People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Badon, et al.

A judge who did not preside over the entire trial may validly decide based on the full record and transcripts, and positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over denial and alibi. Where the victim had an opportunity to parry the initial attack and escape, treachery is absent; abuse of superior strength qualifies the killing as murder when multiple armed assailants attack an unarmed victim.

Edwin Gomez was a bus conductor and inspector at Ceres Bus Company; his wife Florencia and their children lived with him in Barangay Cabangahan, Siaton, Negros Oriental. Among their neighbors were Demetrio Macayan, Sr., whose house stood about thirty meters from the residence shared by Restituto Elma Arellano, his son Arnold Arellano, and his stepson Alfonso Badon. Alfonso was the nephew of Glicerio Badon, then barangay captain of Cabangahan, and Nilo Cafino, the third accused, remained at large, prompting the trial court to order separate trial for Badon and Arellano.

Edwin Gomez was a bus conductor and inspector at Ceres Bus Company. He lived in Barangay Cabangahan, Siaton, Negros Oriental with his wife Florencia and their children. Among their neighbors were Demetrio Macayan, Sr., whose house was about thirty meters from the residence of Restituto Elma Arellano, his son Arnold Arellano, and his stepson Alfonso Badon. Alfonso was the nephew of Glicerio Badon, the barangay captain of Cabangahan.

On June 17, 1983, at about half past 7:00 in the evening, Demetrio Macayan, Sr. was downstairs in his house when he heard gunshots. Shortly thereafter, Edwin appeared at Demetrio’s doorstep and asked for help, saying that Restituto had shot him as he passed by Restituto’s house. On the way to Glicerio Badon’s house for assistance, Edwin related that while passing Restituto’s house, Restituto accused him of being the assassin hired by Remigio Asenas Quiqui, also known as Baloloy, to kill Restituto, and then shot him. Demetrio saw the wound on Edwin’s breast.

At Glicerio’s house, Edwin asked to be brought to a hospital. Because no transportation was available, Glicerio and some companions went to Crispin Encontad to borrow his pedicab. Crispin agreed and returned with them to Glicerio’s house to pick up Edwin. Crispin saw the bullet wound on Edwin’s chest, and Edwin told him he had been shot. Edwin was seated on the passenger side of the pedicab and was ready to be taken to the hospital when Alfonso Badon and Arnold Arellano, together with Nilo Cafino, came rushing in. Alfonso, carrying a two-foot bolo, stabbed Edwin; Edwin parried the thrust, which landed on the pedicab roofing and tore it. Alfonso then succeeded in stabbing Edwin on the breast. Edwin cried out, got out of the pedicab, and tried to walk away, but Arnold and Nilo followed and shot him with a .38 caliber pistol. Edwin fell to the ground and lay prostrate. Nilo left the scene, while Alfonso and Arnold took turns hacking Edwin many times with a bolo before walking away and leaving him dead.

Demetrio and the other neighbors either scampered away or retreated from the scene out of fear. Glicerio sought assistance from barangay Malo, whose barangay captain reported the incident to the Siaton Police Station. SPO3 Donaldo Gadingan and other policemen went to Cabangahan and found Edwin’s dead body lying along the highway near Glicerio’s house. The police investigated and requested a medico-legal autopsy. A municipal health officer at the Siaton District Hospital issued Edwin’s certificate of death. According to Health Officer Rodolfo P. Jalalon, Edwin died of shock, hemorrhage, and stab and bullet wounds.

