People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Mauyao y Lorenzo

Minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on collateral and trivial matters do not destroy their credibility, but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony, and will not warrant reversal of a conviction supported by other evidence. Any admission wrung from an accused in violation of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence against him, but such inadmissibility does not preclude conviction where the prosecution's other evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution was mounted by the Narcotics Unit of the Western Police District, whose Special Reaction Unit was a unit formed precisely to operate against drug dealers, and the offense charged — pushing marijuana — carried a statutory penalty of life imprisonment and a fine. The case reached the Court on appeal from the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 45, Manila, presided over by Judge Andres E. Matias.

On 20 April 1987, at about six o'clock in the evening, a team of police operatives from the Narcotics Unit of the Western Police District conducted a buy-bust operation on Leyte del Sur Street after the office received several phone calls from residents reporting that a suspect named "Arthur" was engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana cigarettes. P/Sgt. Jimmy Carbonell, after conferring with an informant who admitted having acted as a "runner" for Arturo Mauyao, formed a raiding team composed of himself as team leader and four others, among them Pat. Rizal Papa and Pat. Ramon Alferos. Alferos was designated poseur-buyer and was handed two ten-peso bills, both initialled by Papa; Carbonell would act as the arresting officer while the others would serve as back-up security.

The team boarded a civilian Ford Fiera and proceeded to Leyte del Sur Street, stopping a few meters away from where the suspect was expected. Alferos walked with the informant towards Mauyao's residence, while Carbonell, then in short pants and slippers, positioned himself on the other side of the street across the residence, pretending to buy fish balls from a fish ball stand and standing more or less four meters away from where the transaction was to take place. Upon seeing Mauyao, who was standing outside his house at 923 Leyte del Sur Street, the informant introduced Alferos and described him to Mauyao as a "drug addict." Alferos told Mauyao that he wanted to buy five tea bags and gave him the two marked ten-peso bills. Mauyao, in turn, handed over to Alferos five tea bags and two sticks of marijuana cigarettes "as free."

At that point Alferos introduced himself as a police officer and arrested Mauyao. Carbonell, having witnessed the exchange, immediately ran towards the suspect and assisted the poseur-buyer, and the other team members closed in upon seeing him. Mauyao then voluntarily surrendered the red clutch bag tucked to his waist, which turned out to contain ten more tea bags of marijuana leaves and four more sticks of marijuana cigarettes. The two marked ten-peso bills and some other bills were likewise recovered from him. The place where the transaction took place was well-lighted by a street light, and no search and seizure warrant had been secured for the operation.

Mauyao was taken to the Narcotics Control Investigation Section of the Western Police District and turned over to Police Investigator Martin R. Orolfo, who received from Carbonell one red clutch bag containing ten tea bags of marijuana leaves and four sticks of marijuana cigarettes, five tea bags of marijuana leaves, two sticks of marijuana cigarettes, two marked ten-peso bills, and other bills amounting to P30.00. Mauyao was made to sign the Receipt of Property Seized to admit that the items had been seized from him. Thereafter, in the presence of his wife, Carbonell, the police investigator, and the Chief of the Narcotics Section, he allegedly admitted that he had sold five tea bags of marijuana and owned the red clutch bag containing ten tea bags; the admission was made without the presence of counsel. He was also made to sign Exhibit E, to which the two marked ten-peso bills were attached, acknowledging that the bills were taken and confiscated from his possession during a buy-bust narcotics operation, and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report affirming that he had sold and delivered five tea bags of marijuana leaves and two sticks of marijuana cigarettes to a police poseur-buyer. On 21 April 1987, the seized tea bags and marijuana cigarettes were transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation, where Forensic Chemist Felicisima Francisco conducted microscopic, chemical, and chromatographic examinations; all three tests revealed that the seized articles were positive for marijuana.

