Primary Holding
A claim of self-defense fails where the accused, having admitted the killing, does not prove unlawful aggression by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence; treachery qualifies the killing to murder where the attack is sudden, from behind, and continues while the victim is defenseless.
Background
Alex De Los Santos and Fernando A. Catriz were brothers-in-law, Catriz having married De Los Santos’s sister. The applicable statutory framework included Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which penalizes murder, and Article 11, which governs self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Republic Act No. 9346 governed parole eligibility for persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
History
2004 – 2014-
Apr 6, 2004
Information filed in the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1165-T, charging Alex De Los Santos with murder for the April 6, 2004 killing of Fernando A. Catriz.
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Arraignment
De Los Santos entered a "not guilty" plea; pre-trial and trial followed.
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Jan 7, 2008
RTC
Convicted De Los Santos of murder, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, awarded civil indemnity, moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, and costs; self-defense was rejected and treachery found.
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De Los Santos appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03790.
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Sep 17, 2012
CA
Affirmed the RTC conviction and penalty, holding that Catriz’s conduct did not constitute unlawful aggression and that the defense version was unbelievable.
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1 yr 10 mos later
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Jul 23, 2014
Supreme Court
Affirmed the conviction with modifications to damages and imposed reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Facts
Alex De Los Santos and Fernando A. Catriz were brothers-in-law, Catriz having married De Los Santos’s sister. On April 6, 2004, at about 4:00 p.m., Catriz and his nephew Reynaldo Bayudan were at Barangay Mungo, Tuao, Cagayan, unloading culled cob chickens from a Toyota Tamaraw vehicle. While Bayudan and Catriz were transferring the chickens into a cage beside the vehicle, De Los Santos suddenly appeared behind Catriz and hacked him on the right shoulder with a tabas, a long-bladed bolo. The impact caused the handle of the tabas to dislodge, enabling Catriz to run toward the nearest house. De Los Santos drew a “Rambo-type” knife, pursued Catriz, and repeatedly stabbed him until he fell. Catriz knelt and pleaded for his life, asking De Los Santos to stop, but the pleas were not heeded; De Los Santos continued stabbing him until he fell again. Upon seeing the lifeless Catriz, De Los Santos jumped and exclaimed: “Happy New Year, natayen ni Ferdie!” (Happy New Year, Ferdie is dead!). He then went to a nearby pump well and washed his hands. Bayudan ran toward a nearby house for fear of his life.
Dr. Exuperio Yuaga, Municipal Health Officer of Tuao, Cagayan, testified that based on his post-mortem examination, Catriz sustained 11 stab wounds, four of which were in the mid extremity of the heart area and could cause instantaneous death, while two were located at the back. Catriz also sustained one incised wound on the left scapula. His cause of death was “hypovolemic shock, secondary to multiple stab wounds.”
According to the defense, De Los Santos and his uncle Joseph Aginawang had a drinking spree with Catriz on the night of April 4, 2004. After consuming two bottles of gin, Catriz asked De Los Santos if he could till the family lot in Bagumbayan, Tuao, Cagayan. When De Los Santos answered that he could not decide because the land was family-owned, Catriz suddenly stood up and slapped his face. De Los Santos did not take offense and simply left, while Catriz summoned his wife and children and headed home. Catriz returned between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. looking for De Los Santos but did not find him. Catriz was again unable to find De Los Santos when he returned the next day.
On April 6, 2004, at about 4:00 p.m., De Los Santos saw Catriz unloading chickens. He approached and offered help, but Catriz pushed him away, causing him to stumble. Catriz then tried to hack De Los Santos twice with a bolo, but De Los Santos dodged the attacks. On Catriz’s third attempt, De Los Santos got hold of a knife from the wall of a nearby house and defended himself by plunging it into Catriz. When Catriz again attempted to hack him, De Los Santos shoved the knife against him once more. De Los Santos failed to recall how many times he stabbed Catriz because he got dizzy and lost touch with his senses. Aginawang ran to the back of a house toward a creek. De Los Santos proceeded toward the road, where he met Abe Ballesil, who accompanied him, upon his request, to the police station to surrender.
