People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro Rellota y Tadeo

The convictions for two counts of consummated rape were affirmed because AAA’s positive testimony, corroborated by medical findings, established carnal knowledge by force and intimidation; minor inconsistencies did not impair credibility. For the January 31, 1994 incident, attempted rape was not established, but the acts constituted acts of lasciviousness, which are necessarily included in rape under the variance doctrine and punishable under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

AAA, a minor born on July 16, 1981, lived with her siblings BBB and CCC under the care of her aunt DDD and DDD’s second husband, appellant Alejandro Rellota y Tadeo, in Antipolo City, Rizal, from September 1992 to January 1994. DDD worked overseas during the material period, while she and appellant sent AAA and her siblings to school. The charges implicated the rape provisions of the Revised Penal Code and, for the January 31, 1994 incident, Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.

AAA, born on July 16, 1981, in XXX, Eastern Samar, was a little over twelve years old when the alleged incidents occurred. From September 1992 to January 1994, she and her siblings BBB and CCC lived in Antipolo City, Rizal with her aunt DDD and DDD’s second husband, appellant Alejandro Rellota y Tadeo; two cousins also lived with them. DDD and appellant sent AAA and her siblings to school, and DDD was working overseas at the time of the incidents.

According to AAA, appellant had been kissing her and touching her private parts since September 1993, and raped her several times between September 1993 and January 1994. The rapes usually occurred at night when other family members were out or asleep. AAA testified that she resisted but was unsuccessful; appellant usually placed a bolo beside him and threatened to kill her brother and sister and to stop sending her to school.

Around noon on December 20, 1993, AAA took a bath at an artesian well near the house and returned wrapped in a towel. Appellant followed her to the bedroom, pulled down her towel, laid her on the bed, tied her hands with a rope, and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA fought back by kicking and scratching him, but he was not deterred. Appellant then untied her hands and left; a few moments later, he returned and raped her again. AAA explained that the first rape occurred while she was wrapped only in a towel and her hands were tied, and the second occurred after she had dressed and appellant returned to the room.

On January 31, 1994, AAA went inside their room after taking a bath, not knowing appellant was inside. Appellant snatched the towel around her body, laid her on the sofa, kissed her, and touched her private part while AAA kicked him and scratched his arms. She pushed him, and appellant ran out the door. AAA later testified that on January 31, 1994, appellant did not insert his penis into her vagina; she said she was not raped on that date because she had already told her sister about the earlier incidents, although she recalled being raped between January 1 and 5.

After the January 31 incident, AAA told her older sister about appellant’s repeated deeds, and her sister accompanied her to the police station. On February 3, 1994, three separate complaints for rape were filed against appellant and raffled to different branches. The prosecution presented AAA and Dr. Rosaline Onggao, a medico-legal officer; Dr. Onggao’s report showed healed hymenal lacerations that could have been caused by forcible entry of a hard object, such as a penis. The defense presented only appellant’s denial; he claimed he could think of no reason for the complaints and that AAA’s aunt, who helped file the charges, was angry at him for not giving her a loan. The trial court credited AAA’s testimony and found the medical evidence corroborative; the Court of Appeals also relied on AAA’s testimony but treated the January 31, 1994 incident as attempted rape.

• Credibility of AAA: Appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in not acquitting him because AAA’s testimony was inconsistent and full of falsehoods. He pointed to the alleged impossibility of the September 1993 rape, claiming his wife was still in the Philippines and left for Jeddah only on October 21, 1993, and asserted that AAA testified only to kissing and touching of her breast and private parts without mentioning insertion of his penis.
• Denial of the Charged Incidents: Appellant denied raping AAA on January 31, 1994 and December 20, 1993.
• Improper Motive: Appellant claimed the criminal charges were instigated by AAA’s aunt because he refused to lend her money.
• December 20 Inconsistencies: Appellant contended that AAA’s account of the December 20, 1993 incident was full of lies and inconsistencies, particularly because she said she was wrapped only in a towel yet later claimed he removed her shorts and panty, and because she said she dressed after the first rape although her hands had been tied with a rope.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The Office of the Solicitor General averred that the prosecution satisfactorily proved that appellant raped AAA in September and December 1993 and that appellant used his moral ascendancy over the victim to have carnal knowledge of her against her will.
• Medical Corroboration and Weak Denial: The OSG argued that the medical report bolstered AAA’s claim of repeated rape and that appellant’s defense of denial was weak and deserved scant consideration.
• January 31 Incident and Penalties: In agreement with the CA, the OSG posited that there was inadequate proof that AAA was actually raped on January 31, 1994 and that the penalties imposed by the trial court should be adjusted in accordance with the crimes proved.

