People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Medina y Catud

Insanity or imbecility under Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code is exempting only upon clear and competent proof of complete deprivation of reason or consciousness of responsibility immediately before or at the time of the crime; the presumption of sanity prevails absent such proof.

Alberto Medina y Catud, brother of Delia Aguila, was among those present at a celebration at the Aguila residence in Barangay Caingin, San Pascual, Batangas; Andres M. Dalisay was a guest. The prosecution charged Medina with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 7. The appeal implicated Article 12, paragraph 1 (insanity) and Article 13, paragraph 9 (diminished will-power) of the Revised Penal Code, as well as the rules on treachery, evident premeditation, voluntary surrender, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

On or about May 20, 1992, as alleged in the Information, a party was held at the house of Sebastian and Delia Aguila in Barangay Caingin, San Pascual, Batangas, to celebrate the awarding of a championship trophy to the basketball team of Larry Andal. Among those present were Andres Dalisay, Edgardo Silang, Larry Andal, Norberto Biscocho, Bayani Dorado, Salustiano Aguila, and appellant Alberto Medina. During the celebration, Medina and Dalisay danced the “cha-cha” near the terrace; after the dance, Medina left the house. Later, Dalisay invited Andal to go home, and the two left with Dalisay walking ahead of Andal.

According to the prosecution, while they were walking, Andal saw Medina waiting along the way and suddenly stab Dalisay in the abdominal region with a balisong. Dalisay held Medina’s hand; during the struggle, Dalisay extricated himself and ran, but Medina chased him. When Medina caught up, he stabbed Dalisay once more at the back. Dalisay fell, tried to get up and run, but fell again; Medina stabbed him on the chest and then fled. Andal, about one meter away, was stunned and did not help. Edgardo Silang, who was urinating twenty paces away, heard Delia Aguila shout, “Husay ka Alberto pihadong makukulong ka, sinaksak mo si Andres.” Turning toward the shout, Silang saw Dalisay running toward him pursued by Medina, with blood in front of Dalisay’s body; Silang held Dalisay’s arm and tried to hug him, but Dalisay fell to the ground, and Medina fled. Dalisay was brought to Batangas Hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Benjamin M. Aguado, Municipal Health Officer of San Pascual Rural Health Unit, conducted a post-mortem examination and issued a Post-Examination Report (Exhibit “C”) listing eight stab wounds; the medico-legal officer reported that six of the eight stab wounds were fatal.

Medina testified that on the evening of May 20, 1992, he went to his sister Delia Aguila’s house to watch television. He saw the group of Dalisay, Andal, and Silang drinking at the balcony. He refused their invitation to drink but accepted their invitation to dance with Dalisay, with whom he danced about six or seven times. As the party ended, he left for his home in Barangay Balete, about 200 meters away. While walking, he heard Dalisay say, “Bert, sandali lang,” and stopped. Dalisay, who appeared drunk, approached and said, “Bakit mo ako hiniya?” and hit Medina on the chest. Enraged, Medina prepared to fight back when Dalisay threatened to kill him; it looked as if Dalisay was taking something from his pocket. Medina beat him to the draw, took out his balisong, and stabbed Dalisay, who then looked like a devil with horns. He stopped when Dalisay said, “May tama ako.” Upon realizing he had stabbed a person, Medina surrendered himself and the weapon on the same evening to the authorities.

The defense also presented Lorna Medina, appellant’s sister, who testified that during the latter part of 1981 Medina exhibited unusual behaviors; on June 22, 1982, she brought him to the National Mental Hospital after he had looked blankly at a distance, hit his wife or banged her head on the wall for no reason, and had sleepless nights. From June to October 1982, Medina was confined at the National Mental Hospital. Lourdes Palapal, Records Officer of the National Center for Mental Health, testified on documents showing confinement for “schizophreniform disorder.” After release, Medina lived with his mother and two children in Barangay Balete, San Pascual, Batangas; his condition did not seem to improve. In January 1992, Lorna again observed the same unusual behavior and referred him to Dr. Teresita Adigue, a psychologist, who conducted a psychological examination on January 20, 1992. Dr. Adigue testified that Medina suffered from depression and exhibited homicidal tendencies and did not know the difference between right and wrong; her evaluation was based on behavioral history from Lorna Medina and Leticia Regalado, a case study of family background, and psychological tests.

The trial court rejected the insanity defense. It found Dr. Adigue not properly qualified as an expert because she lacked Medina’s complete behavioral history, failed to demonstrate how she reached her conclusions, used incomplete and inconclusive testing, examined him only for a few hours without follow-up, obtained a doctoral degree from a university not known to specialize in psychology or psychiatry, was not known as a psychiatrist, and reported that Medina’s mental activity was functioning on a normal level at the time of evaluation, that he comprehended instructions fast, and that he suffered only from mild depression. The trial court also found Lorna’s observations insufficient, noted that Medina had been released from confinement on October 4, 1982 and was not readmitted for about ten years, and observed that during hearings Medina was attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to questions in English without translation. It found that Medina’s mental agility was shown when he admitted seeing the deceased take something from his pocket and decided to beat him to the draw (“Inunahan ko na”), and it appreciated treachery based on Andal’s narration. The evidence also showed that after the stabbing, Medina had earlier given himself up to a certain Col. Faltado and surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, about an hour after the incident, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City Police Station.

• Insanity: Petitioner argued that the trial court gravely erred in not acquitting him or mitigating his criminal liability on the ground of insanity; Dr. Adigue, an accredited psychologist of the Philippine National Police since 1979 and holder of a doctorate in psychology from the University of Calcutta, India, and a master’s degree in clinical and industrial psychology, deserved credence. He maintained that her testimony showed he suffered from depression, exhibited homicidal tendencies, and did not know the difference between right and wrong. Alternatively, he argued that his condition should at least be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 9 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Petitioner argued that, assuming criminal liability, the trial court erred in convicting him of murder by appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation despite doubt tending to show their existence.
• Voluntary Surrender: Petitioner argued that, assuming criminal liability, the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor.

• Evident Premeditation: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, conceded that only a few minutes had passed from the time appellant left his sister’s house to the time he stabbed the victim, so no sufficient lapse of time was appreciable from determination to commit the crime until its execution to allow reflection; evident premeditation cannot be appreciated.
• Voluntary Surrender: Respondent concurred that voluntary surrender should be credited, noting that appellant, after having earlier given himself up to a certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, about an hour after the stabbing, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City Police Station.
• Penalty/Article 63: Respondent contended that Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code governed the determination of the proper penalty, a position the Court rejected; the Solicitor General relied on People vs. Buenaflor, which the Court held involved rape punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty.

• Insanity: Whether the trial court erred in not acquitting appellant or mitigating his criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance in convicting appellant of murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• Proper Penalty: Whether Article 63 or Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code governs the imposition of penalty, and what indeterminate sentence should be imposed.

• Insanity: No. Insanity was not proven; Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code requires complete deprivation of reason at the time of the crime, and the evidence showed only mild depression and normal mental activity. The claim for mitigating illness under Article 13, paragraph 9 also fails.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was properly appreciated; the attack was sudden and unexpected, and appellant chased and stabbed the victim seven more times while he was helpless.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation was not established; only a few minutes passed between appellant leaving his sister’s house and the stabbing, insufficient time for reflection.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. Voluntary surrender should be credited; the offender was not actually arrested, surrendered to a person in authority, and did so voluntarily.
• Proper Penalty: Article 64, not Article 63, governs. Voluntary surrender entitles appellant to reclusion temporal in its maximum period, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law yields ten years and one day of prision mayor maximum as minimum and seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.

