People of the Philippines vs. Abdul Macalaba y Digayon

The element of lack of authority to possess a regulated drug is a negative averment that need not be proved by direct evidence where the facts are more immediately within the accused's knowledge; once the prosecution establishes circumstances fairly indicating the absence of authority, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show a license, prescription, or other authority. A warrantless search and seizure is valid under the plain view doctrine where there was a prior valid intrusion, the evidence was inadvertently discovered by officers with the right to be where they were, the evidence was immediately apparent, and the plain view justified mere seizure without further search.

The prosecution arose under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), Section 16 of Article III of which penalizes the possession or use of any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, and Section 20 of Article IV of which fixes the applicable penalties according to the quantity of the drug involved. The statute had been amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 44, 1675, 1683, and 1707, Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and Republic Act No. 7659, and was later further amended by Republic Act No. 9165. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from a conviction rendered under that statutory framework.

At about 5:15 p.m. on April 12, 1999, Major R'Win Pagkalinawan of the Laguna Criminal Investigation Detection Group ordered a search for Abdul Macalaba y Digayon, alias "Boy Muslim," based on verified information that he was driving a carnapped Mitsubishi olive green car with Plate No. UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher in San Pedro, Laguna. Two teams were formed for the operation: the first headed by Major Pagkalinawan with SPO4 Aberion and five others, and the second led by Capt. Percival Rumbaoa with SPO1 Generoso Pandez and PO3 Ernani Mendez as members. Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded to Barangay Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, on board a car and a van, and went to the apartment where Macalaba was reportedly selling shabu, only to learn that he had already left.

While looking for him, the officers spotted the suspected carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro, Laguna, heading towards the Poblacion. When the car stopped at a red traffic light, the CIDG officers alighted from their vehicles; Capt. Rumbaoa positioned himself at the passenger side, Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car, and SPO1 Pandez, with PO3 Mendez beside him, went straight to the driver and knocked on the driver's window. Macalaba, who was driving, lowered the glass window. SPO1 Pandez introduced himself as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked Macalaba to turn on the light and show the car's certificate of registration.

With the light on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45 caliber gun with Serial No. 909904 inside an open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of the driver's seat near the gear. Asked for the supporting papers of the gun apart from the car's certificate of registration, Macalaba failed to show any. When Macalaba opened the zipper of the clutch/belt bag, the CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be shabu. They likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag containing two fake P1,000 bills with Serial Numbers BG 021165 and BG 995998, a list of names of persons, a magazine, and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber gun. They confiscated the gun, the shabu, and the fake P1,000 bills and thereafter brought Macalaba to the CIDG office. PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Pandez.

Macalaba gave a different account. He testified that between 6:50 and 7:00 p.m. on April 12, 1999, he was driving a borrowed Mitsubishi Galant car with Plate No. UPV 501 somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna, with Rose, his live-in partner, whom he had fetched from Angeles City, Pampanga. He had borrowed the car from his friend Ferdinand Navares, who instructed him to return it in front of the latter's store at the San Pedro Public Market. He was about to park when a man knocked hard on the glass window on the driver's side and pointed a .45 caliber pistol at him; another, armed with an armalite rifle, positioned himself in front of the car, while a third positioned himself near the passenger window and pointed a gun at Rose. Macalaba lowered the window; the man near him opened the door, held him, and told him to alight. Asked whether he was "Boy Muslim," he answered in the negative. The same man opened the back door and boarded the back seat, while Rose remained at the front passenger seat. The other men likewise boarded the car, which was thereafter driven by one of them. While inside the car, they saw a .45 caliber pistol at the edge of the driver's seat and asked whether he had a license; he showed his gun license and permit to carry, which they took along with his gun, and they tried to remove his belt bag from his waist, which he did not allow.

Upon reaching the headquarters, Macalaba learned that these people were C.I.S. agents. There, he was told to surrender the belt bag to the officer who would issue a receipt for it. He complied, and the money inside his belt bag was counted and amounted to P42,000. They then took his money and the cellular phone inside the bag, together with some other pieces of paper, and also took another cell phone from the car. He was never issued a receipt for these items. Thereafter, a man entered the office with a white plastic bag allegedly taken from the borrowed car; Macalaba denied ownership over the plastic bag, and the same man told him that it contained shabu. Macalaba and Rose were detained at the headquarters; the next morning Rose was allowed to get out, and in the afternoon he was transferred to the San Pedro Municipal Jail.