• Credibility and Rape Convictions: Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to AAA’s testimony and in convicting appellant of two counts of consummated rape despite the alleged inconsistencies and falsehoods.
• September 1993 Rape: Whether appellant’s claim that he could not have raped AAA in September 1993 because his wife was still in the Philippines until October 21, 1993 negated the charge.
• December 20, 1993 Rape: Whether the alleged inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony regarding the December 20, 1993 incident rendered her testimony incredible.
• January 31, 1994 Incident: Whether the January 31, 1994 incident constituted attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
• Variance Doctrine and Penalty: Whether appellant, charged with rape, may be convicted of acts of lasciviousness as a lesser included offense and what penalty should be imposed under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

• Credibility and Rape Convictions: No. The two convictions for consummated rape were affirmed; AAA’s positive testimony, corroborated by the medico-legal findings, established carnal knowledge by force and intimidation, and the alleged inconsistencies were minor and did not impair her credibility.
• September 1993 Rape: No. The presence of appellant’s wife in the country did not make the rape impossible; lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape may be committed even when other people are nearby.
• December 20, 1993 Rape: No. The supposed inconsistencies were not inconsistencies because AAA was describing two separate rapes on that date; any minor discrepancies did not affect her credibility.
• January 31, 1994 Incident: No attempted rape. The evidence showed only kissing and touching of private parts, without proof of intent to have carnal knowledge on that date; the acts constituted acts of lasciviousness.
• Variance Doctrine and Penalty: Yes. Acts of lasciviousness are necessarily included in rape; under Section 4, Rule 120, appellant could be convicted of the lesser offense proved, with the penalty under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 as applied in People vs. Candaza.

• Credibility and Rape Convictions: In reviewing rape convictions, the Court applied settled principles: the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution’s evidence must stand on its own merits; trial court findings on witness credibility are entitled to great respect absent overlooked facts of substance; a rape accusation is easy to make but difficult to prove and disprove; and the complainant’s testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution. The trial court’s assessment of AAA was upheld because she positively identified appellant and her testimony was corroborated by Dr. Onggao’s medico-legal report, which showed healed hymenal lacerations caused by forcible entry of a hard object such as a penis. Appellant’s denial was unsubstantiated negative self-serving evidence, and his claim of improper motive was uncorroborated; absent evidence of improper motive on AAA’s part, her testimony was worthy of full faith and credence. The alleged inconsistencies were trivial and forgivable, as a rape victim cannot be expected to recall every detail of a traumatic experience. People vs. Delos Reyes was cited for this rule.
• September 1993 Rape: The Court rejected the impossibility defense. The fact that appellant’s wife was still in the country until October 21, 1993 did not preclude rape in September 1993; lust is no respecter of time or place, and neither cramped space, presence of other people, nor high risk of being caught has been held a sufficient obstacle to rape. AAA testified that since September 1993 appellant had kissed her and touched her private parts, and that he raped her several times, once almost every day. Her cross-examination and redirect testimony showed she was intimidated by appellant’s threats that she would not be sent to school and that he would kill her brother and sister, and by his display of a bolo beside him.
• December 20, 1993 Rape: The Court found no real inconsistency. AAA testified that she was raped twice on December 20, 1993: first, after her bath when she was wrapped only in a towel, appellant pulled her to the bed, tied her hands, and raped her; and second, after she had dressed, appellant returned and raped her again. Her testimony that appellant removed her shorts and panty referred to the second rape, while her testimony that she put on her t-shirt and panty referred to the interval after the first rape when appellant had untied her hands and left. There was sufficient time between the two incidents, and any minor inconsistencies did not erase the fact of rape. The Court reiterated that testimony must be considered in its entirety, not in truncated passages, and that a young rape victim cannot be expected to remember every ugly detail.
• January 31, 1994 Incident: The Court disagreed with the CA’s finding of attempted rape. Attempted rape requires that the offender commence the commission of rape directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution by reason of a cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The elements are: (1) the offender commences the felony directly by overt acts; (2) he does not perform all acts of execution; (3) the offender’s act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to a cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. These elements were wanting. AAA herself testified that on January 31, 1994, appellant removed her towel, laid her on the sofa, kissed her, and touched her private parts, but did not insert his penis into her vagina; she stated she was not raped on that date. Appellant’s acts did not demonstrate an intent to have carnal knowledge on that particular date, and AAA’s belief that he wanted to rape her was mere opinion and speculation.
• Variance Doctrine and Penalty: Although attempted rape was not established, the acts could not go unpunished. The elements of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is done by using force or intimidation, or when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the offended party is under twelve years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex. Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as intentional touching of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or introduction of an object into the genitalia, anus, or mouth, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify sexual desire. Appellant’s acts on January 31, 1994—laying AAA on the sofa and kissing and touching her private parts—were lewd, and the intimidation was apparent. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 covers a child who engages in lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation, not only abuse for profit. Intimidation need not be irresistible; it is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s will, especially for young, innocent, and immature girls. Under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, and the offense charged includes or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. Acts of lasciviousness are necessarily included in rape. People vs. Abulon and People vs. Candaza were cited. Under People vs. Candaza, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua; applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty should fall within prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum. The Court imposed the indeterminate penalty stated in the dispositive portion and awarded moral damages and fine of ₱15,000.00 each.

