People of the Philippines vs. Abelardo Subido

Subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of a fine remains imposable even after the principal penalty of imprisonment is eliminated on appeal, but the retroactive application of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, exempts an accused from subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of civil liability (indemnity). The Court also held that attachment of property does not operate as satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability, and subsidiary imprisonment attaches upon the offender's inability to pay the fine without need for a prior determination of solvency.

The case involves a libel prosecution under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, which grants courts discretion to impose imprisonment, a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action that may be brought by the offended party. The accused-appellant, Abelardo Subido, was convicted of libel against Mayor Arsenio Lacson. The case reached the Supreme Court on questions of law after the Court of Appeals certified it pursuant to Section 17, paragraph 16, in relation to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Abelardo Subido was charged with and convicted of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code for an offense committed against Mayor Arsenio Lacson. The trial court sentenced him to three months of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, a fine of P500.00, indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion under the libel law and eliminated the three months of arresto mayor, imposed only a fine of P500.00, and reduced the indemnity to P5,000.00, affirming the appealed judgment with these modifications at appellant's costs.

The case was remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment. On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion praying that the court enter of record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and that his appeal bond be cancelled. He argued that although he could not pay the fine and indemnity, he could not be required to serve them through subsidiary imprisonment because the appellate judgment did not expressly and specifically provide for subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On December 20, 1958, upon motion of the offended party, the lower court issued a writ of execution, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. On February 25, 1959, the Sheriff of Manila, armed with an alias writ of execution, attached "whatever rights, interests, or participation, if any, defendant Abelardo Subido may have" in a two-storey building at No. 2313 Suter, Sta. Ana, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54170. It turned out that the property was registered in the name of Agapito Subido, who filed a third-party claim and instituted Civil Case No. 41731 to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the sale. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the sale.

On December 10, 1959, the offended party opposed the motion for cancellation of appeal bond and asked the court to require the accused to pay the fine and indemnity with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On December 19, 1959, the lower court denied the motion and declared that, in accordance with the terms of the Court of Appeals judgment, the accused had to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine and indemnity. The motion for reconsideration was denied on December 26, 1959, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court.

• Subsidiary Imprisonment Not Expressly Provided: Accused-appellant argued that the Court of Appeals' judgment did not expressly and specifically provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and therefore he could not be required to do so.
• Satisfaction of Civil Liability Through Attachment: Accused-appellant contended that his civil liability had been satisfied with the attachment secured by the offended party on the property of Agapito Subido, wherein he was supposed to have an interest. He argued that until the final determination of Civil Case No. 41731, his liability for subsidiary imprisonment could not attach, as the determination of whether he was solvent or not was a prejudicial question that must first be resolved.

• Opposition to Cancellation of Appeal Bond: The offended party registered its opposition to the accused-appellant's motion for cancellation of appeal bond and asked the lower court to require the accused to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

• Subsidiary Imprisonment Under the Court of Appeals Judgment: Whether the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
• Satisfaction of Civil Liability Through Attachment: Whether the accused-appellant's civil liability has been satisfied with the attachment secured by the offended party on the property of Agapito Subido, thereby precluding subsidiary imprisonment.

• Subsidiary Imprisonment Under the Court of Appeals Judgment: Yes, with modification. The subsidiary imprisonment remained part of the judgment because the Court of Appeals' modifications only eliminated the three months of arresto mayor and reduced the indemnity; all other portions of the punishment, including subsidiary imprisonment, remained. However, applying Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, which has retroactive effect in favor of the accused, the accused may no longer be required to suffer subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the indemnity, but he remains liable for subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the fine.
• Satisfaction of Civil Liability Through Attachment: No. Attachment does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability, and the accused must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment thereof. There is nothing in the law requiring a prior determination of solvency before subsidiary imprisonment may attach.

