People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Tabarnero and Gary Tabarnero

Treachery may be appreciated even where the lone eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault, provided the victim was restrained or otherwise rendered defenseless during the killing; the swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only means by which the victim's defenselessness can be ensured. Corollarily, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, and its absence bars both the justifying circumstance and the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

Gary Tabarnero resided in the house of Ernesto Canatoy in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan from 1997 to 1999 as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar, Ernesto's stepdaughter, and was treated by the household as a member of the family. The arrangement ended shortly before the incident when Ernesto allegedly opposed the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was then pregnant. Alberto Tabarnero is Gary's father, a construction worker employed as leadman/foreman of Alicia Builders. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the Regional Trial Court but was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People vs. Mateo, which modified the Rules of Court on direct appeals in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

Gary Tabarnero, a twenty-two-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony in June 2001, lived in the house of Ernesto Canatoy in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan from 1997 to 1999 as the live-in partner of Ernesto's stepdaughter, Mary Jane Acibar. He left the house shortly before the October 23, 1999 incident because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto, who allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, then pregnant. Alberto Tabarnero, Gary's father, was a forty-five-year-old construction worker employed as leadman/foreman of Alicia Builders and was then living in Norzagaray, Bulacan.

Late at night on October 23, 1999, Gary went to Ernesto's house. According to Gary, he had been in his house in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan at around 11:40 p.m. with his friend Richard Ulilian, his father Alberto, his mother Elvira, and his brother Jeffrey; overcome with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, he proceeded to Ernesto's house but could not enter because no one came out to let him in. He shouted his pleas from outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong to cause the breakup and voicing several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When he was about to leave, the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe; Ernesto aimed at his head but Gary blocked the blow with his hands, breaking his left index finger. Gary embraced Ernesto, who then strangled him. At that point Gary felt a bladed weapon tucked at Ernesto's back and, losing control of himself, took the weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he could not recall how many times. Ernesto fell to the ground and pleaded, "saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako" three times. Gary was stunned and did not notice Alberto approaching; Alberto asked, "anak, ano ang nangyari?", to which Gary replied, "nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning." Gary and Alberto fled out of fear. Gary denied any conspiracy with his father and maintained that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was going to kill him.

The prosecution presented a different account through Emerito Acibar, Mary Jane's brother, who testified that at around eleven o'clock on the night of the incident he was inside their one-room house in Daang Bakal, Longos, Malolos, Bulacan with his brother and his stepfather Ernesto. He heard somebody calling for Ernesto but ignored it, then heard a "kalabog" followed by Ernesto's plea for help. As he reached the door, he saw Ernesto being held by a certain Toning "Kulit" and another person while Gary and Alberto stabbed Ernesto with fan knives. Emerito lost count of the thrusts made by each, but each inflicted more than one, and the last stab was made by Alberto. Emerito shouted for help, and the four assailants left when somebody arrived, allowing him to approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital. On cross-examination, Emerito confirmed that Gary and Mary Jane used to reside in Ernesto's house but that Gary had already left by the date of the incident, while Mary Jane had moved to Abra with Teresita. He stated that the family did not know of the relationship because they treated Gary like a member of the family, and that Ernesto got mad when his wife Teresita found out. Emerito neither saw Ernesto leaving the room nor the fight between Ernesto and Gary; he saw only the stabbing, which occurred seven to eight meters away from the doorway where he stood, and he was sure there were four assailants, two of whom boarded a yellow XLT-type car on a bridge eight to ten meters from the incident.

Senior Police Officer 2 Ronnie Morales testified that he was on duty at the Malolos police station on the night of October 23, 1999, when Emerito reported that Ernesto had been stabbed. He and Emerito proceeded to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, where he saw Ernesto in the operating room, very weak due to multiple injuries. In the presence of two doctors on duty, SPO2 Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed him, and Ernesto answered that the assailants were the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan. On cross-examination, SPO2 Morales clarified that it was already 1:00 a.m. of the following day when they proceeded to the hospital, and that Emerito did not inform him on the way that he had witnessed the incident. Ernesto was unable to affix his signature on the Sinumpaang Salaysay because he could no longer talk after the fourth question. Dr. Apollo Trinidad, the government physician who prepared Ernesto's death certificate, clarified that Ernesto died on October 25, 1999; because the defense admitted the fact of death, its cause, and the execution of the death certificate, the prosecution no longer questioned him on these matters. Teresita's testimony was likewise dispensed with in light of the defense's admission that she was Ernesto's common-law wife and that she incurred ₱55,600.00 in expenses related to his death.

Gemarie Tabarnero, Gary's sister, testified that she was a childhood friend of Mary Jane and that Mary Jane had been Gary's girlfriend from 1995 to 1999; sometime in 1999, however, Gary and Mary Jane were prevented from talking to each other, and Gary was always sad and appeared dumbfounded, sometimes mentioning Mary Jane's name and crying. On the night of the incident, Gemarie observed that Gary was crying and seemed perplexed; he told her he was going to Ernesto's house to talk about Mary Jane, and he allegedly brought nothing with him.

Edilberto Alarma, a barangay tanod of Longos, Malolos, Bulacan since February 2000, testified that while he was in a meeting at around 4:00 p.m. on April 22, 2001, Gary arrived and told him of his intention to surrender, stating that he was responsible for the "incident [that] happened at Daang Riles." Together with fellow barangay tanod Zaldy Garcia, Alarma brought Gary to the Malolos Police Station, where the surrender was entered in the blotter report. Alberto, for his part, testified that on October 23, 1999 he was living in Norzagaray, Bulacan but had gone to visit his children in Barangay Longos, Malolos; before going to sleep at 11:00 p.m. he realized Gary was not in the place where he usually slept, went downstairs thinking Gary was merely urinating, waited five minutes, and then proceeded to Daang Bakal where Gary had many friends. About four hundred meters from the site of the incident, he saw Gary and asked him what happened and why he was in a hurry, to which Gary replied: "Wag na kayong magtanong, umalis na tayo, napatay ko po yata si Kuya Erning." The two ran in different directions; Alberto passed through the railways and exited in front of the capitol compound to wait for a jeepney to Sta. Maria, his route toward his home in Norzagaray. He claimed he had no knowledge of the accusation that he conspired with Gary, learning only three months after the incident that he was being charged, by which time he was already residing in Hensonville Plaza, Angeles City, Pampanga, where he had been assigned when his engineer, Efren Cruz, secured a project. He repeated on cross-examination that he did not return to Gary's house after the incident and that it did not occur to him to inform the authorities; he later learned by phone from a sibling that Gary had already surrendered, and did not consider surrendering because, although he wanted to clear his name, nobody would support his family. He stated that he had no previous misunderstanding with Ernesto, and, answering questions from the court, that he immediately went home to Norzagaray because he was afraid of being implicated, and that it did not occur to him to stay and help Gary because he did not know where Gary had gone.

The trial court found Gary's account of the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto unconvincing, having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The RTC convicted both accused of murder on August 29, 2002, and the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification on April 29, 2005.

• Self-Defense: Gary argued that all three requisites of self-defense were present — that Ernesto committed unlawful aggression by delivering the first blow with a lead pipe, that Gary employed reasonable means to repel it, and that his shouted professions of feeling for Mary Jane could not be considered sufficient provocation for Ernesto to commit unlawful aggression.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: The defense argued in the alternative that even if the justifying circumstance of self-defense were unavailable, Gary was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Voluntary Surrender: The defense argued that Gary's yielding to Barangay Tanod Alarma should be credited as the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Absence of Conspiracy: The defense asserted that there was no conspiracy between Alberto and Gary, claiming that Alberto merely happened to be near the scene of the crime while looking for his son, whom he saw only after the altercation.
• Treachery: The defense asseverated that because Emerito failed to see how the attack commenced, the qualifying circumstance of treachery could not be considered, citing People vs. Amamangpang, People vs. Icalla, and People vs. Sambulan.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Solicitor General agreed with the defense that Gary's surrender should be credited as a mitigating circumstance.
• Treachery: The Solicitor General argued that treachery was amply demonstrated by the restraint upon Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much less evade, the assault.
• Actual Damages: The Solicitor General claimed that the award of ₱55,600.00 in actual damages was not proper, considering the lack of receipts supporting the same.
• Civil Indemnity: The Solicitor General alleged that a civil indemnity ex delito in the amount of ₱50,000.00 should be awarded.

• Self-Defense: Whether the justifying circumstance of self-defense was properly appreciated in favor of Gary Tabarnero.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Whether Gary was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether Gary's surrender to Barangay Tanod Alarma should be credited as the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Conspiracy and Alberto's Participation: Whether Alberto Tabarnero was liable as a principal by direct participation in the killing of Ernesto Canatoy.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing.
• Damages: Whether the awards of actual damages, civil indemnity ex delito, and exemplary damages were proper.

• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of self-defense, was not proven; the defense rested solely on Gary's self-serving testimony, and the nine stab wounds negated both the intent to defend and the reasonable means employed.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete; its absence bars the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(1) regardless of the presence of the other elements.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. The surrender was not spontaneous, having been made almost one year and six months after the incident and almost one year and one month after the warrant of arrest issued against Gary.
• Conspiracy and Alberto's Participation: Conspiracy need not even be proven; Alberto was categorically pointed to by eyewitness Emerito as one of the assailants who actively and directly participated in the killing, and the victim's dying declaration likewise named both father and son, making Alberto a principal by direct participation.
• Treachery: Yes. The restraint upon Ernesto rendered him defenseless and ensured the accomplishment of the assailants' purpose without risk to themselves; the swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only means by which the victim's defenselessness can be ensured. Abuse of superior strength would alternatively qualify the killing as murder.
• Damages: The award of ₱55,600.00 in actual damages was sustained on the strength of the defense's admission; civil indemnity ex delito was increased to ₱75,000.00; and the ₱25,000.00 award of exemplary damages was affirmed.

• Self-Defense: The requisites of self-defense are (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and (3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel the aggression. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement. The only evidence presented by the defense to prove the alleged unlawful aggression was Gary's own testimony, which the Court of Appeals found insufficient and self-serving; the alleged sudden appearance of Ernesto and his first attack with the lead pipe the very moment Gary decided to leave seemed to the Court all too convenient, considering that there was no one around to witness the start of the fight. The RTC, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, found Gary's account unconvincing, and factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Court and entitled to great respect. By invoking self-defense, Gary in effect admitted killing Ernesto, shifting upon him the burden of evidence to prove the elements of the justifying circumstance; a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence but also extremely doubtful in itself. The nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicated Gary's intent to kill, not merely an intent to defend himself, and negated the claim that the means used were reasonable.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code treats as mitigating those circumstances mentioned in the preceding chapter when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability are not attendant. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. There is incomplete self-defense when the element of unlawful aggression by the victim is present and any of the other two essential requisites for self-defense is lacking. Having failed to prove the indispensable element of unlawful aggression, Gary was not entitled to the mitigating circumstance even assuming the presence of the other two elements.
• Voluntary Surrender: For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be credited, the following requisites must be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous — there must be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because the offender acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses in capturing him. In People vs. Barcimo, Jr., the pending warrant for the arrest of the accused and the latter's surrender more than one year after the incident were considered damaging to the plea of voluntary surrender; voluntary surrender presupposes repentance, and going to the police station to clear one's name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally. The records showed that Gary surrendered on April 22, 2001, while the commitment order commanding his detention was issued on April 24, 2001; the surrender was made almost one year and six months from the October 23, 1999 incident and almost one year and one month from the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him on March 27, 2000. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General had miscomputed the length of time before Gary surrendered himself, but the correct computation still negated spontaneity.
• Conspiracy and Alberto's Participation: The basis of Alberto's conviction was not solely conspiracy; conspiracy need not even be proven by the prosecution because Alberto was categorically pointed to by eyewitness Emerito as one of the assailants who actively and directly participated in the killing. Emerito testified that he saw Gary stabbing Ernesto more than once and that Alberto was the last one to stab him, and that both used fan knives. Having actually participated in the stabbing of Ernesto, it was adequately proven that Alberto is a principal by direct participation. Even more persuasive was the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2 Morales, that it was "the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan" who stabbed him. Although Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement was admissible under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as a dying declaration, the declaration of a dying person made under the consciousness of an impending death being receivable in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. A dying declaration requires that it was made under a realization by the decedent that his demise, or at least its imminence, is at hand, which may be proven by the deceased's own statement or inferred from the nature and extent of his wounds or other relevant circumstances. Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the next forty-eight hours, and at the time he uttered his statement his body was already rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to speak and write towards the end of the questioning. A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation; it was hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his body already manifesting an impending demise, would summon every remaining strength just to lie about his true assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
• Treachery: Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In People vs. Amamangpang, People vs. Icalla, and People vs. Sambulan, cited by the appellants, the eyewitnesses were not able to observe any means, method, or form in the execution of the killing which rendered the victim defenseless: in Amamangpang, the first thing the witness saw was the victim already prostrate on the bamboo floor, blood oozing from his neck and about to be struck; in Icalla, the witnesses merely saw the accused fleeing from the scene with a knife in his hand; and in Sambulan, the witness saw the two accused hacking the victim with a bolo. Since in those cases there was no restraint upon the victims or any other circumstance rendering them defenseless, the Court ruled that it should look into the commencement of the attack to determine whether it was done swiftly and unexpectedly. However, the swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only means by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured. In People vs. Montejo, the prosecution witnesses testified that after challenging the victim to a fight, the accused stabbed the victim in the chest while he was held in the arms by the accused and a companion, and the Court held that there is treachery where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation, as when he was being held by others while being stabbed, since the accomplishment of the accused's purpose was ensured without risk to him from any defense the victim might offer. In People vs. Alvarado, despite the yelling which should have warned the victim of a possible attack, the mere fact that the accused's companions held the victim's hands while the accused stabbed him was considered to constitute alevosia. The killing of Ernesto was therefore attended by treachery. Even assuming that treachery should not be appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, though alleged in the Information, would nevertheless qualify the killing to murder; the act of stabbing Ernesto while two persons were holding him clearly showed the deliberate use of excessive force out of proportion to the defense available to the person attacked. Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission of the crime; when four armed assailants, two of whom are the accused-appellants, gang up on one unarmed victim, excessive force was purposely sought and employed.
• Damages: The RTC awarded ₱55,600.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Ernesto, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and an unidentified amount as costs of suit; the Court of Appeals modified the decision by awarding an additional ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of the presence of treachery. Although the Solicitor General claimed that the award of actual damages was improper for lack of receipts, People vs. Torio held that ordinarily receipts should support claims of actual damages, but where the defense does not contest the claim, it should be granted; Teresita Acibar's testimony was dispensed with on account of the defense's admission that she incurred ₱55,600.00 in relation to Ernesto's death, and this admission was even more binding on the defense than a failure to object to the testimony. The award of actual damages was therefore sustained. As to civil indemnity ex delito, Article 2206 of the Civil Code authorizes its award for death caused by a crime; the award is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime, and current jurisprudence has already increased the award to ₱75,000.00, which amount was awarded to Ernesto's heirs. Finally, the Court of Appeals was correct in awarding exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00, since an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

