People of the Philippines vs. Baltazar Amion y Dugaduga

Where the accused admits authorship of the killing but fails to prove unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot be credited; and where murder is attended by no aggravating circumstance and one mitigating circumstance, the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, not death, must be imposed under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, aid of armed men, and abuse of public office are not appreciated absent proof that the vehicle facilitated the crime, that more than one armed man took part and was relied upon, or that the public official used the influence and prestige of his office.

SPO2 Baltazar Amion y Dugaduga was a member of the Bacolod City Police Office, while PO3 Victor Vaflor was a member of the Escalante Police Station. The killing was prosecuted as Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, which imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The prosecution's case rested principally on the eyewitness accounts of Chief Inspector Edmundo Sanicas and PO3 Richard Dejoras.

On January 24, 1994, PO3 Victor Vaflor and PO3 Richard Dejoras, both members of the Escalante Police Station, were ordered by their Chief of Police to proceed to Bacolod City to submit a Performance Evaluation Report at the PNP Headquarters, to file calamity loan applications with the GSIS, and to see Chief Inspector Edmundo Sanicas regarding a training program. They traveled aboard an Escalante police car, a Nissan Sentra, accompanied by a civilian friend of Vaflor, and arrived in Bacolod City at about 10:00 A.M. Both wore their police uniforms and carried their service handguns. After completing their first two missions, they ate lunch and, because they did not know the location of Sanicas' house in Mansilingan, stopped at Precinct 7 to ask for directions — where Amion himself pointed them the way.

They found Sanicas' house and parked in front of the steel gate of its perimeter fence. After their conversation with Sanicas, the two policemen left, with Dejoras stepping out of the gate first, followed by Vaflor, and Sanicas escorting them to their car. As Vaflor was about to open the driver's-side door, Amion, who was about four meters away, shot him with an M16 Armalite rifle. Vaflor fell.

According to Sanicas, Amion was only about a meter away from Vaflor when the shooting began. Sanicas tried to wrest the rifle from Amion, but the latter refused to surrender it, backed away, and circled the Escalante patrol car with Sanicas following. Upon reaching the fallen Vaflor, Amion fired at him again. Sanicas again tried to disarm him, and Amion again refused, circled the car, and approached his victim once more; Sanicas could not distinctly recall whether shots were fired on that third approach. Dejoras, for his part, testified that Amion shot Vaflor several times at intervals of thirty seconds to one minute, and that during one interval Sanicas tried to intervene but Amion refused to give up his firearm and fired more shots at the fallen victim. Dejoras also saw Ladislao Amion, the accused's uncle, seated in the front seat of the Precinct 7 police car parked immediately behind the Escalante car, with a companion pointing an Armalite rifle in Dejoras' direction. After the shooting, Sanicas took Vaflor's service firearm, which was still tucked in its holster.

Amion gave a different account. He testified that he was on a roving patrol with CVO Ricardo Divino at about 12:30 P.M. when they reached the vicinity of Sanicas' house and noticed a car parked in the middle of the road. Amion disembarked to ask the driver to clear the way, bringing his Armalite rifle slung on his shoulder. As he approached the gate, Vaflor emerged, and Amion greeted him; Vaflor replied, "So what." Amion then saw Vaflor make a motion to draw his sidearm, so he leveled his rifle and it fired. Amion said he was almost in a state of shock upon seeing Vaflor, whom he blamed for the killing of his uncle, Rodito Amion, in Escalante in 1986 — a killing he had witnessed and during which he had pleaded for his uncle's life. Divino corroborated Amion's account, testifying that he saw Vaflor make a motion to draw his gun and that it was then that Amion shot him.

Vaflor was brought to the Bacolod Sanitarium Hospital, where he was declared dead on arrival. The autopsy showed multiple gunshot wounds, including wounds to the right deltoid, right axillary, left infrascapular, and left lumbar regions, and a contusion-abrasion on the head with fracture of the skull and laceration of the brain. The trial court found the testimonies of Sanicas and Dejoras credible and rejected Divino's testimony as "rehearsed and untruthful," concluding that Amion had suddenly, deliberately, and without warning shot Vaflor, that the killing was attended by treachery because Vaflor was absolutely unprepared for the attack, and that the motive was revenge. The firearm used was an Armalite rifle with Serial No. RP-186739, issued to Amion in his official capacity.

