People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro Calongui y Lopez

The sweethearts defense, to be credited, must be proven by compelling evidence that the accused and the victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the sexual relations; even if established, the relationship does not by itself prove consent, for love is not a license for lust. A bare and unsubstantiated denial is a weak, negative, and self-serving defense that cannot overcome the affirmative testimony of credible witnesses, and the failure of a 13-year-old victim to offer tenacious resistance does not render voluntary her submission to the criminal act. Exemplary damages may be awarded only where an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, attends the commission of the crime; absent any such circumstance, the award must be deleted.

Marinel O. Calongui, then thirteen years old, lived with her parents and siblings in Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur. When she was five years old, her family took in the appellant, Alejandro Calongui y Lopez, her first cousin, who was then twenty-one years old, to live with them and help in the upkeep of the family farm; he shared a room with Marinel and her three siblings. The offenses were charged under Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which reclassified rape as a crime against persons and fixed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for simple rape. The case also implicated the retroactivity of Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000 and now require aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the information.

Marinel O. Calongui was thirteen years old and lived with her parents and siblings in Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur. When she was five years old, her family took in the appellant, Alejandro Calongui y Lopez, her first cousin, then twenty-one years old, to live with them and help in the upkeep of the family farm. Appellant slept in the same room as Marinel and her three siblings.

At about two o'clock in the morning of January 1, 1998, Marinel awoke to find that appellant had removed her shorts and panties. He threatened to kill her and her siblings if she resisted his sexual advances. She tried to repel the assault by moving her body and kicking appellant's thighs, but he succeeded in having sexual congress with her. The next morning, she learned that her twelve-year-old brother, Noel, had witnessed the incident but had pretended to be asleep because appellant might harm him. Marinel told Noel not to tell anyone about what he saw, and she herself did not report the matter to her parents for fear that appellant would make good on his threats.

At about three o'clock in the morning of September 26, 1998, appellant raped Marinel a second time, an act likewise witnessed by Noel. She was undressed from the waist down and was again threatened that she and her siblings would be killed if she resisted; when she kicked him twice, he told her to stop moving or he would kill them.

Shortly after the second incident, appellant stayed at the B-Meg barracks where he worked as a laborer. Emboldened by his absence, Marinel told her mother, Gracia, of her ordeals on November 15, 1998, and Gracia thereafter accompanied her daughter to the police authorities. On November 18, 1998, Dr. Salvacion Pantorgo, Medical Officer at the Bicol Medical Center in Naga City, examined Marinel and found sparse pubic hair, well-apposed labia majora and minora, an old superficial hymenal laceration at the 3 and 4 o'clock positions, old complete hymenal lacerations at the 6 and 11 o'clock positions, and a vagina that admitted two fingers with ease. Dr. Pantorgo found Marinel to be in a non-virgin state consistent with her claim that appellant had sexual intercourse with her on two occasions.

For the defense, appellant denied having sexual congress with Marinel on January 1, 1998, but claimed that the September 26, 1998 incident was a consensual act because he and Marinel were sweethearts at that time. Marinel denied the alleged love relationship on both direct and cross-examination. Appellant further contended that Marinel had a bigger physique than he did, so she could have resisted and overcome his advances, or could have shouted for help since her siblings and parents were nearby; Marinel testified that she was not of bigger built than appellant at the time she was raped, although at the time she testified two years after the incidents she indeed looked bigger than he did. Noel testified that he saw appellant rape his sister on both occasions but pretended to be asleep out of fear, and that he did not report the matter to their parents upon Marinel's instructions and because of appellant's threats.

The trial court found the prosecution's evidence sufficient to establish carnal knowledge of Marinel through force, threats, and intimidation on both dates, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment in all respects save for the manner of stating the penalty, which it corrected by imposing reclusion perpetua in each case.