The defense denied killing Edwin. According to the accused-appellants, at around 8:00 in the evening of June 17, 1983, Restituto Arellano was bagging copra in his house while Alfonso Badon was lying in a bed in the nearby piggery. Edwin arrived on a bicycle, parked it by the fence, and asked Restituto whether he would haul copra the following day. Edwin angrily told Restituto that he should haul the copra the next day. Restituto replied, “Why should you dictate me?” Edwin raised his shirt and said, “Do you know what is this?” Restituto saw a .38 caliber pistol on Edwin’s waistline, the same gun Edwin used to carry. Edwin was then pulled away by his companion, Susing Alama. While they were talking on the national highway, Susing told Edwin that Alfonso was in the piggery. Edwin said, “Let’s go,” and both proceeded toward the piggery. As they walked toward Alfonso, a barking dog chased and jumped at Edwin. Edwin fired his gun toward Alfonso’s location, and Alfonso jumped down. Edwin shouted, “Isang bala ka lang.” Edwin proceeded toward Alfonso; the dog continued barking; Alfonso held Edwin’s gun; and they wrestled. The gun fired twice. While they were wrestling, Alfonso fell, and Edwin was on top of him when Susing Alama fired his gun. Edwin said in the local dialect, “Yawa Bay, naigo ko,” meaning “Yawa Bay, I am hit.” After they separated, Edwin went to a coconut tree and hid. He touched his breast and wiped his blood on the trunk. After a few minutes, Edwin left the coconut tree, went to the road, and said, “You wait because I will get bullets.” After Edwin promised to return, Alfonso prepared himself inside their house with a spear, a stone, and a bolo, and did not go out anymore that night outside the perimeter of their house, although he later learned that Edwin died that evening near Barangay Captain Glicerio Badon’s house. Arnold Arellano had not left their house that evening. After Edwin left the perimeter of Restituto’s house, he had a fight with Nilo Cafino, as testified to by Restituto; when Edwin drew his gun, Nilo ran. After about seven minutes, Restituto saw Demetrio Macayan stab Edwin several times. Edwin then went to Glicerio Badon’s house, about one hundred meters away from Restituto’s house, where Alfonso and Arnold were preparing in case Edwin returned. When Edwin reached the barangay captain’s house, he asked to be brought to the hospital, and the barangay captain saw him carrying the gun.

The prosecution’s case rested on the eyewitness accounts of Demetrio Macayan and Crispin Encontad, who positively identified Badon and Arellano as among the assailants. The defense relied on denial and alibi, with Restituto Arellano corroborating that the accused were at their house or nearby and did not leave. These conflicting accounts formed the factual backdrop of the appeal.

• Credibility and Trial Judge: Accused-appellants argued that their guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt because the case was not wholly heard and tried by the judge who rendered the decision, who therefore was not in a position to ascertain the credibility of prosecution witnesses, mainly Crispin Encontad and Demetrio Macayan; they maintained that the general rule of according great weight and respect to the trial court’s findings did not apply.
• Inconsistencies: Accused-appellants sought to discredit the testimonies of Demetrio and Crispin based on the lack of absolute harmony in their accounts.
• Religious Bias: Accused-appellants asserted that Crispin falsely testified against them because they were members of Iglesia Ni Kristo while Crispin was a Roman Catholic.
• Delay in Testifying: Accused-appellants argued that Demetrio’s testimony could not be relied upon because he testified seven years after the incident.
• Alibi: Accused-appellants insisted that they had sufficiently established alibi because they were far from the crime scene, which was around one hundred meters away from their house, and this was corroborated by their witness, their father Restituto Arellano.
• Denial: Accused-appellants denied killing the victim and presented their own account of the incident.

• Penalty and Applicable Law: The Solicitor General observed that while the trial court imposed the proper penalty of reclusion perpetua, it erred in holding that the law at the time the record of the case was reconstituted should apply; the law at the time of the commission of the crime should determine the imposable penalty unless such penalty had been reduced in the meantime.

• Credibility and Trial Judge: Whether the conviction may stand where the judge who rendered the decision did not hear all the prosecution witnesses and thus allegedly could not assess their credibility.
• Guilt and Positive Identification: Whether the guilt of accused-appellants was proved beyond reasonable doubt through the positive identification of prosecution witnesses Demetrio Macayan and Crispin Encontad.
• Inconsistencies and Delay: Whether minor inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies and the delay in Demetrio Macayan’s testimony impair their credibility.
• Alibi and Denial: Whether the defense of alibi and denial overcomes the prosecution’s positive identification.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing of Edwin Gomez.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength attended the killing and qualified it as murder.
• Exemplary Damages: Whether exemplary damages may be awarded in view of an aggravating circumstance.
• Penalty and Applicable Law: Whether the law at the time of the commission of the crime or at the time of the reconstitution of the record determines the imposable penalty.

