People of the Philippines vs. Aquil Pilpa y Dipaz

Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, and a co-conspirator remains liable as a principal even if he fails to inflict the fatal wound; however, treachery cannot be presumed from the mere suddenness of an attack and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that the assailant deliberately chose a mode of attack to ensure the crime’s execution without risk to himself.

The People of the Philippines charged Aquil Pilpa y Dipaz with the killing of Dave Alde. Pilpa resided with “JR” and JR’s two sisters and mother. The prosecution’s case rested on eyewitness identification and the alleged concerted action of Pilpa and “JR,” while Pilpa denied being at the scene and denied any participation. The appeal placed at issue the statutory distinction between Murder under Article 248 and Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as the requisites of conspiracy and treachery.

An Information was filed against Aquil Pilpa y Dipaz for the murder of Dave Alde. The accusatory portion alleged that on or about August 23, 2003, in the City of Manila, Pilpa, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities, and whereabouts were unknown, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attacked and stabbed Alde with a bladed weapon on the chest, inflicting a mortal stab wound that caused his death. Pilpa was arraigned on September 27, 2004 and pleaded not guilty; pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.

According to the prosecution, around 8:00 in the evening of August 23, 2003, Barangay Tanod Leonila Abuel went to Quirino Highway, Pandacan, assigned by her officer in charge to look for a certain Reynan. She saw a group of five persons including Alde, Carol Asis, Evangeline Abuel, and two others whose names she failed to remember. She asked if they knew Reynan’s whereabouts, and Carol answered in the negative. While she was still talking to the group, another group of five men, including “JR” and Pilpa, arrived. “JR” stabbed Alde on the chest with a big knife while Pilpa was positioned at the back of Leonila. After “JR” stabbed Alde, Pilpa, who was a mere arm’s length away from Leonila, poised to thrust Alde as well. Leonila tried to intervene by announcing her position as Barangay Tanod, but Pilpa disregarded her by uttering “wala kaming pakialam kahit Barangay Tanod ka.” Leonila sustained injuries as she attempted to parry the thrusts. Pilpa’s attempts to stab Alde ultimately failed because “Choy,” a companion of Alde, parried the thrusts. Leonila then ordered Alde to run away, which he did despite his wounds, but Pilpa and his group gave chase; thereafter, Pilpa and his group scampered away.

Alde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical attention. While Alde was at the hospital, Leonila, accompanied by the police, including PO3 Benedict Cruz, caught up with Pilpa in a house near the railroad. She identified him as one of the group, and he was arrested and brought to the hospital as standard operating procedure required medical attention for suspects. At the hospital, Alde positively identified Pilpa as one of those who stabbed him. Dr. Nolan Alandino was the physician on duty at the emergency room when Alde was admitted. Alde underwent emergency surgery due to the stab wounds, and Dr. Alandino referred him for further surgery. Alde underwent an operation on both sides of the chest and repair was made on his heart; the operation ended around 11:40 p.m. of the same day. Twenty minutes after the operation, while in the recovery room, Alde went into cardiac arrest and died.

For his defense, Pilpa alleged that on August 23, 2003, between 8:00 and 8:30 in the evening, he was at a billiard hall operated by a certain Aling Cora located in front of their house. He played with companions whose names he did not know. After a few minutes, he left the billiard hall around 8:30 p.m. and went straight home to sleep. He lived with “JR” and JR’s two sisters and mother. Just when he was about to sleep, policemen arrived to arrest him and “JR” Niepes. The policemen informed him that JR stabbed somebody, and because of this, Pilpa was brought to Police Station 10. JR was not at home at the time of the arrest. Pilpa maintained that he was not in the place of the incident and denied that he was with JR when the stabbing happened. He further denied participation in the killing and stressed that he was not familiar with the identities of the prosecution witnesses. He clarified that he had no motive to attack or kill Alde as he did not personally know him.

The RTC gave greater evidentiary weight to the positive identification by Leonila, Evangeline, and Carolina over Pilpa’s general denial. It found that although only “JR” inflicted stab wounds on the victim, Pilpa was liable because there was conspiracy among the assailants, and that the attack was swift and unexpected, affording the victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. The CA affirmed, finding the elements of the crime, conspiracy, and treachery present; it described the attack as sudden and unexpected, the victim as unarmed, and the assailants’ means as ensuring no risk from the victim’s defense. The CA also found receipts for P15,000.00 representing expenses for the wake and burial of Alde.