• Denial — January 1, 1998 Incident: Appellant denied having sexual congress with Marinel on January 1, 1998, offering a bare and unsubstantiated denial in the face of the prosecution's affirmative evidence.
• Sweethearts Defense — September 26, 1998 Incident: Appellant claimed that the September 26, 1998 incident was a consensual act, asserting that he and Marinel were sweethearts at that time.
• Victim's Physique and Failure to Resist: Appellant contended that Marinel had a bigger physique than he did, such that she could have resisted and overcome his advances, or could have shouted for help because her siblings and parents were nearby.
• Credibility of the Victim's Account: Appellant challenged the plausibility of Marinel's testimony, including her account that the sexual intercourse lasted for thirty minutes.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: Appellant raised the sole issue of whether the prosecution proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had carnal knowledge of Marinel through force, threats, and intimidation on January 1, 1998 and September 26, 1998.
• Denial and Sweethearts Defense: Whether appellant's denial of the January 1, 1998 incident and his claim of a consensual relationship with Marinel on September 26, 1998 were sufficient to overturn the prosecution's evidence and create reasonable doubt.
• Propriety of the Award of Exemplary Damages: Whether the trial court correctly awarded exemplary damages in the absence of any aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the rapes.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Yes. The prosecution satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had carnal knowledge of Marinel through force, threats, and intimidation on both dates; simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.
• Denial and Sweethearts Defense: No. Appellant's bare denial is a weak, negative, and self-serving defense that cannot overcome the affirmative testimonies of credible witnesses, and the sweethearts defense, uncorroborated and unsubstantiated, does not rule out rape.
• Propriety of the Award of Exemplary Damages: No. The award of exemplary damages is deleted, no aggravating circumstance having been alleged or proved, and none of the circumstances invoked being appreciable on the records.

• Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: The clear, candid, and straightforward testimony of Marinel firmly established that appellant raped her on January 1, 1998, and the medical findings of old hymenal lacerations corroborated her account of sexual intercourse on two occasions. The presence of force, threats, and intimidation during both incidents was clearly established through her testimony: she awoke to find her shorts removed, appellant held both her hands as she fought him, she shouted and kicked him, and he repeatedly threatened to kill her and her siblings if she reported the matter. That she did not call her parents or report the incidents until November 1998 was explained by appellant's constant watching of her movements and his threats. Under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua; since appellant was guilty of two counts of simple rape, the trial court correctly meted out that penalty for each count, as the Court of Appeals corrected by deleting the erroneous period of twenty years and one day to forty years.

• Denial and Sweethearts Defense: Appellant's defense as to the January 1, 1998 incident consisted of a bare and unsubstantiated denial, a weak, negative, and self-serving defense that cannot overcome affirmative testimonies from credible witnesses. As to the September 26, 1998 incident, the claim of consensual intercourse was rejected because the sweethearts defense must be proven by compelling evidence that the accused and the victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the alleged sexual relations; appellant's claim remained uncorroborated and unsubstantiated, no documentary evidence such as mementos, love letters, notes, or pictures having been presented, and Marinel having denied the alleged love relationship on direct and cross-examination. Even if the relationship were true, it would not by itself establish consent, for love is not a license for lust. Appellant's contention that Marinel's bigger physique enabled her to resist or to shout for help was untenable: at thirteen years of age, she could not be expected to put up the resistance expected of a mature woman, and her failure to offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts. Nor was there anything unusual in her testimony that the sexual intercourse lasted thirty minutes, since a rape victim is not expected to recall every peripheral and sordid detail of her ordeal, and minor lapses are to be expected when recounting a traumatic experience too painful to recall.

• Propriety of the Award of Exemplary Damages: Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to the award; the trial court thus correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil liability and P50,000.00 as moral damages in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. The award of exemplary damages, however, lacked factual and legal basis. Under People vs. Catubig, the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages, and although Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now require aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the information, the acts of rape and the filing of the informations in this case occurred prior to the effectivity of those rules; the retroactive application of the Revised Rules cannot adversely affect the rights of a private offended party that had already vested, so aggravating circumstances not alleged but proved during trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining the accused's liability for exemplary damages. A review of the records nonetheless showed no aggravating circumstance. Dwelling could not be appreciated because Marinel and appellant lived in the same house at the time of the rape incidents, which negated the rationale of the circumstance — the violation by the offender of the sanctity of the victim's home by trespassing therein to commit a crime. Night time could not be appreciated because there was no proof that appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime. Relationship was not aggravating because the relationship between Marinel and appellant as first cousins is not within the concept contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Abuse of confidence was likewise absent because the prosecution did not establish that it facilitated the attainment of the rape. Finally, use of a deadly weapon could not be appreciated because Marinel's belated assertion on cross-examination that appellant used a knife raised doubts as to the knife's existence, she having also stated that what she saw was an object that "looked like a knife." The award of exemplary damages was accordingly deleted.

• Sweethearts Defense — The defense that the accused and the victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the sexual relations must be proven by compelling evidence; it cannot rest on the accused's uncorroborated assertion. Documentary evidence such as mementos, love letters, notes, and pictures is expected to corroborate the claim. Even when the relationship is established, it does not rule out rape, because the relationship does not by itself prove consent — love is not a license for lust. In this case, appellant's claim remained uncorroborated and unsubstantiated, and Marinel denied the alleged love relationship on both direct and cross-examination.
• Denial as a Weak Defense — A bare and unsubstantiated denial is a weak, negative, and self-serving defense that cannot overcome affirmative testimonies from credible witnesses. Appellant's denial of the January 1, 1998 incident failed against Marinel's clear, candid, and straightforward testimony.
• Resistance Expected of a Minor Rape Victim — A rape victim of tender age cannot be expected to put up the resistance expected of a mature woman, and her failure to offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts. Marinel was only thirteen years old at the time of the rape incidents.
• Minor Lapses in a Rape Victim's Testimony — A rape victim is not expected to recall every peripheral and sordid detail of her ordeal, such as the exact duration of the sexual intercourse; minor lapses are to be expected when a person recounts details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. The Court thus found nothing unusual in Marinel's testimony that the intercourse lasted thirty minutes.
• Penalty for Simple Rape — Under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Being guilty of two counts of simple rape, appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count.
• Civil Indemnity Ex Delicto and Moral Damages in Rape — Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to the award. The trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil liability and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count.
• Exemplary Damages and Aggravating Circumstances — The presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Under Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information to be validly appreciated; however, for acts committed and informations filed before the effectivity of the Revised Rules, the retroactive application of the rules cannot adversely affect the rights of a private offended party that have become vested, so aggravating circumstances not alleged but proved during trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining liability for exemplary damages. No aggravating circumstance being present in this case, the award was deleted.
• Dwelling as an Aggravating Circumstance — Dwelling cannot be appreciated where the offender and the victim lived in the same house at the time of the rape, because the rationale of the circumstance — the violation by the offender of the sanctity of the victim's home by trespassing therein to commit a crime — is absent.
• Night Time as an Aggravating Circumstance — Night time cannot be appreciated absent proof that the offender deliberately sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime.
• Relationship as an Alternative Circumstance — Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, the alternative circumstance of relationship is taken into consideration only when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender. The relationship of first cousins is not within this concept and is therefore not aggravating.
• Abuse of Confidence as an Aggravating Circumstance — Abuse of confidence is not appreciated where the prosecution fails to establish that it facilitated the attainment of the rape.
• Use of a Deadly Weapon — The use of a deadly weapon cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance where the victim's belated assertion that the accused used a knife raised doubts as to the weapon's existence, she having also described what she saw as an object that "looked like a knife."

• "Well-settled is the rule that the sweethearts defense must be proven by compelling evidence, specifically, that the accused and the victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the alleged sexual relations." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the sweethearts defense and its evidentiary burden, the ratio for rejecting appellant's claim that the September 26, 1998 incident was consensual.
• "Besides, the sweethearts defense does not rule out rape. Even if it were true, the relationship does not, by itself, establish consent for love is not a license for lust." — This is the Court's frequently quoted pronouncement that an existing amorous relationship between the accused and the victim does not negate the element of lack of consent in rape.
• "At such a tender age, she could not be expected to put up a resistance as would be expected from a mature woman. Besides, Marinel testified that she was not of bigger built than the appellant at the time she was raped, although at the time she testified two years after the incidents, she indeed look bigger than the appellant." — The passage disposes of appellant's argument that the victim's physique and failure to resist negated the charge, and articulates the standard of resistance expected of a minor rape victim.
• "Thus, aggravating circumstances which were not alleged in the informations but proved during the trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining the accused's liability for exemplary damages." — This passage states the retroactivity rule governing the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as applied to the private offended party's vested right to exemplary damages, a point of procedure and damages law.
• "In view of the foregoing, the award of exemplary damages by the trial court should be deleted." — This is the dispositive modification in the case, resting on the absence of any aggravating circumstance despite the retroactive appreciation rule.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — The controlling procedural precedent pursuant to which the Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals, which then rendered the assailed decision now under review.
• People vs. Serrano, G.R. No. 137480, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 161 — Cited for the rule that a bare and unsubstantiated denial is a weak, negative, and self-serving defense that cannot overcome affirmative testimonies from credible witnesses.
• People vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 140278, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 469 — The principal authority for the sweethearts defense: it must be proven by compelling evidence, and even if true, the relationship does not by itself establish consent.
• People vs. Vergel, 374 Phil. 535 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the victim's failure to offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts.
• People vs. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 152589 & 152758, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 328 — Cited for the rule that a rape victim is not expected to recall every peripheral and sordid detail of her ordeal, minor lapses being expected in recounting a traumatic experience.
• People vs. Gementiza, 349 Phil. 407 (1998) — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape.
• People vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 619 — Cited for the rule that moral damages are awarded upon a finding of rape without need of further proof, it being assumed that the victim suffered moral injuries.
• People vs. Garces, Jr., 379 Phil. 919 (2000) — Cited as prevailing jurisprudence on the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to a rape victim.
• People vs. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102 (2001) — The controlling precedent on exemplary damages: the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages, and the retroactive application of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure cannot adversely affect a private offended party's vested rights.
• People vs. Bañez, 361 Phil. 198 (1999) — Cited for the rule that dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance where the offender and the victim lived in the same house, the rationale of the circumstance being the violation of the sanctity of the victim's home by trespassing therein.
• People vs. Degamo, 450 Phil. 159 (2003) — Cited for the rule that night time cannot be appreciated absent proof that the offender deliberately sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Balondo, 140 Phil. 618 (1969) and People vs. Lamberte, 226 Phil. 581 (1986) — Cited for the rule that the relationship of first cousins is not within the concept of the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
• United States vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 136 (1907) and People vs. Morales, No. L-35413, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 191 — Cited, through People vs. Bañez, on the rationale underlying the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
• People vs. Balansi, G.R. No. 77284, July 19, 1990, 187 SCRA 566 — Cited on the sanctity of the victim's home as the basis for appreciating dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.

• Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) — Defines rape as committed by a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. The Court found this element established beyond reasonable doubt for both the January 1, 1998 and September 26, 1998 incidents, based on Marinel's testimony that appellant held her hands as she fought him, that she kicked him and shouted, and that he repeatedly threatened to kill her and her siblings.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Provides that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is punished by reclusion perpetua. The Court applied this provision in holding that the trial court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for each of the two counts of simple rape, as the Court of Appeals corrected by deleting the erroneous period of twenty years and one day to forty years.
• Article 15, Revised Penal Code — Defines alternative circumstances, including relationship, intoxication, and the degree of instruction and education of the offender, and limits the alternative circumstance of relationship to cases where the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender. Because appellant and Marinel were first cousins, relationship was held not aggravating.
• Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Require the complaint or information to specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances and to state them in ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged and its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The Court held that although these rules took effect on December 1, 2000, they could not be applied retroactively to prejudice the private offended party's vested right, the rapes having been committed and the informations filed before their effectivity; aggravating circumstances not alleged but proved at trial could thus be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining liability for exemplary damages.

Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.