• Requisites of Self-Defense — Self-defense requires (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and (3) employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel the aggression. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement, and a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence but also extremely doubtful in itself. By invoking self-defense, the accused in effect admits killing the victim and shifts upon himself the burden of evidence to prove the elements of the justifying circumstance. The plea failed here because the only proof of unlawful aggression was Gary's own self-serving testimony, and the nine stab wounds negated both intent to defend and reasonable means.
• Incomplete Self-Defense — Under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance applies when all the requisites necessary to justify the act are not attendant. There is incomplete self-defense when the element of unlawful aggression by the victim is present and any of the other two essential requisites for self-defense is lacking. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete; its absence precludes the mitigating circumstance regardless of the presence of the other elements.
• Requisites of Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender requires that (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) he surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, showing an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, either because the offender acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance; going to the police station to clear one's name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally. A surrender made almost one year and six months after the incident and almost one year and one month after the issuance of the warrant of arrest is not spontaneous.
• Dying Declaration — Under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. It must be shown that the declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his demise, or at least its imminence, is at hand; this may be proven by the deceased's own statement or inferred from the nature and extent of his wounds or other relevant circumstances. A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation. Here, Ernesto's statement naming both father and son, made while very weak and with his body already manifesting an impending demise, was admitted and credited.
• Treachery and Defenselessness — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only means by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured; treachery may be appreciated where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation, as when he was being held by others while being stabbed, since the accomplishment of the accused's purpose was ensured without risk to him from any defense the victim might offer. Restraint upon the victim, even if the eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault, suffices.
• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of in the commission of the crime. When four armed assailants, two of whom are the accused, gang up on one unarmed victim, excessive force was purposely sought and employed. This circumstance, though alleged in the Information, would independently qualify the killing to murder even if treachery were not appreciated.
• Civil Indemnity Ex Delito — Article 2206 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of civil indemnity for death caused by a crime. The award is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Current jurisprudence has increased the award to ₱75,000.00.
• Actual Damages Without Receipts — Ordinarily, receipts should support claims of actual damages, but where the defense does not contest the claim, it should be granted. An express admission by the defense that the claimant incurred the amount is even more binding than a mere failure to object to the testimony supporting it.
• Exemplary Damages — Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, in criminal offenses exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and are paid to the offended party.