The RTC sustained Bayudan’s testimony, corroborated by Dr. Yuaga’s post-mortem examination, that De Los Santos struck a hacking blow on Catriz from behind. It found treachery because while Catriz was kneeling and begging for his life, De Los Santos continued to stab him; Catriz was totally helpless while De Los Santos was in no danger from retaliation. The RTC rejected self-defense because De Los Santos failed to claim it at the earliest opportunity when he surrendered, the number and seriousness of the wounds showed a determined effort to kill, and he failed to surrender the weapon and instead threw it away. The CA found the defense version unbelievable because De Los Santos was unscathed despite his claim of a disadvantageous position from Catriz’s relentless assault, and because the presence of a knife on the wall of a nearby house was highly specious. The CA also held that Catriz’s attitude and behavior did not constitute unlawful aggression.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Self-Defense: Accused-appellant Alex De Los Santos argued that the trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to his claim of self-defense, and he pleaded for acquittal on that sole ground.
Issues
- Self-Defense: Whether the trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense.
- Treachery: Whether the killing of Fernando A. Catriz was attended with treachery, thereby qualifying it to murder.
- Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the monetary awards were proper, and whether the amounts should be modified.
Ruling
- Self-Defense: No. The claim was rejected because De Los Santos failed to prove unlawful aggression by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence; the physical evidence and eyewitness testimony contradicted his version.
- Treachery: Yes. The attack came from behind and continued while Catriz was kneeling and defenseless, ensuring execution without risk to the attacker.
- Penalty and Damages: Affirmed with modifications. Reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole was imposed; civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱75,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, and temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 were awarded, plus 6% interest per annum from finality.
Ruling Rationale
- Self-Defense: The prosecution bears the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but when the accused admits killing the victim and pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove the defense by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission by the accused that he committed the criminal act. Under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused must prove: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the primordial element; without it, no self-defense, complete or incomplete, may be validly invoked. It exists when the victim puts in actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense, and there must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. Here, De Los Santos failed to prove unlawful aggression. The incised wound on Catriz’s left scapula belied the defense version and was consistent with Bayudan’s account that the initial blow came from De Los Santos, who suddenly emerged behind Catriz; Dr. Yuaga confirmed the wound could have been inflicted from behind. The defense testimonies were contradictory: Aginawang said Catriz pushed and boxed De Los Santos, but De Los Santos omitted the punching detail, and Aginawang admitted on cross-examination that De Los Santos delivered the first aggression by stabbing Catriz. The claim that a knife was immediately available on the wall of a nearby house was highly dubious. The location, number, and gravity of the wounds—11 stab wounds, four in the heart area, causing hypovolemic shock—indicated a determined effort to kill, not merely to defend. Thus, the courts a quo correctly found that De Los Santos failed to discharge his burden.
- Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two elements must concur: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed. The essence of treachery lies in an attack that comes without warning, is swift, deliberate, and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Here, Bayudan testified that De Los Santos attacked Catriz when the latter was defenseless and unable to retaliate. The attack commenced from behind Catriz, and when Catriz fell to his knees begging for his life, De Los Santos continued stabbing him. De Los Santos took advantage of Catriz’s vulnerable position to ensure the successful execution of the offense without risk and denied the victim any opportunity to defend himself. Treachery therefore qualified the killing to murder.
- Penalty and Damages: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Both penalties are indivisible, and with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63. The accused is not eligible for parole under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346. The awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages were correct. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of death and culpability. Moral damages are proper despite the absence of allegation and proof of mental anguish because death invariably brings emotional pain and anguish to the victim’s family. Exemplary damages are warranted because the killing was attended by treachery. In conformity with current jurisprudence, the amounts were increased to ₱75,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 exemplary damages. The award of nominal damages was deleted and replaced with temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 because pecuniary expenses were incurred in the funeral and burial but their amount could not be proved with certainty. All monetary awards earn 6% interest per annum from finality until fully paid.
Doctrines
- Self-defense — A justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code that implies admission of the criminal act. When invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the primordial element; without it, no self-defense, complete or incomplete, may be validly invoked. In this case, the accused failed to prove unlawful aggression because the physical evidence, eyewitness account, contradictory defense testimonies, and nature and location of wounds contradicted his claim.
