People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Bueza

A murder conviction may be sustained on the positive identification by a lone eyewitness, whose perception of the victim's voice and the sounds of the assault is corroborated by circumstantial evidence, even if she did not visually see the fatal blow; an extrajudicial confession taken without a competent and independent counsel has no probative value and cannot support a mitigating plea of guilt.

Antonio Bueza and Rodolfo Solis were charged with murder for the killing of Juanito Rosela in Barangay Niño Jesus, Iriga City. The prosecution's case rested in part on the eyewitness testimony of the victim's wife, Nilda Nasayao Rosela, and on an extrajudicial confession executed by Bueza. The governing provisions included Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the constitutional right to counsel under Article 111, Section 12(1) as cited in the decision, and the rules on voluntary confession and treachery. Solis escaped and remained at large, leaving Bueza to be arraigned and tried alone.

On March 8, 1983, at about 7:00 p.m., Nilda Rosela y Nasayao was at their house in Barangay Niño Jesus, Iriga City, cooking the family's night meal while her husband Juanito Rosela and their small child slept. Antonio Bueza and Rodolfo Solis, both drunk and armed with a bolo and powder, arrived and tried to drag Nilda to a dark place. She held on to the wall of their house and told Rodolfo Solis that she did not want to go because she already had a husband.

Rodolfo Solis then threw stones at the house, waking Juanito Rosela. Juanito got a bow and arrow, but Rodolfo Solis grabbed it. Bueza and Solis then assaulted Juanito, dragged him to a dark place, and struck him with stones. As he was being dragged, Juanito pleaded, "Don't kill me for I have a family," and as he was hit he kept moaning. That was the last time Nilda saw him alive.

On the third day, a Thursday, after a search, Juanito's body was found buried with his foot protruding from the ground near the house of Paquito Lamiel in Niño Jesus. The Barangay Captain and Kagawad found the body, and Oscar Rosela, Juanito's son, identified it. On March 11, Dra. Consuelo Margate, City Health Officer of Iriga City for the past 14 years, exhumed the body and made an exhumation report (Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2). She found many injuries, but item No. 7 in her report—a contusion with hematoma, 3 x 3 inches in the parietal region, right, with concomitant fracture of the skull—was the most serious and caused death. The death certificate issued and signed by Margarita Barce (Exhibit B) listed the cause of death as cerebral hemorrhage.

On March 21, 1983, Police Corporal Nicomedes Lopez of Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, acting on a suspicious persons report, apprehended and investigated Bueza and Solis after informing them of their constitutional rights. The investigation was reduced to writing (Exhibit C). In his statement, Bueza admitted killing Juanito Rosela, claiming that Rosela had chased him with a bow and arrow, that he hid, and that when he came out thinking Rosela was gone, Rosela was very near, so they grappled, and he wrested the bow and arrow and struck and killed Rosela.

Because no bail was recommended by the City Fiscal, both accused were detained at the Iriga City Jail. Rodolfo Solis escaped on July 26, 1983, and remained at large. Bueza, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned alone on October 28, 1983, and pleaded not guilty.

The trial court gave credence to Nilda Nasayao's testimony. The Court of Appeals found that she positively identified Bueza and Solis as the two persons who came to their house that night; that Solis dragged her to a dark and secluded place in an attempt to sexually abuse her; that she escaped by holding on to the wall; that Solis threw stones at the house; and that when Juanito was awakened and picked up his bow and arrow, Solis grabbed it and, together with Bueza, assaulted and dragged Juanito to a dark place where they stoned him. At a distance of eleven meters from the spot to which the victim was dragged, Nilda could hear her husband moaning and the thud sounds of stones hitting his body. The Court of Appeals also noted circumstantial evidence: both accused were drunk; Bueza had a bolo while Solis carried powder; the victim's house was near a creek with plenty of stones; Nilda heard her husband pleading, then moaning, then thud sounds of a blunt instrument; and the autopsy revealed that a blunt instrument fractured the skull and caused death. The trial court credited Bueza with the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt arising from the extrajudicial confession, but the Court of Appeals found the requisites for voluntary confession unsatisfied and appreciated treachery because the victim, after being dragged unarmed into a dark and secluded place, was first disabled by hacking the anterior aspects of both knees, causing a horizontal cut wound two inches long and one and one-half inches deep, so that he could not run or fight.

• Eyewitness Testimony: Appellant argued that the lone eyewitness, Nilda Nasayao Rosela, admitted she did not see him assault or kill Juanito Rosela, so her testimony could not support conviction.
• Inconsistencies: Appellant maintained that Nilda's testimony contained material inconsistencies that the trial court disregarded, and that the court erred in giving it credence and finding positive identification.
• Extrajudicial Confession: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in giving validity to and admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence against him.
• Conviction and Penalty: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting him, imposing imprisonment, and ordering payment of damages.
• Motion for Reconsideration: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration.

• Sufficiency of Lone Eyewitness Identification: Whether the testimony of the lone eyewitness, who did not visually see the fatal assault, sufficiently identified appellant as a perpetrator and established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility and Inconsistencies: Whether the alleged inconsistencies in the eyewitness's testimony rendered her testimony unworthy of credence.
• Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession was admissible and had probative value against appellant.
• Mitigating Voluntary Confession: Whether appellant was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession.
• Aggravating Treachery and Penalty: Whether treachery was correctly appreciated and whether the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua.

• Sufficiency of Lone Eyewitness Identification: Yes. The lone eyewitness's positive identification, including perception through senses other than sight, and corroborating circumstantial evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility and Inconsistencies: No. The cited inconsistencies concerned only minor details and did not destroy the witness's credibility.
• Extrajudicial Confession: No. The extrajudicial confession had no probative value because it was taken without a competent and independent counsel, and the right to counsel cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
• Mitigating Voluntary Confession: No. The requisites for voluntary confession were not satisfied: spontaneous confession of guilt, made in open court, and prior to presentation of prosecution evidence.
• Aggravating Treachery and Penalty: Yes. Treachery was correctly appreciated; with no mitigating circumstance, the penalty was reclusion perpetua.

• Sufficiency of Lone Eyewitness Identification: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Nilda Nasayao's testimony was sufficient to convict Bueza because she positively identified him as one of the authors of the crime. Positive identification does not require visual perception alone; it includes perception through other human senses. Nilda recognized her husband's voice while he was being killed and heard his plea, "Don't kill me for I have a family," his moaning, and the thud sounds of stones hitting his body at a distance of eleven meters. This testimony was corroborated by circumstantial evidence: both accused were drunk; Bueza had a bolo while Solis carried powder; the victim's house was near a creek with plenty of stones; and the autopsy showed that a blunt instrument fractured the skull and caused death. The Court thus found guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility and Inconsistencies: The inconsistencies and contradictions cited by the accused referred only to minor details and did not destroy the credibility of the witness. The Court saw no need to discredit Nilda's lone testimony because it was corroborated by circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the conviction. It cited People vs. De Las Piñas and People vs. Roa.
• Extrajudicial Confession: The extrajudicial confession executed on March 21, 1983 at Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, had no probative value because it was taken without a competent and independent counsel present to assist the appellant. The Constitution provides that the right to counsel cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Thus, the confession could not be used against Bueza.
• Mitigating Voluntary Confession: The trial court credited Bueza with the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt arising from the extrajudicial confession, but since he questioned the confession's validity, it could not reduce his penalty. For voluntary confession to mitigate, the requisites are: (1) the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open court; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. None of these requisites was satisfactorily complied with. Although Bueza admitted killing Juanito Rosela in self-defense in his extrajudicial confession, this was never proved nor raised during trial. When arraigned, he did not plead guilty but insisted he was not informed of the nature of the offense. In his testimony, he kept denying the whereabouts of the victim, which signified a stubborn refusal to admit guilt. He was therefore not entitled to the mitigating circumstance.
• Aggravating Treachery and Penalty: Treachery was correctly appreciated. Based on the evidence and Dr. Margate's testimony, after the victim was dragged into a dark and secluded place unarmed, the two accused first disabled him by hacking the anterior aspects of both his right and left knees, causing a horizontal cut wound two inches long and one and one-half inches deep. Dr. Margate testified that the joints were cut so that the victim could not run and fight. The accused employed a mode of attack deliberately designed to insure the victim's death without any risk arising from the defense he could have made; the victim was unarmed and unable to make any defense. The other aggravating circumstances alleged—abuse of superior strength and nocturnity—were absorbed by treachery, while disrespect or disregard of age was not proven. With treachery and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty was reclusion perpetua.

• Positive Identification Through Other Senses — Positive identification in criminal cases need not be based only on the visual sense; it may include perception through other human senses. The Court applied this doctrine where the lone eyewitness did not visually see the fatal assault but heard her husband's voice, his plea, his moaning, and the thud sounds of stones hitting his body, and identified the accused as the persons who dragged him.
• Sufficiency of Lone Eyewitness Testimony Corroborated by Circumstantial Evidence — A lone eyewitness's testimony can sustain a conviction if it is credible and corroborated by circumstantial evidence. The Court applied this where Nilda Nasayao's testimony was supported by evidence that the accused were drunk and armed, the house was near a creek with stones, and the autopsy showed a blunt instrument caused the skull fracture.
• Inadmissibility of Extrajudicial Confession Without Competent and Independent Counsel — An extrajudicial confession taken without a competent and independent counsel present has no probative value; the right to counsel cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The Court applied this to reject Bueza's confession.
• Requisites of Mitigating Voluntary Confession — For voluntary confession to mitigate criminal liability, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open court; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. The Court applied this and found none satisfied.
• Treachery as an Aggravating Circumstance — Treachery is aggravating when the offender employs a mode of attack deliberately designed to insure the victim's death without any risk arising from the defense the victim could have made. The Court applied this where the unarmed victim was dragged into a dark and secluded place, his knees were hacked to prevent him from running or fighting, and he was then stoned. Treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength and nocturnity.
• Minor Inconsistencies Do Not Destroy Credibility — Inconsistencies and contradictions on minor details do not destroy a witness's credibility. The Court applied this to reject the appellant's attack on Nilda Nasayao's testimony.

• "The extrajudicial confession, however, has no probative value as it was taken without a competent and independent counsel present to assist the appellant. The Constitution clearly provides that the right to counsel cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (Article 111, Section 12 (1), Constitution)." — This states the ratio for rejecting the extrajudicial confession and explains why it could not be used against Bueza.
• "The Court of Appeals correctly observed that "positive Identification need not only mean the Identification by the use of the visual sense. It also includes other human senses with which one could perceive" as Nilda Nasayao defenitely recognized the voice of her husband while the latter was being killed." — This defines positive identification through senses other than sight, the key basis for sustaining the lone eyewitness testimony.
• "The inconsistencies and contradictions cited by the accused refer only to minor details which do not destroy the credibility of the witness (People v. De Las Piñas, 141 SCRA 379 [1986])." — This states the rule on minor inconsistencies and supports the Court's refusal to discredit the lone eyewitness.
• "Treachery is aggravating. The accused in waylaying the victim, employed a mode of attack, which was deliberately designed by them to insure his death without any risk arising from the defense which he could have made. He was unarmed. He was not able to make any defense at all." — This is the Court's quoted formulation of treachery, applied to the unarmed victim who was dragged and attacked without chance to defend himself.

• People vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511 [1978] — Cited as basis for the Court of Appeals' certification of the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court after it found the imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
• People vs. De Las Piñas, 141 SCRA 379 [1986] — Cited for the rule that inconsistencies and contradictions on minor details do not destroy the credibility of a witness.
• People vs. Roa, 167 SCRA 116 [1988] — Cited for the sufficiency of a lone testimony corroborated by circumstantial evidence to support a judgment of conviction.
• People vs. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 [1988] — Cited for the requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession.
• People vs. Pampanga, 139 SCRA 339 [1985] — Cited in connection with the accused's arraignment, where he did not plead guilty to the offense charged.
• People vs. Velez, 58 SCRA 21 — Cited for the rule that treachery is aggravating where the accused employed a mode of attack deliberately designed to insure death without risk from the victim's defense.
• People vs. Remollo, 123 SCRA 209 — Cited for the rule that abuse of superior strength and nocturnity are absorbed by treachery.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. The accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder under this provision.
• Article 111, Section 12(1), Constitution (as cited in the decision) — Provides that the right to counsel cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The extrajudicial confession was taken without a competent and independent counsel, so it had no probative value.
• Section 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court — The provision under which the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court after finding that the imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the trial court in imposing the original sentence of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor maximum; the Supreme Court modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.