• Credibility of Rape Victim’s Testimony — Trial courts’ findings on credibility are entitled to great respect because they observe witnesses’ demeanor; minor inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not destroy credibility, as a victim cannot be expected to recall every detail of a traumatic experience. The Court applied this to uphold AAA’s testimony and the rape convictions.
• Rape May Be Committed Despite Presence of Others — Lust is no respecter of time or place; cramped space, presence of other people, or risk of being caught does not prevent rape. The Court used this to reject appellant’s claim that his wife’s presence made the September 1993 rape impossible.
• Denial as Negative Self-Serving Evidence — Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-serving evidence that deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters. The Court applied this to reject appellant’s denial.
• Elements of Attempted Rape — Attempted rape requires: (1) the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts; (2) he does not perform all acts of execution; (3) the offender’s act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of execution is due to a cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. The Court found these elements absent for the January 31, 1994 incident.
• Acts of Lasciviousness — The elements are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) it is done by using force or intimidation, or when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the offended party is under twelve years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex. Lascivious conduct under Section 32, Article XIII, IRR of R.A. No. 7610 includes intentional touching of genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify sexual desire. The Court applied this to the January 31, 1994 acts.
• Variance Doctrine — Under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, and the offense charged includes or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. Acts of lasciviousness are necessarily included in rape. The Court applied this to convict appellant of acts of lasciviousness despite the rape charge.
• Intimidation in Sexual Abuse of Minors — Intimidation need not be irresistible; it is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s will, especially for young, innocent, and immature girls. The Court applied this to find the element of intimidation in the January 31, 1994 lascivious acts.
• Penalty for Acts of Lasciviousness under R.A. No. 7610 — Under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness performed on a child is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua; applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty range is prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum. The Court imposed this penalty.

• "Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth." — The Court opened with this principle in assessing AAA’s credibility, signaling that her youth and immaturity supported rather than undermined her testimony.
• "It has been oft said that lust is no respecter of time or place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor the presence of other people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape." — This passage rejected appellant’s impossibility defense based on his wife’s presence in the country during September 1993.
• "Attempted rape requires that the offender commence the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." — The Court used this rule to hold that the January 31, 1994 incident did not constitute attempted rape.
• "Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape." — This statement anchors the variance doctrine applied to convict appellant of acts of lasciviousness despite the charge of rape.

• People vs. Delos Reyes, 443 Phil. 782 (2003) — Cited for the rule that testimony must be considered in its entirety and that a rape victim cannot be expected to remember every detail; used to reject appellant’s inconsistency arguments.
• People vs. Bon, 444 Phil. 571 (2003) — Cited for the elements of acts of lasciviousness and the definition of lascivious conduct under the IRR of R.A. No. 7610.
• People vs. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 675 — Cited for the variance doctrine and the rule that acts of lasciviousness are necessarily included in rape.
• People vs. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 280 — Cited for the penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• People of the Philippines vs. Efren Mateo y Garcia, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Cited as the basis for transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
• People of the Philippines vs. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419 — Cited for withholding the victim’s real name and using fictitious initials in the decision.
• People vs. Mingming, G.R. No. 174195, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 509 — Cited for the elements of attempted rape.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — The rape charges and convictions were based on this provision; R.A. No. 7610’s proviso refers to Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape when the victim is under twelve years of age. The Court affirmed the rape convictions under the Revised Penal Code.
• Article 336, Revised Penal Code — Defines acts of lasciviousness; the Court convicted appellant of acts of lasciviousness as defined in the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
• Section 5, Article III, Republic Act No. 7610 — Child prostitution and other sexual abuse; the Court applied it because AAA, a minor, engaged in lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation, and the penalty for lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) was used.
• Section 32, Article XIII, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 — Defines lascivious conduct as intentional touching of specified body parts with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify sexual desire; the Court used this definition to find the January 31, 1994 acts lascivious.
• Section 4, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Variance between allegation and proof; the Court applied it to convict appellant of acts of lasciviousness, a lesser offense necessarily included in the rape charge.
• Section 5, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Defines when an offense includes or is included in another; cited together with Section 4 to support the variance doctrine.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in fixing the indeterminate penalty for acts of lasciviousness after the penalty under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was determined.
• Article VIII, Section 5, 1987 Constitution — Cited as the basis for the Court’s power to promulgate rules of procedure, including the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
• Section 29, R.A. No. 7610; Section 44, R.A. No. 9262; Section 40, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC — Cited in the footnote for confidentiality of proceedings involving violence against women and children and the use of fictitious initials.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Roberto A. Abad, and Jose Catral Mendoza concurred. No separate concurring opinion is summarized in the text.