• "Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete." — This states the ratio for rejecting both the justifying circumstance of self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and is the canonical formulation of the indispensable-element rule applied to Gary's plea.
• "However, the swiftness and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only means by which the defenselessness of the victim can be ensured." — This is the pivotal ruling distinguishing the cited cases of Amamangpang, Icalla, and Sambulan and supplying the doctrinal basis for appreciating treachery despite the eyewitness not having seen the commencement of the assault.
• "We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation." — This articulates the evidentiary weight accorded to Ernesto's statement naming both accused, which the Court relied upon, together with Emerito's eyewitness account, to establish Alberto's direct participation.
• "The award of said civil indemnity is mandatory, and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime." — This states the rule governing civil indemnity ex delito under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which the Court applied in increasing the award to ₱75,000.00.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Controlling procedural authority that modified the Rules of Court on direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment; pursuant to it, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
• Casitas vs. People, 466 Phil. 861, 870 (2004) — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that the nine stab wounds inflicted upon Ernesto indicated intent to kill rather than intent to defend, and negated the claim of reasonable means of defense.
• Baxinela vs. People, G.R. No. 149652, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 331, 342 — Cited for the requisites of self-defense and for the rule that unlawful aggression is indispensable and that a plea of self-defense cannot be appreciated where uncorroborated and extremely doubtful.
• Senoja vs. People, 483 Phil. 716, 724 (2004) — Cited for the rule that there is incomplete self-defense when unlawful aggression is present and any of the other two essential requisites is lacking.
• People vs. Barcimo, Jr., 467 Phil. 709, 720-721 (2004) — Followed in rejecting voluntary surrender; a pending warrant of arrest and surrender more than one year after the incident were held damaging to the plea, and going to the police station to clear one's name does not show unconditional submission.
• People vs. Saul, 423 Phil. 924, 936 (2001) — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender and the requirement that the surrender be spontaneous.
• People vs. Amamangpang, 353 Phil. 815, 832 (1998); People vs. Icalla, 406 Phil. 380, 394 (2001); People vs. Sambulan, 352 Phil. 336, 350 (1998) — Cited by the appellants for the rule that treachery cannot be appreciated where the lone eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault; distinguished on the ground that in those cases there was no restraint upon the victims or other circumstance rendering them defenseless.
• People vs. Montejo, G.R. No. L-68857, November 21, 1988, 167 SCRA 506, 515 — Controlling precedent applied; treachery exists where the victim was stabbed in a defenseless situation, as when he was being held by others while being stabbed, without need of a swift and unexpected commencement of the attack.
• People vs. Alvarado, 341 Phil. 725, 737 (1997) — Followed; the fact that the accused's companions held the victim's hands while the accused stabbed him was considered to constitute alevosia despite yelling that should have warned the victim.
• People vs. Gemoya, 396 Phil. 213, 221-222 (2000) — Cited for the definition of abuse of superior strength and the rule that when four armed assailants gang up on one unarmed victim, excessive force was purposely sought and employed.
• People vs. Torio, 452 Phil. 777, 800 (2003) — Applied in sustaining the award of actual damages notwithstanding the lack of receipts, because the defense did not contest the claim.
• People vs. Honor, G.R. No. 175945, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 546, 560 — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity ex delito is mandatory and granted without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Amodia, G.R. No. 173791, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 518, 545; People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 173477, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 54 — Cited as current jurisprudence increasing the award of civil indemnity ex delito to ₱75,000.00.
• People vs. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102, 120 (2001); People vs. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 741 — Cited for the rule that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
• Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 441 Phil. 323, 332 (2002) — Cited for the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court and entitled to great respect.
• People vs. De la Cruz, 353 Phil. 363, 381 (1998) — Cited for the rule that a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence and extremely doubtful in itself.
• People vs. Santos, 337 Phil. 334, 349 (1997) — Cited for the requisites of a dying declaration, particularly that it must be made under a realization of impending death, inferable from the nature and extent of the wounds.
• People vs. Lamasan, 451 Phil. 308, 321 (2003) — Cited for the rule that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder; the provision under which both accused were convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
• Article 13(1), Revised Penal Code — Treats as a mitigating circumstance those mentioned in the preceding chapter when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability are not attendant; invoked by Gary for incomplete self-defense and held inapplicable because unlawful aggression was not proven.
• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of crimes against persons which tend directly and specially to insure execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make; applied to qualify the killing to murder because Ernesto was restrained and rendered defenseless.
• Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Governs dying declarations, allowing the declaration of a dying person made under the consciousness of an impending death to be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; applied to admit Ernesto's statement naming Gary and Alberto as his assailants.
• Section 11(e), Rule 119, Rules of Court — Governs the reverse trial procedure; pursuant to it, a reverse trial ensued after Gary admitted the killing at pre-trial while claiming self-defense, and the same procedure was continued even after Alberto was later apprehended.
• Article 2206, Civil Code — Authorizes the award of damages for death caused by a crime, including civil indemnity; applied to increase the civil indemnity ex delito to ₱75,000.00 in favor of Ernesto's heirs.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, separate and distinct from fines and payable to the offended party; applied to sustain the ₱25,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the Court of Appeals on account of treachery.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Requires that the conclusions of the Court in a decision be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division; cited in the certification accompanying the Decision.

• Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chairperson)
• Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
• Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
• Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.