People of the Philippines vs. Arrojado

A criminal Information is a pleading within the meaning of Bar Matter No. 1922, and under the original version of that rule, the investigating prosecutor's failure to indicate the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance warranted dismissal of the Information without prejudice. The trial court's dismissal did not constitute grave abuse of discretion because it was based on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by the Supreme Court.

Bar Matter No. 1922, promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on June 3, 2008 and effective January 1, 2009, requires practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before courts or quasi-judicial bodies the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption for the immediately preceding compliance period. The original version of the rule provided that failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records. The respondent, Jesus A. Arrojado, was charged with murder by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz, through an Information that became the subject of a motion to dismiss predicated on the investigating prosecutor's non-compliance with B.M. No. 1922.

On March 23, 2009, an Information was dated and filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz, charging respondent Jesus A. Arrojado with the crime of murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-75-09 and raffled to Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. The investigating prosecutor who prepared and signed the Information did not indicate therein the number and date of issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922, which had been promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on June 3, 2008 and took effect on January 1, 2009.

On June 16, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information, grounding his motion on the prosecutor's failure to comply with B.M. No. 1922. The petitioner, through the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a Comment/Opposition contending that the Information was sufficient in form and substance, that the lack of proof of MCLE compliance should not prejudice the State's interest in prosecuting violators of the law, and that an administrative edict cannot prevail over substantive or procedural law by imposing additional requirements for the sufficiency of a criminal Information.

On July 2, 2009, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the Information without prejudice. A Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently filed, and the trial court denied it in an Order dated July 23, 2009. Respondent then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus assailing both RTC Orders. The CA, in its Decision dated September 8, 2011, denied the petition and affirmed the questioned RTC Orders; respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution dated April 18, 2013. The People then filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising a single assignment of error challenging the CA's ruling that the prosecutor's failure to indicate her MCLE compliance number and date warranted dismissal of the Information.

• Scope of "Pleadings" under B.M. No. 1922: Petitioner contended that the term "pleadings" as used in B.M. No. 1922 does not include criminal Informations filed in court.
• Formal Defect Not Ground for Dismissal: Petitioner argued that the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to dismiss the Information, which is otherwise complete in form and substance.
• State's Interest in Prosecution: Petitioner maintained that the lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against persons who have violated the law.
• Administrative Edict vs. Procedural Law: Petitioner asserted that an administrative edict cannot prevail over substantive or procedural law by imposing additional requirements for the sufficiency of a criminal Information.
• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules: Petitioner invoked the principle of liberal construction of procedural rules, arguing that liberality may be invoked where there is some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules.

• Information as Pleading: Whether a criminal Information is a "pleading" within the meaning of Bar Matter No. 1922, such that the prosecutor's failure to indicate the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance triggers the rule's dismissal sanction.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Information for non-compliance with B.M. No. 1922, thereby warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari.

• Information as Pleading: Yes. A criminal Information is a pleading within the scope of B.M. No. 1922, and the investigating prosecutor's failure to indicate her MCLE Certificate of Compliance number and date of issue warranted dismissal of the Information under the original version of the rule, which categorically provided that failure to disclose the required information would cause dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Information, because its dismissal was based on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by the Supreme Court; the CA therefore did not err in denying the petition for certiorari.

• Information as Pleading: Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines pleadings as the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment, and Section 2 thereof enumerates the complaint and the answer in a civil suit as pleadings. Section 4, Rule 110 defines an Information as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. Because the allegations in an Information charge a person with an offense in the same manner that a complaint in a civil action alleges a plaintiff's cause of action, an Information is a pleading. The Court quoted with approval the CA's ruling that an Information is, for all intents and purposes, an initiatory pleading because it is a written statement containing the cause of action of the State as represented by the prosecutor against the accused, and is filed in court for appropriate judgment. The Court further cited United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(a), Title IV, which expressly classifies the Information as a pleading in criminal proceedings, as well as decisions from the Supreme Courts of Washington and Illinois holding that an Information or indictment is a pleading accomplishing the same purpose as a declaration in a civil suit. Since B.M. No. 1922 requires practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before courts their MCLE compliance number and date, and since the original version of the rule categorically stated that failure to disclose the required information would cause dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records, the trial court's dismissal of the Information was proper. The Court rejected petitioner's contention that the omission was a mere formal defect, pointing to the express language of the rule mandating dismissal.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. Since the trial court's dismissal of the Information was based on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by the Supreme Court, the court a quo could not have committed a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, nor exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or despotic manner. The CA therefore did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. The Court further noted that the dismissal was without prejudice and did not leave the prosecution without recourse; the prosecution could have simply re-filed the Information containing the required MCLE compliance information instead of resorting to successive petitions. The Court also rejected the petitioner's invocation of liberal construction of procedural rules, finding that the prosecution had never shown any reasonable attempt at compliance — even the Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC did not include the required MCLE information — and that the requested leniency appeared to be an afterthought. Finally, the Court observed that B.M. No. 1922 had been amended by an en banc Resolution dated January 14, 2014, replacing the dismissal sanction with a provision subjecting counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action; while this amendment was not yet in effect when the Information was filed, the Court suggested that the more prudent course would have been for the trial court to simply require the prosecutor to indicate the missing information rather than dismiss the Information outright.

