People of the Philippines vs. Adolfo A. Goyala, Jr.

Upon the lapse of the 60-day period under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer arraignment, regardless of whether a petition for review remains pending before the Department of Justice; the 60-day limitation is not merely directory.

AAA, a minor, was the complainant in a statutory rape case against respondent Adolfo A. Goyala, Jr., which was investigated by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City and later became the subject of review proceedings before the Department of Justice. The dispute implicated the procedure for preliminary investigation and the suspension of arraignment under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows suspension when a petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution is pending before the Department of Justice or the Office of the President but limits the suspension to sixty days from the filing of the petition. The case also involved the trial court’s authority to proceed once an Information has been filed and the prosecutor’s resolution is under review.

AAA, a minor, executed with the assistance of her mother a sworn statement dated June 17, 2013 before Police Inspector Ernesto A. Mones of the Pasig City Police accusing Adolfo A. Goyala, Jr. of statutory rape. After due endorsement to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, the complaint was docketed as IS No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337 and assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor Pedro M. Oribe as Investigating Prosecutor for preliminary investigation. Respondent executed his Counter-Affidavit on July 30, 2013. On August 16, 2013, respondent instituted a civil complaint for damages against AAA and her mother. On the strength of this civil case, respondent filed a Petition for Suspension on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before ACP Oribe and later a supplemental Motion to Reiterate Petition for Suspension on the Ground of Prejudicial Question. This motion was denied in a Resolution dated September 30, 2013.

On November 12, 2013, ACP Oribe issued a Resolution finding probable cause against respondent and recommending the filing of an Information for Statutory Rape under Art. 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, also known as the “Anti-Rape Law of 1997,” in relation to Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 8369. On November 27, 2013, the Regional Trial Court, Criminal Case Unit received the Information for IS No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337 and docketed the same as Criminal Case No. 152682-PSG. On even date, respondent filed an Initial Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration and a Main Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Disqualify ACP Oribe before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. On November 29, 2013, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before the RTC. Meanwhile, Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang issued a 1st Indorsement dated December 18, 2013 forwarding the entire record of IS No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337 to the Department of Justice for further proceedings and inhibited himself from resolving the Motion for Reconsideration. On January 24, 2014, Justice Secretary Leila de Lima issued Department Order No. 173 designating Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Josefa D. Laurente as Acting Prosecutor of Pasig City to resolve with finality IS No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337.

In its February 13, 2014 Order, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. It reasoned that once a complaint or Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court, and the determination of the case is within the trial court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence. It distinguished the preliminary inquiry to determine probable cause for the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest from the preliminary investigation proper to ascertain whether the offender should be held for trial or released, noting that the determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the Warrant of Arrest is made by the judge. The trial court was not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Thus, any pending Petition for Review questioning the preliminary investigation conducted by ACP Oribe was negligible. The RTC found that there was probable cause to hold respondent for trial for the offense charged in the Information, after scrutinizing the prosecutor’s resolution as well as the supporting affidavits and documentary evidence of the parties. On February 21, 2014, a Warrant of Arrest was issued. On March 3, 2014, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking, among others, to recall the Order for the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest, to strike off the Information or dismiss the case, to reconsider and set aside the February 13, 2014 Order, to set the case for hearing for determination of probable cause, and to suspend issuance and/or service of any Warrant of Arrest. The same was denied in the RTC Order dated March 26, 2014.

Aggrieved, respondent went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari to impugn the above-stated orders of the RTC. The Court of Appeals declared void and set aside the February 13, 2014 and March 26, 2014 Orders of the RTC. It also ordered the RTC to hold in abeyance further proceedings and remand the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City for the purpose of resolving with finality the preliminary investigation. Likewise, it revoked the implementation of the Warrant of Arrest issued by the RTC. Lastly, it ordered the RTC to resume the proceedings in the criminal case only upon finality of the preliminary investigation and after due indorsement thereof. The Court of Appeals held that respondent was deprived of his right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the Information against him, applying the Court’s pronouncement in Office of the Ombudsman vs. Castro and Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan. The People filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its May 5, 2016 Resolution. Petitioner argued in its Motion for Reconsideration that the issues were already moot and academic because SACP Laurente had already denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Undated Order. The Court of Appeals did not give merit to the same considering that respondent manifested that he filed, on October 5, 2015, a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice against said Undated Order.

During the pendency of the certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals, the pending Motion for Reconsideration questioning the finding of probable cause was resolved against respondent in an Undated Order. This prompted respondent to appeal the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause to the Department of Justice Secretary. The petition was filed on October 5, 2015. The 60-day period had long expired.

