People of the Philippines vs. Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio

When a trial court observes that an accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition that effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto, it must suspend the arraignment and order a mental examination, and under Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no motion by the accused is necessary to trigger this duty. The requirement of a motion by the proper party introduced by Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect only on 1 December 2000, cannot be applied retroactively to an arraignment conducted on 22 October 1997.

Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio was the husband of Wendy and the father of Arwin, Bernalyn, and Erica; the family had lived with Wendy's mother, Salud Suillan, in Banca-Banca, Victoria, Laguna, for nine months following the marriage. The four criminal cases against Arnel arose from a single incident on 29 August 1997 and were jointly tried after consolidation. Because the trial court imposed the death penalty in the two parricide cases, the judgment came before the Supreme Court on automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.

Arnel Alcalde y Pascasio was married to Wendy, with whom he had three children: Arwin, then eleven months old, and daughters Bernalyn and Erica. After their marriage, Arnel and Wendy lived for nine months at the residence of Wendy's mother, Salud Suillan, in Banca-Banca, Victoria, Laguna. During that period, Salud noticed Arnel's uncontrollable jealousy; he used drugs, which frequently caused his tantrums. Arnel had also been continuously treated at the University of Sto. Tomas Hospital in Manila from 1993 up to 1997, although Salud did not know whether the treatment was for a mental illness.

At about 1:00 p.m. on 29 August 1997, SPO2 Nicanor Avendaño arrived at Arnel's house in Barangay Bubukal, Santa Cruz, Laguna, and found it in disarray. A naked woman lay dead on a wooden bed with both hands and feet tied from behind, and a dead child lay in a crib; the woman was Wendy and the child was Arwin. Some clothes and a puppy had been burned. Avendaño and his team recovered a piece of steel near Wendy's face and empty bottles of gin and Royal Tru-Orange on top of a cabinet. They photographed the bodies and entered the incident in the police blotter. Avendaño later learned that Arnel's two daughters, Bernalyn and Erica, had been rushed to the provincial hospital for treatment before he and his team arrived.

Dr. Nilo Pempengco, who examined the bodies of Wendy and Arwin, testified that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe traumatic head injury and multiple contusion hematoma, and that the injuries could have been caused by any hard and blunt object such as a piece of metal, a piece of wood, or even a hand. Dr. June Mendoza, a physician-surgeon at the Laguna Provincial Hospital, testified that he treated Bernalyn and Erica on 29 August 1997. He found in Bernalyn multiple contusion hematoma, which could have been inflicted by a blunt and hard object and by a rope but which would not have caused immediate death even if not properly treated. He found in Erica contusions and lacerated and incised wounds, which would not have caused death even without immediate medical attention.

Salud Suillan testified that when asked who killed Wendy and Arwin, she answered that according to Jose Alcalde, Arnel was the killer. On cross-examination, she admitted that Arnel had been continuously treated at the University of Sto. Tomas Hospital in Manila from 1993 up to 1997, though she did not know whether he was treated for a mental illness. SPO1 Neptali de la Cruz testified that at around 1:30 p.m. on 29 August 1997, while on duty at the Police Assistance Center Base in Barangay Bubukal, he received a report of a killing at Arnel's house and proceeded there with SPO2 Edilberto Apuada. He saw Arnel seated outside the house being held by two persons; upon entering, he saw the dead bodies of Wendy and Arwin, and noticed that Arnel was motionless and silent as the bodies were brought out.

Jose Alcalde, Arnel's father, testified that at 1:30 p.m. on 29 August 1997 he heard the news that Arnel's house was burning. Accompanied by one Martin, his carpenter, Jose proceeded to the house and, upon entering, saw Arnel with raging eyes holding a kitchen knife and a hammer. Jose tried to pacify Arnel and convince him to surrender his weapons, but his effort proved futile; it was only upon the intervention of Arnel's two brothers that Arnel was successfully disarmed. Jose then left Arnel to the care of his brothers because he had to bring the almost lifeless bodies of Bernalyn and Erica to the hospital.

