People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca

The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved a criminal appeal without affording the Office of the Solicitor General, the sole appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines, the opportunity to be heard. A decision rendered in disregard of the State's right to due process is void for lack of jurisdiction and may be set aside via certiorari even without a prior motion for reconsideration.

The case arose from a criminal prosecution for falsification of an official document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 172, paragraph 2. The dispute traces back to an ejectment case filed by Pedro Calanayan against Cecilia Duca and others before the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasiana, which was decided in Calanayan's favor and resulted in the auction sale of Cecilia Duca's lot. Cecilia Duca subsequently filed an action for declaration of nullity of execution, during which she presented a tax declaration over a house allegedly owned by her son Aldrin Duca, leading to the falsification charge against Arturo Duca and Cecilia Duca.

Arturo F. Duca and his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged with falsification of an official document under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that on or about December 10, 2001, in San Fabian, Pangasinan, the accused, confederating together, caused the preparation of a Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow-type residential house covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 by making it appear that the signature on the sworn statement of owner was that of Aldrin F. Duca, when in truth Aldrin was abroad at that time, having arrived in the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, and that it was Arturo who affixed his own signature, to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Pedro Calanayan. Both accused pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution's evidence showed that in 1999, Calanayan filed an ejectment case against Cecilia Duca and others before the 4th MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto, docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99), which was decided in Calanayan's favor. The decision became final and executory, and on November 22, 1999, a writ of execution was issued. On February 29, 2000, the money judgment was satisfied through the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca covered by TCT No. 233647, and a certificate of sale was issued to Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder.

On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages against Sheriff Vinez Hortaleza, several police officers, and Calanayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0304-D. During the hearing, Cecilia testified that the house erected on the lot was owned by her son Aldrin Duca, presenting Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit "B"). At the back of this exhibit was a sworn statement showing the current and fair market value of the bungalow at P70,000.00, with a signature affixed on top of the typewritten name "Aldrin F. Duca," subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor, on December 10, 2001. The prosecution alleged that the signature was that of Arturo Duca, who made it appear that it was his brother Aldrin's signature, even using his own Community Tax Certificate No. 03841661 issued on December 10, 2001, as Aldrin's. Because of this misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to obtain a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen, stopping the eviction.

Both accused denied falsifying Aldrin's signature. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at that time. Arturo admitted that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was his, but interposed the defense that he was duly authorized by Aldrin to procure the tax declaration. The CA found that as early as June 2001, Arturo had already been verbally authorized by Aldrin to register the house in the latter's name since Aldrin was abroad, and this authority was confirmed by Aldrin's execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002 (Exhibit "6") and a Special Power of Attorney executed on June 17, 2002 (Exhibit "7").

• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner argued that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved respondent's appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the appeal and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his comment.
• Sole Authority of the OSG: Petitioner contended that once a case is elevated to the CA or the Supreme Court, only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People, and thus the CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted on respondent's appeal without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
• Void Decision: Petitioner argued that the CA decision acquitting respondent should be considered void for being violative of due process.

• No Denial of Due Process: Respondent argued that there was no denial of due process because the prosecution was properly represented by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private prosecutor who handled the presentation of evidence under the control and supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor.
• No Withdrawal of Authority: Respondent maintained that since the control and supervision conferred on the private prosecutor by the Provincial Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not claim that the prosecution was not afforded a chance to be heard in the CA.
• No Prejudice to Respondent: Respondent argued that he should not be prejudiced by the Provincial Prosecutor's failure to inform the Solicitor General of the pendency of the appeal.

• Due Process — Right of the State to be Heard: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved respondent's appeal without giving the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, the opportunity to be heard.
• Procedural — Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the filing of the petition for certiorari without a prior motion for reconsideration was justified.

• Due Process — Right of the State to be Heard: Yes. The CA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rendered its decision acquitting respondent without requiring the Solicitor General to file a comment, thereby depriving the State of its right to due process. The decision is void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Procedural — Motion for Reconsideration: Yes. The filing of the petition for certiorari without a motion for reconsideration was justified because the CA decision was void for lack of due process, and the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration admits of exceptions when the disputed order is void.