• Conspiracy and Consummation: Pilpa argued that the evidence showed he attempted only to stab Alde after “JR” had already stabbed him; the attempt was not a crime in itself, the crime had already been consummated by “JR” alone, and the attempt was not evidence that he was part of any conspiracy to kill Alde.
• Alibi and Denial: Pilpa maintained that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of the incident, that he was at a billiard hall and then went home to sleep, and that he denied being with “JR” when the stabbing happened and denied any participation in the killing.
• Witness Credibility and Ill-Motive: Pilpa contended that the eyewitness testimonies, particularly those of Carolina and Evangeline, should not be accorded evidentiary weight because they were long-time friends of Alde.
• Treachery: Pilpa claimed that treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence; absent convincing proof that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the means by which they committed the crime to ensure its execution, the doubt must be resolved in his favor.

• Conspiracy Inferred from Conduct: The prosecution argued that conspiracy need not be proven by a meeting between the perpetrators and may be inferred from conduct before and immediately after the act; the conduct of Pilpa and “JR” in approaching Alde’s group, stabbing him, and running after him showed they had agreed to kill him, and Pilpa was found at JR’s home after the incident.
• Pilpa Took Part in the Stabbing: The prosecution argued that the acts of Pilpa and “JR” were done with a common goal of achieving Alde’s death; their acts of stabbing indicated concerted action and concurrence of sentiments adequate to prove conspiracy, and Pilpa’s failure to actually stab Alde due to “Choy’s” parry did not preclude conspiracy.
• Co-Principal Liability: The prosecution maintained that conspiracy renders Pilpa a co-principal even if he failed to actually stab Alde, and that the fact that “JR” stabbed Alde first did not exculpate Pilpa from conspiracy.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Guilt: Whether the CA erred in convicting Pilpa despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy: Whether the CA erred in convicting Pilpa despite the prosecution’s failure to prove that conspiracy exists.
• Treachery: Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Guilt: No as to guilt; the conviction was affirmed, but only for Homicide. The prosecution proved Pilpa’s participation through positive identification and conspiracy, although treachery was not established.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was established by inference from the assailants’ conduct before, during, and after the crime; Pilpa’s failed attempt to stab Alde did not negate his liability as a co-principal.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was not present; mere suddenness of a frontal attack, in a public place and with the victim accompanied by companions and a barangay tanod, did not prove a deliberately chosen mode of attack ensuring no risk to the assailants.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Guilt: The prosecution proved Pilpa’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the killing. He was positively identified by Leonila, Evangeline, Carolina, and the victim himself when the latter was in the hospital. His defenses of denial and alibi were inherently weak and could not prevail over positive and credible testimony; for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene or its immediate vicinity, which Pilpa failed to do. Long-time friendship, without more, was not sufficient to constitute ill-motive so as to taint the eyewitnesses’ testimony. Even assuming Carolina’s and Evangeline’s testimonies were disregarded, Leonila and the victim positively identified Pilpa. However, because treachery was absent, the proper crime is Homicide, not Murder.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it is the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. It need not be established by direct evidence or by proof of prior agreement, and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime where such conduct reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design. Here, Pilpa and “JR” approached Alde’s group, “JR” stabbed Alde, Pilpa attempted to stab him, and they chased him; Pilpa was later found at JR’s home. These acts showed a common criminal purpose. Pilpa’s failure to actually stab Alde, not by his own volition but due to the parry of Alde’s companion “Choy,” did not preclude conspiracy, and the fact that “JR” stabbed Alde first did not exculpate Pilpa. He was thus liable as a co-principal.
• Treachery: Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence sufficient to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt; it is not presumed from a mere statement that the attack was sudden. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient where the mode adopted by the assailants does not positively tend to prove that they knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense the victim might offer. The method of assault must be deliberately chosen to accomplish the act without risk to the aggressor. Here, the testimonies revealed that the assailants attacked Alde while he was having a seemingly random conversation with four friends in a public highway, and even in the presence of a barangay tanod who later joined the group. The victim was with five persons who could have helped him, as they in fact helped repel the attack. The attack itself was frontal. Under these circumstances, no deliberate mode of attack ensuring execution without risk was shown. Thus, treachery was not appreciated, and the crime is Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal; absent modifying circumstances, it is imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, and the Court imposed eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The damages were modified under People vs. Jugueta to P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it is the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. It need not be proved by direct evidence or prior agreement and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the crime where such conduct shows community of criminal purpose or design. In this case, the Court found conspiracy from Pilpa and “JR” approaching Alde’s group, JR stabbing Alde, Pilpa attempting to stab him, their chasing him, and Pilpa’s presence at JR’s home; Pilpa’s failure to actually stab Alde due to a parry did not preclude conspiracy, and he was liable as a co-principal.
• Alibi and Denial — Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that cannot prevail over positive and credible testimony identifying the accused. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene or its immediate vicinity. Pilpa failed to prove physical impossibility, and the positive identification by Leonila, Evangeline, Carolina, and the victim prevailed.
• Ill-Motive of Witnesses — Long-time friendship, without more, is not sufficient to constitute ill-motive so as to taint an eyewitness’s testimony. The Court held that no convincing reason or improper motive was shown, and even disregarding Carolina’s and Evangeline’s testimonies, Leonila and the victim positively identified Pilpa.
• Treachery — Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence sufficient to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt; it is not presumed from a mere statement that the attack was sudden. Mere suddenness is not sufficient where the mode adopted does not positively tend to prove that the assailants knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without risk to themselves from the victim’s defense. The method of assault must be deliberately chosen to accomplish the act without risk. The Court found no treachery because the attack was frontal, in a public highway, with the victim accompanied by companions and a barangay tanod, and no showing that the mode chosen ensured execution without risk.
• Penalty for Homicide and Indeterminate Sentence Law — Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is penalized by reclusion temporal; absent modifying circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, and the Court imposed eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
• Damages in Homicide — Under People vs. Jugueta, the damages awarded were modified to P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages, with interest at six percent per annum from finality until fully paid.