At his arraignment on 22 October 1997, Arnel, assisted by counsel de parte, refused to speak. Pursuant to Section 1(c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of the four cases, and the defense waived pre-trial. The trial court later recalled in its Order of 21 August 1998 that when Arnel was arraigned, he "acted strangely in a manner as if he [was] out of touch with the world and would not utter any word." The defense also filed a Motion and Waiver of Presence of the Accused During Trial expressing apprehension that Arnel "might explode into another violence while in transit to attend his trial or while in the courtroom." Arnel's continued strange behavior — characterized by deafening silence, motionless behavior, and blank stares — was raised in the demurrer to evidence, in the Manifestation and Motion submitted by the defense, and again in its memorandum, which pointed out that his persistent "out of touch with the world behavior" prevented counsel from effectively communicating with him for his defense. The defense submitted a Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Ramon S. Javier of the Sto. Tomas University Hospital stating that Arnel was first brought to his clinic on 3 December 1993 and was confined at the psychiatric ward several times for bipolar mood disorder (manic-depressive psychosis), with his last confinement from 12 to 24 February 1997, or six months before the incident. A Medical Abstract issued by Dr. Ma. Corazon S. Alvarez likewise showed several hospitalizations of Arnel while in detention at the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, and the finding that he was suffering from bipolar mood disorder with psychotic features.

The trial court found that the prosecution's evidence had established a succession of circumstantial evidence leading to the inescapable conclusion that Arnel committed the crimes charged, gave due credence to the testimony of Jose Alcalde, and found significant that no other person was suspected of having anything to do with the incident from the start of the investigation up to the submission of the cases for decision. It added that Arnel's culpability was further bolstered by his failure to offer any evidence for his defense despite ample opportunity to do so. On 30 April 1999, the trial court convicted Arnel of two counts of parricide and two counts of frustrated parricide, imposing the death penalty in the parricide cases after taking into account the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength.

• Invalid Arraignment: The defense assailed the validity of Arnel's arraignment, asserting that given his questionable mental state he could not have understood the proceedings; it cited the trial court's own Order of 21 August 1998, which recorded its observation of Arnel's strange behavior at the time of arraignment.
• Failure to Order Mental Examination: The defense argued that the trial court erred in failing to have the accused medically examined to ascertain whether he was in possession of his mental faculties when he allegedly committed the acts imputed to him, or that he was suffering from mental aberration at the time the crime was committed, and when he entered his plea and during the trial on the merits, despite the court's own observations.
• Insanity/Unsound Mental Condition: The defense invoked the Medical Certificate of Dr. Ramon S. Javier and the Medical Abstract of Dr. Ma. Corazon S. Alvarez showing that Arnel suffered from bipolar mood disorder (manic-depressive psychosis) with psychotic features, and prayed for acquittal or, in the alternative, for the remand of the case to the lower court for further proceedings and for the determination of Arnel's mental state.

• Waiver of the Right to Suspend Arraignment: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that under Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, suspension of arraignment on the ground that the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition may be granted upon motion by the party; since neither the accused nor his counsel de parte asked for the suspension of the arraignment, such failure was tantamount to an admission that Arnel was not suffering from any mental disorder or to a waiver of the right to move for suspension of arraignment.
• Insanity Must Be Proved at the Time of the Crime: The OSG argued that for the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proved that the accused was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed.
• No Duty on the Trial Court to Initiate: The OSG contended that the trial court was not duty-bound to initiate the determination of Arnel's alleged mental incapacity.
• Sufficiency of the Circumstantial Evidence: The OSG agreed with the trial court that the chain of circumstances in these cases proved beyond reasonable doubt that Arnel committed the crimes charged.
• Penalty: The OSG submitted that Arnel should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua only, instead of death, in the two parricide cases because the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against him, while agreeing with the trial court as regards the two frustrated parricide cases.

• Suspension of Arraignment and Mental Examination: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the accused, and in failing to order his mental examination, despite its own observation that he appeared to be suffering from an unsound mental condition.
• Waiver: Whether the failure of the accused or his counsel to move for the suspension of the arraignment amounted to a waiver of the right to seek such suspension.
• Validity of the Conviction: Whether the consolidated judgment of conviction may stand in light of the trial court's failure to ascertain the accused's mental state before arraignment and trial.

• Suspension of Arraignment and Mental Examination: No. The trial court gravely abused its discretion. Under Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the arraignment shall be suspended and the accused subjected to mental examination once it appears that he is of unsound mind, and the trial court should have done so motu proprio upon observing Arnel's condition.
• Waiver: No. Section 12(a) of the 1985 Rules did not require a motion by the accused, so the absence of one could not be considered a waiver; moreover, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made, and Arnel was apparently deprived of the mental faculties to make one.
• Validity of the Conviction: No. In light of the fatal infirmities committed by the trial court and by defense counsel, the joint decision was set aside and the cases remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to allow the defense to present evidence that Arnel was either unfit for arraignment and trial or was insane at the time the crimes charged were committed.