• Credibility and Trial Judge: No. The circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the prosecution witnesses did not taint the decision; the full record and transcripts were available, and no misappreciation of facts was shown.
• Guilt and Positive Identification: Yes. Guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt by the positive identification of Demetrio Macayan and Crispin Encontad; denial and alibi were insufficient.
• Inconsistencies and Delay: No. Inconsistencies in minor details do not impair credibility where the principal occurrence and positive identification are consistent; delay in testifying does not necessarily render a witness less credible if explained.
• Alibi and Denial: No. Alibi failed because it was not physically impossible for accused-appellants to be at the crime scene, which was only one hundred meters away, and alibi corroborated only by a relative deserves scant consideration.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not sufficiently established because the victim had the opportunity to parry the initial thrust and escape, and treachery must be present at the inception of the attack.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. Abuse of superior strength attended the killing because the unarmed victim was simultaneously attacked by two armed accused-appellants and a third accused at large, who took turns stabbing him while he was prostrate.
• Exemplary Damages: Yes. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
• Penalty and Applicable Law: The law at the time of the commission of the crime governs the imposable penalty unless the penalty has been reduced in the meantime; the penalty of reclusion perpetua was proper.

• Credibility and Trial Judge: No misappreciation of facts was found. Although the ponente of the assailed decision heard only the testimony of all witnesses for the defense and the rebuttal evidence of the prosecution, the circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimony of the prosecution witnesses would not taint his decision (People vs. Folina, 247 SCRA 28 [1995]). The full record was available to Judge Alfonso P. Briones, and his decision was based on the evidence presented during trial, including the stenographic notes. While the judge who presided over the entire trial would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimony of all witnesses, a judge who only took over from a colleague cannot, for that reason alone, render an invalid decision (People vs. Gazmen, 247 SCRA 414 [1995]). The Court may also make its own assessment of the probative value of the testimony based on the transcript of the stenographic notes (People vs. Compendio, Jr., 258 SCRA 254 [1996]). The trial judge had meticulously examined the records and reviewed the transcripts, and no misappreciation was shown.
• Guilt and Positive Identification: Guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt because accused-appellants were positively identified by Demetrio Macayan and Crispin Encontad. Crispin testified that the victim was stabbed by Alfonso Badon and then shot by Nilo Cafino, after which Alfonso stabbed the victim several times. Although Crispin was not sure whether Arnold Arellano was armed, Demetrio testified that Alfonso stabbed the victim while he was inside Crispin’s pedicab, and when the victim alighted, he was shot by Nilo Cafino and Arnold Arellano; thereafter, Nilo left and Alfonso and Arnold took turns hacking and stabbing the victim. The lack of absolute harmony in their testimony did not discredit them. Witnesses react differently to what they see and hear depending on their situation and state of mind, and identical testimony may even suggest a prefabricated story (People vs. De Castro, 252 SCRA 341 [1996]). Inconsistencies in minor details do not impair credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants (People vs. Panganiban, 241 SCRA 91 [1995]). Crispin was less incisive and keen than Demetrio, but Demetrio filled in the details and positively identified Arnold Arellano as one of the assailants.
• Inconsistencies and Delay: The attempt to discredit Crispin based on religious differences failed, as accused-appellants did not prove that their religious differences had reached such intensity as to cause Crispin to falsely attribute a crime to them. As to Demetrio’s testimony seven years after the incident, delay in revealing the names of the perpetrators does not necessarily render a witness less credible if the delay is sufficiently explained (People vs. Alcantara, 254 SCRA 384 [1996]). Failure to volunteer what one knows to law enforcement officials does not necessarily impair a witness’ credibility (People vs. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 [1996]). Demetrio testified only on December 4, 1990, but it was established that a day after the victim was killed on June 17, 1983, Demetrio was told by the victim’s wife that he would testify as to what he witnessed; he readily agreed and felt no need to report what he saw. The fact that he was put on the stand only on December 4, 1990 could not be attributed to him.
