People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Mendoza

A marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. Consequently, a subsequent marriage contracted after the death of the first spouse cannot be the basis of a bigamy charge when the intervening marriage was void ab initio.

The appellant, Arturo Mendoza, was charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for contracting a third marriage with Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949. The applicable marriage law at the time Mendoza contracted his second marriage in 1941 was Act 3613, Section 29 of which declared any marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse to be illegal and void from its performance, subject to two exceptions. The case required the Court to determine whether a void marriage needed prior judicial annulment before a subsequent marriage could escape criminal liability for bigamy.

Arturo Mendoza married Jovita de Asis on August 5, 1936, in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, Mendoza contracted a second marriage with Olga Lema in the City of Manila. Jovita de Asis died on February 2, 1943. On August 19, 1949, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.

The appellant contended that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941, was null and void and therefore non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949, could not be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General argued that, even assuming the second marriage to Olga Lema was void, the appellant was not exempt from criminal liability in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage, citing People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134.

The Court of Appeals decision in People vs. Cotas was found not controlling because that case was essentially different: the defendant therein impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit. In the case at bar, it was admitted that the appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis.

• Nullity of Second Marriage: The appellant contended that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941, was null and void and therefore non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis was still in effect.
• Effect of First Spouse's Death: The appellant argued that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949, could not be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of Jovita de Asis.

• Need for Judicial Annulment: The Solicitor General argued that, even assuming that the appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema was void, he was not exempt from criminal liability in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage, citing People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134.

• Validity of Void Marriage Without Judicial Decree: Whether a marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is void from its performance and requires no judicial decree to establish its invalidity.
• Criminal Liability for Bigamy: Whether the appellant's third marriage, contracted after the death of his first spouse, can be the basis of a charge for bigamy when his second marriage was void ab initio.

• Validity of Void Marriage Without Judicial Decree: Yes. Section 29 of Act 3613 plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages.
• Criminal Liability for Bigamy: No. Since the second marriage was void from its performance and there was no pretence that it was contracted under the exceptions in Section 29, the third marriage after the death of the first spouse cannot constitute bigamy.

• Validity of Void Marriage Without Judicial Decree: Section 29 of the marriage law (Act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides that any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless the first marriage was annulled or dissolved, or the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years without news of the absentee being alive or the absentee being generally considered as dead. The statutory provision plainly makes such a subsequent marriage illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There was no pretence that the appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years or was generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.

• Criminal Liability for Bigamy: The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, People vs. Cotas, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially different because the defendant therein impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Since the second marriage was void from its performance, the third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio, contracted after the death of Jovita de Asis, cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy.

• Void Marriage vs. Annullable Marriage — A marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void from its performance under Section 29 of Act 3613, requiring no judicial decree to establish its invalidity. This is distinguished from mere annullable marriages, which require a judicial declaration of nullity. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the appellant's second marriage was void ab initio, and therefore the third marriage could not constitute bigamy.

• "This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: a bigamous marriage is void from its performance and requires no judicial declaration, unlike annullable marriages.
• "There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court." — This passage confirms that none of the exceptions under Section 29 of Act 3613 applied to the appellant's second marriage.

• People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134 — Distinguished, not controlling. The Court of Appeals decision was essentially different because the defendant therein impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit, unlike the present case where the bigamous character of the second marriage was admitted.

• Section 29, Act 3613 (Marriage Law) — Declared any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse illegal and void from its performance, unless the first marriage was annulled or dissolved, or the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years without news of the absentee being alive or the absentee being generally considered as dead. The Court applied this provision to hold the appellant's second marriage void from its performance.
• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the dissenting opinion as the provision punishing with prision mayor any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concurred.

• Justice Reyes — Dissented, arguing that Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved. Though the logical may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not; that judgment is reserved to the courts. Citing Viada, Justice Reyes maintained that the sanctity and importance of marriage does not permit the spouses to judge its nullity for themselves; the nullity must be submitted to the judgment of the competent tribunal, and only when the tribunal declares the nullity of the marriage shall it be considered void. Until such declaration exists, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage, and one who contracts another marriage before such declaration of nullity incurs the penalty under the article. Justice Reyes also cited People vs. Jose Cotas (CA), 40 Off. Gaz., 3145, quoting Mr. Justice Tuason that this is a sound opinion in line with the well-known rule in adultery cases that until the marriage contract is set aside by competent authority in a final judgment, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family exist. Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concurred.