• Suspension of Arraignment and Mental Examination: The arraignment took place on 22 October 1997, at which time what applied was Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provided that the arraignment shall be suspended if at the time thereof the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto, in which case the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. The provision did not require that a motion by the accused be filed for the suspension of arraignment, so the absence of such a motion could not be considered a waiver of the right to a suspension of arraignment. The trial court should have ascertained Arnel's mental state instead of proceeding with his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings. The following circumstances were enough for the trial court to take seriously the issue of whether Arnel was in full possession of his mental faculties at the time of the arraignment and trial: (a) at his arraignment, the trial court observed that Arnel "acted strangely in a manner as if he [was] out of touch with the world and would not utter any word"; (b) in its Motion and Waiver of Presence of the Accused During the Trial, the defense expressed apprehension that Arnel "might explode into another violence while in transit to attend his trial or while in the courtroom"; (c) Arnel's continued strange behavior characterized by his deafening silence, motionless behavior, and blank stares was raised as an issue in the demurrer to evidence; (d) the persistent "out of touch with the world behavior" of Arnel, which prevented his counsel from effectively communicating with him for his defense, was pointed out in the Manifestation and Motion submitted by the defense; and (e) Arnel's questionable mental state was reiterated in the defense's memorandum. These physical and outward manifestations indicated a substantial demonstration of a mental disorder that rendered Arnel unfit to be arraigned or tried. The trial court failed to exercise utmost circumspection in assuming that Arnel was in full possession of his mental faculties and understood the proceedings against him. The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense, and at the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives; under the circumstances, the trial court gravely failed in this regard. The Court also faulted defense counsel, Atty. Vasquez, whose apparent lackadaisical attitude amounted to disregard of the strict demands of fidelity to his oath as a lawyer, duty to his client, and responsibility as an officer of the court. He knew, or ought to know, from the very beginning that Arnel was hospitalized for mental disorder, and Arnel's strange appearance at arraignment was enough reason for counsel to ask for the deferment of arraignment and for leave of court to have Arnel subjected to psychological examination and psychiatric evaluation; at the very least, he should have presented the doctor who treated Arnel at the University of Sto. Tomas Hospital. Even if counsel's zeal fell short, the greater demand of due process overwhelms such inadequate zeal. The Court stressed that the constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law is most pronounced in criminal cases where the accused is in the gravest jeopardy of losing his life, and that nothing can be more demanding of judges than when the possible punishment would be in its severest form like death — a penalty that, once carried out, is irreversible and irreparable.
• Waiver: The OSG invoked Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires a motion by the proper party for the suspension of arraignment. The Court held that this new requirement of "motion by the proper party" could not be applied to these cases because the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such requirement, took effect only on 1 December 2000. Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing such right; unfortunately, Arnel was apparently deprived of such mental faculties, so no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by him at the time of his arraignment by reason of his mental condition. Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter, and if it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. Moreover, Section 12(a) of Rule 116 mandates the suspension of the arraignment and the mental examination of the accused should it appear that he is of unsound mind.
• Validity of the Conviction: In light of the fatal infirmities committed by the trial court, as well as by defense counsel, the Court had no other alternative except to set aside the joint decision in question and remand the cases to the trial court for further proceedings to allow the defense to present evidence to prove that Arnel was either unfit for arraignment and trial or was insane at the time the crimes charged were committed. The Court also observed that while the trial court's remarkable enthusiasm in adjudicating the cases might at first glance earn emulation, it could not be countenanced considering its disregard of Arnel's constitutional rights, and reminded courts to be mindful of their responsibility to see to it that the paramount interests of justice are not sacrificed for the sake of speed and efficiency.

