People of the Philippines vs. Adones Abatayo

The right to confront and cross-examine a witness is personal and waivable, and is deemed waived where the accused, having had the opportunity to cross-examine, fails to assert the right; and treachery cannot be appreciated where the lone eyewitness did not see how the attack commenced, since qualifying circumstances cannot rest on mere conjecture.

Teofredo Basalan and his brother Dominador Basalan, aged 24 and 26, respectively, lived with their mother Silvina Basalan in Colon, Naga, Cebu City, and worked as stay-in construction workers at the construction site of Gaisano FCDC at Ibabao, Mandaue City. The appellant, Adones Abatayo, was a co-worker at the same site, having begun work for Super Metro Gaisano sometime in mid-August 1993.

At around 7:00 p.m. on September 9, 1993, after a hard day's work, laborers Juanito Gutang, Apolonio Quilag, and Pedro Esconia, together with an unidentified co-worker, retired early in their quarters. At around 3:00 a.m. the following day, Juanito was awakened by an unusual thud, similar to that produced by someone striking somebody. He got up and, from a distance of about three meters, saw the appellant hitting Teofredo and Dominador with a lead pipe. Juanito woke his co-workers and told them what he had just witnessed; Apolonio saw the victims already lying in a pool of blood. Juanito and his co-workers immediately reported the incident to the security guards on duty, who in turn called the Mandaue City police station. Meanwhile, the appellant hurriedly left the job site, bringing with him his personal belongings.

PO2 Alfredo Andales, assigned to the case, conducted an on-the-spot investigation. At the crime scene, he found the victims' bloodied corpses with their respective heads smashed, and a galvanized iron pipe, the weapon used to kill them. His investigation revealed that the night before the victims were killed, they had an acrimonious quarrel with the appellant over some misplaced construction tools which were later recovered. The incident was recorded in the police blotter with the appellant as the prime suspect. In the afternoon of that same day, the bodies were brought to the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, where Dr. Ladislao V. Diola, Jr. conducted a post mortem examination and signed a necropsy report stating that the victims died due to cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to injuries to the head. By agreement of the parties, Dr. Diola's testimony was dispensed with after the defense admitted the findings in the report. On September 16, 1993, Juanito and Apolonio subscribed and swore to the truth of their respective affidavits before the public prosecutor. Silvina testified that she fainted upon learning of the death of her two sons, spent around P50,000.00 for the wake and funeral, and suffered emotional pain.

The appellant testified that he started working for Super Metro Gaisano as a construction worker sometime in mid-August 1993. On September 9, 1993, after rendering two hours of overtime work, he decided to go home, leaving the job site at around 7:00 p.m. and hitching a ride in the company vehicle driven by Charmel Ralago, his neighbor. He arrived home at about 9:00 p.m. The following morning, his uncle dropped by and asked to be accompanied to Carcar, Cebu, for the town fiesta; the appellant readily acquiesced, absented himself from work, and requested a co-worker to get his salary. After the fiesta, he went home but no longer reported for work, instead going to Bohol. He returned home in December 1993 for the holiday season and was surprised when he was arrested in August 1994 for the killings. Bernabe Hinario, a 23-year-old taho peddler and next-door neighbor, corroborated the alibi, testifying that at about 9:00 p.m. on September 9, 1993, he saw the appellant arrive from work as usual and invited him to attend the Carcar fiesta. Leonora Abatayo, the appellant's mother, testified that she was in their house when the appellant arrived home at about 9:00 p.m., that he took his dinner and slept, and that the following morning he left with his uncle, Fransico Malubay, for the fiesta in Carcar.

The trial court relied on the testimony of Apolonio and eyewitness Juanito Gutang, corroborated by the medical findings showing the nature and location of the wounds inflicted on the victims, and brushed aside as dubious and weak the denial and alibi interposed by the appellant, holding that such defenses could not prevail over Juanito's positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator.

• Impairment of Right to Confrontation: The appellant argued that his constitutional and procedural right to confront the witness against him was impaired when his counsel was unable to continue cross-examining Juanito Gutang, citing Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines as the case in point, and faulted the trial court for relying on Gutang's testimony despite its warning that it would consider the entire testimony stricken from the record for lack of proper cross-examination.
• Probative Value of Unfinished Testimony: The appellant maintained that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the unfinished testimony of Gutang despite its inherent implausibility, and in disregarding the evidence interposed by the accused-appellant which was amply corroborated on material points.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The appellant contended that the trial court erred in rendering a verdict of conviction notwithstanding that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Alibi: The appellant insisted that the trial court erred in disbelieving his alibi, arguing that the testimony of Bernabe Hinario, a disinterested neighbor, should have been given more weight than the untested words of Juanito Gutang.

