People of the Philippines vs. Baltazar Lacao, Sr., et al.

The absence of a prior agreement or contemporaneous understanding among multiple attackers negates a finding of conspiracy, and each accused's liability must be determined by the nature of his or her individual participation in the felonious act. Where the attack originated spontaneously and the other participants joined instinctively without prior deliberation, conspiracy cannot be inferred, and those who merely supplied material or moral aid without indispensable participation are liable as accomplices rather than principals.

The accused-appellants were charged in an information filed on February 3, 1986, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1416 in the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Branch XXI, with the complex crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority, allegedly committed on September 28, 1985, in Brgy. Manibad, Municipality of Mambusao, Province of Capiz. The victim, Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr., was an agent of a person in authority who was in the actual performance of his official duties at the time of the incident. The accused were charged with conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, armed with knives and wooden stools, with evident premeditation, treachery, and taking advantage of nighttime and superior strength.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1985, prosecution witness Mila Parto was at her house in Barangay Manibad attending to persons who came to the wake of her aunt, Nemesia Lacao. Mila Parto is the sister-in-law of the deceased police Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. While she was so engaged, she heard and witnessed a commotion at the first floor of the two-storey house. The commotion arose from a card game where one Mansueto Rivera was losing and accused Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing with him, was furiously arguing with the former. Baltazar Lacao II then unsheathed his knife and threatened Mansueto Rivera by pointing the knife at the latter's neck. Wilma Rivera, the sister-in-law of Mansueto, intervened and Baltazar Lacao II released the latter. Baltazar Lacao II then went inside the house wielding his knife and causing the other guests to panic.

It was then that Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. went down to inquire into the matter and to pacify the people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao II with a knife, he held the latter's hand holding that knife. Baltazar Lacao II then said: "Nyor, release me." As Cpl. Inocencio did not release him, the latter's mother, Patria Lacao, then said: "Nyor, release my son." When Cpl. Inocencio released Baltazar Lacao II, the latter suddenly stabbed Inocencio on his right side. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III, together with his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, rushed inside the house and surrounded the victim. The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women hit him with stools. As the attack continued, the victim was pushed toward the door of the kitchen and he later slumped on the floor facing downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat astride him and continued stabbing the latter as he was thus lying prostrate. Thereafter, this appellant asked: "Nyor, Nyor, are you still alive?" Appellant Patria Lacao interjected: "What are you waiting for, it is already finished, we have to go." Baltazar Lacao III then got the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused went away.

The prosecution presented three eyewitnesses: Mila Parto, Isabel Llorente, and the victim's widow, Nelfa Inocencio, who were admittedly present at the scene and time of the bloody incident. The medico-legal officer, Dr. Abel P. Martinez, examined the body of the deceased and submitted an autopsy report showing fifteen stab wounds and other injuries, with the cause of death being cardiac tamponade, severe internal and external hemorrhages secondary to the inflicted wounds. The defense of Baltazar Lacao, Sr. was self-defense, claiming that Cpl. Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the gun did not fire, and that he grabbed the gun and stabbed the deceased more than five times. The other appellants, Trinidad Mansilla and Patria Lacao, interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at 7:30 in the evening of September 28, 1985, they and one Consolacion Lago went to the wake at Barangay Manibad, prayed, and at about 9:30 A.M., went home but Baltazar, Sr. was left behind. Baltazar Lacao II was alleged to be sleeping in their house and Baltazar Lacao III was said to be then in Roxas City studying at the La Purisima College.

