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People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Reyes y Magano

The conviction for robbery with homicide was affirmed with modification, the penalty reduced from death to reclusion perpetua. Antonio Reyes y Magano was charged with robbing and killing Dr. Aurora Lagrada in her house in Lumban, Laguna on June 11, 1998, and was convicted on the strength of his extrajudicial confession and the articles seized from him. On appeal, the claim that his confession was forged and that the seized items were products of an illegal search was rejected, the confession having been executed with the assistance of counsel and notarized, and the forgery claim being unproven. The death penalty was set aside because the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disregard of the victim's age and sex were not alleged in the Information and, in any event, disregard of age and sex did not apply to robbery with homicide.

Primary Holding

An extrajudicial confession is admissible where the accused was assisted by counsel and the notary's certification of voluntariness stands unrebutted, forgery being never presumed and required to be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence; and the death penalty may not be imposed where the aggravating circumstances relied upon are not alleged in the Information, disregard of the victim's age being inapplicable to robbery with homicide, a felony against property.

Background

Dr. Aurora Lagrada, a 74-year-old spinster, lived alone in her two-storey house at General Luna Street, Barangay Balimbingan, Lumban, Laguna, and was the sole proprietor of Neal Construction and Supplies; the appellant Antonio Reyes y Magano lived with his mother and brother in a house four to five meters away. Robbery with homicide is defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, by reclusion perpetua to death.

History

  1. Information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, charging Antonio Reyes y Magano with robbery with homicide; he was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty.

  2. The trial court convicted the appellant of robbery with homicide, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay the heirs ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱65,000.00 for funeral expenses.

  3. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic appeal.

Facts

Dr. Aurora Lagrada, a spinster of about seventy years old, lived alone in her two-storey house at General Luna Street, Barangay Balimbingan, Lumban, Laguna, and was the sole proprietor of Neal Construction and Supplies at No. 90 General Luna Street. The appellant Antonio Reyes y Magano lived with his mother and brother in a house four to five meters away from the doctor's house.

At around 11:00 p.m. on June 11, 1998, Barangay Captain William Magpantay received a radio report from a barangay kagawad that someone had gained entry into Lagrada's house and that she had shouted for help. Magpantay, a barangay councilman and a barangay tanod responded and proceeded to the house; when they knocked, no one responded. Magpantay then went to the Lumban Police Station and reported the matter. SPO2 Maximo Gonzales and SPO1 Pedro Nacor, Jr. responded and, accompanied by Magpantay, proceeded to Lagrada's house. There, the policemen passed by the garage and opened the door; they saw the bloodied Lagrada, naked from the waist up, sprawled sidewise on the floor opposite the sink near the kitchen. Near the cadaver was a bolo (itak), which Gonzales took into custody. Magpantay noticed that Lagrada's neighbors were in the vicinity, but the appellant was nowhere to be found.

Magpantay and the policemen went to the appellant's house, where his mother and brother informed them that he was in Barangay Concepcion. Magpantay, Barangay Chairman Floro Bulderon and the policemen proceeded there but failed to locate him. They returned to the Lumban Police Station, where Noel Saniste (Samonte) told them the appellant was in the vicinity of the town plaza in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. In a mobile police car, the policemen and Magpantay rushed to the place and saw the appellant in the town plaza on board a tricycle, apparently on his way to the Kapalaran Bus Station. The appellant was handcuffed and boarded in the mobile police car, and was told that he was a suspect in the killing of Lagrada.

While the car was on its way to Lumban, Gonzales ordered Magpantay to frisk the appellant. Magpantay found two watches — a Rolex and a Wittnauer — in the right pocket of the appellant's pants; bank passbook no. 164764 issued by the Solid Bank under the name of Lagrada; a gold bracelet and a gold ring; and in the appellant's left pocket, ₱130.00. Magpantay turned over the articles and money to Gonzales. The policemen then proceeded to the appellant's house, where they found a pair of slippers and the green-colored t-shirt which the appellant wore when he broke into Lagrada's house. At the police station, Gonzales and Nacor, Jr. turned over the appellant to SPO2 Benedicto del Mundo, the investigator-on-case; by then it was about 1:30 a.m. of June 12, 1998, and the incident was placed in the police blotter.