For his part, Mauyao denied having sold marijuana and alleged extortion. According to him, at about six o'clock in the evening of 20 April 1987 he was invited to drink at the house of Tina, a neighbor who had just been married, in the company of Tina's brother-soldier Ernesto Estrada, Manuel Guadialla, and others. A power failure occurred, and Tina's husband asked him to buy wine, cigarettes, "pulutan," "katol," and candles, giving him P50.00, with Estrada contributing another P50.00 and Guadialla a further P50.00, for a total of P150.00. He was unable to buy the items because, as he stepped out of Tina's place, he saw a Ford Fiera whose passengers, led by a certain Lt. Carbonell, alighted and held him "for verification only." He was ordered to board the Ford Fiera and his P150.00 was taken, with the assurance that it would be returned once they reached the precinct. Upon reaching Precinct 5, however, he was locked up and asked to produce a substantial amount of money in exchange for his release; he was shown a red clutch bag full of marijuana leaves and told that if he had money the clutch bag would not be his, but that if he did not, he would "own" it. He was threatened and ordered to write his name on the clutch bag. At around two o'clock the following morning, when Carbonell and the rest of the group were no longer around, Orolfo took him out of his cell and subjected him to an investigation that lasted until four o'clock, demanding P4,000.00 for his release; when he replied that he could afford only P2,000.00, Orolfo said, "Hindi raw pwede at marami sila." Four other witnesses corroborated his version regarding the wedding party, and Ernesto M. Estrada averred that he did not believe Mauyao had sold marijuana on the evening of 20 April. No defense witness, however, testified that Mauyao was not a drug-pusher, nor did he deny that the informant had been his former "runner."

After evaluating the conflicting versions, the trial court rejected Mauyao's assertions, convicted him, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and the Court, on review, perceived no misapprehension of facts on its part.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Accused-appellant Mauyao, the party seeking reversal, faulted the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite what he characterized as irreconcilable inconsistencies and improbabilities, specifically the divergent accounts of P/Sgt. Carbonell and Pat. Alferos as to who received the informer's telephone call, whether the informer went to the headquarters or was met elsewhere, and whether the buy-bust team stopped thirty or two hundred meters from the accused-appellant's residence.
• Violation of Constitutional Rights: He argued that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution despite the manifest violation of his constitutional rights, referring to the documents he was made to sign and the admission allegedly extracted from him without the assistance of counsel.
• Failure of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: He maintained that the trial court erred in convicting him despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Improbability of the Sale: He contended that even assuming he was engaged in the illicit trade, he would not have sold at his own doorstep, in full view of his inquisitive neighbors and passers-by, nor to a total stranger, and for the measly sum of P20.00, given the gravity of the offense and the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by law.
• Non-presentation of the Informant: He questioned the prosecution's failure to present the informant as a witness.
• Extortion: He alleged that the police officers had extorted money from him, narrating that his P150.00 was taken and that P4,000.00 was demanded for his release.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite the alleged irreconcilable inconsistencies and improbabilities therein.
• Admissibility of Evidence and Custodial Investigation Rights: Whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution despite the alleged violation of the accused-appellant's constitutional rights.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the guilt of the accused-appellant for drug-pushing was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Non-presentation of the Informant: Whether the failure of the prosecution to present the informant as a witness is fatal to the prosecution's case.
• Improbability of the Sale: Whether the circumstances surrounding the sale — a public place, a stranger-buyer, and a consideration of only P20.00 — rendered the prosecution's version improbable.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The trial court did not err in crediting the prosecution witnesses; the inconsistencies cited referred to insignificant details and trivial matters that did not affect the substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
• Admissibility of Evidence and Custodial Investigation Rights: Partly yes as to the documents. The signatures on the Receipt of Property Seized, Exhibit E, and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report are inadmissible, having been obtained without counsel during custodial investigation; the conviction nonetheless stands on other evidence.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. Guilt for drug-pushing was established beyond reasonable doubt by the testimonies of the apprehending officers who caught the accused in flagrante delicto and by the NBI findings that the seized articles were positive for marijuana.
• Non-presentation of the Informant: No. The non-presentation of the informant is not fatal to the prosecution, his testimony being merely corroborative and cumulative, and the manner of presenting the prosecution's case being a matter within the prosecutor's discretion.
• Improbability of the Sale: No. Small-level drug-pushing may be committed at any place and at any time, and the public setting of the transaction does not render the sale improbable.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The alleged inconsistencies concerned whether it was Capt. Cablayan or P/Sgt. Carbonell who received the informer's call, whether the informer went to the headquarters or was merely met at an agreed place, and whether the buy-bust team stopped two hundred or thirty meters from the accused-appellant's location. These were held to be de minimis, the irrefutable fact being that the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of the buy-bust operation. Minor inconsistencies and contradictions in a witness's declarations do not destroy credibility but even enhance truthfulness, as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and attest to the human mind's imperfection. Inconsistencies with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of the declaration, the witness's veracity, or the weight of the testimony. The prosecution witnesses were law enforcers presumed to have regularly performed their duties absent convincing proof to the contrary, and, as members of the Special Reaction Unit of the Narcotics Section formed precisely to operate against drug dealers, they could have had no motive other than to accomplish their mission of enforcing the Dangerous Drugs Act. Where the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial judge who saw the witnesses testify and observed their demeanor are not disturbed on appeal unless facts of substance and value were overlooked, and no misapprehension of facts was perceived.