• Self-Defense: Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. argued that he acted in complete self-defense when he stabbed the deceased, claiming that Cpl. Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the gun did not fire, and that he grabbed the gun and stabbed the deceased more than five times.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla argued that they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with direct assault notwithstanding the fact that they had not performed overt acts showing conspiracy, for mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act without cooperation is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.
• Treachery: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding that treachery as a qualifying circumstance attended the killing of Jose Inocencio by all accused-appellants, particularly that treachery cannot be considered against Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla who allegedly did not conspire with Baltazar Lacao, Sr.
• Reasonable Doubt: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in not acquitting Baltazar Lacao, Sr. on self-defense and in not acquitting Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Prosecution's Case: The prosecution established through three eyewitnesses — Mila Parto, Isabel Llorente, and Nelfa Inocencio — that the appellants were positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime, with the women hitting the victim with stools while the men stabbed him with knives.
• Physical Evidence: The prosecution presented the autopsy report showing fifteen stab wounds on the victim's body, with the cause of death being cardiac tamponade, severe internal and external hemorrhages, and noted that none of the six bullets recovered from the gun showed any sign or mark that the gun was ever fired, refuting the self-defense claim.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. acted in complete self-defense when he stabbed the deceased Jose Inocencio, Jr.
• Conspiracy: Whether appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla conspired with the male accused in killing the victim, such that they should be held liable as principals.
• Treachery: Whether treachery as a qualifying circumstance attended the killing of Jose Inocencio by all accused-appellants.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalties and damages imposed by the trial court were proper given the circumstances of the case.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established, as the first requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was not proven. The appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five times, and the victim actually suffered fifteen stab wounds, showing that he exceeded the limits of what was necessary to suppress an alleged unlawful aggression.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not established, as the attack on the victim originated spontaneously from and was initiated unexpectedly by Baltazar Lacao II, with the other appellants joining instinctively without prior or apparent deliberation. The respective liabilities of the appellants were determined by the nature of their individual participations in the felonious act.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against all appellants, as the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he unsuspectingly released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II, and the concerted action of the appellants ensured the commission of the crime without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim might have resorted to.
• Penalty and Damages: The trial court correctly sentenced Baltazar Lacao, Sr. to reclusion perpetua, but Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The death indemnity was increased to P50,000.00.

• Self-Defense: By pleading self-defense, appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. necessarily admitted that he killed the victim and was duty bound to prove the essential requisites for this justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence, the onus probandi having shifted to him. The appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five times, and the medico-legal report showed that the victim actually suffered fifteen stab wounds, most of which were fatal. Even indulging the appellant in his theory, he definitely exceeded the limits of what is necessary to suppress an alleged unlawful aggression. The claim that Cpl. Inocencio fired his gun but it did not fire was refuted by the unequivocal statements of the prosecution witnesses that the victim never removed his gun from his waistband, and that the revolver only fell when appellants pushed the deceased. The absence of marks on the bullets recovered from the gun further sustained the holding that even the first element of self-defense was not proved.

• Conspiracy: The Court was not favorably impressed with the prosecution's theory that the assailants acted pursuant to a conspiracy just because they apparently acted in unison in attacking the victim. While conspiracy is predominantly mental in composition and complicity may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, conspiracy must be proved with as much certainty as the crime itself, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. A dispassionate appraisal of the facts revealed that the attack on the victim originated spontaneously from and was initiated unexpectedly by Baltazar Lacao II, with the other appellants joining instinctively without prior or apparent deliberation. The rapidity in the succession of such consecutive acts, with the last four coming instinctively to the aid of the original assailant, cannot but produce the conclusion that their actuations were activated without prior or apparent deliberation. The spontaneity of their respective reactions rules out the existence of a conspiracy.

• Treachery: There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he unsuspectingly released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden and unanticipated was the attack that the victim was given no chance to defend himself. The concerted action of the appellants ensured the commission of the crime without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim might have resorted to. The use of superior strength was absorbed as an integral part of the treacherous mode of commission.

• Penalty and Damages: The lower court properly considered recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense embraced in the same title of the Code. This aggravating circumstance of recidivism offsets the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender by Baltazar Lacao, Sr. With respect to appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, they did cooperate in the execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which, although not indispensable to the commission of the offense, bore a relation to the acts done by the principal and supplied material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. Since they were aware of the criminal intent of the principals and having participated in such murderous criminal design sans a conspiracy, they were held guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices.

• Self-Defense Requisites — Self-defense requires proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as an indispensable first requisite. There can be no self-defense unless it is proven that there has been unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused; if there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel, and the second requisite of self-defense will have no basis. The burden of proof shifts to the accused who must prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.