• "The existence of conspiracy need not, at all times, be established by direct evidence; nor is it necessary to prove prior agreement between the accused to commit the crime charged." — This states the evidentiary rule allowing conspiracy to be inferred from circumstantial proof and from the accused’s conduct, which the Court applied to uphold Pilpa’s liability as a co-conspirator.
• "[t]reachery, just like any other element of the crime committed, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence — evidence sufficient to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed or taken for granted from a mere statement that "the attack was sudden"[;] there must be a clear showing from the narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be "sudden."" — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the quantum of proof for treachery, relied upon to reject the lower courts’ finding of treachery based merely on the suddenness of the attack.
• "Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the assailants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer." — This passage supplies the ratio for reducing the conviction from Murder to Homicide, because the prosecution failed to show a deliberately chosen mode of attack that eliminated risk to the assailants.
• "In addition, the attack itself was frontal. In People v. Tugbo, Jr., the Court held that treachery was not present because the attack was frontal, and hence, the victim had opportunity to defend himself." — The Court considered the frontal nature of the attack, together with the public setting and the presence of the victim’s companions and a barangay tanod, as creating reasonable doubt on the existence of treachery.

• People vs. Santos, 175 Phil. 113 (1978) — Cited for the rule that treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and cannot be presumed from a mere statement that the attack was sudden; the Court relied on it to reject the finding of treachery.
• People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738 (1949) — Cited for the principle that treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused did not make any preparation to kill in a manner to insure the commission of the crime or make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.
• People vs. Tugbo, Jr., 273 Phil. 346 (1991) — Cited for the rule that treachery is not present where the attack was frontal and the victim had an opportunity to defend himself; considered with other circumstances to create reasonable doubt on treachery.
• People vs. Taborada, 284-A Phil. 736 (1992) — Cited for the rules that conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt but need not be established by direct evidence or prior agreement, and may be inferred from conduct before, during, and after the crime.
• People vs. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519 (2013) — Cited for the rule that denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses that cannot prevail over positive and credible testimony.
• People vs. Desalisa, 451 Phil. 869 (2003) — Cited for the requirement that alibi must be supported by proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene or its immediate vicinity.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited as the basis for modifying the damages to P50,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages.
• Silon vs. Court of Appeals, 281 Phil. 536 (1991) — Cited for the definition that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
• People vs. Aquino, 390 Phil. 1176 (2000) — Cited for conspiracy as the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime, and for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from acts showing the same criminal purpose and united execution.
• People vs. Sabanal, 254 Phil. 433 (1989) — Cited for the rule that it does not always follow that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Murder. The Information charged Pilpa with Murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, and the RTC and CA convicted him under this provision; the Supreme Court held treachery absent, so Article 248 did not apply.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Homicide. After removing the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime was Homicide, with the penalty of reclusion temporal.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied because Pilpa was convicted of Homicide. The penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal is prision mayor, and the Court imposed an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code — The RTC ordered that Pilpa, as a detention prisoner, be given full credit for the period of his preventive detention; the Supreme Court’s dispositive portion did not expressly discuss or modify this matter.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr. concurred. J. Reyes, Jr. was designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.