• Use of a Motor Vehicle: The Solicitor General argued that the use of a motor vehicle cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance, as the police vehicle used to reach the Sanicas residence was not used directly or indirectly to facilitate the criminal act.
• Line of Fire: Both Dejoras and Sanicas were outside the line of fire during the shooting and could not have been hit unless directly shot at.
• Voluntary Surrender: The appellee assailed the trial court's conclusion that voluntary surrender was present, contending that there was no showing that the appellant surrendered in a spontaneous manner, as shown by Sanicas' testimony that the appellant refused to surrender his firearm.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The trial court erred in upholding the testimonies of PO3 Dejoras and CI Sanicas, which contained statements that were not only false but highly improbable.
• Findings of Fact: The trial court erred in its findings of fact on several matters.
• Self-Defense: The trial court erred in discounting the clear evidence of self-defense; the accused never intended to shoot Vaflor, who made a motion to draw his gun, leaving the accused no alternative but to shoot in self-defense.
• Improbability of the Prosecution's Account: The accused could not have shot Vaflor without harming Sanicas and Dejoras; Dejoras, having come out of the gate first, should have retreated and closed the gate upon seeing Amion; and the nature of Vaflor's gunshot wounds did not support Sanicas' testimony that he shot Vaflor from a distance of one meter.
• Discounting of Defense Witnesses: In discounting the testimonies of CVO Divino and SPO4 Alabia, the trial court effectively barred the truth from being unearthed.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in upholding the testimonies of PO3 Dejoras and CI Sanicas as credible and in rejecting the testimony of CVO Ricardo Divino.
• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court erred in discounting the accused-appellant's claim of self-defense.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, aid of armed men, and abuse of public office were properly appreciated.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of death was properly imposed.
• Damages: Whether the award for loss of earning capacity was proper.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility is primarily addressed to it and is generally respected on appeal; the testimonies of Sanicas and Dejoras corroborated each other on the essential points and positively identified the accused.
• Self-Defense: No. The accused failed to prove unlawful aggression, the first element of self-defense; the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds after falling from the first shot, and the accused fired again upon reaching the fallen victim.
• Aggravating Circumstances: No. None of the aggravating circumstances was properly appreciated — the police vehicle was not used to facilitate the shooting, the aid of armed men contemplates more than one armed man and was not relied upon, and the accused did not use the influence or prestige of his office.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The trial court did not err in giving the accused the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Penalty: Reclusion perpetua. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, where the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser of two indivisible penalties shall be applied.
• Damages: The award for loss of earning capacity should be increased to P562,399.98, computed under the formula in People vs. Silvestre.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The objections raised by the accused-appellant refer to minor matters and do not detract from the positive identification of the accused as the assailant. The two witnesses corroborated each other on the essential points regarding the shooting incident, and both were outside the line of fire. Dejoras saw Amion when the latter was already well past the gate and in front of the car, so it was pointless to argue that Dejoras should have closed the gate upon seeing Amion. As to the alleged ballistics rule on the effective fire power of an Armalite, there was no showing to support the bare allegation that, judging from Vaflor's bullet wounds, he could not have been fired upon at a distance of about one meter. What was material was that the two prosecution witnesses positively declared that the accused-appellant, without warning, fired upon Vaflor with an M16 Armalite. Sanicas admitted that the incident happened so quickly that other details escaped his observation, but he distinctly recalled that after he stepped out of the steel gate following Vaflor, the accused, only about a meter away from Vaflor, fired a shot and Vaflor fell. Dejoras, a friend and neighbor of the accused-appellant, had no reason to testify against him. Divino's attempt to corroborate the accused's version was rejected by the trial court as "rehearsed and untruthful," in contrast to the testimonies of Sanicas and Dejoras, which the court described as credible and given in a "sincere, honest and straightforward manner." The doctrinal rule is that the question of assessing the credibility of witnesses is primarily addressed to the trial court, whose findings are generally respected on appeal.

• Self-Defense: Where the offender admits authorship of the killing, the onus probandi is shifted to him to prove the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The first element was not proven. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, and this was not established. Moreover, Vaflor suffered multiple gunshot wounds after falling from the first gunshot. The accused circled the Escalante patrol car, with Sanicas following him in order to disarm him, and upon reaching the fallen Vaflor, fired shots at him again. If he had shot the victim merely to defend himself, there would have been no cause for the accused-appellant to shoot him again.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The use of a motor vehicle cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance because the police vehicle used to reach the Sanicas residence was not used directly or indirectly to facilitate the criminal act. Although the accused-appellant used a patrol car to commute from Escalante to the Sanicas residence, there was no showing that the use of that vehicle facilitated the act of shooting itself. Neither may the aggravating circumstance of aid of armed men be appreciated. This circumstance contemplates more than one armed man, as the use of the plural form suggests, and its requisites are: (1) that armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly; and (2) that the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed. Neither circumstance was proven; the accused-appellant carried out the killing all by himself and did not rely on his companion for assistance. As to abuse of public office, for public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must use the influence, prestige, and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position. Although the victim was killed with the appellant's Armalite rifle, which was issued to him, there was nothing to show that he took advantage of his position.

