People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio Bandula y Lopez

Extrajudicial confessions obtained during custodial investigation conducted without the assistance of competent and independent counsel — and attended by indications of violence — are inadmissible in evidence, and a lone eyewitness identification that is contradicted by other eyewitnesses who testified that the malefactors were hooded cannot sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The victim, Atty. Juanito Garay, was the Manager of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where Leoncio Pastrano served as Chief of Security and General Foreman and Antonio Salva as a security guard manning his post at the plantation compound. The accused — Aurelio Bandula y Lopez, Pantaleon Sedigo, Teofilo Dionanao, and Victoriano Ejan — were charged with robbery with homicide for the raid on the plantation compound and the killing of Garay. The case reached the Court on appeal from a judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 42, and the guarantees governing custodial investigation under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution supplied the controlling framework for the admissibility of the extrajudicial statements taken from the accused.

On January 27, 1986, at around ten o'clock in the evening, six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. Security Guard Antonio Salva identified four of them as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan, and Pantaleon Sedigo, while the two others, who wore masks, were referred to only as "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short."

At gunpoint, the two masked men held Salva, who was manning his post, disarmed him of his shotgun, and tied his hands behind his back. They then went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation, hog-tied him, and divested him of his driver's license, goggles, wristwatch, and .38 cal. snubnose revolver. From there, the six armed men, with Salva and Pastrano in tow, proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito Garay, Manager of the plantation. Dionanao, Ejan, and Sedigo stayed downstairs while Bandula and the two masked men, with Salva and Pastrano, went up Garay's house. After forcing their way in, the masked men and Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. The hooded men then took Atty. Garay with them and locked Pastrano inside his house together with Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva heard gunshots coming from the direction of the gate of the compound. After succeeding in untying themselves, they went to report the matter to the police and, on their way, found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty. Garay, who bore three gunshot wounds.

Bandula was arrested on January 28, 1986, at around six o'clock in the morning, brought to the Tanjay Police Station, and there interrogated by Cpl. Borromeo, Cpl. Esparicia, Cpl. Ebarso, Pat. Moso, and Pat. Baldejera; at that time there was no counsel present "because that (investigation) was not yet in writing." Two weeks after his arrest, Bandula allegedly gave a sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, admitting his participation in the killing and narrating that after "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall" shot Atty. Garay, he was ordered likewise to shoot the latter, which he did. Dionanao, for his part, was "picked-up for investigation" on January 28, 1986 and interrogated by Cpl. Ephraim Valles inside the police station, where he implicated Sedigo; the following day he was brought to the Office of the Municipal Attorney, Atty. Zerna, where he supposedly executed his extrajudicial confession, and on February 4, 1986, upon the suggestion of another investigator, Cpl. Valles took his Supplementary Sworn Statement, again in the presence of Atty. Zerna.

The four accused denied the charges and testified to warrantless arrests and mauling. Dionanao claimed he was arrested without a warrant and brought to the Tanjay Police Station for no apparent reason, where Cpl. Kagawasan Borromeo, Pat. Tomas Borromeo, and Pat. El Moso took turns mauling him until he spat blood; the following morning he was again mauled and forced to sign a piece of paper without counsel, the contents of which he did not know. Bandula claimed that on the evening of January 27, 1986 he was in the house of Jovito Marimat, Sr., a quack doctor, bedridden and undergoing treatment for an inflamed stomach, when he was awakened and dragged from his sickbed the following morning, brought to the Municipal Hall, interrogated, and later beaten by four persons, including Salva, until he lost consciousness; that evening he was made to sign a blank paper purportedly for his release and then jailed, and he did not know nor ever meet Atty. Zerna. Ejan claimed he was arrested at gunpoint the following afternoon and mauled until he lost consciousness, that his relatives were barred from seeing him, and that he had no relative by the name of Emilio Rendora. Sedigo claimed that police officers with guns drawn barged into his house, searched his belongings, and arrested him without a warrant, and that when he refused to go with them he was hit on the chest and eye; he had never met any of his co-accused prior to his detention and did not know the deceased.

On June 6, 1986, the four accused were transferred from the Municipal Jail of Tanjay to the Negros Oriental Provincial Rehabilitation Center in Dumaguete City, where Bandula asked to see a doctor and was examined and diagnosed to have an "[o]ld healed fracture with callous formation at the 6th and 7th rib along the mid-auxiliary line, left." When prosecution witness Pat. Baldejera was asked in open court on September 15, 1987 whether he saw any contusions or bruises on any of the four accused after their arrest, he admitted that he noticed accused Sedigo with a "black eye."

The trial court relied on Bandula's alleged confession that after the incident he gave his .38 cal. revolver for safekeeping to Jovito Marimat, Jr., from whom the police recovered three handguns — a .38 cal. revolver with four live ammunitions and one empty shell, a .22 cal. "paltik" revolver, and a revolver with M16 bullets; on Ejan's supposed admission that he kept a 12-gauge Winchester shotgun, a tape recorder, a bayonet, and a pair of binoculars in the house of his relative Emilio Rendora; and on a sum of money suspected to be part of the loot recovered from Sedigo. It admitted the extrajudicial confessions of Bandula and Dionanao as having complied with the requirements of an admissible confession, and disregarded the accused's alibis in view of Salva's positive identification. It nonetheless acquitted Dionanao, Ejan, and Sedigo, finding that while they were present at the scene from the inception of the crime to its termination, they were merely bystanders who did not participate in one way or another in its commission.

• Inadmissibility of the Extrajudicial Confessions: Appellant argued that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffered from constitutional infirmities and were inadmissible in evidence, considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.
• Insufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Appellant contended that, with the extrajudicial confessions excluded, the prosecution was left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confessions: Whether the extrajudicial confessions executed by appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao are admissible in evidence, given that they were taken without the assistance of competent and independent counsel and allegedly under duress and intimidation.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: Whether the prosecution's remaining evidence — principally the lone identification of appellant by security guard Antonio Salva — is sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide beyond reasonable doubt.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confessions: No. The confessions were inadmissible, having been obtained during custodial investigation conducted without counsel at the outset and later assisted only by the Municipal Attorney, who was not a competent and independent counsel; the records likewise bore telltale signs of violence, in violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: No. The lone identification by Salva did not measure up to the required standard of moral certainty, being contradicted by the testimonies of Maria Paz Garay and Leoncio Pastrano that the malefactors were hooded; acquittal followed as a matter of course.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confessions: Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; that these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel; that no torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means vitiating free will shall be used; and that any confession or admission obtained in violation thereof shall be inadmissible in evidence. The procedure laid down in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, Moncupa, Jr. vs. Enrile, and People vs. Galit requires that no custodial investigation be conducted unless in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by anyone on his behalf, or appointed by the court, and that any statement obtained in violation of that procedure, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, be inadmissible. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz holds that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, when the investigating officer begins to ask questions to elicit information, confessions, or admissions; hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible against him. Custodial investigation, as defined following Miranda vs. Arizona, is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody, carried out through interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements. The records showed that when Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present; counsel came only a day after the custodial investigation as to Dionanao and two weeks later as to Bandula, and the counsel who supposedly assisted both was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. Following People vs. De Jesus, admissions obtained during custodial interrogation without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution. The Constitution further requires that counsel be independent; he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. As a legal officer of the municipality, Atty. Zerna provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services, including the maintenance of peace and order, and it is seriously doubted whether he could effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into a conflict of interests; he is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations, as held in People vs. Matos-Viduya. Beyond these defects, the records strongly drew the Court to the belief that violence attended the extraction of the statements: the investigators did not inform the accused of their rights before attempting to elicit incriminating statements, did not advise them that counsel could be provided free of charge, and continuously disregarded their repeated requests for medical assistance; Sedigo bore a "black eye" admitted even by Pat. Baldejera, and Bandula suffered a fractured rib. Where there is doubt as to the voluntariness of a confession, it must be rejected in toto, as held in People vs. Galit.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: With the extrajudicial confessions rejected, the prosecution was left with nothing but the alleged positive identification of appellant by witness Salva, which by itself did not measure up to the required standard of moral certainty. Credence could not be given to the lone identification by Salva of all four accused who were supposedly bold enough to bare their faces, because Maria Paz Garay, the victim's widow, recounted that except for Pastrano and Salva, whose hands were tied behind their backs, she could not recognize any of the men as all their faces were fully covered, although according to Salva only two were hooded, and she could only see their eyes. Pastrano, who witnessed the crime together with Salva, was likewise unable to recognize any of the armed men as they were hooded; even if there was light, he said he would not be able to recognize the malefactors. Contraposed with the testimonies of Garay and Pastrano, the alleged positive identification by Salva crumbled. While the alibi of the accused is easily fabricated, it assumes importance when faced with the inconsistencies and the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence, as held in People vs. Malakas and People vs. Ambih. The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but on its own proof, which must be strong enough to convince the Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished; in this, the State utterly failed.

• Custodial Investigation Rights under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution — Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense has the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; if he cannot afford counsel, one must be provided for him; these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means vitiating free will may be used, and secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or similar forms of detention are prohibited. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of the section is inadmissible in evidence against the person. The Court applied the provision to reject the extrajudicial confessions of Bandula and Dionanao.
• The Right to Counsel Attaches at the Start of Custodial Investigation — Following Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, that is, when the investigating officer begins to ask questions to elicit information, confessions, or admissions from the person under investigation. If no counsel is present at the start of the custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. The Court found that both Bandula and Dionanao were interrogated immediately after arrest without counsel, counsel appearing only a day later as to Dionanao and two weeks later as to Bandula.
• Custodial Investigation Defined — Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police, who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements; it is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, as defined in Miranda vs. Arizona.
• The Requirement of Competent and Independent Counsel — Counsel contemplated by the Constitution cannot be a special counsel, a public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. A municipal attorney, being a legal officer who provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services, including the maintenance of peace and order, cannot effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into a conflict of interests; he is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. The Court thus disqualified Atty. Zerna's assistance as satisfying the constitutional requirement.
• Admissions Reduced to Writing After Uncounselled Interrogation Remain Flawed — Following People vs. De Jesus, admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution. The subsequent presence of counsel does not cure the defect attending the uncounselled interrogation.
• Doubt as to Voluntariness Requires Rejection of the Confession In Toto — Where there is doubt as to the voluntariness of a confession, the same must be rejected in toto. The Court so held in light of the unanswered questions on the investigators' failure to inform the accused of their rights, their failure to advise them of free counsel, their disregard of requests for medical assistance, Sedigo's "black eye," and Bandula's fractured rib.
• Lone Eyewitness Identification and Moral Certainty — A lone identification by a prosecution eyewitness does not measure up to the required standard of moral certainty where it is contradicted by the testimonies of other eyewitnesses who could not recognize the malefactors because their faces were fully covered or hooded. The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but on its own proof, which must be strong enough to convince the Court that the accused deserves punishment.
• Alibi as a Defense — While the alibi of the accused is easily fabricated, the claim assumes importance when faced with the inconsistencies and the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence.

• "The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense." — Quoted from Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, this passage fixes the precise moment at which the constitutional right to counsel attaches and supplies the ratio for rejecting statements taken before counsel appeared.
• "The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the independence requirement for counsel during custodial investigation, applied to disqualify the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay as counsel for the accused.
• "Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto." — The Court's statement of the standard governing confessions whose voluntariness is placed in doubt, applied in light of the unanswered questions on the mauling and the medical findings on the accused.
• "The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished." — A frequently cited restatement of the burden of proof in criminal cases, invoked to explain why the prosecution's failure to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt required acquittal notwithstanding the accused's alibi.

• Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538 — Controlling precedent laying down the procedure for peace officers in making an arrest and conducting custodial investigation; the Court quoted its requisites at length and applied them to the case.
• Moncupa, Jr. vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 61107, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538 — Twin case with Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, cited for the same custodial investigation procedure.
• People vs. Galit, G.R. No. 51770, March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465 — Followed for the rule that any statement obtained in violation of the prescribed procedure is inadmissible, and for the rule that a confession attended by doubt as to voluntariness must be rejected in toto.
• Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, G.R. No. 56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642 — Followed for the rule that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, so that any statement elicited without counsel at that stage is inadmissible.
• People vs. De Jesus, G.R. No. 91535, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 345 — Followed; the Court described the case as analogous, holding that admissions obtained during custodial interrogation without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution.
• People vs. Matos-Viduya, G.R. No. 60025, September 11, 1990, 189 SCRA 403 — Cited for the disqualification of a municipal attorney as independent counsel, being no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.
• Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 — Cited for the definition of custodial investigation as interrogation initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
• People vs. Malakas, G.R. No. 92150, December 8, 1993 — Cited for the rule that alibi, though easily fabricated, assumes importance when faced with the inconsistencies and shaky nature of the prosecution evidence.
• People vs. Ambih, G.R. No. 101006, September 3, 1993 — Cited for the same rule on alibi as People vs. Malakas.
• Sampaga vs. People, G.R. No. 62305, November 23, 1992, 215 SCRA 839 — Referenced as the source of the citation to Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz in a separate concurring opinion.

• Section 12, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Enumerates the rights of a person under investigation for the commission of an offense: to be informed of the right to remain silent and to competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; to have counsel provided if he cannot afford one; to waive these rights only in writing and in the presence of counsel; protection against torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, and similar means; and the inadmissibility of any confession or admission obtained in violation of the section. The Court held that the extrajudicial confessions of Bandula and Dionanao were obtained in violation of this provision and were therefore inadmissible.
• Article 235, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes the maltreatment of prisoners. The Court adverted to its existence in noting that, notwithstanding the violations of the accused's rights, there exists a penal law punishing the maltreatment of prisoners.
• Republic Act No. 7438 — "An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations thereof." The Court cited the statute as penalizing the failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional rights.

Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur. Cruz and Kapunan, JJ., are on leave.