The two P1,000 bills were found to be counterfeit after examination conducted by Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura, a document examiner at Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. The white crystalline substance contained in the four small plastic bags was subjected to physical and laboratory examination conducted by Police Inspector Lorna Tria, a Forensic Chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim. Her findings were that the three small plastic sachets weighed 29.46 grams while the big plastic sachet weighed 197.21 grams, for a total weight of 226.67 grams; that representative samples taken from the specimens were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug; and that the improvised tooter and the rolled aluminum foil with residue found in the self-sealing plastic bag were also positive for shabu residue. On this record, the trial court acquitted Macalaba in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236 and 1237 for insufficiency of evidence but found the prosecution evidence sufficient to convict him in Criminal Case No. 1238 for illegal possession of the regulated drug.

• Insufficiency of Evidence / Negative Averment: Macalaba argued that the prosecution failed to prove the material allegations of the information, which charged that "without being authorized by law" he had possession, custody, and control of methamphetamine hydrochloride; no certification from the concerned government agency, such as the Dangerous Drugs Board, was presented to show that he was not authorized to possess shabu, a regulated drug, so his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Illegal Search and Seizure: Macalaba asserted that he was not committing a crime when the CIS agents boarded his car, searched it, and ultimately arrested him; he was about to park his borrowed car as instructed by the owner when he was harassed by the operatives at gunpoint, and the gun seen was properly documented, leaving no reason to bring him and his companion to the headquarters. The shabu allegedly found in the car was brought in by somebody while he was under interrogation and was taken in violation of his constitutional right against illegal search and seizure; as a "fruit of a poisonous tree," it should not have been admitted in evidence.
• Absence of Legal Basis for Warrantless Arrest: The members of the CIDG merely relied on information received from an anonymous telephone caller who said that Macalaba was driving a carnapped vehicle, and they had no personal knowledge of the veracity of that information; consequently, there was no legal basis for his warrantless arrest.

• Burden of Proof on Authority: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Macalaba had the burden of proving that he was authorized to possess shabu, and having failed to discharge that burden, he is presumed to have had no authority and is consequently liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
• No Violation of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches: The Office of the Solicitor General likewise refuted Macalaba's argument that there was a violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Negative Averment: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the element that the accused possessed shabu without authority, or whether the burden of proving authority to possess the regulated drug shifted to the accused.
• Validity of the Warrantless Search, Seizure, and Arrest: Whether the warrantless search, seizure, and arrest of the accused were valid under the plain view doctrine and the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, such that the seized shabu was admissible in evidence.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Negative Averment: Yes; the conviction stands. The negative averment that the accused had no license or authority to possess shabu was fairly indicated by established circumstances, shifting the burden of evidence to him, and he offered nothing to show a license, prescription, or authority.
• Validity of the Warrantless Search, Seizure, and Arrest: Yes; the warrantless search and seizure, as well as the warrantless arrest, did not transgress the accused's constitutional rights, all the elements of seizure in plain view being present.

• Sufficiency of Evidence / Negative Averment: The general rule is that where a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or where a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the charge. This rule admits an exception: where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the defendant's knowledge or control. Here, the negative averment that the accused had no license or authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride was fairly indicated by facts proven through the testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) he was driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when caught and appeared healthy and not indisposed as to require the use of shabu as medicine; (b) the contents of the sachets found in his open clutch bag inside the car were prima facie determined by the CIDG officers to be shabu; and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to be shabu by the forensic chemist. These established facts shifted the burden of evidence to the accused, who could easily have disproved the damning circumstances by presenting a doctor's prescription for the drug or a copy of his license or authority to possess the regulated drug, yet offered nothing.
• Validity of the Warrantless Search, Seizure, and Arrest: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of that right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Reasonable searches and seizures are not proscribed; if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the search and seizure is valid. The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute, the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence being (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest, the last including a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, the Rules of Court recognizing permissible warrantless arrests effected in flagrante delicto, in hot pursuit, and of escaped prisoners, with a further exception for searches made pursuant to routine airport security procedure under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235. On the basis of intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by the accused, who was also a suspect of drug pushing, the CIDG members of Laguna went around looking for the carnapped car; they spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was indeed driven by the accused, and while he was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration papers of the car, the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets of shabu, which were therefore in plain view of the law enforcers. Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence, provided that (a) there was a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. All these elements exist in the case at bar. The accused's sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated; mere denial, like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters, and as between a categorical testimony that rings of truth and a bare denial, the former generally prevails. On the issue of credibility between the accused's testimony and the declarations of the CIDG officers, credence is given to the narration of the prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police officers presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, absent evidence to the contrary; and in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses, prevails over the accused's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed. The accused failed to rebut this presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses. Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more of shabu is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Section 16 of Article III, in relation to Section 20 of Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended; the charge of illegal possession was proved beyond reasonable doubt since the accused knowingly carried with him 226.67 grams of shabu without legal authority, and there being no modifying circumstance proven, the proper penalty pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua.