• Alibi and Denial: The bare denial and weak alibi of accused-appellants were insufficient to overcome the positive identification by prosecution witnesses (People vs. Nazareno, 260 SCRA 256 [1996]). Where alibi is established only by the accused and a relative, it deserves scant consideration, especially in the face of affirmative testimony of credible prosecution witnesses (People vs. Corpus, 240 SCRA 203 [1995]). Alibi can prosper only if it is shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime or within its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]). Accused-appellants failed to prove this. It was not physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene when they were only one hundred meters away; that distance could be covered by a one-minute leisurely walk or a dash of less than thirty seconds. Their alibi was therefore worthless in the face of positive identification (People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]).
• Treachery: The trial court’s observation that treachery attended the killing was rejected. The characteristic and unmistakable manifestation of treachery is a deliberate and unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present at the inception of the attack; if absent and the attack is continuous, even if present at a subsequent stage, it is not considered (People vs. Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222 [1997]). Here, Edwin Gomez could not be said to have been totally oblivious of the impending attack by Alfonso because he had the opportunity to parry the thrust, which instead landed on the roof of the pedicab and tore it. Alfonso succeeded in stabbing him the next time, but Edwin was able to get out of the pedicab and escape his assailants. The fact that he was simultaneously shot while running away did not matter. Where the deceased was suddenly attacked but was able to retreat to avoid being hit by hacking blows and was hit only while defending himself, there is no treachery (People vs. Diva, 23 SCRA 332, 340 [1968]). Even if the deceased was shot while lying wounded on the ground, if the firing of the shot was a mere continuation of the assault with no appreciable time intervening between the delivery of the blows and the firing of the shots, treachery cannot be appreciated (People vs. Peje, 99 Phil. 1052 [1956]).
• Abuse of Superior Strength: The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength beyond doubt attended the killing. Given that the victim, himself unarmed, was simultaneously attacked by the two accused-appellants and the third accused who remained at large, all of them with weapons, superior strength was clearly in attendance (People vs. Alitao, 194 SCRA 120, 128 [1991]). The combined acts of Alfonso and Arnold, both armed with guns and bolos, in taking turns in stabbing the victim who was unarmed and already prostrate on the ground, administering to him a total of twenty stab and bullet wounds, certainly exhibited abuse of superiority. Thus, the crime committed was murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength (People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA 1403, 1410 [1967]).
• Exemplary Damages: Considering that the prosecution had proved one aggravating circumstance—abuse of superior strength—and in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (People vs. Estares, 282 SCRA 524 [1997]).
• Penalty and Applicable Law: The trial court imposed the proper penalty of reclusion perpetua, but it erred in holding that the law at the time the record of the case was reconstituted should apply in determining the imposable penalty. The law at the time of the commission of the crime shall apply in determining the imposable penalty, unless such penalty has been reduced in the meantime. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was therefore affirmed.

• Credibility and the Judge Who Did Not Preside Over the Entire Trial — A judge who did not hear all the witnesses may still validly decide a criminal case based on the full record and stenographic transcripts; the circumstance that the deciding judge did not hear the prosecution witnesses does not by itself taint the decision. The Court applied this rule to uphold the conviction, finding no misappreciation of facts and noting that the judge had examined the records and transcripts.
• Positive Identification Over Denial and Alibi — Denial and alibi are weak defenses that cannot overcome credible positive identification by prosecution witnesses. Alibi must be supported by proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene or within its immediate vicinity; alibi corroborated only by a relative deserves scant consideration. The Court applied this to reject accused-appellants’ alibi, since the crime scene was only one hundred meters from their house.
• Treachery — Treachery requires a deliberate, unexpected attack on the victim without warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault; it must be present at the inception of the attack. If the victim had an opportunity to parry the initial thrust and escape, treachery is absent. The Court applied this to hold that treachery did not qualify the killing.
• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength qualifies a killing as murder where the assailants deliberately use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim. It was present where the unarmed victim was simultaneously attacked by multiple armed assailants who took turns stabbing him while he was prostrate. The Court applied this as the qualifying circumstance for murder.
• Exemplary Damages in Criminal Cases — Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this to award P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim’s heirs.
• Applicable Penalty Law — The law at the time of the commission of the crime governs the imposable penalty unless the penalty has been reduced in the meantime. The Court applied this to affirm reclusion perpetua, rejecting the trial court’s reliance on the law at the time of the reconstitution of the record.