• RTC’s Authority to Deny Suspension: Petitioner contended that the RTC acted within its authority in denying respondent’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest.
• Misplaced Reliance on Torralba and Castro: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on Torralba and Castro because the facts in those cases are incongruous to the facts of the instant proceedings; in Torralba, the accused were not served copies of the final resolution of the preliminary investigation and were not apprised of a modified memorandum and special audit report, while respondent was duly provided with full information of the basis of the accusation against him and was not deprived of legal processes and avenues to contest the initial findings of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.
• Castro Does Not Advance Respondent: Petitioner maintained that in Castro, the Court, rather than ousting the trial court of its jurisdiction over the criminal case due to a contrary finding of the prosecutor in its reinvestigation, effectively recognized and respected the assumed authority of the lower court, and thus Castro cannot advance respondent’s case.
• Odilao as Controlling: Petitioner posited that People vs. Odilao, Jr. is appropriate and decisive on the issue of the court’s deferment of the criminal proceedings in view of a review of the findings of the preliminary investigation, and that the Court therein allegedly directed the trial court to proceed with the arraignment of respondent and trial on the merits on the basis of Section 11, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Due Process Afforded: Petitioner contended that there is no reason to enjoin the criminal prosecution of respondent because he was afforded the fundamental right to due process, listing the numerous ways in which respondent had availed himself of the legal remedies afforded by law.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner claimed that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondent’s Motion for Suspension of Criminal Proceedings, pointing out that respondent’s Petition for Certiorari failed to state any factual averment constituting grave abuse of discretion and that it is not grave abuse of discretion for the trial court judge to deny respondent’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings as a finding of probable cause against him was evident from the magistrate’s own determination of such facts.
• Mootness: Petitioner argued in its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals that the issues in the instant controversy are already moot and academic because SACP Laurente had already denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Undated Order.

• Incomplete Preliminary Investigation: Respondent argued that the preliminary investigation remains incomplete because his Petition for Review assailing the Undated Order of SACP Laurente denying his Motion for Reconsideration is pending with the Department of Justice.
• Castro and Torralba: Respondent rejected petitioner’s discussion concerning the Castro and Torralba cases, asserting that there was no issue of an incomplete preliminary investigation on the aspect of the Castro case cited by petitioner and that reliance on the Torralba ruling is proper because it directly discusses the issue of an incomplete preliminary investigation.
• Odilao, Perez, and Solar Team: Respondent disparaged petitioner’s reliance on Odilao on the ground that it was decided prior to Castro and does not involve the issue of an incomplete preliminary investigation, and for the same reason rejected reliance on Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Judge How, which Odilao cited.
• Section 11, Rule 116 and Speedy Trial Act: Respondent rejected petitioner’s invocation of Section 11, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure because petitioner allegedly previously argued that the subject of the instant case is not a Petition for Review; even if the 60-day period is applicable, the lapse of such period is allegedly due to petitioner; further, said period is applied in relation to an Information already filed in court as against a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice after preliminary investigation; petitioner also argued that the proceedings before the Court of Appeals is an interlocutory appeal excluded from the delay contemplated by Section 11, Rule 116, citing Sections 10(a)(3 and 6) and 11 of Republic Act No. 8493, or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, and asserting that as between Republic Act No. 8493 and Section 11, Rule 116, the former shall prevail.
• Due Process and Grave Abuse: Respondent contended that petitioner’s assertion that he was afforded his fundamental right to due process is off-tangent because it failed to address the main issue—that he was denied his right to due process of law in the form of a complete preliminary investigation; he also insisted that the grave abuse of discretion consists in the denial of his right to due process because he was deprived of a complete preliminary investigation.
• Finality of CA Directive: Respondent claimed that since petitioner failed to directly contravene the third directive of the Court of Appeals Decision—that the proceedings in the criminal case shall only resume upon finality of the preliminary investigation and after due indorsement thereof—in either its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals or in this petition before the Court, petitioner may no longer assail said directive, which has become final and irreversible; with the filing and pendency of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice, there is no final resolution, no finality of the preliminary investigation, and no due indorsement thereof.

• Suspension of Arraignment After 60-Day Period: Whether the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 152682 should continue to be held in abeyance despite the lapse of the sixty (60)-day period provided for under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

• Suspension of Arraignment After 60-Day Period: No. The proceedings should not continue to be held in abeyance. The 60-day period under Section 11(c), Rule 116 had lapsed, and the trial court was bound to arraign respondent or deny the motion to defer arraignment regardless of the status of the petition before the Department of Justice.