• Waiver of Cross-Examination: The Office of the Solicitor General asserted that while the appellant had the constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, he waived such right when he failed to invoke the same after his initial cross-examination of Juanito Gutang.

• Waiver of Right to Cross-Examine: Whether the trial court erred in not ordering the striking out of the entire testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness Juanito Gutang on the ground that the appellant was deprived of his right to complete cross-examination.
• Credibility and Probative Value: Whether the trial court erred in giving probative value to the unfinished testimony of Juanito Gutang despite its alleged inherent implausibility and in disregarding the evidence interposed by the accused-appellant.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Whether the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were established to qualify the killings to murder.
• Alibi and Denial: Whether the trial court erred in disbelieving the appellant's defenses of alibi and denial.
• Duplicity of the Information: Whether the filing of a single information for double murder barred conviction for two separate offenses.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty imposed and the damages awarded were correct.

• Waiver of Right to Cross-Examine: No error. The appellant waived his right to further cross-examine Juanito Gutang; the right of confrontation and cross-examination is personal and waivable, and silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof.
• Credibility and Probative Value: No error. The testimony of the lone eyewitness was clear, straightforward, categorical, and consistent, and his positive identification of the appellant was entitled to full faith and credit absent any showing of improper motive.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes, as to homicide. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant killed the victims, though the qualifying circumstances elevating the crime to murder were not established.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: No. Neither qualifying circumstance was proved beyond reasonable doubt; the lone eyewitness did not see how the assault began.
• Alibi and Denial: No error. Alibi and denial are inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification; the appellant's flight after the incident was indicative of guilt.
• Duplicity of the Information: The defect was waived for failure to file a motion to quash before arraignment; under Section 3, Rule 120, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: The penalty was modified to an indeterminate sentence for homicide; actual damages were deleted for lack of documentary proof, and temperate, civil, and moral damages were awarded.

• Waiver of Right to Cross-Examine: Under Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the accused has the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and under Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court, the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at trial, a fundamental right forming part of due process. This right, however, is personal and not absolute; it may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. The common basic principle underlying implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. The task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is imposed on the party who wishes to exercise the right, and it is the opposing counsel who must move to cross-examine the witness; silence or failure to assert the right on time amounts to renunciation. Here, the appellant's counsel cross-examined Gutang on the corpus delicti on November 22, 1994, then moved for a resetting; when Gutang failed to appear on January 23, 1995 due to fever, the appellant did not object to the deferment of the cross-examination or to the presentation of Apolonio Quilag; no subpoena was issued to Gutang for the March 2, 1995 trial, and the appellant did not object when the prosecution presented PO2 Andales and Silvina Basalan; on April 17, 1995, the appellant did not call the court's attention to the unfinished cross-examination nor move to strike Gutang's testimony; and on May 22, 1995, he did not object to the offer of Gutang's affidavit. These circumstances conclusively showed that the appellant had waived his right to further cross-examine Gutang, and that his counsel considered the initial cross-examination adequate.
• Credibility and Probative Value: The prosecution proved beyond doubt that the appellant killed the victims, as he was positively identified by the lone eyewitness, Juanito Gutang, whose testimony was clear, straightforward, categorical, and consistent, without any tinge of falsehood or sign of fabrication. No evil motive was imputed against Gutang; the appellant himself admitted that no bad blood existed between them and that he knew of no reason why Gutang would testify against him. Where there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. The trial court's calibration of the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal, since it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard and observed the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that could alter the result.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The prosecution established the appellant's guilt for the killings beyond reasonable doubt through the positive identification of the eyewitness, corroborated by the medical findings on the nature and location of the wounds. The defenses interposed by the appellant did not overcome the prosecution's evidence.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: The trial court found the appellant guilty of murder without finding any circumstance attendant to the crime to qualify the killings to murder, contrary to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court, which require the judgment of conviction to state the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the lone eyewitness was not able to see how the assault started; the fact that the incident happened at around 3:00 a.m. did not prove that the victims were sleeping when killed, since Gutang testified that he was asleep when the appellant started the attack and was only awakened by thudding sounds. Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself, much less to retaliate; and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. While killing a victim who is sleeping or has just awakened is attended by treachery, when the lone eyewitness did not see how the attack commenced, the trial court cannot presume from the circumstances that there was treachery; circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence. Like treachery, evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive evidence; the prosecution did not even attempt to prove its three elements: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. A police report of a prior spat between the appellant and the victims was insufficient, as nothing showed that the appellant planned the crime in advance, and the principal eyewitness was not even aware of any prior incident or possible reason for the attack.
• Alibi and Denial: The trial court could not be faulted for not giving probative weight to the appellant's alibi, which was inherently weak for not being airtight and could not prevail against the positive identification made by the prosecution witness. Alibi becomes less plausible when corroborated only by a relative or close friend of the accused. The denial was negative and self-serving and could not be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters. The appellant's flight after the incident—his sudden and unexplained trip following the killing—was a clear and positive indication of guilt.
• Duplicity of the Information: Only one information for double murder was filed, and the records showed no objection to its duplicity by a motion to quash before arraignment; the appellant was therefore deemed to have waived such defect. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal, ranging from twelve years and one day to twenty years. With no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum period of the imposable penalty should be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months, while the minimum should be taken from the full range of prision mayor, one degree lower. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant may be meted an indeterminate sentence of from eight years and one day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum, for each count of homicide. The award of P17,000.00 for actual damages was deleted for absence of documentary evidence, but temperate damages of P25,000.00 may be recovered under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, considering that the family undisputedly incurred expenses for the wake and burial. The heirs of the victims are entitled to indemnity for loss of earning capacity under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, but while testimonial evidence may suffice in exceptional cases, the victims' mother did not indicate how much her sons were earning, so the case did not fall under any exception. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide. Moral damages may be awarded upon sufficient proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, and similar injury, and considering the pain and anguish of the victims' family, the award of P50,000.00 for each offense was justified.