• Conspiracy Must Be Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt — Conspiracy must be proved with as much certainty as the crime itself; the same degree of proof required to establish the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. At the very least, conspiracy presupposes a prior agreement or contemporaneous understanding on the part of the conspirators to commit a felony. Where the attack originated spontaneously and the participants joined instinctively without prior deliberation, conspiracy cannot be inferred.

• Accomplice Liability — One who cooperates in the execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which, although not indispensable to the commission of the offense, bear a relation to the acts done by the principal and supply material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way, is liable as an accomplice. Where the accused were aware of the criminal intent of the principals and participated in such murderous criminal design without a conspiracy, they are guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices.

• Treachery — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The use of superior strength is absorbed as an integral part of the treacherous mode of commission.

• Recidivism and Pardon — A pardon for a preceding offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense embraced in the same title of the Code.

• "The spontaneity of their respective reactions, albeit resulting in an attack where they all participated, rules out the existence of a conspiracy." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning for finding no conspiracy among the assailants, establishing that spontaneous and instinctive participation without prior agreement negates a finding of conspiracy.

• "There can be no self-defense unless it is proven that there has been unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the accused. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the first indispensable requisite of self-defense, which the Court applied to reject the appellant's defense.

• "Since they were aware of the criminal intent of the principals and having participated in such murderous criminal design sans a conspiracy, we hold them guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices." — This passage establishes the basis for holding the female appellants liable as accomplices rather than principals, defining the distinction based on the nature of participation.

• People vs. Gavino, Sr., 155 SCRA 625 (1987) — Cited for the proposition that by pleading self-defense, the accused necessarily admits killing the victim and is duty bound to prove the essential requisites for this justifying circumstance.
• People vs. Masangkay, et al., 155 SCRA 113 (1987) — Cited for the rule that self-defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, with the onus probandi having shifted to the accused.
• Ortega vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 38 (1989) — Cited for the proposition that the first requisite of self-defense is indispensable, and if there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel.
• People vs. Cinco, et al., G.R. No. 79497, February 27, 1991 — Cited for the doctrine that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct and crumbles in the face of positive identification.
• People vs. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 325 (1989) — Cited for the principle that complicity may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, i.e., the community of purpose and the unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the act.
• People vs. Geronimo, et al., 53 SCRA 246 (1973) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy must be proved with as much certainty as the crime itself.
• People vs. Dagangon, et al., 145 SCRA 464 (1986) — Cited for the same proposition that conspiracy must be proved with as much certainty as the crime itself.
• People vs. Tumalip, et al., 60 SCRA 303 (1974) — Cited for the rule that the same degree of proof required to establish the crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy.
• People vs. Saavedra, 149 SCRA 610 (1987) — Cited for the requirement that conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Tividad et al., 20 SCRA 549 (1967) — Cited for the principle that the respective liabilities of appellants shall be determined by the nature of their individual participations in the felonious act.
• People vs. Cajandab, et al., 52 SCRA 161 (1973) — Cited for the same principle regarding individual participation determining liability.
• People vs. Melgar, et al., 157 SCRA 718 (1988) — Cited for the definition of treachery under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.
• U.S. vs. Sotelo, 28 Phil. 149 (1914) — Cited for the rule that a pardon for a preceding offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense embraced in the same title of the Code.
• People vs. Tamayo, et al., 44 Phil. 38 (1922) — Cited for the definition of accomplice liability where one cooperates in the execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which supply material or moral aid.
• People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158 (1972) — Cited for the proposition that those who participate in a murderous criminal design without a conspiracy are guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices.
• People vs. Palencia, et al., 71 SCRA 679 (1976) — Cited for the same proposition regarding accomplice liability.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining the crime of murder, which was the graver offense in the complex crime charged against the appellants.
• Article 148, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority, which was the other component of the complex crime charged.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — The provision on complex crimes, providing that the penalty for the complex crime at bar is that for the graver offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — The provision defining treachery, which the Court applied in finding that treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against all appellants.
• Article 110, Revised Penal Code — The provision governing the subsidiary liability of accomplices, which the Court referenced in apportioning the death indemnity among the appellants.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concurred. Sarmiento, J., was on leave.