• Insanity: The defense of insanity or imbecility under Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code must be established by clear and competent evidence showing complete loss of reason or dementia immediately prior to or at the moment of the crime. The law presumes sanity under Article 800 of the Civil Code, and acts penalized by law are presumed voluntary. Dr. Adigue examined appellant on January 20, 1992, four months before the incident, and reported that his mental activity was functioning on the normal level at the time of evaluation, that he comprehended instructions fast, and that he suffered only from mild depression and emotional disturbances. This did not prove complete deprivation of rationality or inability to distinguish right from wrong. The trial court rejected the insanity defense, and the Court held that Dr. Adigue’s testimony failed to establish legal insanity. The Court distinguished insanity from mere mental depravity or failure to use reason due to extreme anger; prior cases such as Bascos and Bonoan involved confirmed violent mania or dementia praecox/manic depressive psychosis, while Rafanan, Dungo, and Aquino held that mental illness or abnormality not totally depriving intelligence does not exempt. As to Article 13, paragraph 9, the defense failed to show diminished will-power without consciousness of acts; appellant testified that he thought the victim would pull out a weapon, so he beat him to the draw and stabbed him, showing reason and discernment. The “devil with horns” perception occurred only after the fatal blows.
• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the victim might make. Andal witnessed appellant waiting along the path and suddenly stabbing Dalisay. After the first stab, appellant chased the victim and stabbed him seven more times; the victim fell several times and was helpless. The medico-legal officer reported eight stab wounds, six fatal. The attack was sudden, unexpected, vicious, and relentless, ensuring execution without risk to appellant. Treachery qualifying the killing as murder was properly appreciated.
• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation requires (1) the accused determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Only a few minutes passed from the time appellant left his sister’s house to the time he stabbed the victim. No sufficient lapse of time was appreciable for reflection. The trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation.
• Voluntary Surrender: The elements of voluntary surrender are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. Appellant, after having earlier given himself up to Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, about an hour after the stabbing, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City Police Station. The evidence sufficiently established these elements, and the mitigating circumstance should have been credited.
• Proper Penalty: The crime was committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659; the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The proscription of the death penalty by the 1987 Constitution did not amend the imposable penalty under the article. Article 64, which provides rules for penalties containing three periods, governs. Article 63 does not apply; the Solicitor General misinterpreted People vs. Buenaflor, which applied Article 63 because rape was punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty. Following Article 64(2), voluntary surrender entitles appellant to reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence is prision mayor maximum as minimum and reclusion temporal maximum as maximum, specifically ten years and one day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, and seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum.

• Insanity as an exempting circumstance — Under Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, insanity or imbecility exempts from criminal liability only when the accused completely lost reason or was demented immediately before or at the time of the crime. The defense must be clearly proved; the law presumes sanity under Article 800 of the Civil Code. Mere mental abnormality, mild depression, prior confinement, or failure to use reason due to extreme anger does not exempt. Applied: Dr. Adigue’s report showed normal mental activity and mild depression, not complete deprivation of reason.
• Diminished will-power as a mitigating circumstance — Article 13, paragraph 9 of the Revised Penal Code treats as mitigating such illness as would diminish the exercise of the offender’s will-power without depriving him of consciousness of his acts. Applied: not established, because appellant’s own testimony showed he thought the victim would pull a weapon and decided to beat him to the draw, indicating reason and discernment; the “devil with horns” perception came after the stabbing.
• Treachery — Treachery qualifies a killing as murder when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the victim might make. Applied: appellant waited for the victim, suddenly stabbed him, then chased and stabbed him seven more times while he was helpless; eight wounds, six fatal.
• Evident premeditation — Evident premeditation requires (1) the accused determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Applied: only a few minutes passed, so the circumstance was not established.
• Voluntary surrender — The elements are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. Applied: appellant surrendered to Wilfredo Sevillano about an hour after the stabbing, after earlier giving himself up to Col. Faltado; the mitigating circumstance should be credited.
• Application of penalties with three periods and the Indeterminate Sentence Law — Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code governs penalties containing three periods; Article 63 applies to indivisible penalties and was inapplicable because murder before Republic Act No. 7659 was punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to death, not a single indivisible penalty. Applied: voluntary surrender entitled appellant to reclusion temporal maximum, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law fixed prision mayor maximum as minimum and reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.

• “The law presumes that an offender possesses full control of his mental faculties. Thus, the exempting circumstance of insanity or imbecility under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, must be established by clear and competent evidence showing that the accused completely lost his reason, or was demented immediately prior to or at the very moment the crime was committed.” — This opening statement states the controlling standard for insanity and the presumption of sanity, framing the Court’s rejection of appellant’s defense.
• “Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of the power to discern.” — This passage defines the exact degree of mental deprivation required for the exempting circumstance of insanity.
• “Treachery can be gleaned from the fact that appellant waited behind a chico tree and then, all of a sudden, jumped on the victim. Appellant’s attack was not only sudden and unexpected; it was also vicious and relentless.” — This passage explains why treachery qualified the killing as murder, emphasizing the sudden and relentless nature of the attack.
• “Hence, the evidence sufficiently established the elements of voluntary surrender, namely: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.” — This passage states the elements of voluntary surrender and supports the Court’s crediting of the mitigating circumstance.

• People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 [1922] — Cited as an example where the accused was exempted from criminal liability because he was a violent maniac as confirmed by the acting district health officer who examined him; distinguished from appellant’s unproven insanity.
• People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87 [1937] — Cited for the principle that a person afflicted with dementia praecox and manic depressive psychosis may lack control of his acts; the Court noted that reports of alienists confirmed the accused’s mental disorders, unlike the evidence for appellant.
• People vs. Rafanan, Jr., 204 SCRA 65, November 21, 1991 — Cited for the rule that schizophrenic reaction does not exempt from liability because it does not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts, though it may be a mitigating circumstance; also cited for the test of cognition.
• People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860, July 31, 1991 — Cited for the holding that the accused’s knowledge of the nature of what he had done negated his claim of insanity.
• People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851, June 27, 1990 — Cited for the rule that mental illness which does not totally deprive the offender of intelligence does not exempt from criminal liability; mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude culpability.
• People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, November 29, 1950 — Cited for the principle that feeblemindedness may be a mitigating circumstance where the accused’s faculties were not fully developed, and for the requirement of complete deprivation for insanity.
• United States vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, March 13, 1914 — Cited to distinguish lack of reason (insanity) from failure to use reason or good judgment due to extreme anger or passion; mere moral insanity does not exempt.
• People vs. Isleta, G.R. No. 114971, November 19, 1996 and People vs. Castillo, 261 SCRA 493, September 6, 1996 — Cited for the elements of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Buenaflor, 211 SCRA 492, July 15, 1992 — Distinguished; the Solicitor General misinterpreted it, because it applied Article 63 to rape punishable by reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty, unlike murder before Republic Act No. 7659.
• People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989 — Cited for the rule that the proscription of the death penalty by the 1987 Constitution did not amend the imposable penalty for murder committed before Republic Act No. 7659.

• Article 12, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines insanity or imbecility as an exempting circumstance; the Court held it requires complete deprivation of reason or consciousness of responsibility at the time of the crime, which was not established.
• Article 13, paragraph 9, Revised Penal Code — Treats as mitigating such illness as would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving the offender of consciousness of his acts; the Court found this not established.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; the conviction was affirmed because treachery qualified the killing.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs application of indivisible penalties; held inapplicable because murder before Republic Act No. 7659 was not punishable by a single indivisible penalty.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for application of penalties containing three periods; applied to credit voluntary surrender and impose reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
• Article 800, Civil Code — Establishes the presumption of sanity; cited to support the rule that every person is presumed of sound mind absent proof to the contrary.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) — Applied to fix the indeterminate sentence of prision mayor maximum as minimum and reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Referred to as not yet effective at the time of the crime; the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
• 1987 Constitution — Its proscription of the death penalty did not amend the imposable penalty for murder committed before Republic Act No. 7659.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.