and testified for the appellant. The trial court's rejection of Danilo's testimony was in accord with the physical facts: there was no competent evidence of his alleged surrender to the Chief of Police, no police blotter showing the record of events, and Pat. Ben Sason testified that the person who shot the victim was not yet known. The Court found that Danilo's assumption of penal responsibility appeared to be an afterthought, noting that as the eldest of ten children under his parents' custody, his mother may have prevailed upon him to take full responsibility to clear his father.

• Conspiracy: The Court held that while there may be no evidence of an agreement of direct conspiracy, the unity of purpose and community of design among the appellant and his co-accused was clearly inferred from their acts. Marina Balderas declared that she saw the appellant with co-accused Jimmy Monaga and Jesus Barrido, and three other persons, sitting by the roadside, recognized by the lights of a tractor inside the bodega directed towards the road. When her husband was about 11 brazas from them, Jimmy Monaga shot him with a homemade shotgun, Jesus Barrido shot him in the forearm, and the appellant Benhur Banaban also shot but missed because the victim ran away. Florenia Aspero declared that five minutes after the victims left her house, she heard three successive gunshots, saw the three accused running along the road carrying homemade shotguns, and later saw the victim lying on the roadside bleeding, who told her he was shot by Jimmy Monaga and his companions. The Court cited the settled rule that conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence but may be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances, and that the existence of the agreement need not be proved directly.

• Basis of Conviction: The Court held that the appellant and his co-accused were positively identified as the assailants, and there was no convincing proof that the prosecution witnesses had a reason to testify falsely. The appellant had a motive to kill the deceased, whose carabao was taken by the deceased for ransom, and who failed to fulfill his promise to pay its value after the carabao died. The contradictions and inconsistencies pointed out by the appellant were inconsequential and miniscule.

• Alibi: The Court held that the appellant was positively identified as one of the perpetrators, and there was no convincing proof that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. The Court applied the settled rule that where issues hinge on the credibility of witnesses, the appellate tribunal should give due respect to the assessment of facts made by the lower court, which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses testifying, unless the trial court overlooked or failed to consider facts of weight and importance.

• Mitigating Circumstance: The Court held that the appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance analogous to, if not the same as, vindication of a grave offense committed by the deceased, who took away the appellant's carabao and held it for ransom, and thereafter failed to fulfill his promise to pay its value after the carabao died. The offense being attended by a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided for by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

• Conspiracy inferred from acts — A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. Conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a matter of inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an apparent criminal or unlawful purpose in common between them. The existence of the agreement, or joint assent of the minds, need not be proved directly. In this case, the Court inferred conspiracy from the accused's acts of lying in wait together, successively shooting the victim, and fleeing together while carrying homemade shotguns.

• Declaration against interest (Section 32, Rule 130) — The declaration made by a person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, pecuniary or moral, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. The Court held that this exception to the hearsay rule does not apply where the declarant is available as a witness and actually testifies in court.

• Credibility of witnesses — Where the issues raised hinge on the credibility of witnesses, the settled rule is for the appellate tribunal to give due respect to the assessment of facts made by the lower court, which had the opportunity not only of receiving the evidence but also of observing the witnesses while testifying. This rule should not be overturned unless there is a showing that in making the disputed factual finding, the trial court had overlooked or failed to consider certain facts of weight and importance that could have materially affected the conclusion reached in the case.

• Mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense — A mitigating circumstance analogous to vindication of a grave offense may be appreciated where the accused acted in response to a grave offense committed by the victim. In this case, the deceased had taken the appellant's carabao and held it for ransom, and thereafter failed to fulfill his promise to pay its value after the carabao died, which entitled the appellant to the mitigating circumstance.

• "While there may be no evidence of agreement of direct conspiracy, the unity of purpose and community of design among the appellant and his co-accused in the killing of Herminio Balderas is clearly inferred from the acts of the accused proven by evidence." — This passage states the Court's core reasoning on the conspiracy issue, holding that direct evidence of an agreement is not required and that conspiracy may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused.

• "A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. It is also a settled law that 'conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished.'" — This passage articulates the canonical definition of conspiracy and the rule on how it may be proved, which the Court applied to the facts of the case.

• "The appellant, however, is entitled to the mitigating circumstance analogous to, if not the same as, vindication of a grave offense committed by the deceased when the latter took away the carabao of the appellant and held it for ransom, and thereafter, failed to fulfill his promise to pay its value after the carabao had died." — This passage identifies the mitigating circumstance appreciated in favor of the appellant, which formed the basis for the modification of the penalty.

• People vs. Belen, 118 Phil. 880 — Cited as authority for the rule that conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence but may be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances, and that the existence of the agreement need not be proved directly.
• People vs. Sales, G.R. No. L-29340, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 489 — Cited for the settled rule that where issues hinge on the credibility of witnesses, the appellate tribunal should give due respect to the assessment of facts made by the lower court, unless the trial court overlooked or failed to consider facts of weight and importance.

• Section 32, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court — The provision on declarations against interest, which the Court held inapplicable because the declarant, Danilo Banaban, was available as a witness and actually testified in court, rather than being deceased, outside the Philippines, or unable to testify.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the Court in modifying the penalty, sentencing the appellant to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, given that the offense was attended by a mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset it.

Justices Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin concurred.

• Justice Aquino — Dissented, voting to hold the appellant guilty as an accomplice rather than as a co-principal, and to sentence him to 6 years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eleven years of prision mayor, as maximum.