People of the Philippines Islands vs. Marasigan

Self-defense cannot be validly invoked when the accused voluntarily engages in a mutually accepted fight, as the first act of force is merely an incident of the fight itself and not an unwarranted and unexpected aggression.

On March 24, 1927, a baptismal feast was held at Agapito de Silva's house in the barrio of Mangalang, municipality of Sariaya, Province of Tayabas. Among those present were the accused, Fermin Marasigan, and the deceased, Pedro de Chavez. During the gathering, the deceased offered the accused a cup of wine. The accused declined, explaining that he was not in the habit of drinking much and had already taken wine during the meal. The deceased took the refusal as a slight, replying, "Well, I did not think you would slight me in that way." The accused answered, "What was I to do since I could take no more, having drunk during the meal?"

The record does not clearly show what immediately followed, but the deceased drained the cup of wine himself and became flushed. Noticing this, the accused sought to slip away, went into the house, took his hat, and left. The refusal to drink had provoked a discussion between them before the accused departed, causing commotion among the guests, who soon descended as well. The accused was the first to leave, but while still on the staircase, he opened his penknife and held it in his hand. Once on the street, he picked up a club from the ground.

A few moments later, the deceased followed and overtook the accused at a distance of about 5 brazas. As soon as the deceased reached him, they prepared for combat. The accused immediately struck the deceased's face with the club, and the two grappled and engaged in a fistfight. During the struggle, the accused stabbed the deceased several times with his penknife, and both fell to the ground. They soon got up and separated, the accused going to the right and the deceased to the left. The deceased had scarcely taken a few steps when he fell to the ground dead. The body was examined by the head of the Health Service Division of Sariaya and Candelaria, who found five fatal wounds, including a piercing wound in the chest, an abdominal wound with protruding viscera, and a long wound in the neck. The trial court admitted the facts as related by the prosecution witnesses and rejected the defense's version of the events.

• Suppression of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the prosecution's failure to present other disinterested eyewitnesses—specifically Francisco Vergara, Mariano Vergara, Moises Hernandez, and Alipio Albiondo—raised the presumption that their testimony would be unfavorable to the prosecution.
• Self-Defense: Petitioner maintained that the accused acted in self-defense, contending that the aggression came from the deceased. He supported this by citing the lack of motive on the accused's part, the deceased's aggressive drunkenness and quarrelsome reputation, the deceased's greater strength, the accused's good reputation and lack of criminal record, the failure of the prosecution's eyewitnesses to see the beginning of the aggression, and the serious contradictions among the prosecution witnesses.

• Suppression of Evidence: Whether the prosecution's failure to present all eyewitnesses to the crime raises the presumption that their testimony would be unfavorable to the prosecution.
• Self-Defense: Whether the accused acted in self-defense when he killed the deceased during their struggle.

• Suppression of Evidence: No. The prosecution is not obliged to present all eyewitnesses to an act, but only a sufficient number to prove its occurrence; the suppression of cumulative evidence does not give rise to the presumption of unfavorable testimony.
• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense cannot be validly set up by a person who voluntarily exposes himself to a hand struggle with his adversary, as the first act of force is merely an incident of the fight itself and not an unwarranted aggression.

• Suppression of Evidence: The incident was witnessed by several persons, and the prosecution presented the testimony of three of them: Agapito de Silva, Casimiro de Chavez, and Juan Resurrection. The testimony of the other eyewitnesses would have been merely cumulative. Under established jurisprudence, when an act has been witnessed by several persons, the prosecution is not required to present all of them. The presumption regarding suppressed evidence does not arise from the mere failure to present all eyewitnesses if the omitted testimony is cumulative.
• Self-Defense: The Supreme Court accepted the trial court's factual findings, which established that the accused left the house with a penknife in hand and picked up a club on the street. When the deceased caught up, both prepared for combat. Because the fight was mutually accepted, the first aggression was merely an incident of the fight. A person who voluntarily engages in a hand struggle cannot claim self-defense, as the initial act of force cannot be considered an unwarranted and unexpected aggression, which is the only kind that can legalize self-defense.

• Presumption of Suppressed Evidence — The presumption that suppressed evidence would be unfavorable to the party suppressing it does not arise from the mere failure of the prosecution to present all eyewitnesses to an act, provided a sufficient number of witnesses are presented to prove the occurrence. The omitted testimony is considered merely cumulative.
• Self-Defense in a Mutually Accepted Fight — The right of lawful self-defense cannot be validly set up by a person who voluntarily exposes himself to a hand struggle with his adversary. In a mutually accepted fight, the first act of force is an incident of the fight itself and not an unwarranted and unexpected aggression, which is the only kind that can legalize self-defense.

• "The right of lawful self-defense cannot validity be set up in behalf of a person who voluntarily exposes his person to the consequences of a hand struggle with his adversary in which, for the reason that each of the combatants has no other intention than to injure the other, the first act of force, came from whichever of the two it may, cannot be held but to be an incident of the fight itself and in nowise whatever as an unwarranted and unexpected aggression which alone can legalize self-defense." — This passage, quoting United States vs. Cortes, articulates the ratio decidendi that self-defense is unavailable when a fight is mutually accepted.
• "When an act has been witnessed by several persons, the prosecution is not obliged to present all such witnesses, but only a sufficient to prove the occurrence of the alleged act." — This quotation from United States vs. Gonzales defines the rule on the presentation of eyewitnesses and the inapplicability of the presumption of suppressed evidence for cumulative testimony.

• United States vs. Gonzales, 22 Phil. 325 — Followed. Cited to support the ruling that the prosecution is not required to present all eyewitnesses and that the failure to present cumulative evidence does not trigger the presumption of unfavorable suppressed evidence.
• United States vs. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713 — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that in a mutually accepted fight, the first aggression is an incident of the fight and cannot be considered an element of self-defense.
• United States vs. Cortes, 36 Phil. 837 — Followed. Cited to confirm the ruling in Navarro, holding that self-defense cannot be invoked by one who voluntarily engages in a hand struggle where the first act of force is merely an incident of the fight.

• Paragraph 5 of Section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure — Cited in relation to the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable, which the Court held does not apply when the omitted evidence is merely cumulative.
• Paragraph 4 of Article 8 of the Penal Code — Referenced in a quoted Spanish Supreme Court judgment regarding the exclusion of self-defense when a personal encounter or fight is accepted.

Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concurred.