• "The circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimony of the prosecution witnesses would not taint his decision (People vs. Folina, 247 SCRA 28 [1995])." — This states the rule that a judge who did not hear all prosecution witnesses may still validly decide based on the full record, a key point in rejecting accused-appellants’ first assignment of error.
• "The bare denial and weak alibi of accused-appellants are insufficient to overcome the positive identification by prosecution witnesses (People vs. Nazareno, 260 SCRA 256 [1996])." — This is the ratio for rejecting the defense of denial and alibi in light of the eyewitnesses’ positive identification.
• "The characteristic and unmistakable manifestation of treachery is the deliberate, and unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present at the inception of the attack, and if absent and the attack is continuous, even if present at a subsequent stage it is not to be considered (People vs. Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222 [1997])." — This defines treachery and explains why it was not appreciated despite the trial court’s finding.
• "Given the fact that the victim, himself unarmed, was simultaneously attacked by the two accused-appellants and the third accused who has remained at large, all of them with weapons, superior strength was clearly in attendance (People vs. Alitao, 194 SCRA 120, 128 [1991])." — This is the core finding that abuse of superior strength qualified the killing as murder.

• People vs. Folina, 247 SCRA 28 [1995] — Cited to support the rule that the circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the prosecution witnesses does not taint the decision.
• People vs. Gazmen, 247 SCRA 414 [1995] — Cited to hold that a judge who did not try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous.
• People vs. Compendio, Jr., 258 SCRA 254 [1996] — Cited to affirm that the Court may make its own assessment of the probative value of witness testimony based on the transcript of stenographic notes.
• People vs. Nazareno, 260 SCRA 256 [1996] — Cited to hold that bare denial and weak alibi are insufficient to overcome positive identification.
• People vs. Panganiban, 241 SCRA 91 [1995] — Cited to hold that inconsistencies in minor details do not impair credibility where the principal occurrence and positive identification are consistent.
• People vs. De Castro, 252 SCRA 341 [1996] — Cited to explain that witnesses react differently and that identical testimony may suggest a prefabricated story.
• People vs. Corpus, 240 SCRA 203 [1995] — Cited to hold that alibi established only by the accused and a relative deserves scant consideration.
• People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995] — Cited to require physical impossibility for alibi to prosper.
• People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995] — Cited to hold that alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification.
• People vs. Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222 [1997] — Cited for the definition and requisites of treachery.
• People vs. Diva, 23 SCRA 332, 340 [1968] — Cited to hold that there is no treachery where the deceased was able to retreat and was hit only while defending himself.
• People vs. Peje, 99 Phil. 1052 [1956] — Cited to hold that no treachery attends where the shooting was a mere continuation of the assault with no appreciable time intervening.
• People vs. Alitao, 194 SCRA 120, 128 [1991] — Cited to support the finding of abuse of superior strength where an unarmed victim was attacked by multiple armed assailants.
• People vs. Verzo, 21 SCRA 1403, 1410 [1967] — Cited to hold that murder is qualified by abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Estares, 282 SCRA 524 [1997] — Cited to allow exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code when the crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Alcantara, 254 SCRA 384 [1996] — Cited to hold that delay in revealing the names of perpetrators does not necessarily render a witness less credible if explained.
• People vs. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 [1996] — Cited to hold that failure to volunteer information to law enforcement does not necessarily impair credibility.

• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this after finding abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance, awarding P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Edwin Gomez.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred.