People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot

The defense of insanity, when raised, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the accused was completely deprived of reason at the time of the commission of the offense; mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude criminal imputability. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof that the accused had deliberately planned the crime and had sufficient time for reflection and persistent pursuit of the criminal design.

The accused-appellant, Alberto Ocfemia, was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for stabbing Miriam Reyes, his 16-year-old maid, on September 22, 1995, in Makati City. The information alleged that the crime was committed with treachery and evident premeditation. The accused initially pleaded guilty but later withdrew his plea and entered one of not guilty, subsequently raising the defense of insanity.

Alberto Ocfemia y Maimot was charged with murder for stabbing Miriam Reyes, his 16-year-old maid, on September 22, 1995, in Makati City. The victim was dead upon arrival at the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig. At his arraignment on November 13, 1995, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the offense charged. The trial court, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, set the case for hearing to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea, and ordered the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and precise degree of culpability.

The prosecution presented Margie Ocfemia, the accused's live-in partner of five years, who testified that on November 22, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning, the maid Miriam complained that the accused had touched her private part. When confronted, the accused admitted the act. That night, the accused asked Miriam not to tell anyone, but she refused, insisting she would tell her siblings. Later that evening, the accused told the household to go to sleep. While Margie was lying down, she noticed the accused taking coffee, smoking, and roaming around the house. At 11:00 that evening, while Miriam was lying on her side and asleep, the accused stabbed her several times. Miriam shouted for help, and Margie brought her to the hospital, where she died at 12:45 in the morning. The prosecution also presented Dr. Ferdinand Gonzalez of Rizal Medical Center, Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the examination on the cadaver, and Lorna Reyes, the victim's sister, who testified on the expenses for the hospital, wake, and interment.

Before the reception of defense evidence, the accused, through counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea as improvidently made. The motion was granted, and the accused entered a plea of not guilty. In his defense, the accused testified that on September 22, 1995, he was working as a "cantero" in Quezon City from 7:00 in the morning to 6:00 in the evening. He left work at 7:00 in the evening after waiting for his salary, and due to heavy traffic, arrived home at around 11:00 in the evening. Upon reaching home, his wife told him that Miriam would be leaving the following day. After asking the maid why she was leaving, he went out of his house. He could not recall where he went, only that he found himself near the chapel of the Mormons in Tambac, Taguig, and did not know how he got there. On his way home, he passed by his brother Oscar's house, where his brother told him "Wala na patay na" and referred to him as the one who killed Miriam. He was arrested by the police at his brother's house. He testified that he pleaded guilty because his mind was confused at the time.

After his testimony, the accused, through counsel, filed a written motion on May 20, 1996, requesting that he be subjected to psychiatric examination by the National Center for Mental Health, claiming that during the stabbing he appeared to have acted without the least discernment and was unable to perceive and exercise proper judgment. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that there was no evidence of prior insanity, that a person is presumed sane, and that the defense of insanity was completely opposite to his earlier defense of denial and alibi. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty at arraignment, appeared of sound mental condition, and that there was no insinuation of insanity until after he had testified.

• Denial of Psychiatric Examination: The accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in denying his request to be examined by the National Center for Mental Health, claiming that his counsel personally observed signs of mental dysfunction, including changeable dispositions, incoherence, flight of ideas, lack of knowledge of his whereabouts at the time of the incident, and lack of concern during the proceedings.
• Feigning Insanity: The accused-appellant contended that the trial court's declaration that he was "feigning insanity" was improper where no psychiatric study was made on his alleged mental malady, and that the signs of mental dysfunction indicated the importance of the requested examination to prove the exempting circumstance of insanity.

• Waiver and Lack of Evidence: The Solicitor General argued that it was too late for the accused-appellant to question the denial of his motion for psychiatric examination, as he rested his case after the denial and submitted the issue of guilt for resolution, and that there was no showing, even in the slightest extent, that the appellant was insane or mentally impaired prior to or at the time of the offense.
• Futility of Examination: The Solicitor General further argued that a psychiatric examination would not serve any useful purpose considering that the stabbing incident took place almost three years prior, and sought affirmance of the trial court's finding on the sufficiency of evidence establishing guilt.

• Psychiatric Examination: Whether the trial court erred in denying the accused-appellant's motion to be subjected to psychiatric examination to establish his mental condition during and after the commission of the crime.
• Feigning Insanity: Whether the trial court erred in considering the accused-appellant as having feigned insanity.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was properly appreciated.
• Private Relations: Whether the aggravating circumstance of private relations between the accused and the victim, as master and maid, was properly appreciated.

• Psychiatric Examination: No. The trial court did not err in denying the motion for psychiatric examination, as the defense of insanity was not raised at the earliest opportunity and was raised only after the accused had testified in his defense.
• Feigning Insanity: No. The trial court's conclusion that the accused was feigning insanity was supported by his invocation of denial and alibi, which indicated full control of his mental faculties, and the shift in theory to insanity was a clear indication of a concocted defense.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation was not established because there was no evidence as to when the accused decided to kill the victim or the time that lapsed between the planning and the actual perpetration of the crime.
• Private Relations: No. The alternative circumstance of relationship applies only when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender, and does not include the relationship of master to maid.

• Psychiatric Examination: The Court held that Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted during a lucid interval, and under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every man is sane; anyone pleading the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime. The defense of insanity was not raised at the earliest opportunity; it was raised only after the accused had testified in his defense. The accused's invocation of denial and alibi indicated that he was in full control of his mental faculties, and a shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after realizing the futility of his earlier defense, is a clear indication that his defense is a mere concoction. The eyewitness account of the accused's common-law wife never mentioned any indication that the accused could not have been in his right mind when he committed the crime; his actuations of telling the household to sleep, walking around the room, smoking, and drinking coffee are hardly the actuations of a man not in full possession of his mental faculties. The accused's professed inability to recall events does not necessarily indicate an aberrant mind but is more indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself. The fact that the accused originally pleaded guilty and thereafter changed his plea does not support a claim of mental dysfunction, as it is not uncommon for an accused to change his plea.

• Feigning Insanity: The Court agreed with the appellee that the accused's professed inability to recall events before and after the stabbing incident does not necessarily indicate an aberrant mind but is more indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself. The trial court's conclusion that the accused was feigning insanity was supported by the evidence, and the Court found no cogent reason to disturb it.

• Evident Premeditation: The Court held that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is satisfactorily established only if it is proved that the defendant had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and continuously followed it notwithstanding that he had ample time to allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will. This circumstance is not proven where there is no evidence as to the time when the defendant decided to kill the victim. Nowhere in the testimony of the lone eyewitness is there an indication as to when the accused decided to stab the victim, or as to the time that lapsed after the accused planned to kill the deceased up to the time the killing took place, that would establish that there was a sufficient or substantial period of time that lapsed. The element of sufficient time is necessary to show that his decision is the result of calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt.

• Private Relations: The Court held that the alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration only when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. Article 62 paragraph 3, cited by the trial court, merely states the rule for the application of penalties with respect to the aggravating circumstance of relationship, as defined in Article 15, by limiting the effect of the attendance of such aggravating circumstance to the principal, accomplice, or accessory to whom such circumstance is attendant. Article 62 does not purport to define or establish an aggravating or mitigating circumstance arising from the offender's private relations with the offended party such as the relationship of a master to a maid. Accordingly, the crime is murder with no aggravating circumstance which can be appreciated to increase the penalty, and in the absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed is reclusion perpetua.

• Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance — Under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code, an insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted during a lucid interval. The presumption is that every man is sane, and anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged. Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. Proof of insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense.

• Shift in Defense Theory as Indication of Concoction — A shift in theory by the defense, from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after realizing the futility of his earlier defense, is a clear indication that his defense is a mere concoction.

• Evident Premeditation — The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is satisfactorily established only if it is proved that the defendant had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and continuously followed it notwithstanding that he had ample time to allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will. The element of sufficient time is necessary to show that the decision is the result of calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt.

• Alternative Circumstance of Relationship — The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration only when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. The relationship of master to maid is not included within the scope of this circumstance.

• "Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an insane person is exempt for criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every man is sane; anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged." — This passage establishes the controlling doctrine on the defense of insanity, including the burden of proof and the standard of complete deprivation of reason.

• "It has been held that a shift in theory by the defense, from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after realizing the futility of his earlier defense, is a clear indication that his defense is a mere concoction." — This passage articulates the rule that a belated shift to an insanity defense, after the failure of denial and alibi, indicates a fabricated defense.

• "The rule is that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is satisfactorily established only if it is proved that the defendant had deliberately planned to commit the crime and had persistently and continuously followed it notwithstanding that he had ample time to allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will, if he had so desired after meditation and reflection." — This passage states the canonical formulation for establishing the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

• "It is clear that Article 62 merely states the rule for the application of penalties with respect to, among others, the aggravating circumstance of relationship, as this is defined in Article 15, by limiting the effect of the attendance of such aggravating circumstance to the principal, accomplice or accessory to whom such circumstance is attendant. Article 62 does not purport to define or establish an aggravating or mitigating circumstance arising from the offender's private relations with the offended party such as the relationship of a master to a maid." — This passage clarifies the scope of Article 62 and the definition of the relationship aggravating circumstance under Article 15.

• People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325 — Cited for the proposition that the presumption of sanity applies and the burden of proving insanity rests on the accused.
• People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the burden of proving insanity.
• People vs. Cruz, 109 SCRA 288 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the burden of proving insanity.
• People vs. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, May 12, 2000 — Cited for the rule that proof of insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense.
• People vs. Bañez, 301 SCRA — Cited for the rule that mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
• People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658 — Cited for the same proposition.
• People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 — Cited for the rule that proof of insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or during the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 129899, April 27, 2000 — Cited for the same proposition.
• People vs. Balgos, G.R. No. 126115, January 26, 2000 — Cited for the rule that a shift in theory from denial and alibi to insanity indicates a concocted defense.
• People vs. Trimor, 243 SCRA 129 — Cited for the same proposition.
• People vs. Amamangpang, 291 SCRA 638 — Cited for the same proposition.
• People vs. Pambid, G.R. No. 124453, March 15, 2000 — Cited for the same proposition.
• People vs. Sarmiento, 8 SCRA 263 — Cited for the rule on evident premeditation requiring proof of the time when the defendant decided to kill the victim.
• People vs. Bautista, 79 Phil. 652 — Cited for the same proposition.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder; as amended by RA 7659, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
• Article 12(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that an insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted during a lucid interval.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as employing means or method in the execution of a crime which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
• Article 15, Revised Penal Code — Defines the alternative circumstance of relationship, which applies only when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.
• Article 62, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — States the rule for the application of penalties with respect to aggravating or mitigating circumstances arising from the moral attributes of the offender or from his private relations with the offended party; does not define or establish such circumstances.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides that in the absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period.
• Article 80, Civil Code — Establishes the presumption that every man is sane.
• Section 3, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Requires the court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of a plea of guilty.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, JJ., concurred. Kapunan, J., was on leave.