The appellant, bothered by his conscience, stated that he wanted to execute an extrajudicial confession. Del Mundo informed him of his right to be assisted by counsel of his own choice and asked if he had any lawyer; the appellant replied that he had none and asked Del Mundo to procure a lawyer. Del Mundo located Atty. Wilfredo Paraiso, a practicing lawyer in Lumban, Laguna, then President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Laguna Chapter, and a member of the Knights of Columbus, who was at the patio of the Catholic church after the Independence Day parade. Del Mundo informed Paraiso that the appellant had expressed his desire to execute an extrajudicial confession and asked him to assist; the lawyer informed the appellant of his constitutional rights, including his right to counsel, and told him that he was volunteering his services. The appellant agreed to be assisted by Paraiso. Paraiso explained the appellant's right to remain silent; that if he did not want to make any confession, it was his right to do so; and that any admission he made might be used against him. The appellant said he would proceed because his conscience bothered him. Paraiso inquired whether he had been forced, coerced or intimidated, or offered any reward; the appellant replied that he was not. Del Mundo nevertheless enumerated and explained the appellant's constitutional rights before commencing the investigation in Paraiso's presence.

After the investigation, Del Mundo showed the sworn statement to Paraiso and the appellant. Paraiso explained its contents to the appellant, who then signed on top of his typewritten name on page 1, on the left margin of page 2, and atop his typewritten name on page 3; Paraiso followed suit. Because it was a holiday, no public officer was available before whom the appellant could swear to the truth of his confession, so Del Mundo requested Paraiso, a notary public, to notarize the sworn statement; Paraiso agreed and affixed his signature above his typewritten name on page 3 as Notary Public. Pictures of the articles seized from the appellant were taken, including the bolo, his green t-shirt and the pair of slippers, with the appellant made to stand beside a table on top of which the articles were placed and photographed.

On June 15, 1998, Dr. Leoncia M. delos Reyes performed an autopsy on Lagrada's cadaver and submitted a postmortem report listing incised wounds and a hematoma, and stating the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock; she also signed Lagrada's Certificate of Death. Gonzales and Nacor, Jr. executed a Joint Affidavit on the incident. Norma Quetulio executed a sworn statement stating that her sister, Aurora Lagrada, owned the ring, the bracelet, and the two watches confiscated from the appellant, and that the articles were worth ₱80,000.00. She testified that before Lagrada was killed, the latter was employed by the AMA Computer College, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, as Professor 2 with a monthly salary of ₱2,000.00, later increased to ₱5,700.00, and, being a retired public school teacher, was also receiving a monthly pension of ₱3,000.00 from the Social Security System; the victim was also the sole proprietor of Neal Construction and Supplies.

The appellant denied any involvement in the killing of Lagrada and the robbing of her money and jewelry. He testified that he was never investigated by Del Mundo; that he did not hire Atty. Paraiso as his counsel, Del Mundo merely having referred the lawyer to him; and that he had no conference with the lawyer before and after his custodial investigation. He claimed that he merely affixed his signature on a piece of paper with some writings on it when it was presented to him, after the policemen threatened him at the station, and that the signature above the typewritten name on the third page of the statement was not his. Contrary to the extrajudicial confession, he finished third year in high school. After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Forgery of the Extrajudicial Confession: The appellant asserted that the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence because the signature above his typewritten name on page 3 thereof is a forgery; he claimed he was forced by SPO2 Benedicto del Mundo and another policeman to sign a blank page at the town plaza in the presence of Atty. Wilfredo Paraiso, and that the blank page he signed is now the first page of the extrajudicial confession.
  • Dissimilarity of Signatures: The appellant claimed a patent and utter dissimilarity between his genuine signature on page 1 of the extrajudicial confession and his purported signature on page 3 thereof.
  • Inconsistency of Witnesses: The appellant claimed that SPO2 Benedicto del Mundo and Atty. Wilfredo Paraiso were not in accord as to the precise time when he signed the confession.
  • Illegal Search: The appellant contended that Barangay Captain William Magpantay, SPO2 Maximo Gonzales and SPO1 Pedro N. Nacor, Jr. seized the money and articles from him in the mobile car and from his house without any search warrant, when he was already arrested, rendering the articles inadmissible in evidence.
  • Insufficiency of Evidence: The appellant argued that, given the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession and the money and articles seized from him, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Forgery Not Proven: The Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the appellant failed to prove that the disputed signature is a forgery, and that the signatures atop the typewritten name of the appellant on page 3 and on pages 1 and 2 are similar.
  • Valid Warrantless Seizure: The Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the warrantless seizure of the money and articles from the appellant made by the barangay captain and the policemen was permissible as an incident to the appellant's lawful warrantless arrest.

Issues

  • Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible on the ground that the appellant's signature on page 3 thereof is a forgery and that he was made to sign a blank page.
  • Validity of the Warrantless Seizure: Whether the money and articles seized from the appellant without a search warrant are inadmissible as products of an illegal search.
  • Propriety of the Penalty: Whether the death penalty was correctly imposed, considering the aggravating circumstances of commission in the victim's dwelling and disregard of the victim's age and sex.

Ruling

  • Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: No. The forgery claim fails; forgery is never presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the notarized confession's presumption of regularity was not overcome.
  • Validity of the Warrantless Seizure: The reproduced text does not set out an express ruling on the warrantless seizure; the appeal was nonetheless denied and the conviction affirmed.
  • Propriety of the Penalty: No. The death penalty cannot stand; the aggravating circumstances were not alleged in the Information, and disregard of the victim's age and sex did not apply to robbery with homicide, a felony against property.

Ruling Rationale

  • Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: The forgery claim was rejected. The appellant was required to submit his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation before the MTC of Lumban, Laguna, but failed to do so, and in his Comment on the Formal Offer of Exhibits he did not claim that he was made to sign a blank paper or that his signature on page 3 was a forgery; he raised the claim for the first time only when he testified before the trial court. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the burden lies on the one alleging it. The appellant relied solely on the alleged dissimilarity between his signatures; per Causapin vs. Court of Appeals and Professor Albert S. Osborn, an accurate examination to determine forgery must dwell on both the similarities and dissimilarities of the standard and questioned signatures, since a forgery is in some measure like the genuine writing and there is always some variation in genuine samples. The confession was notarized by Atty. Paraiso, who certified that he had personally examined the appellant and was satisfied that the latter had voluntarily executed the same; as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have regularly performed his duties as notary public, and the presumption cannot be overcome by the appellant's bare and uncorroborated claim. The appellant's counsel cross-examined Atty. Paraiso but failed to cross-examine him on the alleged dissimilarity of the signatures on page 3 and those on the left margin of pages 1 and 2, and the appellant himself had initialed the corrections of typographical errors in his confession. The discordance between the testimonies of Atty. Paraiso and SPO2 Del Mundo as to the exact or precise time the appellant signed his confession is of minor and inconsequential importance, both agreeing that it was signed in the morning of June 12, 1998.
  • Validity of the Warrantless Seizure: The reproduced text does not set out an express ruling on this issue; the appeal was nonetheless denied and the conviction affirmed.
  • Propriety of the Penalty: The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The prosecution proved the essential elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed. The accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery, the homicide being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery; the homicide may precede or follow the robbery, provided there is a nexus, an intrinsic connection between the two, and the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of the victim's life. The appellant's extrajudicial confession established that he barged into the victim's house to rob her and stabbed her when she was about to shout and because he was drunk, and that he took her money and personal belongings and fled. However, the death penalty was improper. First, robbery with homicide is essentially a felony against property, and the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the victim's age applies only to crimes against persons and honor; the bare fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of sex, and for this circumstance to be considered the prosecution must adduce evidence that the accused had particularly intended to insult or commit disrespect to the sex of the victim. Here, the appellant killed the victim because she started to shout; there was no intent to insult or commit disrespect to her on account of her sex. Second, while commission of the crime in the victim's dwelling, without provocation on her part, is aggravating in robbery with homicide, such circumstance was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; although the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Revised Rules, the rule should be applied retroactively as it is favorable to the appellant. The appellant failed to prove any mitigating circumstance; although he claimed he was drunk, he failed to prove that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. With no modifying circumstance, the penalty is reclusion perpetua under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly did not award moral damages, the prosecution having failed to present any of the heirs to testify on the factual basis; the heirs are nonetheless entitled to exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 in accordance with current jurisprudence.