• Duty to Suspend Arraignment and Order Mental Examination — When a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter; if it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. Under Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the suspension of arraignment and the mental examination of the accused are mandated should it appear that he is of unsound mind, and no motion by the accused is required. In this case, the trial court gravely abused its discretion in proceeding with the arraignment and trial despite its own observation of Arnel's strange behavior.
• Non-Retroactivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — The requirement under Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that the suspension of arraignment be upon motion by the proper party took effect only on 1 December 2000 and could not be applied to an arraignment conducted on 22 October 1997, at which time Section 12(a) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure governed and imposed no such requirement.
• Waiver Must Be Knowingly and Intelligently Made — A waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing the right. Because Arnel was apparently deprived of his mental faculties at the time of his arraignment by reason of his mental condition, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by him.
• Right to Be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation — The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense; at the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives.
• Due Process in Capital Cases — The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law is most pronounced in criminal cases where the accused is in the gravest jeopardy of losing his life; it behooves every court to proceed with utmost care, especially where the possible punishment is death, a penalty that, once carried out, is irreversible and irreparable.
• Duty of Defense Counsel — Counsel's failure to move for the suspension of arraignment despite knowledge of the accused's mental disorder, and his failure to present the physician who treated the accused, fell short of the demanding duty to present every defense that the law permits so that no person may be deprived of life or liberty but by due process of law; nonetheless, the greater demand of due process overrides such inadequate zeal.

• "Nowhere in that Section was it required that a motion by the accused be filed for the suspension of arraignment. Hence, the absence of such motion could not be considered a waiver of the right to a suspension of arraignment." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the waiver issue, holding that the 1985 Rules imposed no motion requirement and that the defense's silence could not operate as a waiver.
• "Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered." — This is the canonical formulation of the trial court's duty to investigate an accused's mental condition, drawn from U.S. vs. Guendia and cited as the controlling rule in the case.
• "The physical and outward manifestations of ARNEL at the time of his arraignment, which were brought to the attention of the trial court, indicated substantial demonstration of a mental disorder that rendered ARNEL unfit to be arraigned or tried in the four criminal cases at bar." — This passage applies the rule to the facts, establishing that the observable manifestations of Arnel's condition triggered the trial court's duty to suspend the proceedings.
• "Solemn and inflexible is the constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Absolute heedfulness of this constitutional injunction is most pronounced in criminal cases where the accused is in the gravest jeopardy of losing his life." — This passage articulates the due process standard governing capital cases and explains why the trial court's procedural lapses warranted setting aside the conviction.

• U.S. vs. Guendia, 37 Phil. Reports 337, 345 [1917] — The controlling precedent for the rule that a judge who is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently insane or imbecilic may investigate the matter and must suspend proceedings if the accused cannot make a proper defense; cited twice in the ponencia as the settled rule.
• Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422, 428 [1977] — Cited for the principle that a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing the right, which the Court applied to hold that no waiver could have been made by Arnel given his mental condition.
• Pecho vs. People, 262 SCRA 518, 527 [1996] — Cited for the proposition that the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey the information to the accused to enable him to prepare his defense.
• Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 543, 554 [1997] — Cited for the reminder that courts must be mindful of their responsibility to see to it that the paramount interests of justice are not sacrificed for the sake of speed and efficiency.
• People vs. Bermas, 306 SCRA 135, 147-148 [1999] and People vs. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490, 506 [2000] — Cited together as authority on the standards of fidelity, duty, and responsibility required of defense counsel, which Atty. Vasquez failed to meet.
• People vs. Tizon, 317 SCRA 632, 638 [1999] and People vs. Aranzado, G.R. Nos. 132442-44, 24 September 2001 — Cited for the principle that courts must proceed with utmost care in capital cases because the death penalty, once carried out, is irreversible and irreparable.
• People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994] — Cited in the footnote as authority for the automatic review of death penalty cases pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659.

• Section 12(a), Rule 116, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provided that the arraignment shall be suspended if at the time thereof the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto, in which case the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. The Court held this provision applicable to Arnel's arraignment on 22 October 1997 and ruled that it required no motion by the accused.
• Section 11(a), Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires that the suspension of arraignment be "upon motion by the proper party" where the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition. The Court held that this new requirement could not be applied retroactively because the Revised Rules took effect only on 1 December 2000.
• Section 1(c), Rule 116, Rules of Court — Pursuant to this provision, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for Arnel in each of the four cases after he refused to speak at his arraignment.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; the Court held that this right carries the correlative obligation to effectively convey the information to enable the accused to prepare his defense.
• Article 246, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5, R.A. No. 7659 — Defines parricide and imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; applied by the trial court in imposing the death penalty in the two parricide cases.
• Article 47, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22, R.A. No. 7659 — Governs the automatic review of death penalty cases; the basis for the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the appeal.
• Section 20(I), Rule 138, Rules of Court and Canon 5, Canons of Professional Ethics — Cited as the standards of counsel's duty to his client and to the court, which defense counsel failed to observe.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ.