People of the Philippines vs. Amado Bagnate

A counsel's failure to apprise an accused of the imposable penalty for the crime he is about to admit does not render an extrajudicial confession inadmissible, since the Constitution requires only that the accused be informed of his right to remain silent and to competent and independent counsel, and that the assistance given be more than a routine, peremptory, and meaningless recital of constitutional rights.

Amado Bagnate was charged with the killing of Aurea Broña, his blind 70-year-old grandparent, and with the rape and killing of Rosalie Rayala, whom he described in his confession as his nephew, both crimes having been committed in Barangay Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. The offenses were prosecuted under Republic Act No. 7659, the law that reimposed the death penalty on certain heinous crimes, including murder qualified by abuse of superior strength and rape attended by homicide. No eyewitnesses existed to either incident, so the prosecution's case turned on the admissibility and weight of Bagnate's extrajudicial confession, which had been taken with the assistance of a lawyer and subsequently sworn before a municipal trial court judge.

At around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of August 7, 1997, in Barangay Buhian, Tabaco, Albay, Aurea Broña, a 70-year-old blind woman, and Rosalie Rayala were killed. Aurea was hacked to death, and Rosalie was raped and then hacked to death. No one witnessed the incidents; the prosecution's account of how the crimes were committed came entirely from the extrajudicial confession of Amado Bagnate, whom the victims' relatives and the police identified as the assailant.

In the afternoon of August 7, 1997, Bagnate was turned over to SPO2 Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation. Without first asking his name, SPO2 Ambion informed Bagnate in the Bicol dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by counsel, that whatever he said might be used against or in his favor, and that he could not be tortured or molested. Asked whether he was willing to cooperate, Bagnate assented and initially gave his name as "Amado Magnate." When Bagnate signified his willingness to confess, SPO2 Ambion again informed him of his rights and asked whether he wanted counsel; Bagnate replied that his counsel was in Manila. SPO2 Ambion offered the services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, which Bagnate accepted. SPO2 Ambion fetched Atty. Brotamonte, whose office was several meters from the police station, but the lawyer said he would follow because he was then holding an office blessing. Upon arriving, Atty. Brotamonte asked the policemen to leave the investigation room and conferred privately with Bagnate, introduced himself, informed Bagnate of his rights, examined his body for injuries, and found none, though he noticed that Bagnate's left hand was handcuffed to the table. Bagnate told Atty. Brotamonte that he was willing to give a statement. The investigation proceeded in the Bicol dialect, with SPO2 Ambion asking the questions and the answers later translated into English with Atty. Brotamonte's help. After each page was typed, Atty. Brotamonte translated and explained its contents to Bagnate, and both signed. SPO1 Rogelio Gonzales took photographs throughout.

In the confession, Bagnate narrated that at about 6:00 P.M. on August 6, 1997, he drank gin with Faustino Bufi and Carlito Begil at the store of Yolanda Buban; that Begil mentioned he would have sex with a woman that night without identifying her; that they finished drinking at about 8:00 P.M. and went home; that he proceeded to the house of his brother-in-law Roberto Angeles to spend the night; that at about 12:30 A.M. on August 7, 1997, he went out, left his bolo on the ground, and entered his grandparents' house, going directly to the room where Rosalie Rayala was sleeping; that he embraced and kissed the sleeping Rosalie, who boxed and slapped him, but he continued until she followed him to the door, where he kissed her again; that when she slapped him once more, he got hold of the bolo and hacked her on the neck, causing her to fall; that he then pulled Rosalie and had carnal knowledge of her while she was still alive, while Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles stood watching; that after he satisfied his lust, Begil took his turn; that his grandparent Aurea Broña then shouted, and thinking that she had heard what he was doing, he hacked her on the neck; that when she fell, he pulled her away from the house toward the grassy portion of the yard, where Begil and Angeles followed and where he could no longer determine which of the two had carnal knowledge of his grandparent; and that he then left and proceeded to the main road to Tabaco. He added that before reaching the main road he passed the house of Jose (whose family name he had forgotten) and Armando Bosque, both barangay tanods, told them that his godfather Julian Baloloy wanted them because something had happened at his grandparents' house, then hurriedly left, prepared coffee at Angeles's house, and boarded a jeep to the town proper, where he spent the night at the plaza, heard mass the next morning, ate breakfast at his sister Avelina Calla's house in Tayhi, Tabaco, and decided to evade arrest by proceeding to Metro Manila and then to his workplace in Pulilan, Bulacan. He stated that he was apprehended by residents of Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay, and brought to the Tabaco police.

After the confession was typed and signed, Atty. Brotamonte left the police station; the entire process took more than an hour. The next day, August 8, 1997, Bagnate was brought before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested Atty. Brotamonte's presence and examined the voluntariness and veracity of the confession and the authenticity of the signatures. He explained to Bagnate the consequences of confessing to the crimes charged, asked whether he had been coerced, inspected his body, and asked whether he was still willing to sign; Bagnate answered in the affirmative, saying his conscience bothered him, and affixed his signature again in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte.

Bagnate repudiated the confession before the trial court, assailing its admissibility on the ground that it was executed in violation of his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and that he had not been fully apprised of the consequences of his confession. He testified that the real perpetrators were his brother-in-law Roberto Angeles and a certain Carlito Begil, and that he was forced to own up to the crimes because Angeles threatened to harm him or his sister, Angeles's wife, if he refused. On the witness stand, Bagnate recounted that in the afternoon of August 6, 1997, he was drinking with Carlito Begil and Faustino Bufe at Yolanda Bulan's store; that Begil mentioned planning to have sex with someone he did not identify; that they finished at about 8:00 P.M. and walked home; that Begil asked him to accompany him to Rosalie Rayala's house but he declined because he was hungry; that he went to the house of Roberto Angeles, who was married to his sister Maria Nellie Bagnate; that while he was on the porch smoking, Angeles arrived very drunk and Begil arrived later; that Begil and Angeles drank "kalampunay," of which he took only one glass before going inside to get a cigarette; that when he returned to the porch, Angeles and Begil were gone; that at about 12:30 A.M. he went inside and slept; that he was awakened by the shout of his ninong, Julian Baloloy, telling him to fetch a barangay tanod; that he fetched Jose Rodriquez and Armando Bosque and they went to Rosalie's house thirty meters away; that he was told to build a fire while the rest searched for "something"; that after idling in the yard he returned to Angeles's house for coffee; that Angeles and Begil then arrived and Angeles told him to flee or he would kill his sister, giving him P10.00; that he took a jeep to Tabaco, reached the plaza at 2:00 A.M., proceeded to his sister Avelina Bagnate's house in Tayhi, and was finally arrested in Bangkilingan, Tabaco at 5:00 A.M. of August 7, 1997.

The trial court found the extrajudicial confession admissible and, on that basis, convicted Bagnate of the crimes charged. The trial court found that Bagnate hacked both victims on the neck with a bolo and dragged Aurea toward the grassy portion of the yard, and that he raped Rosalie, findings confirmed by the autopsies conducted by Tabaco Rural Health Officer Dr. Amelia Guiriba, which showed that both victims were hacked to death and that Rosalie had contusions on the floor of her vaginal wall. Defense witness Julian Baloloy testified that around midnight of August 7, 1997, he heard cries for help from Aurea's house; that he and his son Rodel went there with a flashlight, called out without response, and found blood and strands of hair on the floor but no sign of the two; that they shouted for help and Roberto Angeles arrived, followed by Bagnate, who said he had just come from work and had not cleaned his hands; that when Rodel shone the flashlight on Bagnate, they saw his hands sticky and covered in red; that Baloloy ordered Bagnate to fetch a barangay tanod; that when Armando Bosque and Jose Rodriguez arrived, they searched while Bagnate was told to build a fire; and that at the back of the house they saw impressions indicating an object had been dragged, and found the dead bodies fifty meters away.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant assigned as error the trial court's giving of credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession, contending that it was executed in violation of his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and that he was not fully apprised of the consequences of his confession.
• Incompetence of Counsel: Appellant maintained that Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and independent counsel because he failed to advise him of the penalty to be imposed for the crimes he was accused of committing, so that he was not aware of the consequences of his admissions.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and Rape with Homicide.
• Coercion and Third-Party Perpetration: Appellant claimed that the real perpetrators were his brother-in-law Roberto Angeles and a certain Carlito Begil, and that he was forced to own up to the crimes because Angeles threatened to harm him or his sister if he did not do so.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession was admissible in evidence notwithstanding that counsel failed to apprise the accused of the imposable penalty for the crimes to which he was admitting.
• Competence and Independence of Counsel: Whether Atty. Paterno Brotamonte rendered competent and independent assistance to the accused during custodial investigation.
• Voluntariness of the Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession was executed voluntarily, free from torture, force, violence, threat, or intimidation.
• Corroboration by Corpus Delicti: Whether the extrajudicial confession was corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether treachery, nocturnity, and abuse of superior strength were properly appreciated in qualifying the killing of Aurea Broña to Murder.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: Yes. The confession was admissible; the failure of counsel to apprise the accused of the imposable penalty is not a ground to strike it down, since the Constitution does not mandate such disclosure.
• Competence and Independence of Counsel: Yes. Atty. Brotamonte rendered assistance that was more than perfunctory, having conferred privately with the accused, informed him of his rights, and explained the questions and answers to him.
• Voluntariness of the Confession: Yes. The confession was voluntary; the accused failed to substantiate his claim of maltreatment, and the safeguards of the Constitution were observed.
• Corroboration by Corpus Delicti: Yes. The confession was corroborated by the death certificates and autopsy findings showing that both victims were hacked to death and that Rosalie was raped.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Treachery and nocturnity were not established; abuse of superior strength was alleged and proven, qualifying the killing to Murder and sustaining the death penalty.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: To be admissible, an extrajudicial confession must be express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and competent counsel, and a person under custodial investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very start. Section 12(1) to (3), Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible only a confession given without the accused having been informed of his right to remain silent, or without competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, or where the waiver was not in writing and in the presence of counsel, or where torture, force, threat, intimidation, or other means vitiated free will. Nothing in the Constitution mandates that counsel inform the accused of the possible penalty for the crime committed, and no presumption of incompetence or lack of independence arises from such failure, because the imposable penalty is immaterial to the accused's resolve to admit guilt.

• Competence and Independence of Counsel: To be considered competent and independent, a lawyer must be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who merely gives a routine, peremptory, and meaningless recital of constitutional rights; the right to be informed contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than a ceremonial recitation of an abstract principle. Atty. Brotamonte privately conferred with the accused before the investigation, examined his body for injuries, informed him of his constitutional rights, explained the questions propounded by SPO2 Ambion, and translated and explained the contents of each page before both signed, thereby ably assisting the accused from the time he signified his intention to confess until he signed the confession. The accused was further made aware of the consequences of his admissions when Judge Base explained them to him before administering the oath.

• Voluntariness of the Confession: The accused failed to substantiate his bare claim that the police boxed and kicked him and told him to confess. Both Atty. Brotamonte and Judge Base asked whether he was forced to confess, and he answered that he was not; had the claim of force been true, he had the opportunity to complain to either of them. The absence of evidence of compulsion or duress, the failure to complain to the officers who administered the oath, the failure to institute any criminal or administrative action against the alleged intimidators, the absence of marks of violence, and the failure to have himself examined by a physician all indicate voluntariness. To consider the allegation of maltreatment as true would facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture without proof. The confession thus constitutes evidence of a high order, given the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.

• Corroboration by Corpus Delicti: Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession is not sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, which requires some other evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. The corpus delicti in both cases consisted of the victims' deaths, evidenced by their death certificates and by the autopsies showing that both were hacked to death and that Rosalie was raped. These findings coincided with the confession: the hacking of both victims on the neck with a bolo, the dragging of Aurea toward the grassy portion of the yard, and the rape of Rosalie, confirmed by the contusion on the floor of her vaginal wall. The recovery of the bolo likewise jibed with the confession. These were details the accused could not have known had he not committed the crimes, and his arrest only five hours after the occurrence made it impossible for him to have learned the details elsewhere. The defense evidence itself lent additional credence, particularly Julian Baloloy's testimony that he saw marks on the yard indicating something had been dragged and that he saw the accused's hands sticky and covered in red.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The trial court erred in appreciating treachery, because the evidence did not sufficiently prove its attendance and no one actually saw the incident; the fact that Aurea was blind did not necessarily qualify her killing as treacherous, and the confession contained nothing demonstrating that the accused deliberately employed a particular means, method, or form of attack. Nocturnity could not be considered aggravating because it was not shown that the darkness of the night was purposely sought to facilitate or ensure the commission of the crime. Dwelling could not be appreciated because it was not alleged in the Information. Abuse of superior strength, however, was alleged in the Information and established by the prosecution; under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by death if committed with abuse of superior strength, so the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty in Criminal Case No. T-2874. In Criminal Case No. T-2875, Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, imposes the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape a homicide is committed, so the death penalty was likewise correctly imposed.

• Requisites of an Admissible Extrajudicial Confession — An extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must be express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and competent counsel, and the person under custodial investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very start. The presence of counsel is intended to secure voluntariness and must provide full protection to the accused's constitutional rights, premised on the presumption that the accused is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere of menacing police interrogation where compulsion, physical or psychological, is forcefully apparent.
• Competent and Independent Counsel — For a lawyer to be considered competent and independent in assisting an accused during custodial investigation, he must be willing to fully safeguard the accused's constitutional rights, as distinguished from one who merely gives a routine, peremptory, and meaningless recital of constitutional rights. The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. The presence of counsel is not intended to stop the accused from saying anything incriminating but to preclude the slightest coercion that would lead him to admit something false; counsel should never prevent the accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
• Imposable Penalty Not a Requisite of Disclosure — The Constitution does not mandate that counsel inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he is about to admit, and no presumption of incompetence or lack of independence arises from such failure, because the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the accused's resolve to admit guilt.
• Corpus Delicti Corroboration Rule — Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, which requires some other evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. Corpus delicti means the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, that a crime has actually been committed.
• Indicia of Voluntariness — Where the accused presented no evidence of compulsion, duress, or violence; failed to complain to the officers who administered the oath; did not institute any criminal or administrative action against the alleged intimidators; showed no marks of violence on their bodies; and did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress the claim, these factors indicate the voluntariness of the confession. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language where, upon its face, it exhibits no suspicious circumstances and is replete with details that could only be supplied by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It must be shown that the offender deliberately employed a particular means, method, or form of attack in the execution of the crime.
• Nocturnity — Nocturnity is aggravating only where it is shown that the darkness of the night was purposely sought by the offender to facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure its execution.
• Dwelling — Dwelling may not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance where it is not alleged in the Information.
• Abuse of Superior Strength — Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by death if committed with abuse of superior strength, where such circumstance is alleged in the Information and established by the prosecution.
• Civil Indemnity, Moral and Exemplary Damages — In murder cases, civil indemnity requires no further proof other than death, and is separate and distinct from moral damages, which are based on a different jural foundation and assessed in the exercise of sound discretion. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In rape with homicide, civil indemnity was increased to P100,000.00, and moral damages of P75,000.00 may be awarded without need of proof in view of the rape suffered by the victim.

• "The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellant's extrajudicial confession." — This states the ratio decidendi on the principal issue of admissibility, holding that disclosure of the imposable penalty is not among the constitutional requisites for a valid extrajudicial confession.
• "There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission of a crime." — This is the canonical formulation of the Court's holding on the scope of the right to competent and independent counsel, distinguishing the constitutional requisites from matters that do not affect voluntariness.
• "To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting an accused during a custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be: '….willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights.'" — This defines the standard for competent and independent counsel, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on custodial investigation.
• "Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. The Rule specifically requires that there should be some other evidence 'tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.'" — This states the corroboration requirement applied to sustain the conviction on the basis of the confession.

• People vs. Basay, 219 SCRA 404 — Cited for the principle that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
• People vs. Porio, G.R. No. 117202, February 13, 2002, 376 SCRA 596 — Cited for the standard defining a competent and independent counsel as one willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused.
• People vs. Continente, G.R. Nos. 100801-02, August 25, 2000, 339 SCRA 1 — Cited for the factors indicating voluntariness of a confession, including the absence of evidence of compulsion and the failure to complain to the officers who administered the oath.
• People vs. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999, 312 SCRA 640 — Cited for the rule that an extrajudicial confession requires corroboration by evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.
• People vs. Manlansing, G.R. Nos. 131736-37, March 11, 2002, 378 SCRA 685 — Cited for the rule that nocturnity is not aggravating unless the darkness of the night was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Gallego, G.R. No. 130603, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 21 — Cited for the rule that dwelling may not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance where it is not alleged in the Information.
• People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994) — Cited for the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993.

• Section 12(1) to (3), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the rights of a person under investigation to be informed of the right to remain silent and to competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; prohibits torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, and other means vitiating free will; and renders inadmissible any confession or admission obtained in violation of the section. The Court applied it to hold that the confession was admissible because the accused was informed of his rights and assisted by competent and independent counsel, and no coercion was shown.
• Section 17, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; cited in relation to the inadmissibility clause of Section 12(3).
• Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides that an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. The Court applied it to require corroboration, which was supplied by the death certificates and autopsy findings.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines murder and imposes the penalty of death when committed with abuse of superior strength. The Court applied it to affirm the death penalty in Criminal Case No. T-2874.
• Article 334, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Imposes the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape a homicide is committed. The Court applied it to affirm the death penalty in Criminal Case No. T-2875.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Court applied it to award P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of each victim.
• Article 2219, paragraph 1, Civil Code — Basis for the award of moral damages; cited in connection with the award of moral damages to the heirs of Rosalie Rayala.
• Section 25, Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83, Revised Penal Code — Governs the forwarding of records to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power upon finality of the decision.

Vitug (Acting Chief Justice), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., were on official leave. It was noted that three Justices of the Court maintained their position that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submitted to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.