Doctrines

  • Forgery must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence — Forgery cannot be presumed; one who alleges it bears the burden of proving it. An accurate examination to determine forgery must dwell on both the similarities and dissimilarities of the standard and questioned signatures, not on dissimilarities alone, since a forgery is in some measure like the genuine writing and genuine signatures of the same writer always vary. The appellant relied solely on the alleged dissimilarity between his signatures and failed to discharge his burden.
  • Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty — A notary public's certification that he personally examined the affiant and was satisfied that the document was voluntarily executed is presumed regular. The presumption cannot be overcome by the bare and uncorroborated claim of the accused. Applied to Atty. Paraiso's notarization of the extrajudicial confession.
  • Elements of robbery with homicide — To sustain a conviction, the prosecution must prove: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, used in a generic sense, was committed. The accused must have the principal purpose of committing robbery; the homicide may precede or follow the robbery, provided there is a nexus, an intrinsic connection between the two, and the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of the victim's life. The constituted crimes of robbery and homicide must be consummated.
  • Aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the Information — Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the complaint or information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Although the crime was committed before the effectivity of the Revised Rules, the rule applies retroactively as favorable to the accused. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling could not be appreciated.
  • Disregard of age applies only to crimes against persons and honor — Robbery with homicide is essentially a felony against property, so the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the victim's age does not apply to it. The bare fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of sex; the prosecution must adduce evidence that the accused particularly intended to insult or commit disrespect to the victim's sex.
  • Retroactive application of procedural rules favorable to the accused — A procedural rule that is favorable to the accused, such as the requirement under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that aggravating circumstances be alleged in the Information, may be applied retroactively even to a crime committed before its effectivity.

Key Excerpts

  • "Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. One who alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same." — States the ratio on the evidentiary burden for forgery, which the appellant failed to discharge.
  • "To sustain a conviction of the accused for robbery with homicide, the prosecution was burdened to prove the essential elements of the crime, viz: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed." — Enumerates the elements of robbery with homicide, the canonical formulation of the offense.
  • "Robbery with homicide is essentially a felony against property. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the victim's age is applied only to crimes against persons and honor." — States the classification rule that defeated the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of age.
  • "The bare fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of sex. For this circumstance to be properly considered, the prosecution must adduce evidence that in the commission of the crime, the accused had particularly intended to insult or commit disrespect to the sex of the victim." — Defines the requisites for appreciating disregard of sex as an aggravating circumstance.

Precedents Cited

  • Causapin vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 615 (1994) — Cited for the rule that an accurate examination to determine forgery should dwell on both the similarities and dissimilarities of the standard and questioned signatures; applied to reject the appellant's forgery claim.
  • People vs. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998) — Cited for the elements of robbery with homicide and for the rule that the constituted crimes of robbery and homicide must be consummated.
  • People vs. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705 (1998) — Cited for the rule that the accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery.
  • People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627 (1991) — Cited for the rule that the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of the victim's life.
  • People vs. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003 — Cited for the rule that robbery with homicide is essentially a felony against property and for the retroactive application of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  • People vs. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the victim's age applies only to crimes against persons and honor.
  • People vs. Braña, 30 SCRA 307 (1969) — Cited for the rule that the bare fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of sex.
  • People vs. Fabon, 328 SCRA 302 (2000) — Cited for the rule that commission of the crime in the victim's dwelling, without provocation on her part, is aggravating in robbery with homicide.
  • People vs. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001) — Cited as the basis for awarding exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00.
  • Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 363 SCRA 811 (2001) — Cited for the rule that forgery must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and is never presumed.

Provisions

  • Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, imposing reclusion perpetua to death when, by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide is committed. The Court held the appellant's conviction under this provision was correct.
  • Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties; applied to impose reclusion perpetua, there being no modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime.
  • Section 8, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires the complaint or information to state the designation of the offense and to specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The Court applied it retroactively as favorable to the appellant, thereby barring appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.