• Due Process — Right of the State to be Heard: The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides that the OSG shall "represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." The Court cited consistent jurisprudence, including Cariño vs. De Castro, City Fiscal of Tacloban vs. Espina, and Labaro vs. Panay, all affirming that the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People in all criminal cases. The records showed that the CA failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca's petition; the CA Resolution dated May 26, 2004 was served only upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr., Atty. Villamor Tolete, and RTC Judge Crispin Laron, with no showing that the Solicitor General was furnished a copy. The failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. Citing Saldana vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that when the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is violated, and where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, and a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. Additionally, respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party, the People of the Philippines through the OSG, but instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City, which was inefficacious. Under Section 3, Rule 42, respondent's failure to have a copy of his petition served on the People through the OSG was a sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition, and the CA should have dismissed it rather than proceeding to acquit respondent.

• Procedural — Motion for Reconsideration: The Court acknowledged the general rule that certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and that a motion for reconsideration must generally be filed before the respondent tribunal. However, citing National Housing vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that this rule admits of exceptions, including when the issue raised is purely one of law, where the error is patent, or where the disputed order is void. Since the CA decision was void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for reconsideration was justified.

• Sole Authority of the OSG in Criminal Appeals — The Office of the Solicitor General is the sole authority to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal proceedings on appeal before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that service of a petition for review upon the Assistant City Prosecutor, rather than the OSG, was inefficacious, and that the CA's failure to require the OSG to file a comment deprived the State of due process.
• Due Process in Criminal Cases Applies to the State — The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, meaning it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court applied this principle to hold that a decision rendered without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file a comment on a petition for review is void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Void Judgment for Lack of Due Process — A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally; a decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. The Court applied this doctrine to set aside the CA decision acquitting respondent.
• Exception to the Motion for Reconsideration Requirement — The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resorting to certiorari is not a condition sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, where the error is patent, or where the disputed order is void. The Court applied this exception because the CA decision was void for lack of due process.

• "In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General." — This passage from Cariño v. De Castro, quoted by the Court, establishes the controlling principle that the OSG is the exclusive appellate counsel of the People in criminal cases.
• "When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated." — This passage from Saldana v. Court of Appeals, quoted by the Court, articulates the standard for determining when the State's right to due process has been infringed in criminal proceedings.
• "The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction." — This passage from Saldana v. Court of Appeals, quoted by the Court, explains why the CA's decision was void for lack of jurisdiction.
• "Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered." — This passage from Dimatulac v. Villon, quoted by the Court, underscores the even-handed administration of justice between the accused and the State.

• Cariño vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 688 — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court.
• City Fiscal of Tacloban vs. Espina, L-83996, October 21, 1988, 166 SCRA 614 — Cited to distinguish the fiscal's authority to prosecute before trial courts from the Solicitor General's exclusive authority to represent the People on appeal.
• Labaro vs. Panay, G.R. No. 129567, December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 714 — Cited to affirm that the OSG is the law office authorized to represent the Government or the People before the Supreme Court and the CA in all criminal proceedings.
• Saldana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88889, October 11, 1990, 190 SCRA 396 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that deprivation of the prosecution's fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case violates due process and ousts courts of jurisdiction.
• Dimatulac vs. Villon, G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 679 — Cited to emphasize that justice must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused and the State and offended party.
• National Housing vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144275, July 5, 2001, 360 SCRA 533 — Cited for the exception to the motion for reconsideration requirement in certiorari proceedings, including when the disputed order is void.
• Uy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 246 — Cited for the doctrine that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
• Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 602 — Cited for the general rule that a motion for reconsideration must be filed before resorting to certiorari.

• Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, 1987 Administrative Code — Provides that the Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. The Court applied this provision to hold that the OSG is the sole appellate counsel of the People and should have been given the opportunity to be heard.
• Section 1, Rule 42, 1997 Rules of Court — Requires a party appealing from a decision of the RTC rendered in its appellate jurisdiction to file a verified petition for review with the CA and furnish the adverse party with a copy. The Court applied this provision to hold that respondent was mandated to serve copies of his petition upon the People through the OSG.
• Section 3, Rule 42, 1997 Rules of Court — Provides that failure to comply with the requirements regarding proof of service of the petition shall be sufficient ground for dismissal. The Court applied this provision to hold that respondent's failure to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG was a sufficient ground for dismissal of the petition.
• Section 13, Article VIII, Constitution — Referenced in the certification portion of the decision, confirming that the conclusions in the decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Renato C. Corona, Acting Chairperson
• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
• Arturo D. Brion
• Lucas P. Bersamin