People of the Philippines vs. Angel Reyes y Alcantara

A killing committed suddenly against an unarmed victim seated and unaware, by a method insuring execution without risk from defense, is murder qualified by treachery, and abuse of public position aggravates liability when the offender uses his status and service firearm to commit the act.

On October 1, 1970, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jose Garcia and his cousin Norberto Flores were on their way to the place where they drove a taxi near their residences on G. Tuason, Sampaloc, Manila. Along the way they stopped to watch an insane person with a group of people. Two men, one of whom was accused Angel Reyes, approached and inquired about a certain Oscar Solomon. Norberto Flores then approached the accused to ask for a cigarette light, but the accused struck him with a karate chop to the stomach using the side of his open palm while poking a gun at them and saying, Ang sama ng porma ninyo. The accused and his companion appeared to have taken liquor as they had alcoholic breath, then proceeded to look for Oscar Solomon while Garcia and Flores went to the latter's house and stayed by the door.

Thereafter, Garcia together with Flores, Ernesto Bautista and Isagani Reyes went to Police Precinct No. 4 on G. Tuason to report the gun-poking incident. The accused and his companion were picked up by three police officers and brought to the precinct for investigation. The accused made known that he was a policeman from Police Precinct No. 8, Manila Police Department, in civilian clothes because he was on emergency leave that day. Inside the investigation room on the second floor, the accused tried to settle the matter with Garcia. Conchita Flores, mother of Norberto Flores, arrived, refused settlement, and she and the accused shouted at each other, with the accused saying, Ayaw ninyong paareglo gusto ninyo cuarta, cuarta.

The accused then approached Norberto Flores, who was seated on a chair in front of the table of investigator Det. Domingo Gomez of the MPD, and sat on the edge of the table about two feet away. After uttering bad words and saying, I will shoot you now, he pulled his gun from his waistline and shot Flores, then seated, stooping and smoking, hitting him in the abdomen. The wound caused Flores' death a few hours thereafter. People inside scampered for cover except Det. Gomez; Det. Ferrera arrived, disarmed the accused, and Det. Gomez placed him under arrest. The accused refused to give any statement.

According to appellant, the shooting was accidental. He testified that when he approached Flores, he heard Flores say he was only brave because he had a gun, prompting him to answer, You are always saying about my gun, here is my gun, after which he drew his gun from his right waist to hand it over. While allegedly handing it over, the gun suddenly fired. The trial court rejected this version, found the shooting intentional, and convicted appellant as charged.

• Accidental Shooting: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in holding the shooting was not accidental.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioner maintained that the testimonies of Jose Garcia and Conchita Flores should not have been given weight because they were contradictory and conflicting on material points and were biased as cousin and mother of the deceased.
• Absence of Treachery: Petitioner argued that treachery did not attend the commission of the offense.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Petitioner claimed the attendance of sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, drunkenness, voluntary surrender, and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.

• Intentional Shooting: Respondent countered through the Solicitor General that accidental shooting was negated because a revolver requires pressure on the trigger to fire whether cocked or uncocked, and because appellant, as a police officer, should have handed the gun butt first rather than with the muzzle pointed at the deceased.
• Post-Shooting Conduct: Respondent argued that appellant's refusal to give a statement after arrest and failure to help the victim or express regret cast doubt on the claim of accident.

• Nature of Shooting: Whether the shooting of Norberto Flores was accidental or intentional.
• Witness Credibility: Whether inconsistencies and relationship to the victim impaired the credibility of prosecution witnesses Jose Garcia and Conchita Flores.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Abuse of Public Position: Whether the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position attended the crime.
• Mitigation and Intoxication: Whether sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, drunkenness, voluntary surrender, or lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong mitigated liability.
• Civil Liability: Whether the awards of moral and exemplary damages were in accordance with law.

• Nature of Shooting: No. The shooting was intentional, not accidental, as shown by the preceding threat, the mechanics of firing a revolver, improper handling, and appellant's subsequent conduct.
• Witness Credibility: No. Minor inconsistencies on collateral matters did not impair credibility and relationship alone does not render testimony biased.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery qualified the killing to murder because the unarmed, seated victim was unaware and defenseless against a sudden gunshot at close range.
• Abuse of Public Position: Yes. Abuse of public position aggravated the crime because appellant used his status as a policeman to retain his service firearm and dominate the investigation room.
• Mitigation and Intoxication: No. None of the claimed mitigating circumstances or intoxication was established under the requisites of the Revised Penal Code.
• Civil Liability: Yes. The P8,000.00 moral damages and P8,000.00 exemplary damages were justified, the latter by the aggravating circumstance.

• Nature of Shooting: The claim of accident defied belief because the shot was immediately preceded by threatening words. Had the firing been accidental, the natural tendency would have been to help the victim and express regret to the mother, yet appellant instead aimed at the prostrate body, preventing the mother from approaching her son. A revolver is not prone to accidental firing when merely handed over, since pressure on the trigger is necessary whether cocked or uncocked, and basic firearms safety required handing the gun butt first rather than muzzle toward the person. Refusal to give any statement after arrest further contradicted innocence.
• Witness Credibility: The cited inconsistencies — who approached whom before the karate chop, whether the gun was poked at one or both men, whether Garcia and Flores went home before the precinct, and the length and tone of talk inside the precinct — concerned only minor and collateral matters. Such discordance was regarded as demonstrating good faith and absence of coaching rather than falsehood. Relationship to the victim alone does not impair positive and clear testimony.
• Treachery: The victim was unarmed, seated on a chair at the investigator's table, stooping and smoking, completely unaware of the impending attack. From the edge of the table two feet away, appellant drew his gun and fired immediately after saying he would shoot. The method employed tended directly and specially to insure execution without risk from any defense the offended party might make.
• Abuse of Public Position: Appellant, though in civilian clothes, identified himself as a Precinct 8 policeman. Because of that position he was not relieved of his service firearm despite a grave-threats charge and had the run of Precinct 4's investigation room, even sitting on the investigator's table in disregard of respect due. Instead of upholding the law with his service firearm, he used it to kill, rendering his responsibility greater.
• Mitigation and Intoxication: Provocation and obfuscation could not be appreciated because the alleged provocation came from the mother, not the deceased, and both arose from the same incident and must be treated as one. Voluntary surrender was absent because appellant was disarmed and arrested without spontaneous unconditional submission; mere non-escape is insufficient. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was negated by use of a deadly weapon fired almost point-blank at the abdomen. Intoxication was disproved by medical certification showing appellant was not intoxicated.
• Civil Liability: Moral damages of P8,000.00 for death were in accordance with law governing civil liability for felonies resulting in death. Exemplary damages were justified in view of the finding of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position.

• Treachery as qualifying circumstance — Treachery exists when the offender employs a method of attack tending directly and specially to insure execution without risk to himself arising from defense the offended party might make. Applied here, sudden close-range shooting of an unarmed, seated, unaware victim qualified the killing to murder.
• Abuse of public position as aggravating circumstance — Under Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, advantage taken of public position aggravates liability. Applied here, retention of the service firearm and dominance of the investigation room by reason of police status made the crime graver.
• Credibility despite minor inconsistencies and relationship — Discrepancies on minor collateral matters heighten rather than destroy credibility as they show absence of coaching, and relationship to the victim alone does not impair positive testimony. Applied to sustain the testimonies of the cousin and mother despite collateral discordance.
• Provocation and passion and obfuscation — Sufficient provocation must come from the offended party immediately preceding the act, and provocation and obfuscation arising from the same incident are treated as one. Applied to deny mitigation where the alleged provocation came from the victim's mother.
• Voluntary surrender — A surrender is voluntary only when spontaneous, showing intent to submit unconditionally to authorities; mere failure to escape after disarming and arrest is not voluntary surrender. Applied to deny mitigation where appellant was disarmed and arrested.
• Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong — Intent to kill may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon fired at close range at a vital part. Applied to deny mitigation where appellant fired almost point-blank at the abdomen causing death.

• "I will shoot you now" — Uttered by appellant immediately before drawing his gun and shooting the seated victim, establishing intent and negating accident.
• "Ang sama ng porma ninyo." — Said by appellant while striking the deceased with a karate chop and poking a gun during the initial encounter, showing the antecedent aggression.
• "Ayaw ninyong paareglo gusto ninyo cuarta, cuarta." — Said by appellant to the victim's mother during the shouting inside the investigation room, providing context for the ensuing shooting.

• People vs. Doria, L-26188-90, Jan. 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 435 — Cited to support that discordance on collateral matters heightens credibility and shows testimony was not coached.
• People vs. Cabiltes, L-18010, Sept. 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 112 — Cited for the rule that minor discrepancies are a demonstration of good faith rather than falsehood.
• People vs. Malillos, L-26568, July 29, 1968 — Cited for the rule that relationship to the victim alone does not impair positive and clear testimony.
• People vs. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1 — Cited to support appreciation of abuse of public position as aggravating.
• People vs. De los Santos, 85 Phil. 870 — Cited for treating provocation and obfuscation arising from the same incident as one circumstance.
• People vs. Conwi, 71 Phil. 585 — Cited for the rule that arrest after being disarmed is not voluntary surrender.
• Heirs of Raymundo Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, Feb. 28, 1969 — Cited to sustain the award of moral damages for death resulting from the crime.

• Article 14, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides abuse of public position as aggravating circumstance; applied because appellant retained his service firearm and dominated the precinct by virtue of being a policeman.
• Article 13, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — Provides sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act as mitigating; denied because provocation did not come from the deceased.
• Articles 100, 104 and 107, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 1161, Civil Code — Provide that every person criminally liable is civilly liable including indemnification for death; applied to sustain indemnity and moral damages.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur. Castro, C.J., concurs in the result. Antonio, J., took no part.