• Admissibility of Evidence and Custodial Investigation Rights: The accused-appellant's signatures on the Receipt of Property Seized, on Exhibit E acknowledging the confiscation of the marked bills, and on the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged, since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. They were obtained in violation of his rights as a person under custodial investigation, the records showing nothing to indicate that he was assisted by counsel. Any admission wrung from an accused in violation of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence against him. It was emphasized, however, that his conformity to the questioned documents was not a factor at all in his conviction; even if the documents were disregarded, his guilt was adequately established by other evidence of record, the trial court's verdict having been based on the evidence of the prosecution and not on those signatures. His denials could not prevail over the detailed and unshaken testimonies of the apprehending officers who caught him red-handed and who were not shown to have had any ulterior motive to testify falsely against him.

• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Weighing the prosecution evidence against the accused-appellant's denials and his allegation of extortion by the police officers, the Court found that his guilt for drug-pushing had indeed been established beyond reasonable doubt. The charge of extortion was not proven; the Court noted that this is the usual defense in the prosecution of drug cases, and that if there had indeed been extortion, the accused-appellant should have come forward with the proper charges against the culprits.

• Non-presentation of the Informant: The matter of the presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the accused-appellant, or, except in a limited sense, for the trial court to dictate; discretion belongs to the city or provincial prosecutor as to how the prosecution should present its case. The testimony of an informant in a drug case is not essential for conviction to lie, and the failure to present it is not fatal, as it would be merely corroborative and cumulative. What was crucial was that the accused-appellant was caught red-handed in the act of trafficking the prohibited plant.

• Improbability of the Sale: The posture that no drug-pusher would sell at his own doorstep, in full view of neighbors, to a total stranger, and for a measly sum, was discredited. Small-level drug-pushing may be committed at any place and at any time; it is completed clandestinely and swiftly after the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange made. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people does not necessarily discourage drug pushers from plying their trade, as these circumstances may even serve to camouflage their illicit operations. Convictions have been sustained for drug-pushers caught selling illegal drugs at a basketball court, in billiard halls, in front of a store, along a street at 1:45 p.m., and in front of a house.

• Minor inconsistencies do not impair credibility — Inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony; they even enhance truthfulness by erasing any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and attesting to the human mind's imperfection. The Court applied this rule to the discrepancies as to who received the informer's call, where the informer was met, and how far the buy-bust team stopped from the target, all of which it deemed de minimis.

• Respect for the trial court's findings on credibility — The findings of fact of a trial judge who has seen the witnesses testify and observed their demeanor and conduct on the witness stand are not disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. The Court found no misapprehension of facts by the trial court.

• Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties — Under Section 5(m), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. The Court applied this presumption to the testimonies of P/Sgt. Carbonell and Pat. Alferos, both members of the Special Reaction Unit of the Narcotics Section, finding no showing of an ulterior motive on their part.

• Non-presentation of the informant is not fatal — The presentation of prosecution witnesses is a matter within the discretion of the city or provincial prosecutor, and the testimony of an informant in a drug case is not essential for conviction, being merely corroborative and cumulative. The Court held that the failure to present the informant did not weaken the prosecution's evidence.

• Small-level drug-pushing may be committed at any place and at any time — The offense is completed clandestinely and swiftly after the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange made, and the fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people does not necessarily discourage drug pushers, as these circumstances may even serve to camouflage their illicit operations. The Court used this doctrine to reject the accused-appellant's improbability argument.

• Extortion as a defense in drug cases — A charge of extortion by police officers is the usual defense in the prosecution of drug cases and must be proven; if extortion truly occurred, the accused should have come forward with the proper charges against the culprits. The Court found the accused-appellant's extortion claim unproven.

• Inadmissibility of uncounselled admissions — Any admission wrung from an accused in violation of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence against him. The accused-appellant's signatures on the Receipt of Property Seized, Exhibit E, and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report were held to be declarations against interest and tacit admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, and were therefore inadmissible.

• Harmless exclusion of inadmissible admissions — The exclusion of an inadmissible admission does not require reversal where the conviction is supported by other evidence of record. The Court emphasized that the accused-appellant's conformity to the questioned documents was not a factor at all in his conviction, and that even if the documents were disregarded, his guilt was adequately established by other evidence.

• "We have ruled, time and again, that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declaration of witnesses do not destroy their credibility, but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. As a matter of fact, it attests to the human mind's imperfection." — This is the canonical formulation of the minor-inconsistency rule applied to reject the accused-appellant's principal assignment of error; it is the ratio decidendi on the credibility issue.

• "Small level drug-pushing may be committed at any place and at any time. It is completed clandestinely and swiftly after the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange made. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other people does not necessarily discourage drug pushers from plying their trade as these may even serve to camouflage their illicit operations." — This passage disposes of the improbability argument that no pusher would sell at his own doorstep, to a stranger, for P20.00, and is the frequently cited formulation on the situs of small-level drug transactions.

• "We have consistently ruled that any admission wrung from the accused in violation of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence against him." — This states the Court's holding on the inadmissibility of the accused-appellant's uncounselled signatures and admission, restating the exclusionary rule under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

• "It bears emphasis, however, that the accused appellant's conformity to the questioned documents has not been a factor at all in his conviction. For even if these documents were disregarded, still the accused-appellant's guilt has been adequately established by other evidence of record." — This passage explains why the constitutional violation did not compel reversal, establishing that the exclusion of the inadmissible admissions was harmless in light of the independent evidence of the buy-bust operation and the NBI findings.

• People vs. Payumo, G.R. No. 81751, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 64 — Cited as the controlling authority for the rule that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
• People vs. Yap and Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 87088-87089, May 9, 1990, 185 SCRA 222 — Cited, together with People vs. Mariano, for the presumption that law enforcers have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.
• People vs. De Mesa, G.R. No. 87216, July 28, 1990, 188 SCRA 48 — Cited, together with People vs. Sagun, Jr. and People vs. Cruz, for the rule that the findings of fact of a trial judge who observed the witnesses' demeanor are not disturbed on appeal absent overlooked facts of substance and value.
• People vs. Sariol, G.R. No. 83809, June 22, 1989, 174 SCRA 237 — Cited for the rule that the matter of presenting prosecution witnesses is a matter of discretion for the city or provincial prosecutor, not for the accused or, except in a limited sense, for the trial court.
• People vs. Cerelegia, No. L-72353, January 30, 1987, 147 SCRA 538 — Cited for the rule that the non-presentation of the informant as a witness does not weaken the prosecution's evidence, his testimony being merely corroborative and cumulative.
• People vs. Hilario, G.R. No. 94037, May 6, 1991 — The recent case relied upon in rejecting the improbability argument; it held that small-level drug-pushing may be committed at any place and at any time and that a public setting does not discourage drug pushers.
• People vs. Turla, No. L-70270, November 11, 1988, 167 SCRA 278 — Cited for the proposition that the accused's conformity to the questioned documents constituted declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged, since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law.
• People vs. De la Peña, G.R. No. 92534, July 9, 1991 — Cited, together with People vs. Yutuc, for the rule that admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible in evidence against the accused.

• Section 12(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees any person under investigation for the commission of an offense the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and provides that these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The Court applied this provision in holding that the accused-appellant's signatures on the Receipt of Property Seized, Exhibit E, and the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, as well as his alleged admission, were obtained without the assistance of counsel and were therefore inadmissible.
• Section 12(3), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that any confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12 or Section 17 thereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against the person concerned. This is the exclusionary rule the Court invoked in excluding the accused-appellant's admissions, while holding that the exclusion did not affect the conviction because other evidence established his guilt.
• Section 5(m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court — Establishes the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. The Court applied this presumption to the testimonies of P/Sgt. Carbonell and Pat. Alferos, holding that the inconsistencies asserted by the accused-appellant were too minor to affect the credibility of law enforcers presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.

Paras, Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concurred. No separate concurring opinions are reflected in the text.