- Credibility of witnesses — The trial judge is best situated to assign values to witness declarations because of the unmatched opportunity to observe witnesses and assess credibility. Appellate courts defer to the trial court’s evaluation absent a showing that it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances affecting disposition. The Court found no compelling reason to depart from the trial court’s credibility findings, as affirmed by the CA.
- Treachery — A qualifying circumstance in crimes against persons. It exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and specifically to ensure the crime without risk to himself from the defense the offended party might make. Two elements: (a) the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack; and (b) the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack. The essence is an attack without warning, swift, deliberate, and unexpected, leaving the unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. The Court applied it because the attack began from behind and continued while the victim was kneeling and pleading for his life.
- Penalty for murder and Article 63 — Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248. When both penalties are indivisible and no mitigating or aggravating circumstance is present, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed under the second paragraph of Article 63. The Court affirmed this penalty.
- Parole disqualification under RA 9346 — Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences are reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of RA 9346, are not eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Court declared the accused ineligible for parole.
- Damages in murder — Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of death and culpability. Moral damages are proper due to the emotional pain and anguish death brings to the victim’s family. Exemplary damages are warranted when the killing is attended by treachery. Nominal damages are proper when there is no proof of actual damages; temperate damages are awarded when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. The Court increased the awards and replaced nominal with temperate damages.
Key Excerpts
- "Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission by the accused that he committed the criminal act." — This states the foundational effect of pleading self-defense: it admits the killing and shifts the burden to the accused to prove the justifying circumstance.
- "There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon." — This defines unlawful aggression, the primordial element of self-defense, which the Court found absent in the accused’s version.
- "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of treachery, applied to qualify the killing to murder.
- "The location, the number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on Catriz indicate a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend." — This supports the rejection of self-defense based on the physical evidence of multiple and severe wounds.
Precedents Cited
- People vs. Credo, G.R. No. 197360, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 633, 644 — Cited for the rule that trial courts’ credibility assessments are respected absent overlooked substantial facts.
- Flores vs. People, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 127, 140-141 — Cited for the shifting of burden of evidence when self-defense is pleaded.
- People vs. Maningding, G.R. No. 195665, September 14, 2011, 657 SCRA 804, 813 — Cited for the principle that self-defense implies admission of the criminal act.
- People vs. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 363, 379 — Cited for the three requisites of self-defense.
- People vs. Paycana, Jr., 574 Phil. 780, 787 (2008) — Cited for unlawful aggression as the primordial element of self-defense.
- People vs. Comillo, Jr., G.R. No. 186538, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 756, 772 — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression.
- People vs. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011, 653 SCRA 99, 110 — Cited for the rule that the nature, number, and location of wounds disprove self-defense, and for treachery and penalty.
- People vs. Dela Cruz, 594 Phil. 381, 395 (2008) — Cited for the elements of treachery.
- People vs. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 169-170 — Cited for the essence of treachery.
- People vs. Dejillo, G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537, 556 — Cited for parole ineligibility under RA 9346.
- People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 150, 161-162 — Cited for moral and temperate damages.
- People vs. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 226, 250-251 — Cited for nominal versus temperate damages.
- People vs. Barbachano, G.R. No. 177754, February 24, 2014 — Cited for interest at 6% per annum.
Provisions
- Article 11, second paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Defines self-defense and its requisites: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. The Court applied it to reject the accused’s claim because unlawful aggression was not proved.
- Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court used it to affirm the murder conviction and penalty.
- Article 63, second paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Requires imposition of the lesser penalty when the penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance. The Court applied it to impose reclusion perpetua instead of death.
- Section 3, Republic Act No. 9346 — Provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences are reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Court applied it to declare the accused ineligible for parole.
- Act No. 4180 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended — Referenced in Section 3 of RA 9346 as the parole law from which persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua are excluded. The Court cited it in denying parole eligibility.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice, Chairperson); Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Lucas P. Bersamin; Martin S. Villarama, Jr.