People of the Philippines vs. Anod

For the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear to prosper, the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat; a situation where the accused could have evaded or resisted the threat does not exempt from criminal liability. Treachery exists where the victim is tied and lying down before being stabbed, as such means ensure execution without risk to the offender.

In the evening of May 16, 1997, Erlando Costan was stabbed and hacked to death inside his home in Barangay Borbonan, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Samuel Anod and Lionel Lumbayan surrendered to the barangay chairperson the following day, admitting the killing. They were charged with murder in an Information alleging conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation. At trial, Anod claimed he acted under Lumbayan’s compulsion; Lumbayan denied participation. The trial court disbelieved the defense and convicted both of murder.

• Nature of the Case: Anod and Lumbayan were charged with murder for the stabbing and hacking death of Erlando Costan on May 16, 1997, in Barangay Borbonan, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
• Prosecution’s Version: Before midnight, Costan was killed in his house. His body was discovered by Miguel Platil. The following day, Anod and Lumbayan surrendered to Barangay Chairperson Andromeda Perater, admitting before her that they killed Costan. On May 18, 1997, they were brought to the police station. Perater testified that Anod narrated the killing to her, and the narration was recorded in the barangay logbook, signed by Anod and Lumbayan, and witnessed by two others.
• Defense’s Version (Anod): Anod claimed that on the evening of May 16, 1997, after a drinking spree with Lumbayan and one Angges, Lumbayan suddenly stabbed Angges on their way home. Lumbayan then brought Anod to Costan’s house. When Costan opened the door, Lumbayan poked a knife at Costan, ordered Anod to tie the victim while he was lying down, and then ordered Anod to stab him. Anod alleged he complied only because Lumbayan was poking a knife at his breast, and he feared for his life. He stabbed Costan once in the back. They subsequently surrendered upon Anod’s prodding. Lumbayan proffered a different defense, claiming both had slept early at his aunt’s house and were merely fetched the next day.
• Trial Court Findings: The RTC gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence, particularly the voluntary surrender and admission recorded in the barangay logbook, and found both accused guilty of murder.

• Exempting Circumstance of Irresistible Force and Uncontrollable Fear: Appellant maintained that he acted without volition, blindly obeying Lumbayan and stabbing Costan under the compulsion of an irresistible force and uncontrollable fear for his life.
• Qualifying Circumstances Not Proven: Appellant contended that treachery and evident premeditation were not proved beyond reasonable doubt, as the prosecution relied solely on the testimony of the barangay chairperson without presenting any corroborating witness.

• No Exempting Circumstance: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the force exerted was insufficient to exempt from criminal liability. Apart from an initial refusal, appellant voiced no protest or objection, and he could have easily evaded Lumbayan or engaged him in equal combat since appellant himself was armed with a knife.
• Treachery Established: The OSG conceded that evident premeditation might not have been adequately proven but maintained that treachery was duly established by the manner of attack — the victim was tied down and stabbed, ensuring execution without risk.

• Exempting Circumstance: Whether appellant acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear sufficient to exempt him from criminal liability.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Exempting Circumstance: The defense of uncontrollable fear was untenable. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code and prevailing jurisprudence, for such a defense to prosper, the duress must be present, imminent, and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. Critically, the compulsion must leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat. Here, appellant had the chance to escape Lumbayan’s threat or to engage him in combat, as appellant himself was holding a knife at the time. His alleged fear, arising from Lumbayan’s threat, did not suffice to exempt him from criminal liability.
• Treachery: Treachery was properly appreciated. The victim was tied while lying down before he was stabbed; these means tended directly and specially to ensure the crime’s execution without risk to the assailants from any defensive or retaliatory act the victim might make. The victim could neither flee nor retaliate. This circumstance qualified the killing to murder.
• Evident Premeditation: The resolution did not make a specific finding on evident premeditation, it having been conceded that treachery alone sufficed to qualify the crime to murder. The conviction for murder thus rested on the established presence of treachery.

• Uncontrollable Fear as an Exempting Circumstance (Art. 12, RPC) — For the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear to apply, the compulsion must: (1) be present, imminent, and impending; (2) induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done; and (3) leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat. A threat of future injury is insufficient. Where the accused himself is armed and had the chance to flee or fight, the defense fails.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from any defense or retaliatory act the victim might make. The tying of a victim who is lying down, followed by a stabbing, constitutes the essence of treachery because it deprives the victim of any opportunity to defend himself or flee.
• Civil Indemnity in Murder Cases — Where the penalty imposed for murder is reclusion perpetua as the original and only penalty (not death subsequently reduced to reclusion perpetua under Republic Act No. 9346), the proper amount of civil indemnity ex delicto is ₱50,000.00. The higher amount of ₱75,000.00 applies only when the original imposable penalty was death.

• “[I]n order for the circumstance of uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat.” (citing People v. Morales)
• “Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend, directly and specifically, to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make.” (citing People v. Ramos)
• “Here, appellant tied Costan while the latter was lying down before he and Lumbayan stabbed the latter to death; thus, ensuring the execution of the crime without risk to themselves. Obviously, Costan could not flee for his life or retaliate. This aggravating circumstance qualifies the crime to murder.”

• People v. Morales, G.R. No. 148518, April 15, 2004 — Applied for the requisites of uncontrollable fear, specifically that the compulsion must leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
• People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 135204, April 14, 2004 — Applied for the definition and elements of treachery.
• People v. Molina and Tagudar, G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009 — Cited to enumerate the types of damages awardable when death occurs due to a crime.
• People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 171272, June 7, 2007, and People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006 — Distinguished; these cases involved the original imposition of the death penalty later reduced to reclusion perpetua by R.A. No. 9346, warranting civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00, unlike the instant case where reclusion perpetua was the penalty imposed from the outset.

• Article 12, Revised Penal Code — Exempting circumstances, including irresistible force and uncontrollable fear. Applied to reject the defense because the compulsion left appellant an opportunity for escape or self-defense.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Murder. Applied with treachery as the qualifying circumstance.
• Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty) — Mentioned to distinguish cases where the death penalty was originally imposable and subsequently reduced, which affects the benchmark for civil indemnity.

Conchita Carpio Morales (additional member per Special Order No. 679); Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 678); Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; Diosdado M. Peralta.