• Voluntary Surrender: The appellee assailed the trial court's conclusion that voluntary surrender was present, contending that there was no showing that the appellant surrendered in a spontaneous manner, as shown by Sanicas' testimony that the appellant refused to surrender his firearm. The fact that the accused-appellant yielded his weapon to Sanicas at the time of the incident, albeit with some persuasion from the latter, should be considered in his favor. Moreover, the records showed that the warrant of arrest was dated March 3, 1994 and received by the Station Commander, Bacolod PNP Station, and by the Provincial Director, PNP Provincial Commander, Camp Alfredo, on March 14, 1994 and March 12, 1994, respectively, whereas the Commitment Order signed by the Executive Judge was dated March 7, 1994. It appeared, therefore, that the accused-appellant was already in police custody before the warrant of arrest was served. The warrant of arrest itself carried a marginal note "voluntarily surrendered March 5, 1994." There was no cogent justification to rule that the trial court erred in giving the accused the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Penalty: In view of the absence of aggravating circumstances and the presence of one mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed by the trial court should be modified. The penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63, in case of two indivisible penalties, when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Hence, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

• Damages: The civil indemnity for death is P50,000.00. With respect to the loss of earning capacity, the formula for computing the same is laid down in People vs. Silvestre: Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x Gross Annual Income – living expense. The deceased Vaflor was a policeman earning P3,800.00 a month, or P45,600.00 per annum, and was 43 years old at the time of his death. Applying the formula, the net earning capacity is P562,399.98. The indemnity for loss of earning capacity should be P562,399.98.

• Self-Defense — Elements and Burden of Proof — When the accused admits authorship of the killing, the burden of proof shifts to him to establish the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In this case, the accused failed to prove unlawful aggression, so self-defense was rejected.

• Unlawful Aggression — Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack. The accused's claim that the victim made a motion to draw his gun did not establish unlawful aggression, especially since the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds after falling from the first shot and the accused fired again upon reaching him.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Use of a Motor Vehicle — The use of a motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance requires that the vehicle was used directly or indirectly to facilitate the criminal act. The police vehicle used by the accused to travel to the scene was not shown to have facilitated the shooting itself.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Aid of Armed Men — This circumstance contemplates more than one armed man and requires: (1) that armed men or persons took part in the commission of the crime, directly or indirectly; and (2) that the accused availed himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed. Neither requisite was proven, as the accused carried out the killing all by himself and did not rely on his companion for assistance.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Abuse of Public Position — For public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must use the influence, prestige, and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. The mere use of a service firearm does not suffice.

• Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance that may be credited where the accused yields to the authorities, even with some persuasion, and is already in custody before the warrant of arrest is served. The warrant's marginal note "voluntarily surrendered March 5, 1994" supported the finding.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Application of Indivisible Penalties — When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, and the penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied. This reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• Loss of Earning Capacity — Formula — Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy [2/3 (80 – age at death)] x Gross Annual Income – living expenses (50% of GAI). Applied to a 43-year-old policeman earning P45,600.00 annually, the net earning capacity is P562,399.98.

• Credibility of Witnesses — The question of assessing the credibility of witnesses is primarily addressed to the trial court, whose findings are generally respected on appeal.

• "The question of assessing the credibility of witnesses is primarily addressed to the trial court, whose findings are generally respected on appeal." — This states the doctrinal rule on appellate deference to the trial court's credibility findings, which the Court invoked to sustain the conviction notwithstanding the accused-appellant's objections to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

• "If the accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position." — This is the ratio for rejecting the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public office; the Court reasoned that the mere use of a service firearm does not establish that the accused took advantage of his official position.

• "In the first place, this aggravating circumstance contemplates more than one armed man, as the use of the plural form easily suggests." — This defines the scope of the aggravating circumstance of aid of armed men, which the Court held was not proven because the accused acted alone and did not rely on his companion for assistance.

• "Pursuant to Article 63, in case of two indivisible penalties, when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied." — This is the controlling rule that compelled the reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• People vs. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 — Cited for the formula in computing net earning capacity for loss of earning capacity; applied to increase the award to P562,399.98.

• People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655 — Cited in support of the rule that for public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must use the influence, prestige, and ascendancy of his office.

• People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728 — Cited in connection with the non-appreciation of abuse of public position where the accused used his service firearm.

• People vs. Herbias, 265 SCRA 571 — Cited in connection with the non-appreciation of the use of a motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance.

• People vs. Ringor, Jr., 320 SCRA 341 — Cited in connection with the rule that the use of a motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance requires that it facilitated the criminal act.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. 7659) — Defines and penalizes murder; the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The accused was convicted of murder qualified by treachery.

• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties; where the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, and the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be applied. This reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

• Section 6, P.D. 7659 — Cited in relation to the penalty for murder under Article 248, which is reclusion perpetua to death.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.