• Negative Averment and the Shifting of the Onus Probandi — Where a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or where a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution generally bears the burden of proving the charge. The rule admits an exception: where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. The prosecution need not adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the defendant's knowledge or control. Applied here, the negative averment that the accused had no license or authority to possess shabu was fairly indicated by the circumstances proven by the prosecution, shifting the burden of evidence to him; his failure to present a prescription, license, or authority warranted conviction.
• Plain View Doctrine — Unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. The seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with four requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. All four requisites were found present, validating the warrantless seizure of the shabu.
• Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement — The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest, which includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest. A further exception is a search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235. The warrantless search, seizure, and arrest in this case were sustained as a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
• Permissible Warrantless Arrests — While an arrest is as a rule legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto; (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The warrantless arrest of the accused was upheld as falling within these recognized exceptions.
• Denial as Self-Serving Negative Evidence — Mere denial, like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth and a bare denial, the former is generally held to prevail. The accused's unsubstantiated denial failed against the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duty — Credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by prosecution witnesses, especially when they are police officers presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary; absent proof of motive to falsely impute a serious crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses, prevails over the accused's self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed. The accused failed to rebut this presumption or to prove any ulterior motive.

• "Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the defendant's knowledge or control." — This passage states the exception to the general rule on negative averments and supplies the ratio for rejecting the accused's claim that the prosecution had to present a certification of his lack of authority to possess shabu.
• "Under the 'plain view' doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence." — This is the canonical formulation of the plain view doctrine as applied to validate the warrantless seizure of the shabu.
• "Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the following requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search." — This passage enumerates the four requisites of the plain view doctrine, all of which the Court found present in the case.
• "A mere denial, just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail." — This passage supplies the evidentiary rule disposing of the accused's sole defense of denial against the positive testimony of the CIDG officers.

• People vs. Manalo, 230 SCRA 309 [1994] — Cited as authority for the rule on negative averments and the shifting of the onus probandi to the accused where the facts are more immediately within his knowledge; the Court quoted the rule as restated in this case.
• People vs. Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 143850-53, 18 December 2001 — Cited as the case in which the rule from People vs. Manalo was reiterated.
• People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 444 [1999] — Cited, together with People vs. Figueroa, for the permissible warrantless arrests recognized by the Rules of Court.
• People vs. Figueroa, 335 SCRA 249, 263 [2000] — Cited, together with People vs. Chua Ho San, for the permissible warrantless arrests recognized by the Rules of Court.
• People vs. Johnson, 348 SCRA 526 [2000] — Cited for the exception to the warrant requirement of a search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure authorized under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235.
• People vs. Aspiras, G.R. Nos. 138382-84, 12 February 2002 — Cited for the four requirements that must be complied with in the seizure of evidence in plain view.
• People vs. Ugang, G.R. No. 144036, 7 May 2002 — Cited for the rule that mere denial, like alibi, is self-serving negative evidence that cannot outweigh the declaration of credible witnesses testifying on affirmative matters.
• People vs. Uy, 327 SCRA 335, 349-350 [2000] — Cited for the rule that credence is given to the narration of prosecution witnesses, especially police officers presumed to have performed their duties regularly, and that the presumption of regularity and the trial court's credibility findings prevail over a self-serving claim of frame-up.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose; the Court used it as the starting point of the analysis before holding that reasonable searches and seizures are not proscribed.
• Section 3(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding; the Court applied it in rejecting the accused's claim that the shabu was the fruit of a poisonous tree.
• Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended — Penalizes the possession or use of any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000; this is the provision under which the accused was convicted.
• Section 20, Article IV, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — Provides for the application of penalties according to the quantity of the dangerous drug involved, fixing the penalty where the drug involved is 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride; the accused's possession of 226.67 grams brought him within this quantity.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties; with no modifying circumstance proven, the Court held that the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 6235 — Authorizes searches made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, cited as a further exception to the warrant requirement.
• Rules of Court (on permissible warrantless arrests) — Recognize arrests in flagrante delicto, arrests effected in hot pursuit, and arrests of escaped prisoners as permissible warrantless arrests; the Court cited these in validating the warrantless arrest of the accused.

Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.