• Subsidiary Imprisonment Under the Court of Appeals Judgment: The Court reasoned that when the Court of Appeals provided in the concluding portion of its decision "WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's costs," the modifications could mean no less than the elimination of the three months of arresto mayor and the reduction of the indemnity from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. All the rest of the punishment remained, including the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Had the Court of Appeals wanted to do away with the subsidiary imprisonment, it would have expressly so provided. The Court also examined the punctuation of the trial court's decision, noting that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" was separated by a comma from the preceding clause, making it refer not only to non-payment of the indemnity but also to non-payment of the fine. However, the Court applied the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil liability. Citing Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, penal laws have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, even if a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence. Thus, the accused could not be required to serve his civil liability in the form of subsidiary imprisonment, but he remained liable for subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of the fine.
• Satisfaction of Civil Liability Through Attachment: The Court rejected the accused's argument that attachment satisfied his civil liability. Attachment does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability. Subsidiary imprisonment applies when the offender is insolvent, as shown in the present case. There is nothing in the law requiring a prior determination of the question of solvency before subsidiary imprisonment may attach. The moment the accused cannot pay the fine, he is insolvent and must serve the same in the form of subsidiary imprisonment.

• Retroactive Application of Penal Laws — Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, even if a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence. The Court applied this doctrine to exempt the accused from subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of civil liability, as Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, no longer requires subsidiary imprisonment for insolvency to pay civil liability.
• Strict Construction of Penal Statutes — Penal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant. The Court invoked this principle in favor of the accused-appellant in applying the amended Article 39.
• Subsidiary Imprisonment — Under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, subsidiary imprisonment is a personal liability imposed on a convict who has no property with which to meet the fine. The Court held that the moment the accused cannot pay the fine, he is insolvent and must serve the same in the form of subsidiary imprisonment, without need for a prior determination of solvency.
• Attachment Does Not Satisfy Civil Liability — Attachment of property does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability. The accused must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment thereof, and there is nothing in the law requiring a prior determination of solvency before subsidiary imprisonment may attach.

• "To Us it is clear that when the Court of Appeals provided in the concluding portion of its decision: 'WHEREUPON, with the modifications above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed at appellant's costs' the alluded modifications could mean no less than the elimination of the three months of arresto mayor and the reduction of the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00. All the rest of the punishment remains including the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Had the Court wanted to do away with the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency of accused-appellant to pay the fine and the indemnity it would have so expressly provided." — This passage establishes the Court's interpretation of the Court of Appeals' judgment, holding that subsidiary imprisonment remained part of the punishment absent express modification.
• "Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil liability." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine of retroactive application of penal laws in favor of the accused.
• "Considering that Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the same should be made applicable to him. It is so provided in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that: 'Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence.'" — This passage applies Article 22 to the accused, exempting him from subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of civil liability.
• "Attachment does not operate as a satisfaction of the judgment on civil liability and the accused must suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment thereof. Subsidiary imprisonment applies when the offender is insolvent as shown in the present case. There is nothing in the law that before subsidiary imprisonment may attach, there must be prior determination of the question of solvency of the accused. The moment he cannot pay the fine, that means he is insolvent and he must serve the same in form of subsidiary imprisonment." — This passage rejects the accused's argument that attachment satisfied his civil liability and clarifies when subsidiary imprisonment attaches.

• U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243 — Cited as authority for the rule that penal statutes are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.
• People vs. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 728 — Cited alongside U.S. vs. Abad Santos for the same principle of strict construction of penal statutes.
• People vs. Ahearn, 196 N.Y. 221, 89 NE 930, 26 LRA (NS) 1153 — Cited as a foreign authority for the proposition that in interpreting a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant.

• Article 355, Revised Penal Code — Defines libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. The Court noted that this provision grants courts discretion to impose imprisonment, fine, or both.
• Article 39, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 — Governs subsidiary penalty. The amended provision exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil liability. The Court applied this provision retroactively to the accused.
• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, even if a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence. The Court applied this provision to make the amended Article 39 applicable to the accused.
• Section 17, paragraph 16, in relation to Section 31, Judiciary Act of 1948 — The basis for the Court of Appeals' certification of the case to the Supreme Court, as the errors assigned involved purely questions of law.

Castro (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra, and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concurred.