• Criminal Information as a Pleading — A criminal Information is a pleading within the meaning of procedural rules and administrative issuances governing pleadings, because it is a written statement of the State's cause of action against the accused, filed in court for appropriate judgment. It bears the same relation to a criminal action that a complaint bears to a civil action. This classification aligns with Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court (defining pleadings as written statements of claims and defenses submitted for appropriate judgment), Section 4, Rule 110 (defining an Information as an accusation in writing subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court), and the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(a), Title IV (expressly listing the Information among the pleadings in a criminal proceeding). The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Information falls squarely within the ambit of B.M. No. 1922, requiring the prosecutor to indicate MCLE compliance details.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. A trial court does not commit grave abuse of discretion when its dismissal of a pleading is based on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by the Supreme Court, because such action cannot be characterized as capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic.

• Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules — Liberal construction of procedural rules may be invoked in situations where there is some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Where the party seeking liberal construction has never shown any reasonable attempt at compliance — even failing to cure the defect in a Motion for Reconsideration — the requested leniency appears to be an afterthought and cannot be granted.

• "In accordance with the above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a plaintiffs cause or cause of action." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that a criminal Information is a pleading, the foundational ruling upon which the application of B.M. No. 1922 to Informations rests.

• "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records." — This is the verbatim text of the original B.M. No. 1922 sanction provision, quoted by the Court to establish that the dismissal sanction was categorical and left no room for the petitioner's argument that the omission was a mere formal defect.

• "[A]n information is, for all intents and purposes, considered an initiatory pleading because it is a written statement that contains the cause of action of a party, which in criminal cases is the State as represented by the prosecutor, against the accused." — This is the Court of Appeals' formulation quoted with approval by the Supreme Court, frequently cited to establish the pleading character of a criminal Information.

• "Since the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information was based on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by this Court, the court a quo could not have committed a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment nor did it exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or despotic manner." — This passage states the Court's rationale for finding no grave abuse of discretion, applying the certiorari standard to conclude that compliance with a categorical Supreme Court rule cannot constitute abuse of discretion.

• Julie's Franchise Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Judge Ruiz, et al., 614 Phil. 108 (2009) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion and the standard for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The Court relied on this case to establish that grave abuse of discretion amounts to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and that the abuse must be so patent and gross as to constitute evasion of positive duty.
• State vs. Cronin, 20 Wash. 512 — Cited as persuasive foreign authority from the Supreme Court of Washington holding that an Information is a pleading, bearing the same relation to a criminal action that a complaint does to a civil action.
• McClendon vs. Callahan, 46 Wn. 2d 733 — Cited alongside State vs. Cronin as additional Washington authority on the pleading character of an Information.
• People vs. Fox, 346 Ill. 374 — Cited as authority from the Supreme Court of Illinois holding that an indictment in a criminal case is a pleading, accomplishing the same purpose as a declaration in a civil suit.

• Section 1, Rule 6, Rules of Court (as amended) — Defines pleadings as the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. Applied to establish that an Information falls within the definition of a pleading.
• Section 2, Rule 6, Rules of Court — Enumerates the complaint and the answer in a civil suit as pleadings. Applied by analogy to support the classification of an Information as a pleading.
• Section 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Defines an Information as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. Applied to demonstrate the functional equivalence between an Information and a civil complaint, thereby bringing the Information within the scope of B.M. No. 1922.
• Bar Matter No. 1922 (En Banc Resolution dated June 3, 2008, effective January 1, 2009) — Requires practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before courts or quasi-judicial bodies the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. The original version provided that failure to disclose the required information would cause dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Applied to sustain the trial court's dismissal of the Information.
• En Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2014 (amending B.M. No. 1922) — Repealed the dismissal sanction and replaced it with a provision subjecting counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action for failure to disclose MCLE compliance information. Noted by the Court as a subsequent amendment not yet in effect at the time the Information was filed, but cited to suggest that the more prudent course would have been to require compliance rather than dismiss.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.