• Waiver of the Right to Cross-Examine — The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, whether criminal or civil, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is personal and may be waived, expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine, and the testimony given on direct examination will be received or allowed to remain in the record. The task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is imposed on the party who wishes to exercise the right; silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the appellant waived further cross-examination of the eyewitness by failing to object or move to strike at every available opportunity.
• Treachery — Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself, much less to retaliate; and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself; it cannot be deduced from mere conjectures, presumptions, or sheer speculation. The Court held that treachery was not established because the lone eyewitness did not see how the assault commenced.
• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation must be established by clear and positive evidence, and mere inferences or presumptions, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient. Its three elements are: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The Court found these elements unproven, a police report of a prior spat being insufficient.
• Alibi — Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail against the positive identification made by a prosecution witness; it becomes less plausible when corroborated only by a relative or close friend of the accused. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the appellant's alibi.
• Denial — Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the appellant's denial.
• Flight as Evidence of Guilt — The flight of an accused from the scene of the crime and his act of hiding himself until he is arrested are circumstances highly indicative of guilt. The Court treated the appellant's sudden and unexplained trip following the killing as unmistakably a flight from justice.
• Duplicity of Information and Waiver — When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense. The defect of duplicity is waived if not raised by a motion to quash before arraignment.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The Court applied this law in fixing the indeterminate penalty for homicide.
• Temperate Damages — Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The Court awarded temperate damages in lieu of unproven actual damages for the wake and burial expenses.
• Civil Indemnity — Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide. The Court awarded civil indemnity to the heirs of the victims.
• Moral Damages — Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the heirs of the victims upon sufficient proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. The Court awarded moral damages based on the testimony of the victims' mother.

• "The task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof." — This passage, quoted from Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, states the ratio decidendi on the waiver of the right to cross-examine, which the Court applied in holding that the appellant forfeited further cross-examination of the eyewitness.
• "Treachery cannot be appreciated in this case where the lone eye-witness to the killing, Juanito Gutang, was not able to see how the assault started." — This is the core holding on the qualifying circumstance of treachery, establishing that the qualifying circumstance cannot be presumed where the eyewitness did not witness the commencement of the attack.
• "Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence." — This passage articulates the evidentiary standard for qualifying circumstances, explaining why both treachery and evident premeditation failed.
• "the 'wicked flee even when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion.'" — This passage supports the Court's treatment of the appellant's flight as a clear and positive indication of guilt.

• Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, 62 SCRA 258 (1975) — Controlling precedent establishing that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness may be waived, expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
• Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 81 (1990) — Followed; held that the task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is imposed on the party who wishes to exercise the right, and that silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to renunciation.
• Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, 64 SCRA 610 (1975) — Cited by the appellant as authority for the claim that his right to confront the witness was impaired; the Court did not adopt the appellant's reliance on it.
• People vs. Gayomma, 315 SCRA 639 (1999) — Followed; where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
• People vs. Sotes, 260 SCRA 353 (1996) — Followed; the trial court's calibration of the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that it plainly overlooked facts of substance and value.
• People vs. Salvador, 224 SCRA 819 (1993) — Cited; treachery cannot be presumed nor established from mere suppositions.
• People vs. Lopez, 313 SCRA 114 (1999) — Cited; treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions, and cannot be deduced from mere conjectures, presumption, or sheer speculation.
• People vs. Reyes, 287 SCRA 229 (1998) — Cited; the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim.
• People vs. Cotas, 332 SCRA 627 (2000) — Cited; killing a sleeping or just-awakened victim is attended by treachery, but the trial court cannot presume treachery where the eyewitness did not see how the attack commenced.
• People vs. Rapanut, 263 SCRA 515 (1996) — Cited; circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures but must be based on facts of unquestionable existence.
• People vs. Academia Jr., 307 SCRA 229 (1999) — Cited; evident premeditation requires proof of its three elements by clear and positive evidence.
• People vs. Datingginoo, 223 SCRA 331 (1993) — Cited; alibi becomes less plausible when corroborated only by a relative or close friend of the accused.
• People vs. Espina, 361 SCRA 701 (2001) — Cited; denial cannot prevail over the positive identification by an eyewitness who had no improper motive to falsely testify.
• People vs. Acala, 307 SCRA 330 (1999) — Cited; denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness testifying on affirmative matters.
• People vs. Delmendo, 296 SCRA 371 (1998) — Cited; the flight of an accused from the scene of the crime and his act of hiding until arrested are circumstances highly indicative of guilt.
• People vs. Delim, 396 SCRA 386 (2003) — Cited; temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
• People of the Philippines vs. Raul Oco @ Boy Usher, G.R. Nos. 137370-71, September 29, 2003 — Cited; documentary evidence is ordinarily necessary to prove loss of earning capacity, with testimonial evidence sufficient only in specified exceptions.
• People of the Philippines vs. PO3 Roger Roxas, G.R. No. 140762, September 10, 2003 — Cited; civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.
• People vs. Leal, 358 SCRA 794 (2001) — Cited; moral damages may be awarded in favor of the heirs of the victims upon sufficient proof of the enumerated injuries.
• People vs. Bonito, 342 SCRA 405 (2000) — Cited; the judgment of conviction should state the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the crime to enable the court to determine the proper penalty.

• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the accused the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face; the Court recognized this right but held it personal and waivable.
• Rule 115, Section 1(f), Rules of Court — Grants the accused the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at trial; the Court held this right was waived by the appellant's conduct.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery; applied to hold that treachery was not established because the eyewitness did not see how the assault commenced.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal; applied in modifying the conviction from murder to homicide and in recomputing the penalty.
• Section 1, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Court — Defines judgment as the adjudication of guilt or innocence and the imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability; cited to note the trial court's failure to state the qualifying circumstance.
• Section 2, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Court — Requires the judgment of conviction to state the legal qualification of the offense, the aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed, and the civil liability; cited in relation to the trial court's omission.
• Section 3, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose the penalty for each offense; applied to sustain the conviction for two counts despite the single information.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court — Governs the waiver of defects in the information not raised by a motion to quash before arraignment; applied to hold that the appellant waived the defect of duplicity.
• Section 1, Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Requires the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term that could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code and a minimum within the range of the penalty next lower; applied in fixing the indeterminate penalty for homicide.
• Article 2224, Civil Code — Allows recovery of temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty; applied to award temperate damages in lieu of unproven actual damages.
• Article 2206, Civil Code — Entitles the heirs of the victims to indemnity for loss of earning capacity; the Court found the exception allowing testimonial evidence inapplicable because the victims' earnings were not shown.
• Article 2217, Civil Code — Provides for moral damages upon proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury; applied to award moral damages.

Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.