People of the Philippines vs. Amistad

A complainant in a criminal action cannot appeal from a judgment of acquittal, even insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, because the civil liability impliedly instituted with the criminal action arises from the offense and is dependent upon conviction; the offended party’s remedy, if any, is a separate civil action.

Mercedes L. Javellana was the complainant in a criminal action for estafa against Itong Amistad, arising from an alleged prior agreement to convey a portion of registered land. The procedural dispute implicated the Rules of Court provisions on the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action and Article 29 of the Civil Code, which permits a separate civil action for damages when an accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt. The case thus required the Supreme Court to distinguish between civil liability arising from the offense and civil liability arising from other sources.

On February 10, 1962, Itong Amistad entered into an agreement with Mercedes L. Javellana to convey to her an area of 10,000 square meters from a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 for the sum of P10,000, and he received from her P5,000. The parcel was Lot 1, plan Psu-203086-Amd., Civil Reservation Case No. 1, L.R.C. Civil Reservation Record No. 211, situated in Res. Sec. “J”, City of Baguio, bounded on the northeast by property of Honor Kingdoms, on the southwest by Lot 2, and on the west and northwest by public land, containing an area of 84,653 square meters, more or less, and registered in the names of spouses Itong Amistad and Luisa Tengdan.

On January 30, 1965, Amistad sold, conveyed, transferred, and delivered by deed of sale to Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42,326 square meters of the same parcel. On October 11, 1965, he sold, conveyed, transferred, and delivered to Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42,326 square meters. On December 23, 1965, he executed a supplemental deed of sale over the entire area covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 in favor of Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an, which effected the issuance of two separate titles in favor of the vendees.

The prosecution alleged that Amistad did these acts knowing fully well and purposely withholding the information that he had previously agreed to convey 10,000 square meters to Javellana and had already received P5,000 from her, thereby causing damage and prejudice to Javellana in the amount of P5,000. An information for estafa under Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code was filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet.

After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision dated February 8, 1971, and promulgated on March 18, 1971, acquitting Amistad. The trial court held that “the case of the prosecution is civil in nature” and that “the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.” On the same day, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the judgment insofar as the civil liability of the accused was concerned. The trial court apparently approved the appeal, and the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without awaiting completion of the transcript of stenographic notes, on the legal proposition that an appeal by the complainant from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed. Javellana moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals resolutions and judgment in her favor against Amistad insofar as his civil liability was concerned, including payment of the value of the one-hectare portion, litigation expenses, and costs.

• Right to Appeal the Civil Aspect: Petitioner argued that Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court expressly allows either party to appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting substantial rights, except the People when the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy, and that her appeal was limited to the civil liability of the accused.
• Implied Institution of the Civil Action: Petitioner maintained that under Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and Article 29 of the Civil Code, the civil action for recovery of civil liability was impliedly instituted with the criminal action because she did not reserve or waive it, and that the extinction of the penal action did not extinguish the civil liability unless the final judgment declared that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist.
• Failure to Rule on Civil Liability: Petitioner contended that she hired a private prosecutor to handle primarily the civil aspect of the case, presented evidence bearing on the accused’s civil liability, and discussed it in a memorandum, yet the trial court failed to rule on that liability; this omission was the thrust of her first assigned error.
• Multiplicity of Actions: Petitioner invoked the rule against multiplicity of actions to argue that she should not be compelled to file a separate civil action when the civil liability could be resolved in the same proceeding.
• Due Process: Petitioner complained that disallowing her appeal denied her due process.

• Appeal from Acquittal as to Civil Liability: Whether the complainant in a criminal action for estafa may appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

• Appeal from Acquittal as to Civil Liability: No. The civil liability impliedly instituted with the criminal action arises from the offense and is dependent upon conviction; an appeal from acquittal would require a new determination of criminal liability, which cannot be done. The remedy is a separate civil action if the cause of action is based on law, contract, quasi-delict, or another source independent of the offense.

• Appeal from Acquittal as to Civil Liability: Article 29 of the Civil Code requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. In a criminal action, the civil liability recoverable is solely dependent upon conviction because it arises from the offense. The accused is not afforded the same remedies as in an ordinary civil action, and no mandatory pre-trial is held. If civil liability arises from other sources, such as law, contract, or quasi-delict, it must be enforced by an ordinary civil action. People vs. Herrera held that an acquittal without pronouncement on civil liability ended both the criminal and civil aspects if no reservation was made; an appeal would reopen civil liability based on criminal responsibility, which cannot be done after acquittal. The two actions rise or fall together. If the civil action was reserved, or if the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt, a separate civil action may be filed alleging an independent cause of action, with only preponderance of evidence required. Here, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal; the trial court’s failure to rule on civil liability did not authorize an appeal. Petitioner may file a separate civil action if her cause of action falls under quasi-delict, law, contract, or another source, but not from the offense of which the accused was acquitted.

• Civil liability impliedly instituted with the criminal action depends on conviction — When the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless reserved or waived, the civil liability is based on the offense and is solely dependent upon conviction. The accused is not afforded the same remedies as in an ordinary civil action, and no mandatory pre-trial is held. In this case, because Amistad was acquitted, the civil liability impliedly instituted with the criminal action could not be enforced through an appeal.
• No appeal by the offended party from a judgment of acquittal — The offended party cannot appeal from a judgment of acquittal, even as to the civil aspect, because such an appeal would reopen the question of criminal liability and require a new determination thereof after the accused had already been acquitted. The Court applied this rule to dismiss Javellana’s appeal.
• Separate civil action after acquittal based on reasonable doubt — Under Article 29 of the Civil Code, when an accused is acquitted on the ground that guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, a separate civil action for damages may be instituted, requiring only preponderance of evidence. The Court held that this remedy requires the filing of a proper complaint in a separate action, not an appeal from the acquittal.
• Distinction between civil liability arising from the offense and civil liability from other sources — If the civil liability arises from law, contract, quasi-delict, or another source independent of the offense, it must be enforced by an ordinary civil action, with all defenses and remedies available to the defendant. Only civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action and depends on conviction. Javellana was thus remitted to a separate civil action if her cause of action fell under any other source, but not from the offense of which Amistad was acquitted.
• Double jeopardy and the People’s right to appeal — The People cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy. The offended party cannot circumvent this by appealing only the civil aspect because the civil liability impliedly instituted arises from the offense and would require re-determination of criminal liability.

• "The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint." — This states the ratio for rejecting the appeal: the remedy after acquittal on reasonable doubt is a separate civil action, not an appeal from the criminal judgment.
• "In a criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment." — This explains why the civil liability impliedly instituted with the criminal action cannot survive an acquittal and why an appeal would be improper.
• "Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall together." — This is the canonical formulation of the dependency of the implied civil action on the criminal action.
• "However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required." — This identifies the available remedy and its evidentiary standard, distinguishing it from an appeal.

• People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21 — Controlling precedent; the accused was acquitted without any pronouncement on civil liability, and the Supreme Court disallowed an appeal by the offended party, holding that the acquittal covered both the criminal and civil aspects if no reservation was made and that civil liability must be based on criminal responsibility.
• People vs. Lipana, 72 Phil. 166 — Cited by the Court of Appeals as holding that an appeal from the dismissal of a criminal case on motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the offended party.
• People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679 — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the same rule disallowing an appeal by the offended party from a dismissal or acquittal in a criminal case.
• People vs. Flores, G.R. No. L-7523, December 18, 1957 — Cited by the Court of Appeals, together with People vs. Velez, People vs. Liggayu, People vs. Lipana, People vs. Florendo, and Ricafort vs. Fernan, as authority that an appeal by the complainant from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.

• Article 316, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — The criminal charge against Amistad was estafa under this provision; the information alleged that he sold the same land to other vendees while withholding his prior agreement to convey a portion to Javellana.
• Section 2, Rule 122, Rules of Court — Petitioner invoked this provision, which states that the People cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy and that in all other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting substantial rights. The Court held it did not authorize the complainant’s appeal from an acquittal.
• Section 3, Rule 111, Rules of Court — Petitioner invoked this provision on other civil actions arising from offenses, which states that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil unless the extinction proceeds from a final judgment declaring that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. The Court distinguished this as requiring a separate civil action where warranted.
• Article 29, Civil Code — Petitioner relied on this provision allowing a civil action for damages when the accused is acquitted on the ground that guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, with only preponderance of evidence required. The Court held it requires the institution of a separate action by proper complaint, not an appeal from the acquittal.
• Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court — This provision, cited in the decision, states that the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless reserved or waived. The Court used it to explain that the implied civil action is based on the offense and depends on conviction.
• Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Cited in the Court of Appeals resolution as recognizing the offended party’s right to intervene in the criminal action, but the Court of Appeals held that this right does not permit an appeal when the accused is acquitted.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the People vs. Herrera quotation, this provision establishes that civil liability must be based on the criminal responsibility of the defendant. The Court relied on this principle to hold that an appeal from acquittal would improperly reopen criminal liability.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., took no part. No separate concurring opinions are set out in the text.