• Suspension of Arraignment After 60-Day Period: The Court preliminarily emphasized, as stated in Dichaves vs. Office of the Ombudsman, that a person’s rights in a preliminary investigation are subject to the limitations of procedural law; these rights are statutory, not constitutional. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to present such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the respondent in a criminal complaint is probably guilty thereof; it does not call for a full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is the filing of a complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal action and carries with it all the accompanying rights of an accused. In the instant case, it was undisputed that the 60-day period provided under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure had already lapsed. Thus, there was no longer any reason to hold in abeyance the criminal proceedings in the case for statutory rape against respondent. In Aguinaldo vs. Ventus, the Court ruled that the 60-day limitation in Section 11(c), Rule 116 is not merely directory. In Samson vs. Judge Daway, the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office; after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. In Diño vs. Olivarez, the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite suspension of the proceedings in the trial court, and its reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored on Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which mandates that the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be seventy-five days. In Heirs of Feraren vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that while rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business; relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. Here, during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals, the pending Motion for Reconsideration questioning the finding of probable cause was resolved against respondent in an Undated Order, prompting respondent to appeal the prosecutor’s finding of probable cause to the Department of Justice Secretary; the petition was filed on October 5, 2015. Obviously, the 60-day period had long expired and trial must proceed in due course. Respondent’s argument that the period that had already lapsed should not be excluded because the delay that consumed the 60-day period is attributable to petitioner, following the Speedy Trial Act, failed to persuade. The Speedy Trial Act finds no application in this case, as the law was passed to impose time limits from arraignment to promulgation of judgment to ensure the constitutional rights of the accused against vexatious prosecution; the exclusion of periods included therein is for the purpose of establishing whether or not there has been acceptable and excusable delay in compliance with such time limits, and nothing more. These provisions cannot be used to further extend a period fixed by law. While the 60-day limitation is indeed a procedural rule that can be relaxed, as recognized in Aguinaldo, respondent utterly failed to provide justifiable reasons to further suspend the criminal proceedings; on the contrary, the suspension has been so long that it becomes unconscionable to continue it any further. Respondent’s argument that the completeness of the preliminary investigation is only achieved upon the final disposition of the Department of Justice of the Petition for Review also did not persuade. The rules are clear and unequivocal: upon the lapse of the 60-day period, the court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the Motion to Defer Arraignment whether or not the petition before the Department of Justice has been resolved. As explained in Crespo vs. Judge Mogul, when an Information has been filed in court, the prosecutor would be stripped of the power to dismiss the case motu proprio; instead, the court acquires the exclusive jurisdiction to decide what to do with the case even if it is against the position of the public prosecutor or even the Secretary of Justice. The 60-day period was enacted in recognition of the power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases, and such power was never revoked by Crespo. As due deference to a co-equal branch of government, the Rules allow a suspension of a criminal case to give an opportunity to the Secretary of Justice to rectify, modify, or correct any mistake or error committed by his subordinates; nevertheless, the Rules limit the suspension to only 60 days. Hence, given the fact that the period has expired and regardless of the status of the appeal before the Department of Justice, the court has no discretion but to proceed with the arraignment. The appellate court’s disquisition, therefore, must be reversed considering the intervening events that have transpired. Accordingly, the other arguments raised by the parties, especially by respondent, were mooted by these events.

• Preliminary investigation rights are statutory, not constitutional — A person’s rights in a preliminary investigation are subject to the limitations of procedural law. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to present such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the respondent in a criminal complaint is probably guilty thereof; it does not call for a full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. The filing of a complaint or information in court initiates a criminal action and carries with it all the accompanying rights of an accused. The Court applied this to reject the claim that an incomplete preliminary investigation justified indefinite suspension.
• The 60-day limitation on suspension of arraignment under Section 11(c), Rule 116 is not merely directory — The period of suspension of arraignment when a petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution is pending before the Department of Justice or the Office of the President shall not exceed sixty days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. After the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. The Court applied this because the 60-day period had long lapsed, so there was no longer any reason to hold the criminal proceedings in abeyance.
• Trial court acquires exclusive jurisdiction after the filing of an Information — Once an Information has been filed in court, the prosecutor is stripped of the power to dismiss the case motu proprio; the court acquires the exclusive jurisdiction to decide what to do with the case even if it is against the position of the public prosecutor or even the Secretary of Justice. The 60-day period was enacted in recognition of the power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates, but that power does not authorize an indefinite suspension. The Court applied this to hold that the RTC could proceed despite the pending DOJ petition.
• The Speedy Trial Act does not extend the 60-day suspension period — Republic Act No. 8493 was passed to impose time limits from arraignment to promulgation of judgment to ensure the constitutional rights of the accused against vexatious prosecution. The exclusion of periods under the Act is for the purpose of establishing whether there has been acceptable and excusable delay in complying with such time limits, and nothing more; these provisions cannot be used to further extend a period fixed by law. The Court applied this to reject respondent’s attempt to extend the 60-day period.
• No indefinite suspension of criminal proceedings pending DOJ review — The Rules allow a suspension of a criminal case to give the Secretary of Justice an opportunity to rectify, modify, or correct any mistake or error committed by his subordinates, but the suspension is limited to only 60 days. The Court applied this to reverse the Court of Appeals and order the RTC to continue with the proceedings with dispatch.

• "These rights are statutory, not constitutional." — The Court preliminarily characterizes the rights of a person in a preliminary investigation as statutory rather than constitutional, grounding its rejection of respondent’s claim that an incomplete preliminary investigation required indefinite suspension.
• "the 60-day limitation in Sec. 11(c), Rule 116 is not merely directory" — The Court cites Aguinaldo vs. Ventus to establish that the 60-day period for suspending arraignment is mandatory in effect, not merely a directory guideline.
• "Upon the lapse of the 60-day period, the court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the Motion to Defer Arraignment whether or not the petition before the DOJ has been resolved." — This is the controlling rule applied to the facts: the RTC was required to proceed despite the pending DOJ petition for review.
• "given the fact that the period has expired and regardless of the status of the appeal before the DOJ, the court has no discretion but to proceed with the arraignment." — The Court states the consequence of the lapse of the 60-day period, emphasizing that the trial court’s duty to proceed is mandatory.

• Dichaves vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 802 Phil. 564 (2016) — Cited for the rule that rights in a preliminary investigation are statutory, not constitutional, and that preliminary investigation merely determines probable cause; the filing of a complaint or information in court initiates the criminal action.
• Aguinaldo vs. Ventus, 755 Phil. 536 (2015) — Controlling precedent for the holding that the 60-day limitation in Section 11(c), Rule 116 is not merely directory; after expiration, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or deny the motion to defer arraignment.
• Samson vs. Judge Daway — Cited for the rule that while a pending petition for review is a ground for suspension of arraignment, the suspension is limited to 60 days from filing; after expiration, the trial court must arraign or deny the motion to defer.
• Diño vs. Olivarez — Cited for the principle that indefinite suspension of proceedings is not sanctioned; reliance on the Justice Secretary to decide the appeal is anchored on Department Memorandum Order No. 12, which mandates a 75-day period for disposition of appeals or petitions for review.
• Heirs of Feraren vs. Court of Appeals — Cited for strict application of reglementary periods; relaxation or suspension is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.
• Crespo vs. Judge Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) — Cited for the rule that once an Information is filed in court, the prosecutor is stripped of the power to dismiss the case motu proprio; the court acquires exclusive jurisdiction to decide what to do with the case, even against the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.
• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Castro, 510 Phil. 380 (2005) — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of preliminary investigation; the Supreme Court found the intervening lapse of the 60-day period controlling.
• Torralba vs. Sandiganbayan, 300 Phil. 25, 35 (1994) — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that an incomplete preliminary investigation warrants holding proceedings in abeyance; petitioner distinguished it on the facts.
• People vs. Odilao, Jr., 471 Phil. 623 (2004) — Cited by petitioner for the rule that the trial court should proceed with arraignment and trial under Section 11, Rule 116.
• Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568 (1996) — Cited in relation to Crespo regarding the court’s authority after the filing of an Information.

• Section 11(c), Rule 116, 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that arraignment shall be suspended when a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at the Department of Justice or the Office of the President, provided that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Applied: the 60-day period had lapsed, so the RTC was bound to proceed and could not continue holding the case in abeyance.
• Article 266-A(d), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Section 5(a), Republic Act No. 8369 — Defines statutory rape and the applicable child-abuse framework. Applied: ACP Oribe found probable cause and recommended the filing of an Information for Statutory Rape under this provision.
• Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998), Sections 10(a)(3) and (6), and 11 — Provides exclusions from time limits for interlocutory appeals and valid prejudicial questions, and factors for granting continuance. Applied: the Court held the Act did not apply to extend the 60-day period fixed by Rule 116; its exclusions concern acceptable delay in complying with time limits from arraignment to promulgation, not the suspension period.
• Section 2, Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 — Sets the time limit for arraignment and pre-trial and excludes the period of pendency of a motion to quash. Applied: respondent invoked it, but the Court rejected its use to further extend the 60-day suspension period.
• Department Memorandum Order No. 12 dated 3 July 2000 — Mandates that the period for disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be seventy-five days. Applied: cited in Diño vs. Olivarez to reject indefinite suspension pending DOJ review.
• Administrative Circular No. 83-2015; Republic Act No. 7610; Republic Act No. 8505; Republic Act No. 9208; Republic Act No. 9262; Republic Act No. 9344 — Mandate confidentiality of the identity of the child/victim in cases of abuse, exploitation, discrimination, rape, trafficking, violence, and juvenile justice. Applied: the victim’s true name was replaced with fictitious initials AAA.

Leonen (Chairperson), Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.